Practice – provisional sentence granted by default – can be rescinded even after provisional sentence has become a final judgment under Rule 8(11).

Kontrak – spesifieke nakoming en interdik gevra – National Land Transport Act 5 van 2009, artikel 46 – geen finale besluit is nog geneem oor toeleesing van trein-kontrak nie – aansoek prematuur. Interdik – alternatiewe remedie – skadevergoeding is moontlik, ook statutêr. Blootlegging in Aansoek verrigtinge – Hofreël 6(11).

Delict – protrusion in road surface causing cyclist to fall and die – provincial administration held 60% liable.

Land – eviction – Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”) – locus standi – land in former Bophuthatswana.

Practice – summary judgment – National Credit Act 34 of 2005 – plaintiff must prove compliance with section 86(10).

Hersiening – Aansoek om LUR se besluit dat Respondent hek oor openbare pad mag oprig ter syde te stel onder PAJA. Openbare pad – Aansoek om hek oor tersiêre pad aan te bring toegestaan deur LUR – applikant, eienaar van plaas aangrensend aan plaas waar hek opgerig is, doen aansoek om tersydestelling van LUR se goedkeuring om hek op te rig. Hersiening – Vraag is of die besluit om hek op te rig applikant nadelig raak en ‘n direkte eksterne regsuitwerking het. Paaie – Ordonansie op Paaie No 4 van 1968 (Vrystaat) – artikel 22(1) laat oprigting van hek oor openbare pad toe – kenniggewing aan applikant nie ‘n vereiste – hek belemmer nie vrye toegang nie. Administratiewe handeling – LUR se optrede nie administratiewe handeling wat neerkom op ‘n wesenlike aantasting van regte van applikant nie. Functus officio – LUR mag op nuwe gronde sy aanvanklike besluit heroorweeg en verander. Aansoek om Hersiening afgewys.

Employment – disciplinary proceedings – applicant seeking order restraining respondent from proceeding with the hearing of internal appeal.

Sentence - life imprisonment for rape of 9-year old retarded girl – appellant 20 year old man who had been drinking for hours before the rape – he did not plan to rape the complainant – appellant was in custody for 27 months before sentence. Appellant changed his plea to one of guilty in the middle of the prosecution case – appellant in evidence expressed remorse. Full Bench substituting life imprisonment with 18 years’ imprisonment.

Koop en verkoop – eiendomsagent – effektiewe oorsaak – eerste voorstelling opgeweeg teen latere.

Practice – costs – Review of taxation – Attorney of record – correspondent attorney – perusal fee by attorney of record allowed – attorney of record not merely a “post box”.

Criminal Procedure – Special Review – accused, represented by attorney, pleading guilty on counts of assault and trespassing – case sent on review by senior magistrate – court on review holding that the factual averments in section 112 statement do not justify, on the first count, the conclusion that the accused had the intention (even dolus eventialis) to assault, nor, on the second count, a finding of unlawfulness. Covictions and sentences set aside and case remitted to magistrates’ court in terms of section 113

Curator bonis – urgent application for appointment of – businessman missing for two weeks, having acted in paranoiac manner prior to his disappearance – curator appointed – curator ordered to furnish security to the Master.

Likwidasie – likwidateur se locus standi om ‘n skuld op te vorder – oorledene het R320 000.00 aan respondent geleen, na vyf jaar terugbetaalbaar – derde party as begunstigde benoem deur oorledene – vraag of daardie benoeming geldig is. Erfreg – pactum successorium – benoeming van derde as begunstigde het slegs beoog om regte aan derde oor te dra na die dood van die oorledene – benoeming in casu nie herroepbaar nie – benoeming nie gedoen uit blote vrygewigheid of liefdadigheid nie, maar uit erkening van behoefte om onderhoud aan die kant van derde. Benoeming van derde was beskikking oor ‘n bate mortis causa, wat ongeldig is omdat dit nie voldoen aan die vereistes vir geldigheid van testamentêre geskrifte nie – omdat benoeming van derde ongeldig is, het applikant die reg as eksekuteur om die bedrag van respondent te vorder. Voorlopige likwidasiebevel toegestaan.

Voorlopige vonnis – skulderkening waarop eerste, tweede en derde verweerders se aanspreeklikheid berus, gekoppel met ‘n sertifikaat van die verskuldigde bedrag – likiditeit van rente-komponent – gekoppel aan bank se prima-uitleen-koers – eksterne getuienis nodig om toepaslike rentekoers te bewys – voorlopige vonnis sou slegs toegestaan kan word vir kapitaal-komponent, nie rente nie. Voorlopige vonnis – tjek – vierde verweerder voer aan dat daar geen onderliggende causa was nie, en dat tjek slegs sou dien as tussentydse sekuriteit – verweerder se verduideliking meer waarskynlik as eiser s’n. Nasionale Kredietwet – onderliggende causa van skulderkening nie ‘n geldleentransaksie nie, maar ‘n skadevergoedingseis – Wet tref nie so ‘n transaksie nie. Voorlopige vonnis – tjek – reëlmatige houer – persoonlike verweer van vierde verweerder dat tjek net as sekuriteit bedoel is – in casu is eiser ‘n onmiddelike party by ‘n order-wissel, en kan dus nie ‘n reëlmatige houer wees nie – persoonlike verweer kan dus wel deur vierde verweerder teen eister geopper word. Voorlopige vonnis slegs vir kapitaalbedrag teen eerste, tweede en derde verweerders toegestaan, en afgwys ten opsigte van vierde verweerder.

Eis om skadevergoeding omdat verweerder (respondent) nie koring aan eiser (appellant) gelewer het ingevolge ‘n skriftelike kontrak nie. Kontrak – skadevergoeding – force majeure – die verskyningsvorm van force majeure waarop verweerder steun in sy verweerskrif is “graadskade as gevolg van reën tydens stroop”. Die geskilpunt wat die landdros gevolglik geroepe was om te bereg was slegs of verweerder graadskade as gevolg van reën tydens stroop gehad het. Bewys verweerder dit moes die landdros die eis afwys. Bewys verweerder dit nie moes die verhoor op kwantum van skade voortgaan. Kontrak – force majeure – kontrak bepaal dat waar ‘n beroep op force majeure gedoen word, moet eiser ‘n instansie aanwys om die geldigheid daarvan te ondersoek – dis nie gedoen nie. Kontrak – force majeure – eiser wil verweerder se beroep op force majeure afhanklik stel daarvan dat die koper met wie eiser op sy beurt ‘n rug-teen-rug koopkontrak ten aansien van die koring gesluit het, tevrede moet wees met die beroep op force majeure – kontrak bevat geen bepaling wat so ‘n houding regverdig nie. Kontrak – force majeure – as verweerder vanweë force majeure nie koring van die ooreengekome graad kon lewer nie, is hy vrygestel van lewering en kon hy sy koring verkoop waar en teen welke prys hy wil. Eiser wou lewering van die koring hê maar slegs die prys betaal vir ondergraad koring. Appellant se eis afgewys.

Regulation – validity of Wildlife-hunting regulations. Hunting of wildlife – validity of regulations, specifically as applicable to lions. What is essentially claimed by the applicants are declaratory orders that the twenty four month self-sustaining provision or regulation 71 and regulation 60 of the regulations would be invalid if applicable or made applicable to lions: (1) The definition of “put and take animal” in regulations – regulation 24 provides for period of 24 months during which the animal must have been fending for itself in an extensive wildlife system before it may be hunted, a so-called “self-sustaining provision” (par [19]). Applicants contended that there should be no self-sustaining provisions. (2) Applicants allege as to Regulations 71, if there is to be a self-sustaining provision, there should be a transitional measure that provides for a period of grace in respect of lions bred in captivity. Administrative actions – Applicability of PAJA accepted by court, without deciding the legal question whether PAJA is applicable to the making of regulations (par [48] – [50]). Administrative law – procedural fairness – applicants alleging that they were not given sufficient opportunity to make recommendations to the panel – such allegation is dismissed (par [51] – [56]), as well as allegation that respondent did not properly consider representations (par [58] – [60]). PAJA – allegation that a relevant consideration, namely the contribution of captive breeding of lions to biodiversity in South Africa, was not considered – court holding that lions bred in captivity make no contribution to biodiversity in South Africa. PAJA – section 6(1)(f)(ii) – rationality – question here is whether there is a rational basis for the 24 month self-sustaining provision in the regulations in respect of the hunting of lions bred in captivity. Court holding, on evidence as a whole, that it cannot be said that it would be practically and physically impossible to comply with the 24 month self-sustaining provision and that there are rational grounds for the 24 month self-sustaining provision. Court holding that the challenged provisions pass the rationality test. PAJA – section 6(2)(h) – reasonableness – applicants alleging that the 24 month self-sustaining provision will destroy the industry and have negative economic and social impact – court accepting that 24 month self-sustaining provision can be implemented and that it cannot be said that it constitutes a decision that no reasonable decision-maker could take. Application dismissed.

Return day of anti-dissipation order. Insolvency – allegation that a trust and a private company used by insolvent as front for insolvent’s own benefit. Anti-dissipation order – applicants (trustees in the insolvent estate) failing to make out a prima facie case in respect of the claim in the action which applicants intend to institute. Company law – corporate veil - when it can be pierced. Trust – corporate veil – can be pierced (par [17]). Insolvent – improprietary conduct and fraud perpetrated by – irregular or improper use of a corporate entity does not ipso facto make their assets the property of a beneficiary. Application dismissed and rule discharged.

Practice – withdrawal of defence and counter-claim – defendant setting matter down for hearing as if he was dominus litis without allowing plaintiff to make the election whether she wanted to proceed or not – defendant seeking costs against plaintiff – defendant not permitted to set matter down as plaintiff had to set the matter down for hearing – notice of set-down by defendant irregular and invalid. Practice – abuse of court process – defendant’s strategy was that plaintiff’s prayers in the main claim (which plaintiff realised were inadequate) would be granted, thereby plaintiff would forfeit her entitlement to maintenance – set-down by defendant was a bad attempt at abusing the court process Application dismissed.

Municipality – delictual claim against. Respondent asked appellant to repair a damaged water pipe. On 18 February 2004 he went to work. On his return from work between 21h00 and 22h00 he saw that a trench was dug in front of his driveway. As a result thereof he could not drive his car onto his premises. He could also not park his car at his neighbour’s premises because there was no space. He was forced to park his vehicle in the street. The next morning he discovered that one of his vehicle’s windows was broken and that items were removed from the vehicle. Delict – foreseeablility and causality. Respondent, contended that there was a legal duty on the appellant to close the trench; that it acted wrongful by not doing so after completing the repair work, that the appellant created a new source of danger by means of its positive act of digging the trench and its failure to eliminate the danger in the damages that the appellant suffered. Pleadings – no allegation of wrongfulness – although not properly pleaded, issue of wrongfulness was fully canvassed during the trial – no exception raised – magistrate was justified in continuing with the matter. Delict – omission to close trench after digging it – legal duty in relation to wrongfulness should not be confused with duty of legal duty in the context of the test for negligence (par [18]). Delict – municipality – legal duty on municipality to do something to avoid the risk of harm eventuating. The appellant should have foreseen that, after digging a trench and not closing it, the owner of the house or anyone living at the house would not be able to drive into those premises – appellants could easily have erected a ramp across the trench – by its prior conduct appellant created a new source of danger – appellant’s omission was wrongful (par [20]). Delict – negligence – foreseeability – depends on facts and circumstances of each case – a reasonable person in the position of the appellant would have taken reasonable steps to guard against the occurrence of the damage – appellant had completed the work and all that was left to do was to close the trench – appellant was negligent. Delict – causation – question is whether appellant’s negligence caused the harm that the respondent suffered – two stage enquiry – (1) as to the factual question, but for the trench the respondent’s car would not have been parked outside overnight and the goods therein would not have been stolen – (2) the second question is legal causation, a matter determined by considerations of policy – the novus actus by the thief did not break the causal chain, because theft out of a motor vehicle under these circumstances is not an abnormal or unexpected event. Municipalities should not be allowed to do their work with impunity fuelled by the knowledge that Courts are generally slow to impute responsibility or liability on them for their negligent actions. Considerations of public policy, fairness, reasonableness and justice dictate that where a municipality acts in this negligent manner without due regard to the proprietary interest of those that they are enjoined to serve it should be held liable for the damages that result from its negligent conduct. It exposed the respondent to damages that he would otherwise, in all likelihood, not have been exposed to. Delict – contributory negligence – respondent was negligent in not removing his bag and tracksuit from the car – damages in respect of those items disallowed on appeal. Appeal dismissed on merits and municipality’s liability confirmed.

Appeal – for the evidence on appeal – principles discussed. Sale – immovable property – application for specific performance, transfer of property. Contract – specific performance – defence that guarantees did not comply with the provisions of the contract, and that seller’s refusal to accept such guarantees not unreasonable. Court of appeal confirming first court’s finding that guarantee which was conditional upon registration of a first bond in favour of Absa, negated the Nedcor guarantee, since the two guarantees had mutually destructive clauses, namely one requiring cancellation of old security bonds and the other requiring the registration of a bond in such bank’s favour. Court holding that the seller was entitled to reject the Absa guarantee. Application dismissed.

Hersiening – tender – beoordeling en remedies bespreek – Bod Beoordelings Kommitee het afgewyk van die aanbeveling van die Bod Evalueerings Kommitee – Bod Beoordelings Kommitee het geen redes aan die tweede respondent (die munisipale bestuurder) verskaf waarom hulle afgewyk het van die aanbeveling van die Bod Evalueerings Kommitee nie. Tender – hersiening – toekenning van tender tersydegestel en aangeleentheid na Bod Beoordelings Kommitee terugverwys met lasgewing dat Bod Beoordelings Kommitee die Bod Evalueerings Kommitee versoek om tekortkominge in hul verslag aan te vul ooreenkomstig riglyne in uitspraak gegee, waarna die tenderproses voortgesit en volvoer moet word ooreenkomstig die tersaaklike wetgewing.

Contract – applicants seeking order that sheriff transfer property to them. Practice – declaratory order that deed of sale between the applicants and the sheriff (second respondent) was valid and enforceable. Applicants purchased the property on 3 March 2004 and paid the purchase price on the same day and transfer costs on 6 April 2004. On 10 October 2008 the application was served on the respondents. Sheriff (second respondent) was obliged to transfer the property to applicants on 6 April 2004. Prescription – commences when debt is due, namely as soon as debtor becomes obliged to perform – in casu, Sheriff was obliged to transfer property on 6 April 2004. The debt become due on 6 April 2004 and was extinguished three years later, before 10 October 2008. Application dismissed.

Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 – appellant’s claim repudiated by respondent because collision occurred on a Sunday, and the driver of the vehicle was not an employee in respect whereof a claim could be made – appeal to Tribunal under s 91(1) of Act 130 of 1993 – Tribunal rejecting contention that employee acting in course and scope of employment, and refusing compensation. Employment – course and scope – appellant not travelling to his workplace, but performing work at the time of collision, thus s 22(5) not applicable – s 22(5) extends respondent’s liability to persons going to or from their place of work in certain circumstances. Course and scope of employment – control test – employee not requiring permission to travel, but could use own discretion. Appeal succeeding.

Parties married out of Community of Property – marriage subject to accrual system – Party diagnosed with multiple sclerosis – policy paid out by insurer – Question whether this compensation should be taken into account when the value of the accrued estate is calculated. The Matrimonial Property Act, 88 of 1984, Section 4(1)(b)(i) makes no mention of assets which replace non patrimonial damages. Held i) that the proceeds of the policies are non-patrimonial and should not be taken into account in the circumstances of an accrued estate. ii) The fruits or interest dividend from the policies are excluded and should not be taken into account in the calculation of the accrued estate.

Parties married out of Community of Property – marriage subject to accrual system – Party diagnosed with multiple sclerosis – policy paid out by insurer – Question whether this compensation should be taken into account when the value of the accrued estate is calculated. The Matrimonial Property Act, 88 of 1984, Section 4(1)(b)(i) makes no mention of assets which replace non patrimonial damages. Held i) that the proceeds of the policies are non-patrimonial and should not be taken into account in the circumstances of an accrued estate. ii) The fruits or interest dividend from the policies are excluded and should not be taken into account in the calculation of the accrued estate.

Review – automatic review – high court of view that more serious charge established than conviction – high court setting conviction aside and remitting matter to magistrate’s court. Dagga – dealing or possession – evidence showing that accused imported dagga – convicted of possession – high court setting conviction and sentence aside and remitting case to magistrate’s court.

Attorney – liability for prescribed RAF claim – Attorney (defendant) failing to contact plaintiff directly - court holding that plaintiff’s father had not been appointed as her agent – Attorney held liable

Administration of Estates – claim against executor after assets already distributed in terms of liquidation and distribution account was published and open to inspection – defence of plene administravit. Court holding that as long as the executor in an estate has not been discharged in terms of the provisions of section 56 of the Act, a creditor whose claim was not dealt with in the administration of the estate in terms of the Act, is not precluded from instituting action against the executor as representative of the estate. Nor can the fact that there are no further assets in the finalised estate be an obstacle. FAURE v BRITZ NO 1981 (4) SA 346 (O) not followed. Special plea dismissed.

Municipality – traffic control – eight incidents of motorists driving through concrete wall fencing applicant’s property in a four year period – court holding that current traffic control measures are reasonably adequate and that the street is reasonably safe for careful and considerate drivers – applicant not entitled to be protected by respondent against criminal transgressions by third parties – respondent cannot be held liable for crimes – this not being a case where municipality actively created a dangerous situation and failed to take adequate steps to guard against possible harm to members of the public. Application for interdict refused.

Prison – Special remission of sentence in terms of President’s Minute No 358 of May 2005 – Remission in terms of Minute No 358 was granted only to persons with one or more unexpired prison sentence on 30 May 2005. Court holding that on 30 May 2005 the applicant did not have any unexpired prison sentence for disqualifying crime and that he is therefore entitled to receive 14 months special remission.