Migration & the Governance of Urban Space

Policy formation & Social Reconfiguration in African Cities

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Presentation to the Centre of African Studies
"Africa Connections. Migration and Africa: From Analysis to Action"
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Outline

▪ **General context: Migration and urbanisation in contemporary Africa**

▪ **Research project & methodological notes**

▪ **Preliminary findings (Demographic trends; Use for planning; National trajectories, decentralisation and mobility; Heterogeneity, resource allocation & conflict)**

▪ **Recommendations**

The Project: Foundations

a) Migration and mobility have been and still are an ongoing and socially transformatory dynamic across Africa

b) Migration is a spatial process, as are the factors shaping and being shaped by it

c) We know little about the post-colonial/apartheid practices of spatial regulation and of local government's response to mobility

d) Answers have important practical/policy and scholarly implications

Context: Migration & Urbanisation in Africa

a) 1950: 14.7% of Africa's inhabitants were urban

2000: 37.2%

2015: 45.3%

3.76% to 3.35% per year (UN, 2002).

Lagos : 11th biggest city by 2015 with 16 million inhabitants (UN, 2002).

b) **Africa's urbanisation rates** extremely fast, faster than during Europe's industrialisation period but very different spatialised effects

c) **Urbanisation without employment** (Evans for INU, 1990; Freund, 2008)

d) **Decentralisation** reforms and **formalisation** policies

L'auteur a choisi ce titre de *Kinshasa ville en suspens* car après vingt quatre ans d'indépendance, cette capitale africaine, créée en 1881, compte plus de 2,5 millions d'habitants et se développe sans contrôle. Nul ne peut savoir comment elle va évoluer et quand son urbanisation entraînera des troubles politiques et sociaux extrêmement graves.

René de Maximy, 1984, *Kinshasa ville en suspens*, Paris: Travaux et Documents de l'ORSTOM: 476.

**www.migration.org.za**

Urbanisation Rates

- **Shifting boundaries of urban edge** distort knowledge and planning for mobility (Bilsborrow, 1996)

- Increased urban population due largely to **natural increase**

- High levels of **city to city and intra-city movements**

- **Domestic migrant population often poorly equipped** to access services and other rights

- **Highly transient**, multi-local households and livelihoods

	1985	1995	2005 (projected)
South Africa	48.3	52.6	57.9
DRC	46.3	50.2	54.4
Botswana	28.6	47.7	52.5
Mozambique	16.8	26.2	38.0
Tanzania	17.6	26.9	37.5
Zimbabwe	25.4	31.7	35.9
Namibia	24.7	28.6	33.5
Swaziland	21.8	23.0	23.9
Lesotho	16.5	17.4	18.2
Malawi	10.3	13.3	17.2

Source: United Nations 2003

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The Project: Objectives

- To provide an **overview of migration (both internal & international) current migration patterns through data available and policies at the municipal level** in four (or more) cities: Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Maputo, Nairobi (Cape Town + study of 4 SA Municipalities)

- To **determine how municipal authorities at various levels understand migration**, collect/use information, engage with migrant populations

- To document migration's relationship with the reconfiguration of **regulation, power and belonging (micro-level case studies)**

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
# Four main cities: Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Maputo, Nairobi

## Johannesburg (& Cape Town + 4 municipalities – SALGA project)

a) Complexification: Long-standing patterns of labour migration + complex survival rural-urban migration + cities as destinations for significant numbers of refugees + cities as transit zones towards other urban centres or global destinations

b) Natural growth continues to explain the greatest increases in the urban population: heightening ethnic, national, religious, political and class **heterogeneity**.

c) A variety of **critical governance** issues around human security, development, and the ability of the state to regulate and plan urban space. Legacy of apartheid-era perception of population control & New Public Management target culture in implementation of social welfare targets.

d) May 2008 and regular social protests: Municipal authorities have recognised the need to address mobility but often lack the conceptual or financial resources to do so.


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Distribution of Recent 'Immigrants'

- 5.6% of Gauteng foreign born; Parts of Joburg >50% non-nationals; 2.5% nationally

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Distribution of Trans-Provincial Migrants in RSA

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Cases with high migration rates, varied HDI

Cases with high migration rates, relative migrant success

- **Blue = migrants' income < locals**
- **Pink= recent migrants' median inc > locals**
- **White = municipalities are too small**
- **Black dots = xenophobic violence in 2008**

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Four main cities: Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Maputo, Nairobi

Kinshasa

a) **From 5 to approximately 8 million inhabitants between 1994 and 2007** and is planned to have 16 million by 2025 (UN, 2007) with an immigration growth rate of 39,6% in 1984 (Lututala); saturated colonial centre and self-developing peripheries

b) **Shift in the countries' structures of accumulation towards Kinshasa** in the post-independence period (Marysse, 2005: 199) and relocation of rent-seeking networks in the post-2006 period (forthcoming Wa Kabwe-Segatti & Tshibwabwa)

c) **Very fragile post-conflict state** that has had up to 3,4 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 2003 but little knowledge of how capital city was affected; **major environmental** challenges

d) **Very little attention paid to the governance of mobility** towards and within urban areas **despite a country with a legacy of conflict between local urban populations and migrant elites inherited from colonisation** (Ndaywel e Nziem, 1997 : 631) and revived at regular intervals as in **Katanga** over the past two decades (Bakajika, 1997)

e) **Massive transformations in urban populations**, at a time when a new **decentralisation** attempt is being made (Marysse, 2005); idea of Kinshasa as cosmopolitan city (De Maximy, 1984; De Boeck, 2008; Trefon, 2006)

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## Four main cities: Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Maputo, Nairobi

Maputo

a) End of 1970s and beginning of 80s, as a result of the civil war (between the Frelimo government and the Renamo): **massive migration of the rural population** fleeing the effects of the war

b) Maputo as **safer place and offering better life opportunities**, was the privileged place for these socially and economic unprotected people who settled in the **periphery of Maputo** (Costa do Sol, Polana Caniço, Maxaquene, Urbanização, etc).

c) **Legacy of anti-urban bias in Mozambican socialist modernisation project (paradoxically traced back to colonial period)** transformed into forced repatriation to rural areas: Operation Production (1984)

d) The end of the armed struggle (1992) did not mean the return of internally displaced people + settlements of expatriate communities => **increased heterogeneity and spatial development** (Matola, 15km from Maputo City)

Four main cities: Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Maputo, Nairobi

Nairobi

a) Kenya: **rapid and high urbanisation rate**. **Regional centre** for trade and transit & primary destination from people from across Kenya and neighbouring countries.

b) Unlike many African cities where slums have grown on or around the urban edge, **Nairobi's centre**: mix of formal, colonially planned office and housing areas; post-colonial housing estates; and enormous 'slums' comprised of self-built housing and poorly serviced by municipal water and sanitation.

c) While the **slums (Kibera, Korogocho) are primary destinations for people from within the country**, significant numbers of people from **Ethiopia, Somalia**, and elsewhere have helped transform neighbourhoods (e.g., **Eastleigh**)

d) **Rights to the city** are rarely **determined** by official policy but rather **through forms of social or extra-legal sovereignty**. Indeed, many of Nairobi's poorer neighbourhoods are controlled by Mungiki and other **militia-type formations**.

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Methodological notes

- Three (four) different colonial legacies: British & apartheid, Belgian & Portuguese

- Different stages of political and economic dvlpmt: LAC to "emerging"

- Multi-scale, multi-level qualitative approach

- International regional team

- 3 phases: 1. The state of data & policies; 2. Governmental perceptions (all levels of government); 3. Micro-scale case studies (access to urban space from below).

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Some Preliminary Findings
## 1. Demographic trends

- **Poor quality data even in SA**; fairly regular census data regionally (except DRC:1984; SA: 2001; Moz.: 2007; Kenya: 2009), but migration / mobility seldom inserted in questionnaires and if yes, not exploited;

- **Almost nowhere used for technical planning** (housing, schools, transport): lack of interdepartmental cooperation; no data pool

- **Highly complex mobilities**: can only be rendered through specific surveys

- **Overemphasis on foreign populations** while internal migrants are everywhere far more numerous

Some Preliminary Findings

2. Use of demographic data for planning

- **No interest from donors** in improving migration/mobility data in connection with development issues: neither data gathering nor urban planning are priority issues (except in SA); stop to technical assistance (French in DRC); channelling of migration resources into documentary fraud and trafficking

- **Chronological gaps in planning**: DRC (late 1970s); Moz (1969 and 2007); Kenya (1970s and 2009 Nairobi 2030); South Africa (more regular; Joburg 2050)

- **Loss of expertise & capacity**: systematic dismantling of stats and planning units at lower levels following independence with centralisation (only recent renewal of interest)

- Little mainstreaming (see table)

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
Intersection: Migration and Public Policy

Areas surveyed	SADC member states
Migration policy framework	South Africa
Key policy priorities	Border control & fight against illegal migration (except Mauritius skills development and SA social cohesion and skills import and DRC & Lesotho: use of skills & resources from diaspora)
Mainstreaming in: **Health**	South Africa, Namibia & Zambia (health plans, HIV, medical professionals loss)
Housing and Land	Negatively for Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius
Economic development / Planning / Decentralisation / Local Govt	**None**
Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans	DRC (2007), Lesotho (2006), Moz (2007)

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Some Preliminary Findings

3. National trajectories, decentralisation and mobility

- **Nature of the State:** has largely conditioned degree of emphasis on movement control (chronology of independence); definition of government's mandate in management mobility; perceptions of mobility's role (urban / anti-urban bias)

- Type and pace of **decentralisation reforms:** unequal across region

- **Role of urban centres in regional and sub-regional political economies**: emergence of municipal authorities that want to play some part in migration policy formation (Gauteng, Western Cape; Nairobi)

- Varying and overlapping local authority responses to mobility
    - DRC-imperial clientelism
    - Maputo – benign neglect
    - Nairobi – Political positioning
    - South African cities: vary across territory; pro-active but restrictive Gauteng; more laissez-faire in smaller municipalities

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Some Preliminary Findings

4. Heterogeneity, resource allocation and conflict

• Saturation and inner city speculation resulting in peri-urban 'estuarial' zones (Kinshasa, Maputo, Ekhuruleni, Johannesburg): high mobility rates (transit zones); low fiscal basis

=> But **unanswered questions**: resource-driven or land driven?

• **Not embedded in budgeted allocation systems** (specific pbs or policy neglect)

• **Competition over resources deeply contested and largely informally regulated** (multiple arrangements overriding or ignoring state structures)

• **Very different conflict management systems**:

   • reciprocity / charismatic chief informal systems (little discrimination & violence but no state welfare): DRC

   • relativ. high levels of welfare: territorialised legitimacy expectations => xenophobic violence (SA)

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Rethinking the right to the city

1. Migrant trajectories create different demands for right to the cities

2. Passage, profit, and protection creates different forms of belonging, investment, and strategic engagement

   a. Invisibility and minimal costs, maximum extraction (usufruct)

   b. Stratified form of citizenship

3. Determinants of lived citizenship largely socially / politically determined

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General recommendations

1. Need for more and better data: re-spatialised, re-categorised, regularly collected, and properly used

2. Enhance local and regional dimensions of policy making and implementation – particularly in small towns

3. Need for multi-sectoral, multi-level, multi-sited 'mobility mainstreaming' for domestic and international movements

4. Develop inclusive mechanisms for promoting political and social participation

Anti-Xenophobia March, Johannesburg

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Specific recommendations

1. Reform national immigration legislations to encourage permanent settlement

2. Build a housing ladder to facilitate transit and 'rooting'

3. Improve service delivery mechanism and bureaucracy to match population movements

4. Reconsider resource allocation models and service delivery time frames

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