

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FOOD AID ON INTERNALLY  
DISPLACED PERSONS**

**THE CASE OF MANICALAND FOOD AID INTERVENTIONS IN ZIMBABWE**

**BY**

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## DECLARATION

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I declare that this research is my own work submitted for the awarding of an MSc Degree and has not previously been submitted by me at another university/faculty. I further cede copyright of the dissertation to the University of the Free State.

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WONESAI WORKINGTON SITHOLE

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DATE

## DEDICATION

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I dedicate this research to my lovely wife, Patience Sithole, and daughter Blessing Sithole; my father, Ezekiel Sithole, and mother, Angeline Sithole, for their moral, emotional and financial support throughout this study.

Last but not least, I want to express my solidarity to IDPs world over and to assure them that one day their plight will be over.

## ABSTRACT

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*Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are some of the most neglected vulnerable populations in the world. They are often neglected due to lack of laws that protect them as the government will be the perpetrator of the displacement. This complicates the situation in that the government cannot be both the perpetrator and a protector. Food aid has become one of the major protection interventions provided to enhance stability in a displacement setting. However, one of the major challenges is how food aid affects IDPs. This study was therefore designed to investigate and evaluate how food aid affects the lives of displaced persons. The focus was to understand households' food security, migration trends and asset loss by displaced persons, and how food aid affects these aspects. The study used the sustainable livelihood framework in analyzing the role of food aid on IDPs. That means the relationship between food aid and the five livelihoods assets, and how the transforming structures could be linked to food aid interventions. The study results showed that food aid plays a significant role in cushioning the displaced households when it is integrated with other sustainable livelihood interventions, for example those that promote the value of household assets and land holding. It was noted that due to denied access to land, IDPs were dependent on food aid for their household food security. Social improvements in form of increased school attendance were noted because of food aid being provided to IDPs. Security of tenure is the most significant contributory factor hindering community driven effective alternatives to a food aid programme. If this is not addressed IDPs in Manicaland will have challenges in finding alternative ways to address their food insecurity.*

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## ACRONYMS

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CFU:	Commercial farmers Union
DFID:	Department for International Development
FAO:	Food and Agricultural Organization
FEWS:	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FDG:	Focus group discussions
FTLRP:	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GoZ:	Government of Zimbabwe
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
IDCM:	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
IASC:	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDP:	Internally Displaced Person
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IOM:	International Organization for Migration
JAG:	Justice for Agriculture
KABPP:	Community Knowledge, Attitudes, Beliefs, Perception and Practices
LHA:	Lancaster House Agreement
LSCF:	Large Scale Commercial Farms
MDC:	Movement for Democratic Change
MDG:	Millennium Development Goals
MSC:	Most Significant Change
SSPS:	Statistical package for social sciences
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
UNWFP:	United Nations World Food Program
UNHCR:	United Nation High Commissioner for refugees
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
WHO:	The World Health Organization
ZIMVAC:	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
ZANU PF:	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZCDT:	Zimbabwe Community Development Trust

# CHAPTER ONE

## BACKGROUND TO STUDY

---

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Food insecurity in Southern African has been attributed to several reasons, among them weather variability and climate change, poverty, HIV and Aids, economic failure and poor governance (Lambrechts & Barry, 2003:2; IASC & UNAIDS, 2003:1). Zimbabwe is no exception to these risk factors. The country has been experiencing severe food shortages that started with a major drought in 2002. As in most countries, the most common response to Zimbabwe on food crisis has been the provision of food aid implemented by the international donor community through the food arm of the United Nations, the World Food Programme targeting vulnerable people in rural areas.

Moyo, Rutherford and Amanor-Wilks (2000:26) state, *“the implementation of the land reform programme, from year 2000, and the subsequent challenging political environment created a new category of the vulnerable people in displaced persons and communities”*. Moyo, *et al.* (2000:181) notes that, *“farm workers have failed to benefit from social infrastructure and the rural development programme mainly because of their historic and current lack of access to independent land”*. The initial food aid programmes left out former farm workers and politically displaced communities. Information in unpublished situational reports in Manicaland Province shows that the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in partnership with the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) assisted 4857 IDPs households in the year 2010. According to unpublished IOM situational report (2010:1), *“183 households were displaced as a result of political violence, 3648 households were displaced as a result of the land reform programme, 693 households as a result of natural disaster and 333 households as a result of land disputes in Manicaland Province”*.

Not much research is available on the impact of food aid programmes on IDPs' household food security (Barret, 2002:1). A review of the existing literature indicates the focus with regard to

the impact of food aid programmes in countries like Ethiopia and Somalia. Little research has been undertaken in Southern Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular. The aim of this study was to conduct an analysis of the impact of food aid on displaced communities in Zimbabwe.

## **1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTION**

### **1.2.2 Problem Statement**

UNWFP in partnership with the International Organization for Migration has been implementing food aid programmes since 2004 targeting displaced communities in Zimbabwe. The aim of the programmes is to alleviate food insecurity of displaced households due to loss in sources of livelihoods. While food aid and other assistance given to households following a shock or disaster may prevent deleterious effects, there has been little research on the impact of food aid programmes among IDPs (Barret, 2002:2). The little done often concludes that general food distributions and other forms of food aid such as food for work have limited impact (Gilligan & Hoddinot, 2006:1). Gilligan and Hoddinot (2006:2) note, *“Previous research has failed to account for the targeting procedures which often lead to failure to accord causation of welfare gains.”* This study aimed to contribute to the body of literature by critically analysing the impact of food aid on communities targeted because of displacement induced vulnerability to food security.

### **1.2.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions**

The overall objective of this study was to understand the impact of food aid programmes on displaced communities in Manicaland through specific objectives:

- To review the food security situation of displaced communities in Manicaland Province.
- To document the impact of the food aid programmes on displaced communities.
- To document other community driven effective alternatives to food aid programme.

In order to meet these objectives, the following research questions guided the study:

- What is the household food stock level in displaced communities that were receiving food assistance?

- Has there been any improvement directly related to food assistance in the welfare of households in displaced communities?
- What has been the social, economic, and political impact of food aid programmes?
- What are the coping strategies employed by displaced communities?
- Do displaced people in Manicaland Province have alternative ways to address their food insecurity?

### **1.3 THE STUDY METHODOLOGY**

This research used both quantitative and qualitative approaches in the collection and analysis of data. The research involved four focus groups discussions (FDGs) in four beneficiary communities, with an average of six respondents per group. This was to come up with community driven views on the impact of food aid as advocated by Elden and Chisholm (1993:133) that their local knowledge is the most participatory valid scientific sense-making. The participants for the FDGs were selected using purposive sampling. The focus group discussions were conducted with heterogeneous members of the displaced people community of different age groups, sex and economic status. The targeted interviewees for the household questionnaire included in the sample, were respondents who had shown their willingness to take part in the study after a brief description of the study by the researchers, which is democratic participation as advocated by (Fals-Borda 1991:5).

The researcher explained the aims of the study and described the ethical issues. The FDGs explored community knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and practices (KABPP) relating to the impact of food aid and how they managed to cope with food insecurity. The community driven coping strategies during stress periods were documented. The discussion also had a comparative analysis where communities gave information on their livelihood strategies before and after being displaced, and before and after receiving food assistance. Comparison established the role of food assistance in these communities. The research administered 100 questionnaires to 100 displaced households. The research also used probability proportion to sample size (PPS) and select the targeted household as per Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.2.

**TABLE 1.1: DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEY SAMPLE BY DISTRICT, COMMUNITY (SITE) AND BENEFICIARIES**

District/ Community	Makoni/ St Stephens		Mutare/ Betty		Mutasa/ Tsvingwe		Mutare/ Mutanda		Total	
		%		%		%		%		%
<b>Beneficiary</b>	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	100	100
<b>Total</b>	(a)	25	(b)	25	(c)	25	(d)	25	100	100




Fig. 1.2: Percentage of interviewees by district

### 1.3.1 Demographics

Interviewed individually there were one hundred respondents, and four focus groups were conducted for this study. As shown in the graphs below, Fig. 1.3 and Fig. 1.4, most of the interviewed households (58%) were male headed whilst (42%) were female headed. However, there were more female-headed households in Tsvingwe community of Mutasa district. Fifty-two per cent of the household heads were married whilst 48% were single headed households, either because of being widowed, separated, single or divorced. Most household heads did not have any tertiary education, with only 25% having finished secondary education, as seen in Fig. 1.5.




Fig. 1.3: Gender of household heads per community




Fig. 1.4: Marital status of the respondents




Fig. 1.5: Education level of household head

TABLE 1.2.: SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY MATRIX

Method	Description	Data/Indicator
<i>Focus group discussions with household members</i>	Open-ended interviews held with household members; designed to obtain the impact of food aid, livelihood options before and after displacement, the current food security situation before and after displacement, coping strategies and possibly their life after food aid.	Select and priority processes. Community infrastructure and facilities, livelihood systems, levels of vulnerability.
<i>Questionnaires</i>	Close-ended interviews held with selected members of the community, designed to bring out the socio-economic situation in a given community. The knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and practices in the context of socio-economic dictates of the general society. The main emphasis was on the impact of food aid.	Disaggregated data on accessing strategies, coping mechanisms, change process as a result of food aid interventions and livelihood practices within the categories of communities within the IDPs locations.

### **1.3.3 Data Analysis**

Quantitative data was entered and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSSv16). The analysis of the data involved three main stages. Firstly, descriptive statistics for each area and the reliability coefficient for the questionnaire were computed. Secondly, inferential statistics based on analysis of variance, multivariate analyses of variance to test for significance were computed from the data. Thirdly, cross tabulations were done to assess knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of the impact of food aid, and how the community had managed to cope with food insecurity. Variable combinations data analysis syntax was made and results posted to MS Excel for graphical presentation. This is a write-up on the findings of the study that had a bearing on the research question. The presentations of the findings are plain text, tables, charts and graphs.

The longitudinal approaches to impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation (LIME) approach was used to analyze qualitative data through the most significant change (MSC) that was assessing the intended and unintended impacts, positive and negative, of food aid interventions among displaced people at the household and community levels, based on perceived changes in status and self-esteem, social networks and support, and village cohesion and security. LIME is an integration of three analytical frameworks, benefit cost analysis (BCA), household economy analysis (HEA) and most significant change (MSC). This integration was aimed at ensuring rigor and effectiveness measuring the impact of food aid on IDPs. Benefit-cost analysis is a quantitative method to assess the economic returns of food aid investments. The BCA framework seeks to measure the financial impact at household level resulting from food aid. This is achieved by the comparison between what IDPs depended on for food security before, during and after displacement.

The household economy approach (HEA) was also used, where survival thresholds, livelihoods protection ability and livelihood promotion abilities of food aid among displaced people were analyzed. The unit of analysis in this study was the individual respondent's statements in most cases. The qualitative data analysis techniques such as grouping of responses, text searches, demographic data exploration, theme and pattern relationship and mapping were used.

## 1.4 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

Time was a major constraint as approval to conduct the research by the local authorities took a long time due to the sensitivity of the targeted group. Access to the community was an uphill task because of the nature of the cause of the displacement. This also affected the way the questioning was done to avoid sensitive issues that could cause harm to the IDPs after the research. The use of a video camera during focus group discussions in Tsvingwe caused some respondents to feel uncomfortable, as they feared that they could be exposed based on threats they had previously received after their video films were aired in the public media. As a mitigation measure, the researcher clearly explained that the purpose of the study was solely for academic purposes, and only interviewed those respondents who had consented to the interview.

## 1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study adopted the sustainable livelihoods framework to understand the impact of food aid programmes on households in displaced communities shown in Fig. 1.6 below




Fig. 1.6: Sustainable livelihood framework

Source (DFID, 1999:1)

Households follow livelihood strategies grounded in the opportunities afforded by their livelihood assets, their vulnerability context and the transforming structures and processes. The basic concept surrounding the livelihood framework is that the quality and sustainability of livelihoods depend on the strategies households develop in managing their assets. Livelihood outcomes could be more income, increased well-being, reduced vulnerability, improved food security and more sustainable use of the natural resource base (DFID, 1999:1). The study used this framework to identify the impact of food aid programmes among other transforming structures and processes in the face of shocks, trends and seasonality factors such as the prevailing economic conditions and policy environment to the food security livelihood outcome.

The sustainable livelihoods framework focuses on the strengths and assets that people own to ensure their food security and livelihoods. These are represented by five key categories of capital that people can draw from to achieve positive livelihood outcomes such as increased income and well-being and improved food security. The sustainable livelihoods framework portrays food security and livelihoods as a cyclical process, as opposed to the linear process depicted by the conceptual malnutrition framework. It also adds the notion of vulnerability and integrates the concept of disaster risk reduction. It is a practical tool that outlines a holistic approach to the design and monitoring of food security and livelihood interventions.

Food aid neutralizes shock of displacement by reducing expenses hence, facilitates the household to regain lost assets such as financial capital which will result in reduced vulnerability.

WFP EFSA (2009:9) states that:

When disaster strikes and people migrate or are displaced from their homes, many draw on social networks for support, seeking refuge or hospitality among local communities rather than in camps. Over time, the burden of providing for migrants/IDPs may be a significant strain on hosts' resources. Host communities may themselves be migrants, or may use migration as a livelihood strategy.

Assessment of the vulnerability context and the livelihood assets could lead to the identification of the needs of local host communities. This might suggest a case for outside assistance which could be in the form of food aid as their livelihoods assets would be strained and they could not be transformed into livelihood outcomes (UNWFP, 2003). Emergency interventions, including

emergency food aid programmes, must occur early enough to reduce the need for negative coping strategies. This requires incorporating risks into livelihoods in early warning efforts, and ensuring effective links among early warning, preparedness, and response. It will also need to involve quicker and more predictable access to full funding for their activities (UNWFP, 2003).

Food aid can be a transforming structure in that humanitarian organizations must advocate for the needs of those at risk of losing their livelihoods, in addition to those whose lives are at more immediate risk. Situations where food assistance plays an important role in preserving capital assets and supporting livelihoods may require a larger quantity of food aid than activities aimed at meeting the immediate survival needs of the destitute. Target groups may be larger, because they include people who still have assets, and there may be additional staff and other costs. Livelihood-support interventions will also require complementary inputs from partners. Staff should know and be able to incorporate into advocacy, messages when food aid is an appropriate response and when it is not. This will result in reduced vulnerability.

The sustainable livelihoods approach (Carney, 1998:1; DFID/FAO, 2000) perceives rural households to possess five livelihood assets essential to their livelihood strategies: human capital, natural capital, financial capital, social capital, and physical capital. The households can adjust to their physical, social, economic, and political environments through the utilization of the five capitals, a set of livelihood strategies designed to strengthen their well-being (Stokes, 2003).

The relationship between food aid, displacement, and rural livelihoods is as follows. A displacement is a shock and it removes the affected population from familiar assets and puts them in a new area with new unfamiliar assets. Because the area is new, people become vulnerable, as they have been detached from their traditional set of livelihoods. Food aid comes in as a life supporting mechanism that facilitates the people to adjust from the effect of the shocks.

## 1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Internal Displaced Persons:** "people or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border" (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1994).

**Food security:** at the World Food Summit in 1996, food security was defined as: *"Food Security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs, and food preferences for an active and healthy life"*.

**Land reform:** a government of Zimbabwe programme, which was initiated to expropriate farms from white farmers for redistribution.

**Food aid or food assistance:** support in the form of food provided to IDPs.

**Beneficiary:** an individual or household that receives food assistance.

**Capital:** includes social, physical, human, financial and natural which make livelihood assets.

**Impact of food aid:** negative and positive contributions of food aid on IDPS.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

---

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

Food security is the accessibility of food, right to use food and the absence of risk related to either, ease of use or access. Food security in a country can only be attained when all people have access to sufficient food at all times to meet their nutritional needs for a healthy and active life (FAO, 2008:1). According to Barnett and Rugamela (2001:4), food availability, equal access to food, consistency of food provisions and quality of food should be in equilibrium for achievement of food security. For most rural households, agriculture is essential as a direct supply of food and as a source of livelihood (FAO, 2008:1). Shocks such as drought, displacements by either war or floods threaten the equilibrium of the four factors of food security and mainly through the loss of agricultural production. Since 2000, Zimbabwe has been undergoing a complex humanitarian, political, and economic predicament that was widely believed to have been set off by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and Operation Murambatsvina. As a result, the country had been receiving food aid, targeting vulnerable people in rural and urban areas affected by displacement. Food aid given to vulnerable people has many facets to rural livelihoods. The analysis of food security is based on three pillars:

- (i) Food availability
- (ii) Food access
- (iii) Food utilization.

This section reviews literature on the rural livelihoods, food security, migration and the impact of food aid to rural livelihoods.

#### 2.2 RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN ZIMBABWE

According to Rukuni (1994:10), agriculture is the mainstay of Zimbabwe's economy and the majority of the rural people depend on it for livelihood. Agriculture sustains directly or indirectly

about 70% of Zimbabweans living in rural areas. Fig. 2.1 indicates the seasonal agriculture calendar in a rural set up in Zimbabwe.




Fig. 2.1 Seasonal rural agricultural calendar for Zimbabwe  
Source: ZIMVAC 2010:10

It also shows that throughout the whole year rural people in Zimbabwe are engaged in agriculture-related activities. This makes agriculture the economic basis of Zimbabwe's rural population.

### 2.2.1 Overview of the Agricultural Sector

The agricultural sector accounted for between 13 to 19 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Zimbabwe during the 1980s and into the 1990s (Davies, Buchanan-Smith & Lambert, 2001:3). It is also the largest employer accounting for about 30% of the labour force in Zimbabwe (ibid). The agricultural sector can be divided into at least five types, namely the communal, resettlement A1 and A2, small-scale commercial farming, and the large-scale commercial sectors spread across the country. The country is divided into five broad agro-ecological Natural Regions (NRs) based on rainfall and types of farming (Table 2.1).

**TABLE 2.1 RAINFALL CHARACTERISTICS IN THE FIVE NATURAL REGIONS OF ZIMBABWE**

<b>Natural Region</b>	<b>Area (km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>% of total</b>	<b>Rainfall Characteristics</b>
<b>I</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>More than 1 050 mm rainfall per year with some rain in all the months.</b>
<b>II</b>	<b>58,600</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>700 - 1 050 mm rainfall per year confined to summer.</b>
<b>III</b>	<b>72,900</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>500 - 700 mm rainfall per year. Infrequent heavy rainfall. Subject to seasonal droughts.</b>
<b>IV</b>	<b>147,800</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>450 - 600 mm rainfall per year. Subject to frequent seasonal droughts.</b>
<b>V</b>	<b>104,400</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>Normally less than 500 mm rainfall per year, very erratic and unreliable. Northern Lowveld may have more rain but topography and soils are poorer.</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>390,700</b>	<b>100</b>	

(Source: adapted from Rukuni and Eicher, 1994:42)

According to Davies, *et al.* (2001: 3-4), Natural Region I is a specialized and diversified farming region dominated by forestry. The region is suitable for forestry, fruit, and intensive livestock production. Much has changed regarding the share of area by farming type. However, communal farmers occupy less than 20% of the area of this region. In Natural Region II flue-cured tobacco, maize, cotton, sugar beans and coffee can be grown. Sorghum, groundnuts, seed maize, barley, and various horticultural crops are also grown. There is supplementary irrigation for winter wheat. Also practised is animal husbandry like poultry, cattle for dairy and meat. Communal farmers occupy only 21% of the area in this productive region. Natural region III is a semi-intensive farming region. The region is subject to periodic seasonal droughts, prolonged mid-season dry spells, and unreliable start of the rainy season. Irrigation plays an important role in sustaining crop production.


Natural regions IV and V are too dry for successful crop production without irrigation, but communal farmers have no other choice, but to grow crops in these areas even without access to irrigation. Millet and sorghum are the common crops but maize is also grown. Maize production is the main farming activity even in the drier natural regions IV and V, previously regarded as areas for cattle and wildlife ranching by the former large-scale commercial farmers. Matebeleland and Masvingo are such provinces.

Owing to intensive agriculture in region I, II, and III it can be justified to assume that these areas are likely to have scrapped more numbers of internally displaced people. The taking over of farms in these climatic regions meant displacement of farm workers. Region IV and V could

have limited cases of displacement due to agricultural activities which were labour extensive except for large irrigation schemes, which were able to sustain agriculture.

## 2.2.2 Food and Nutrition Security

Agricultural production in Zimbabwe generally follows rainfall patterns. Fig. 2.2 shows production trend for the staple crop, maize against rainfall trend. Failure of agricultural production due to drought has often led to periods of food insecurity in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has a national grain requirement (maize, millet, sorghum, and so on) of 1 800 000 MT. Because of droughts, the country could not produce an adequate amount to feed the population in 1983/84, 1986/87, 1991/92, 1995/96 and 1997/98. The country also suffered from a devastating food insecurity predicament in 2002. While the devastating droughts of 1991/1992 and 2001/2002 had somewhat similar yields (Fig. 2.2), the food insecurity from 2001/02 drought was comparatively quite severe. Drimie (2004) notes that the year 2002 food insecurity crisis was not just a result of weather factors but also several other reasons, which include structural imbalance, economic and social decline.



**Fig. 2.2:** Comparison of National Maize production and Average Seasonal rainfall  
(Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation & Irrigation Development 2009:11.)

The reduced farming capacity because of farm disturbances in the guise of the Fast Track Land Reform programme and shortages of important inputs like seed and fertilisers that followed, also accounts for the production drop from year 2000 onwards. Furthermore, the period 2001-2005 manifested poor rainfall distribution. The experience has been the worst since the independence of the country, in a way that the impact of the drought on low productivity patterns of crops like maize and cotton, which are mostly grown by the smallholder farmers, is easily identifiable (Moyo 2005); Moyo & Yeros, 2007). The position of the macro-economy has gravely affected the agricultural sector and related rural social reproduction measures. The agro-industrial linkages created by government over some years, particularly in the seed and fertilizer industry failed to fulfil demand as they were operating below capacity.

Moyo (2005) puts estimates on the maize production drop to be between 30% and 70%. Literature often quotes higher figures on the drop in maize production. Although the decline in the production of maize in Zimbabwe is often attributed to droughts, the brunt of the occurrences after 1997 is quite evident, in addition to the effects of the drought. The extensive commercial farms accounted for over 80% of irrigated land in the post independence period (Moyo, 1985). Such critical volumes of land that mitigated the effects of droughts were not under effective utilization after 1997. This then, to a certain extent, explains the growing shock of rainfall pattern variation. Drimie (2004) notes, that the 2002 food insecurity crisis was not just a result of weather factors, but also several other reasons, which included structural imbalance, economic (land reform programme) and social decline.

For most rural households, agriculture is essential as a direct supply of food and as a source of livelihood (FAO, 2008:1). IFAD (1996:3) describes household food security as “*the capacity of households to procure a sustainable and stable basket of adequate food*”. The agricultural and economic failure after year 2000 severely affected the capacity of rural households in general to procure food. The prevailing political environment also added a special category to the vulnerable people through the pockets of internally displaced communities (Moyo, *et al.*, 2006:26). Communities that might have had previously developed group coping mechanisms and solidarity networks to mitigate the impact of food shortages, found themselves suddenly scattered due to displacement.

Poverty and food inadequacy has the potential to subject internally displaced people (IDPs) to severe risks, for instance sexual abuse of women and girls. Compelled by the need to obtain food for the children, some women agree to offer sexual favours or engage in prostitution and any other way that puts food on the table. Girls are sometimes offered to early marriages to rich families so that their household gain support financially. Inadequate nutrition in children can lead to serious effects on children's physical and mental development. This can prevent them from attending school, and force the children into child labour as a way to participate in the family's income situation, which tends to perpetuate vulnerability to food insecurity (Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, 2010: 248).

## **2.3 THE LAND REFORM PROGRAMME AND ITS IMPACT ON RURAL LIVELIHOODS**

Land, a key resource for rural livelihoods partially distributed to majority blacks at independence in 1980 was not fully implemented. The land issue has been a contentious issue, which partly led to the liberation struggle. This culminated in the independence of Zimbabwe through the Lancaster House Agreement (LHA) of 1979. The government embarked on a land reform programme at independence in pursuit of equity and efficiency goals. The implementation was in two main periods, the first phase ran from 1980 to 1996, and the second started in 1997. This section reviewed implementation of the land reform, how it affected rural livelihoods and led to displacement of populations.

### **2.3.1 First Phase of the Land Reform (1980-1996)**

The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 (LHA) guided the initial phase of Zimbabwe's land reform programme. The LHA specified the "willing buyer-willing seller" principle for government acquirement of land for resettlement intentions. The implementation of large-scale land acquirement was impossible under this agreement (Waeterloos & Rutherford, 2004). The British government and the new Zimbabwean government were to share equally the costs of executing the land reform programme (Palmer, 1990). The LHA remained effective for a decade and expired in 1990. Transfer of land ownership from one owner to the next through the

“willing buyer-willing seller” was the mechanism used during that period although the Land Acquisition Act (Zimbabwe 1992) permitted for obligatory acquirement of land with recompense (Moyo, 2004).

The land reform plan detailing implementation, put in place included methodical selection of the beneficiaries, substantial volumes of input support, infrastructural development and related services provisions (Waeterloos & Rutherford, 2004). The resettlement was in four models. The families had self-contained units comprising cropping land (5-15ha) and forage land of differing sizes allocated to them, and these were determined by the agro ecological region for Model A. The greater number of resettled families, which comprised 93% of the total population, was under Model A with the remainder being under Model B and Model C. Model B was village styled with a cooperative farming system. This model had capability to take in more families. However, it was not popular, and only about 50 such cooperatives were set up which translated to six per cent of the resettled families. Model C was state run farms. A professional farm manager was to professionally run and oversee the operations of the state farm. Model D was styled for livestock production in the drier regions. The resettled families had annual permits, which entitled them to utilize the land for agricultural intentions (Kinsey, 1999). Although a methodical choosing of beneficiaries was existent, farm occupations were also common on abandoned farms and politically charged areas compelled the government to formalize the resettlement of such people swiftly (Moyo, 2005).

The programme aimed at redistributing 8.3 million hectares to 162 000 families but missed the target considerably (Kinsey, 1999; Logan, 2006). Fig. 2.3 shows the trend of land acquired for redistribution during the first phase from 1980 to 1996. The initial land redistribution had appreciable acceleration. The declining accessibility of land for purchase for the purposes of redistribution at the close of the first five years impelled the government to pass the Land Acquisition Act (Zimbabwe, 1985) granting government first right to acquire land although this did not considerably transform the situation. Resultantly, just 71 000 families were resettled on about 3.6 million hectares by 1996, a shortfall of the target of decongesting the communal areas (Logan, 2006).




Fig. 2.3: Land Redistribution between 1980 and 1996 (*Source: Chitsike 2003:6*)

The escalating costs of land and the unavailability of adequate arable land to purchase for redistribution purposes on the market affected the programme in this phase (Munslow, 1985; ; Lebert & Palmer, 1990; Chitsike, 2003; Nmona, 2008). The farmers' disposal of marginal land first meant that unproductive and less land was on offer for acquisition for redistribution. The limited availability of productive land on the market drove the land prices quite high. The purchase of the marginal land meant there was going to be heavy initial investments to enrich the soils thereby making the whole resettlement programme prohibitively expensive. The government's budgetary limitations and inconsistent flows of funds from the British government frustrated the resettlement drive.

### 2.3.2 The Second Phase of the Land Reform (from 1997)

The late 1990s saw farm occupations intensify as the supposedly landless people became impatient with the slow pace of the land resettlement programme. The British government reneged on its responsibility to finance the land reform. Given such a scenario, the Zimbabwean government yielded to the pressure from the agitated black populace by designating 1,471 farms in 1997 for resettlement (Moyo, 2004). The second phase of land reform was then officially embarked on in 1998 aiming to speedily acquire 60 % of land from the commercial sector (which was mainly white farmer owned) for redistribution to black farmers (Logan, 2006). Donors were

not forthcoming to finance this phase due to disagreements mainly on the implementation modalities. The Land Acquisition Act (Zimbabwe, 1992) established legal powers for the implementation of phase two. The afterwards appraisal of the stipulations of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act were meant to close loopholes, which almost undermined the programme when farmers were winning several legal battles on the land issue. The Zimbabwean government was then empowered by the 16th constitutional amendment (Zimbabwe, 2000) and the Land Acquisition Act of 2000 to obtain land at short notice regardless of the need for recompense (Waeterloos & Rutherford, 2004).

According to Waeterloos and Rutherford (2004:537), the second phase of the land reform programme (1997-2000) was progressively implemented. The inception phase started in 1998 and ended in 2000 and 168 264 hectares of land was redistributed to 4 697 families. The funding of this stage was from donors and the World Bank. The disagreements on the implementation stratagem and rate of the programme saw the breakdown of relations hence the radicalization of the resettlement exercise in the first stage. It was unavoidable that a militant approach was the only feasible route under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The redistribution of land of about three million hectares was between 2000 and 2001, and earmarking of more farms for further acquisition (Logan, 2006).

The overlapping second stage branded, the expanded phase, aimed to regularize and strengthen the redistribution as well as the valuation of improvements made on the land for compensation. There were plans for the provision of essentials such as clinics, schools, roads, and service centres in the second stage. The unavailability of adequate funding failed the implementation of this envisaged programme. The second phase of land redistribution achieved a 7.3 million hectares redistribution to 160 340 families (Waeterloos & Rutherford, 2004). There was still some consolidation of land ownership going on although there was an official pronouncement of the end of this phase in 2003.

The targeting generally shifted from the focus on the underprivileged and landless communal farmers as aimed. The fraction of the landless remained unchanged at 20 % after the FTLRP (Moyo, 2004). The two land redistribution models were fashioned after the ones put into

operation between 1980 and 1996. The A1 model was a duplication of the communal areas with independent cropping units of 3-15 hectares besides the collectively owned grazing land. The A2 model meant to resettle those farmers who could acquire their own resources, and had farming knowledge on land units varying from 20 to 2 000 hectares as influenced by the agro ecological region (Waeterloos & Rutherford, 2004; Zikhali, 2008). The offer letters gave land occupancy to the beneficiaries and the intended issuance of 99-year lease permits was yet to be (Nmona, 2008). There were unconfirmed multiple farm ownerships which had negatively affected the authenticity of the land reform programme. The land reform programme overwhelmed the plan. The government's financial resources already constrained, failed to meet the farmers' need for support. That was insufficient support given to new farmers with no meaningful effect. The shortage of inputs resulting from a suppressed economic environment added its own woes and to the agricultural productivity of the resettled farmers.

### **2.3.3 Impact of Land Reform and Emergence of IDPs**

The redistribution of land has effected considerable changes in Zimbabwe's agrarian structure, in terms of the land ownership, inferred class character and nationality of beneficiaries, as well as the demography of the farming population. This change has also forced adjustments in the character of agro-service providers and services, as it has changed the character of the rural labour market and labour process. The fast track process has reconfigured Zimbabwe's agrarian question, reflecting new problems for the transformation of the agricultural sector.

In the 1960s, Schultz put forward an argument that small farmers made economic sense and were effective (Ellis & Briggs, 2001). Equitable land redistribution was therefore necessary to economically empower the deprived (Griffin, *et al.*, 2002; Kinsey, 2004; Chimhowu & Hulme, 2006). Land distribution and ownership was rooted in historical exploitative policies and often the markets were unable to remedy the unevenness to provide a justification for policy motivated land redistribution reform (Griffin, *et al.*, 2002). Political considerations also motivated the land reform policies during that period. The high politicisation of the second phase implementation of the land reform saw a departure from the initial focus of ensuring equity and efficient use of the land. The chaotic manner in which the land reform was implemented during that period saw a marked increase of displacements. The second phase did not cater for the farm workers who lost

their livelihoods as a result (Moyo, 2004). While land was essential for the empowerment of the underprivileged, the land reform did not empower many.

The FTLRP was initiated in the year 2000 on the back of an already ailing economy, a narrowing export base, a negative agricultural situation and the long-term effects of external shocks from recurring droughts in the early 1990s. Most of these economic conditions had taken a steep downturn from 1997, when the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) initiated the compulsory acquisition of 1,471 large-scale commercial farms (LSCF) and paid war veterans large pensions

However, between 1996 and 1999 external flows had declined significantly (Moyo, 2003). Since 2000 real GDP growth had been negative, reaching -14.5% in 2002, and projected at -12.4% for 2003 indicating that factors, other than the drought and land transfers were also critical (Matshe, 2004). The people affected by displacement were poor and had limited assets and entitlement hence, their susceptibility to livelihoods failure was high. Most displaced people were subsistence farmers who depended on their own production and local markets to meet their food needs. When they experienced a production shock, coupled with displacement, they became even more reliant on money-based transactions. The unavailability and devaluation of the currency increased vulnerability of displaced people to food security. An estimated 90 % of households in 2002 depended on food transfers and purchases for their food needs, a far higher percentage than in other years (Lambrechts & Barry, 2003).

Access to social services among the displaced former farm workers declined because of the FTLRP. Schooling rates have always been lower in the farm worker community, even before the land redistribution programme. The school attendance rate of displaced former farm workers' children dropped from 79 percent in 1997 to between 15 percent and 55 percent in 2003 (Sachikonye and Zishiri, 1999; Sachikonye, 2003). The main reason was that the breadwinner could not afford fees payment due to the displacement. The household prioritized the resources raised to household food security. Zimbabwe Community Development Trust ZCDT assessment (2003:4) backs this argument by stating, "*Over 1000 children who should be at school were no longer going*" because of displacement. This confirms a long held suspicion by concerned humanitarian organizations that across the country, thousands of young people were going to be

adversely educationally disadvantaged. The affected children were likely to face challenges in livelihood options in future, as they did not manage to get basic education. Education in Zimbabwe was viewed as a prerequisite for employment and skills training hence, rendering those children illegible.

The combination of employment loss and drought, induced food insecurity reached alarming levels among the former farm workers who used to rely on their employers for subsidized or free food rations. According to Sachikonye (2003:5), 57% of displaced former farm workers were food insecure. Low paying and unreliable jobs substituted the relationship that used to exist between the farm owner and the farm worker that was termed '*domestic government*' meaning an internal arrangement (Rutherford, 2000; Moyo, 2003).

### **2.3.4 Internal Displacements and Migration Trends**

The greater part of Zimbabwe's population are part of the agrarian community. Generally, the farming community used to be a peaceful community before the February 2000 constitutional referendum with limited movements, which were seasonal in search of labour opportunities on farms. The population of Zimbabwe voted overwhelmingly against the government purported people-driven constitution, which was ZANU-PF advocated. That resulted in widespread violence from February 2000 until the harmonized elections of June 2008. The events of this period included the worst violence, torture, harassment and illegal eviction of commercial farmers and the farm workers under the guise of a land redistribution programme, which was familiarly, code-named the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme (Moyo, 2005:18). It caused widespread internal displacement of the former farm workers and opposition political supporters.

Deng (1998:1) defines internally displaced people (IDPs) as "*persons who are obliged or forced to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence. The people do so because they fear the effects of the conflict, natural or human-made disasters, but who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border*". This displacement often results in the loss of sources of livelihoods, shelter, and productive assets such as livestock and land and household food security is affected. For the purpose of this research, the internally displaced communities include people

forced to move out of their area of habitual residence because of the Land Reform Programme, Operation Murambatsvina, election related violence and who lost their employment due to farm take over, becoming displaced in the process.

Generalized violence, that is, a serious disturbance of internal order but does not include acts of violence, that is, of armed nature was one the main causes of internal displacement in Zimbabwe. Internal tensions and instability involving the use of coercion and other suppressive measures by the ZANU PF government agents to maintain or re-establish public order characterized the situation. Many people fled from their homes in search of safe havens because of this generalized violence resulting in dispersed settlements, mass shelter in collective centres, reception and transit camps, self-settled camps, planned camps and recognized and non-recognized camps in Zimbabwe.

On land reform related displacement, Morongwe (2006:8) argues that the process lacked planning and it was haphazard in nature. This resulted in mushrooming of IDP settlements, which posed a humanitarian catastrophe due to absence of livelihoods thereby threatening food security. Civil society added their voice in pointing that the land reform contributed to uncontrolled migration, and that it exposed the affected population of former farm workers to land disenfranchisement, hunger, starvation, abject poverty and impoverishment in Zimbabwe.

It can be concluded based on evidence that the brutality and disorder associated with the programme drove many displaced farm workers into squatter settlements even though the government disputed this view. The squatter settlements, which were in remote areas of the country, did not have infrastructure such as schools, clinics, electricity, and running water and other livelihood options. The IDPs ended up languishing in poverty and facing famine whilst the absence of formal employment resulted in them struggling to make ends meet. These farm workers became tremendously poor as a direct result of their displacement and the violent eviction of the commercial farmers (ZCDT 2003:3). Note that small numbers of farm workers were engaged as casual workers in circumstances where the new farmers had acquired farms, whilst the majority was no longer working on these farms. Linked to this, former farm workers

working as casuals for the new farmers complained of low payments, and in some cases non-payment for work done.

The IDCM report (2010:4) estimated that IDPs in Zimbabwe totalled 570 000 to 1 000 000 individuals though government disputed that number. Notably, there was a significant sprouting of illegal settlements that could be evidence of some people displacement in those areas. The migration trends indicated that displaced persons moved from the farms to illegal settlements and only less than 20 per cent of them benefited from land allocation. The presence of compounds with former farm workers still present today could back the IDCM figures. The IDCM report (2010:3) contributed to the view that the main causes of displacement in Zimbabwe included “*Fast Track Land Reform (FTLRP) 60%, Operation Murumbatsvina 27%, Political Violence 7%, and Natural Disasters 6%*”.

At the start of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, it was estimated that the large-scale commercial farms employed between 300 000 and 350 000 farm workers and a further 250 000 to 270 000 seasonal workers (IDMC, 2008:32). Farm workers, seasonal workers, and farm workers’ families together numbered an estimated two million people, most of who lived on the commercial farms. In 2008, the UNDP estimated that one million people (200 000-farm workers and their families) had lost their homes and livelihoods since the start of the “*fast-track land reform programme*” (UNDP, 2008:157-158).

It was estimated that one person in every ten of the former farm workers was employed on the commercial farms, either by the few remaining commercial farmers who were spared by the land reform exercise or by new farmers. A noticeable number of farm workers who were still living on the farm compounds because they did not have alternative residence and employment, and were commonly referred to as the “*displaced in place*”. The term displaced in place meant that the people had not moved, but the conditions of vulnerability due to the displacement of the farmer made them equally vulnerable as the internally displaced. They had no right to remain on the farms, and were at risk of eviction from their homes by the new farm owners (IDCM, 2010:4).

The Commercial Farmers Union assessment (CFU, 2003:2) claimed that by the year 2002 only 80 000 farm workers were employed by the commercial farming sector from 500 000 employed by the sector before commercial farmers were evicted. An estimate of 2 900 white commercial farmers were ordered to vacate their farms on 10 August 2002 as part of the land reform. According to the Justice for Agriculture (JAG, 2003:5), a lobby group aiming for fairness and transparency in land redistribution, it was estimated that about 600 commercial farmers out of the 2900 issued with eviction notices remained farming by December 2002. In conclusion, 420 000 commercial farm workers became jobless, homeless, and scavenging for food, which was in short supply nationwide. The non-productivity and the non-activity which characterized the state of commercial farms since year 2000 to 2011 led to the acute shortage of basic food commodities in the country. There was no information from government on the whereabouts of the workers of the affected farms, and how many had allocated land to them. Hence, the conclusion that most of those people became destitute as they were not considered for land allocation resulting in them seeking habitat in squatter settlements that were not present before year 2000.

The 2007 Food Security and Nutrition Assessment conducted by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) discovered that about eight per cent of the sampled population had been “*asked to move*” in the past five years. If those figures were taken as indicative for the entire population, which in 2007 was estimated to be between 11 and 12 million people (FAO/WFP, 2008:7), the total number of internally displaced people in Zimbabwe in 2007 could be estimated to have been between 880 000 and 960 000. However, it should be taken into consideration that since 2007 significant numbers of people had been newly displaced by the 2008 harmonized election related political violence and ongoing farm invasions.

## **2.4 OPERATION RESTORES ORDER (ORO) OR OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA (OM)**

In May 2005, with no warning, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on what it called an urban clean-up operation. This was to deal with both the informal business structures and informal housing. According to International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2008:2) the magnitude of displacement increased after the GOZ unleashed Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Clear the Filth), which targeted informal housing in high-density residential areas.




Fig. 2.4: Households affected by Operation Murambatsvina  
Source: UNCT, IOM and Ministry of Local Government: 2005

According to government figures, as stated by Tabajuka (2005:7), 32,538 small and medium-sized enterprises were demolished, while Operation Murambatsvina led to the destruction of 92 460 housing structures, affecting 133 534 households as indicated in Figure 2.4. Based on 2002 census figures, which put the average household at 4.2 persons, the UN estimated that approximately 570 000 people had been made homeless, while an estimated 98 000 people had been deprived of their livelihoods.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005:4) argued that the census figure of 4.2 persons per household was an underestimate, with the average household more likely to have been between 5 and 5.8 people. This would result in a larger estimate of between 668 000 – 774 000 people who lost their habitat because of Murambatsvina. Tabajuka (2005:34) argues that when overlap between people who lost their homes and those who lost their businesses was considered it could be projected that between 650 000 and 700 000 people were directly affected by operation

restore order. Tabaijuka (2005:30) concludes by stating that it is likely that the total number of people directly or indirectly affected was about 2.4 million people, or 18 per cent of the total population.

According to the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights Report (2005:3), the evictions carried out were not in accordance with Zimbabwe's obligations under international law, and thus violated the prohibition on forced evictions and amounted to uninformed displacement. Charamba (2005:5), however, argues that the government presented each operation as no more than "*a simple clean-up operation and a crackdown on crime*". The government claimed that the purpose of the operations was to stop and repeal a development of disorderly and unregulated urbanisation by destroying allegedly illegal structures that did not comply with Zimbabwe's building regulations; and to put an end to illegal trading practices, including foreign currency transactions on the parallel market. Despite justifications given, the exercise resulted in displacement and creation of squatter settlement and unemployment hence, affecting household food security.

## **2.5 RELIEF PROGRAMME AND IMPACT ON LIVELIHOODS**

Food aid given to vulnerable people has many facets to rural livelihoods. Often the aid programmes designed are not in a way that they assist the affected population to benefit from the five capital assets (social, financial, physical, natural and human) and transforming structures. This often results in failure to facilitate the achievement of creating income sources among beneficiaries. Linking food aid and livelihood is one way of achieving durable solutions for vulnerable communities, IDPs included. The United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) report (2002:7) adds to this argument with the view that despite these challenges, in IDP communities and refugee camps, the existence of an UNHCR-led coordination structure to bring food and non-food assistance together under a common strategy can permit close linkages among sectors, which are essential for livelihood interventions. In addition, most refugee camps have functioning markets and some opportunities for labour within the camp, which can support livelihood strategies. For instance, a recent UNWFP case study in Guinea WFP (2003:8) established that:

IDPs can be involved as skilled and unskilled labour in support of the relief effort (setting up tents, building health centres and sanitation systems, making bricks for sale to relief agencies). They can trade with other refugees or the host population (offering services or selling produce cultivated in small gardens, fish or processed goods); or can participate in small income generation activities (such as tailoring or bread-making).

The recently updated UNWFP–UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding highlights the importance of efforts to support food aid asset-building activities and encourage the self-reliance of beneficiaries.

Guarnieri (2003:3) reviews this view by saying that it is increasingly recognized that humanitarian assistance must be used, to the extent possible, to support livelihoods as a part of life-saving strategies. Furthermore, food aid linked with livelihood assistance is not without its challenges, particularly in the context of complex emergencies. Exposure to risk can result for beneficiaries rather than basic relief assistance. Any form of humanitarian assistance, when introduced into a complex emergency typically characterized by a resource-strained environment, can play into the dynamics of the conflict. Food aid is a noticeable type of aid, and maybe subject to manipulation. The aid can influence the balance of power and may in the end aggravate or lengthen a crisis even when it is effective in saving lives and alleviating suffering (Guarnieri, 2003:4).

UNWFP (2003:8) backs the argument of critics who dispute the linking of food aid to livelihoods activities in that it is difficult to ensure maximum impact assistance on the intended beneficiaries. This is because among people who require aid it is difficult to determine who needs it, when, and where they need it. UNWFP is of the view that these challenges are bigger when seeking to offer livelihoods support in complex emergencies making the provision of such help a difficult and dangerous undertaking. Complex emergencies could go for years with continued violence and insecurity, asset depletion and chronic displacement separating people from their traditional means of livelihoods. The systems on which livelihoods are based are at times altered by the length of such situations and significantly to render previous livelihoods completely unsustainable.

Guanieri (2003:8) backs the view by UNWFP in that violence in complex emergencies target civilians especially their livelihoods hence:

Military strategies may be designed not for winning the battle against the fighting groups but disrupt the life at the community level. This makes undermining livelihoods in complex emergencies not to be the result of the conflict but a war tactic.

As Pain and Lautze (2002:6) put it: assistance operations that are for the purpose of supporting livelihoods for IDPs can run in direct opposition to the objectives that warring parties are seeking, possibly leading fighting groups to purposely block assistance efforts for strategic reasons. Targeted attacks on the displaced beneficiary community may have been as revenge for receiving food aid thus, increasing their vulnerability. Indeed, the fact that interventions designed to support livelihoods are intended to have a long-term impact may make them suspect in the eyes of their enemies, because building the capacity of one livelihood group can imply strengthening one side in a conflict at the expense of another (Young 2001). With such challenges in view, Guanieri (2003:5) suggests that it is critical that food assistance providers have a clear understanding of the political/military context in which they are operating before engaging in livelihood support activities.

The UNWFP (2002:8) brings in the other dimension that “*women face particular risk of abuse in implementing their livelihood strategies*”. Hence, connecting food aid during displacement to livelihoods once displaced people resettle or return home, also poses challenges.

In conclusion, food aid is not always the most suitable resource when seeking to maintain assets or maintain livelihoods. Cautious analysis of the current availability and accessibility of food for IDPS must be the basis for livelihood interventions. This includes the impact that the displacement has had on men and women’s assets and livelihood strategies, and the role that food aid can play in both preserving assets and meeting household consumption needs. It is also important to take into account the impact that food aid will have on the policies, institutions, and

processes that influence livelihood strategies, particularly markets. Where food is available on the market and people do not have the means to gain access to it without depleting essential assets, cash interventions may be a preferred mode of response (UNWFP, 2002:4).

### **2.5.1 Migration and Food Aid**

According to Harvey (2005:2), *“people migrate not only as a result of a crisis, but also as a strategy to reduce vulnerability and maximize income in anticipation of, or during, a crisis”*. Displaced people households or individuals may move into areas where they can obtain employment or access to natural resources and other income sources to help reduce the impact of the crisis. In other situations, IDPs may migrate to where food aid or another type of assistance is available and accessible. Harvey (2005:6) states that during displacement people migrate to find protection, safety, and security. Access to food aid or other forms of assistance is seldom the most important determinant in people’s decisions about where to move during a displacement. Migration during displacement can create particular types of vulnerabilities, for both those on the move and those left behind due to probable exposure of the affected population to further exploitation.

According to UNWFP Report (2005:3), *“migration (involving migrants) is a strategy for coping with livelihood stress or for protecting, maintaining or improving people’s livelihoods, through increased accumulation, diversification or improvement of income”*. Migration is often a central part of a population’s usual livelihood coping strategy. A crisis may disrupt the income or the food that migration secures, resulting in corresponding losses hence, people end up migrating in search of better livelihood sources.

WFP further explains the relationship between food aid and migration in that population movement (involving displaced people) is a survival tactic in reaction to disaster or imminent threat, such as unexpected flood or military invasion. It includes forced or involuntary migration, and distress migration. The availability of food aid or other types of assistance is one of many factors influencing people’s movement, whether they are displaced populations or the communities that host them. The two groups affected by the crisis, directly or indirectly, move closer to distribution points. This supports this research argument that food aid has an impact on

internally displaced persons.

### **2.5.2 Solutions to Forced Displacement**

Local integration is one of the important components in facilitating the achievement of durable solutions among IDPs. IDPs who wish to return home get assistance to return and reintegrate. The UN durable solution strategy calls for the provision of community-based support in IDP hosting areas, and the mobilization of development actors and donors.

This is backed by Coetzee (2001:119-120) when he states that action plans should aim in *“providing the opportunities for people to become more than they are”*. It should, however, be noted that securing durable solutions in the form of voluntary, safe and dignified return, local integration or settlement for IDPs remains a challenge, particularly in Zimbabwe where political considerations take precedence over the rights of IDPs. Taking into consideration Roxborough (1979) in Coetzee (2001:120) when he states, *“... it is possible to move from a situation of restriction or dependency to one of self-sufficiency”*. This is in line with the argument that food aid can contribute to influencing a displaced person to take on board other development initiatives up to self-sufficiency.

The main hindrances in improving IDP situations in Zimbabwe are insecurity, lack of protection, unequal or lack of access to documentation, property restitution or livelihoods and political participation. If these are resolved they will assist in the achievement of *“human well-being”* of internally displaced people (Coetzee, 2001:124).

### **2.5.3 Sustainability of Solutions**

Coetzee (2001: 125) is of the view that, *“Any development programme will have to focus on ways to uncover people’s own definition of human well-being”*. Hence, the sustainability of return and local integration is perhaps the greatest challenge for ending a cycle of forced displacement, as implementation must be within the context of the affected people. The UNHCR has continued to promote the early engagement of development actors in post-conflict situations, as IDPs and refugees are reluctant to return to their former areas of habitual residence where

most basic social services, such as education and health, are unavailable. Furthermore, there is competition for land access and other livelihood opportunities may perpetrate conflict with other groups hence, affecting their human well-being.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, within the framework of the reintegration and community recovery cluster, the UNDP has been implementing six short-term reintegration and recovery projects in areas of IDP and refugee return to address their specific and urgent needs. Inter-agency collaboration is also crucial in the area of local integration. In West African countries where a legal framework for local integration is in place, the UNHCR has engaged key partners, such as UNDP, ILO, UNICEF and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), to help enhance refugee livelihoods, including through agriculture, education, and vocational training. In the United Republic of Tanzania, the UNHCR has approached the ILO to include refugees from Burundi in the Joint United Nations programme on wealth creation, employment, and economic empowerment.

Ensuring the sustainability of repatriation and local integration requires the involvement of receiving communities in the design of humanitarian and post conflict programmes. In Côte d'Ivoire, in addition to monitoring and mediation efforts, The Human Rights Division of the ONUCI has funded income-generating activities for communities and returnees.

Closely linked are durable solutions for IDPs and refugees for peace building processes. Return may create or exacerbate friction between former displaced people and communities, and overcoming tensions may require peace building, ideally based on integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery. In Kenya, UNDP interventions in areas affected by post-election unrest, focus on returning IDPs to communities and include support to local peace building initiatives. The UNHCR promoted consultations with Darfur refugees in Chad in the Darfur-Darfur dialogue, as well as the participation of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Goma peace conference held in January 2008. Coetzee (2001:125) supports this idea of participation when he states that, "*real participation take place when people are consciously involved in development*". Involvement of IDP and the host community leads to responsible well-being,

which could promote equity and sustainability resulting in livelihood security (Chambers, 1997:1749).

#### **2.5.4 Delivery of Aid Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons**

A good protection environment depends on security from violence and exploitation. But human dignity also requires safeguarding other fundamental rights, including access to adequate shelter, clean water and sanitation, sufficient food, primary health care and education (UN:2007). Despite serious security problems and logistical constraints, humanitarian agencies made every effort to deliver food assistance and protection to displaced populations. In 2007, UNWFP food aid reached over 1.5 million people in Somalia, and UNICEF provided family relief kits to over 240,000 individuals displaced by flooding or conflict in the country (UNWFP 2008). In Chad, insecurity and poor road conditions required complex logistics operations and intricate planning to pre-position food stocks supplied from long distances. Detailed planning allowed the UNWFP to respond effectively to the crisis, particularly in mid-2007 when the numbers of IDPs in need of assistance rose from 50 000 to 150 000 (UNWFP 2008).

In 2007, the UNWFP assisted 1.53 million refugees, some 900 000 returnees and 6.3 million IDPs in Africa, mainly through general food rations, school feeding and supplementary feeding programmes (UNWFP 2008). In an effort to ensure the efficient use of food aid, United Nations agencies, NGOs, and local authorities undertook 11 joint assessment missions and nutrition surveys in 2007. Of concern is the impact of the current global food crisis on displaced people, whose livelihood opportunities are too often limited or non-existent. In such situations, food aid becomes helpful. Mano and Matshe (2006:19) concur on the positive impact of food aid on vulnerable groups when they say, *“In disasters, supplementary feeding is often the primary strategy for prevention and treatment of moderate acute malnutrition and prevention of severe acute malnutrition”*.

More strategic resource allocation and reinforced inter-agency cooperation among health partners help improve the quality and coverage of care provided to the displaced. Specific examples include the number of countries meeting the ratio of camp-based refugees per primary

health-care facility, which, according to provisional 2007 UNHCR indicators, has improved from 42 per cent in 2006 to 61 per cent in 2007. Notwithstanding these improvements, massive resources are still required to make quality health services available to displaced people in Africa, where life expectancy at birth is still the lowest in the world.

Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Lesotho experienced two or three consecutive years of flooding, drought and other erratic weather conditions, which contributed to reduced yields and the repeated failure of rain-fed maize crops. This, in turn, led to the year-on-year depletion of national grain stocks, including strategic national grain reserves. Zimbabwe experienced the longest mid-season drought in 20 years from the end of December 2001 until February 2002, leading to widespread maize crop failures in the communal areas that normally produced half of the country's maize. Compared to the past five-year average, cereal production in 2001/02 was lower in all Southern African countries except Mozambique. The most severe drop in food production occurred in Zimbabwe, where in 2002 production was 65 per cent lower than the five-year average (Lambrechts & Barry 2003: 6-7).

### **2.5.5 Politics of Food Aid**

Barrett and Heisey (2002:489) state that WFP food aid is both progressive and stabilising because where bilateral donors distribute food aid for multiple motives related to export promotion, farm surplus disposal, and geopolitical interests, with food security in recipient countries a decidedly less prominent concern, the WFP is designed to focus on the latter concern as much as possible. However, one will want to test for the irrelevance of donor interest in WFP aid allocation as opposed to bilateral allocation, rather than assume it. Such a test is undertaken here. It can be noted that in all former commercial farming areas no food aid was distributed due to the reason that those areas were contested areas, and WFP was not prepared to provide aid in those areas unless there were displaced people. Hence, the allocation of food aid was not free from donor interest bias.

Browne (2006:28) argues that the main reason for concentrating on assistance by some donors is to allow their farmers to dispose surplus produce. The European Union, for example has accumulated a lot of food because of overproduction stimulated by farm subsidies. Clay

(2002:203) indicates that such surpluses were disposed in times of a humanitarian crisis like the East African emergencies of the 1970s and 1980s. Stiglitz (1998) purports that, *“food aid is sometimes motivated by the desire to get rid of surpluses, which are a result of misguided and distorted agricultural policies in many developed countries”*. Maren (1993:1) points out that organisations like Catholic Relief Services (CRS) get payment from the United States government to give away surplus food produced by United States farmers. There are questions on why the aid is given, due to these perceived motivations and the utility of food aid as a development resource.

In general, food aid is beneficial to the receiving IDP communities as it saves lives, which could have been lost due to hunger. Food aid generates long-term problems, as it is short-term in nature and thus no continuity of the aid is expected. Browne (1999:3) argues that in practice aid has long-term repercussions on receiving communities. Liffé (1987:15) is of the opinion that food aid has created conditions for another famine, caused by reduction in the area under cultivation and in some parts of Tanzania, people stopped farming and were living on food aid. Food aid dependency results in depressed domestic food prices and inhibited efforts to stimulate domestic food production in some countries (Browne, 1999:12). These destructive effects have led to the labelling of food aid as an important contributor to poverty as it diminishes farmers’ prospects of earning a livelihood.

Food aid has the potential to result in general improvement of economic conditions of a nation as it provides temporary alleviation of the suffering experienced. This comes from savings made in foreign currency and possibly this made payments for imports, as there is a provision of food to cover shortages provided by the donor aid. This is especially so where food aid directly replaces commercial imports and where it reaches those who are too poor to buy food thus freeing domestic resources for other purposes. However, it is detrimental to the recipients as it increases their dependency on other countries. According to Stiglitz (1999:5) food aid develops a culture of dependency and may discourage the receiving countries from helping themselves. Gitu (2004:48) argues that food aid also adversely affects domestic production in that farmers soon reduce their production because of the availability of cheap food imports on the market, which results in a decrease of agricultural prices. Starita (2007:1) claims that this de-motivates

indigenous farmers from producing optimally. Browne (1999:27) clearly explains this when he says, “...*food aid tends to have deleterious ‘macro’ consequences*”.

He argues that food aid dependency depresses domestic food prices and inhibits efforts to stimulate domestic food production in some communities. This makes food assistance distractive in that it affects other livelihood sources and perpetrates poverty.

Gitu (2004:53) states that food aid organizations promotes their own activities and perspectives and in the process neglecting the needs of the people. Maren (1993:1) says just like in the colonial period food aid organizations employs an elite cadre of locals whom they reward handsomely to carry out their work. The elites act as a link to the rest of the population. Societies regard their elites as the voice of the people and they work to speak on their behalf; but in reality, they do not expose the flaws of the systems due to their stakes in the system. The aid establishments therefore move forward, ignoring the widening rift between them and the supposed recipients of their aid. Any meaningful development programme should have its intended beneficiary at the centre of implementation.

Gitu (2004:54) states that the consumers in recipient countries often view food aid commodities as being inferior to those domestically produced. Gitu (2004:57) further stresses that the rural folk considered the provision of relief food in form of yellow maize as inferior to white maize and believe such is livestock feed in the countries of origin. In other cases, consumers might doubt the nutritional and health status of the food aid as seen in Zimbabwe in 2001 when the Zimbabwean government rejected genetically modified maize food aid owing to safety concerns (Gitu, 2004:59).

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO):2004 also states that in Kenya relief food dependent people become lazy and cannot produce to meet their own consumption needs. They keep on postponing production decision-making processes to benefit from the free food. Though not documented, there are certain dry areas of Zimbabwe where food aid has become a common phenomenon. Examples include Chipinge district, Chiredzi district, Buhera district, Gokwe district, Binga district, Tsholotsho and Beitbridge. Some of these areas and in particular Chiredzi, parts of Chipinge, and Buhera have in some instances produced surplus food

which they should have stored for future consumption, but they opted to sell it with an expectation that they would be provided with food when the need arose.

There are arguments that the reason for selling food has been largely due to the level of poverty, and partly because they have always expected the government to organize food assistance.

Gitu (2004:58) further expounds on the food aid issue by stating that food aid will not be beneficial for vulnerable groups overtime since it introduces a dependency syndrome for beneficiary groups that know that even if they do not produce, relief food will be availed. Food aid is a political tool in some countries such as Kenya and during election years has been associated with high levels of inefficiency in distribution. Food aid and food-for-work initiatives are also related with high levels of wastage and pilferage by both pests and humans because people did or do not pay for the food.

Food aid stifles development as has also been identified. Gitu (2004:53) argues that the dependency syndrome that results from constant use of relief food enables the political elite to easily suppress development in such areas, and as such further marginalize residents of these areas. Relief dependent people waste a lot of time that would have otherwise been productively used in own production or in income earning activities awaiting disbursement of relief food. Such inefficiencies in time use breed laziness and are counterproductive. Over time, such people end up not educating their children and being dependent, then perpetuate the vicious cycle of food aid and poverty. These conditions are not desirable for any nation's development. Given the undesirable effects of food aid on human capital development and the psychological impact on development, food aid should be discouraged while making efforts to improve the food security status of rural people.

In summarizing the conceptual literature on food security, Maxwell and Frankenberger (1992:48) conclude: *"Firstly, enough food is mostly defined by emphasis on calories, and on requirements for an active, healthy life rather than simple survival—although this assessment may in the end be subjective"*. Secondly, food entitlements derived from human and physical capital, assets and stores, access to common property resources and a variety of social contracts at household, community, and state levels determine access to food according to Sen (1981:7).

### 2.5.6 Effectiveness of Food Aid

Ho and Hanrahan (2010:12) state that food aid has been essential for saving lives around the world, especially during a crisis or natural disaster; but its value in long-term development has been controversial. Ho and Hanrahan (2010:12) further argue that numerous development experts believe that sourcing food aid for vulnerable populations is essential in the fight against global hunger and malnutrition. Sachs (2005:8) supports this argument in that *“regions such as sub-Saharan Africa continue to require foreign assistance to help break the cycle of poverty, which they believe is a prerequisite for enabling more agricultural productivity and economic development”*.

Moyo (2009:23) a critic of foreign aid, especially food aid, argues that no meaningful help has been noted in communities that are receiving food aid though, the sum of money used amounts to trillions of dollars. Of note in Africa for instance, in the 1970s under 10% of sub-Saharan Africa’s populace lived in calamitous poverty, while today over 70% of sub-Saharan Africa lives on less than US\$2 a day even in the presence of increased aid (Moyo, 2009). Easterly (2006:12) claims, *“no country has meaningfully reduced poverty and spurred significant and sustainable levels of economic growth by relying on aid. Aid often results in unintended consequences that can have detrimental effects on the local economy”*.

Other critics like Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2009: 17), believe that if food aid does not have an exit strategy, African governments will not have any reason to find other, more self-sufficient ways of supporting development. These critics claim that foreign aid can promote corruption, create dependency, fuel inflation, create debt burdens, and remove relevance of Africans from the rest of the world. In answering many views about the negative and positive impact of aid some monitoring mechanism has been put in place to provide a transparent and unbiased review of food aid and other related assistance (Ho & Hanrahan 2010:13).

There are arguments among the donor and NGO community over the justification for using food aid as a long-term tool to promote general development objectives. The WFP and some NGOs have used food commodities directly in programmes that focus on building human assets such as nutrition, health, and education. Some argue that the motivation incentive established to promote

the involvement of the community may be as important as the direct impact of food itself, and can have pros and cons toward sustainability and effectiveness of the development project over the long term (Ho & Hanrahan 2010:12).

## **2.6. COPING MECHANISMS**

Coping mechanisms for displacement refer to the strategy applied by individuals, families, communities, institutions, firms and society or governments to cope with the negative effects of a displacement. WFP (2008: 4) states a range of short-term coping mechanisms identified that are used when there is not sufficient food in the household, according to the person primarily responsible for the preparation and provision of food.

Maxwell (1995:8) observes that short-term coping strategies can include eating foods that are less preferred and limiting the quantity of food served to an individual per meal. Another common practice is borrowing either food or money to increase household food security. Borrowing money for food can lead to a state of permanent indebtedness, and is an example of how a short-term coping strategy can put a household in a more vulnerable position with regard to long-term livelihood options. Maternal buffering is the practice of a mother deliberately limiting her own intake to ensure that children get enough to eat. Lower-income groups commonly practice skipping meals by eating only one or two meals per day. Skipping eating for a whole day is clearly a more severe means of dealing with food insufficiency. This practice is common among the lowest income groups.

Maxwell (1995:15) concludes with the view that, these various strategies are often used together, but individually, they have been presented in order of increased severity. The first two (less preferred food and limiting portion size) are roughly equivalent in terms of severity; the next three (borrowing, buffering, and skipping meals) roughly the same in terms of severity; and the last one (skipping a whole day) the most severe. Other coping strategies alluded to; include drastic measures such as stealing food or abandonment. It should be noted that adaptive capacity of displaced people are determined by (i) education or human capital, (ii) wealth, (iii) material resources, (iv) societal entitlements, (v) information, (vi) technology, (vii) infrastructure and (viii) resources (Belliveau, 2006; Easterling *et al.*, 2007; Adgar, *et al.*, 2009).

Davies (2000), Haile (2005) and Tadesse, *et al.* (2008) agree that many coping strategies result in chronic poverty due to unsustainable livelihood strategies. The selling of productive assets during displacement is an example of such a strategy. Coping strategies differ between communities and between households, depending in most cases on what is available in the environment, the market, and survival options (Watts, 1983; Corbett, 1988; Hutschinson, 1992; FEWS, 1999). They conclude that coping strategies have a social, geographic and gender profile.

In unpublished research Jordaan (2011), Watts (1983), Corbett (1988), and Hutchinson (1992) developed a model for household responses (coping mechanisms) during and after shocks. The USAID included the household response framework as a basis for vulnerability assessments in its vulnerability assessment handbook (USAID, 1999). The framework as illustrated in Fig. 2.5 shows the relation between the vulnerability level and coping strategies and the ways in which households respond to shocks.




Fig. 2.5: Sequencing of household coping responses

Source: USAID Food Security & Early Warning Vulnerability Assessment Manual, (1999:13) (After Watts, 1983).

Several *caveats* exist to interpret and apply the model in an internally displaced people community situation. Some of the coping activities may be used routinely in non-displacement

situations while others might be used as a form of coping during expected seasonal variations especially when households are displaced. Hutschinson (1992) argues that coping may not proceed sequentially along a singular trajectory but that households might pursue several strategies in parallel. Fig. 2.6 (Watts Framework<sup>1</sup>) illustrates the general progression of types of coping activities that can be applied to most households in displaced communities as (i) adaptation (*making do with what is available*), (ii) divestment of liquid assets (iii) divestment of productive assets and (iv) out migration. The World Health Organization (WHO) also uses a classification system that coincides with the Watts framework. The WHO classifies the coping strategies as (i) non-erosive, (ii) erosive and (ii) failed strategies. The activities are the same as those illustrated in the USAID framework:

- Non erosive coping or adaptation
- Changing preferred patterns of consumption
- Borrowing
- Reduction in food consumption like skipping meals or shifting to food that is more readily available
- Substitution of cheaper food
- Cut in non essential expenses
- Sale of non-productive assets
- Alternative livelihood incomes like own charcoal production and sales, etcetera
- At this stage, the market might reflect an increase in cereal prices and pressure on labour prices
- Erosive coping or divestment of liquid assets
- Borrowing with exorbitant interest

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<sup>1</sup> Called the Watts Framework since Watts was the first person to develop the framework while Corbett and Hutschinson later refined certain aspects of the framework.

- Sales of liquid assets such as small animals or accumulated wealth (e.g. sale of jewellery)
- Sales of productive assets
- Tap resources of extended family
- Bonded labour arrangements
- Child labour
- Markets may reflect an increase in number of small animals for sale at deflated prices, a continued rise in cereal prices and an accelerated decline in terms of trade (cereal per small stock unit (SSU))
- Failed coping or divestment of productive assets
- Heavy reliance on hand-outs
- Out-migration
- Prostitution
- Stealing and begging
- Consumption of seed
- Selling of productive items such as breeding cows, draft animals and ploughs
- Markets will show increasing cereal prices and a decline in prices for farm animals, implements and land
- Once crossed this threshold it is difficult – if not impossible for a household to return to previous levels of productivity and food security.
- Out migration

When all other resources are exhausted, people migrate *en masse* out of the region in search of survival. At this stage, international support is needed, as people are not in a situation to recover

using own resources. Drought and famine then become a complex emergency with people concentrated in refugee camps.

As mentioned previously, the resilience or the ability of a household to cope with displacement shocks is a function of several factors (Watts, 1983; Richards, 1986; Corbett, 1988; Hutschinson, 1992; Rocheleau, *et al.*, 1995; FEWS, 1999; De Waal, 2004; Smucker & Wisner, 2007; Erikson & Silva, 2009). The available options such as distance from labour and produce markets (roads, large urban centre), nearby forests, water sources and tourism all have an influence on the vulnerability and coping strategies for communities. The level of own resources on which a household can draw for survival is also critical (Little, *et al.*, 2006; De la Fuente, 2007; Dercon & Porter, 2007; De la Fuente, 2008). Fig. 2.6 illustrates the comparison of the different thresholds for households with different levels of own resources.

Fig. 2.6 clearly illustrates that households with different resource levels reach different thresholds at different times. Also clearly illustrated is that households with large resource levels (richer households) in many cases manage to increase their resource base due to favourable prices for animals or other goods (FEWS, 1999; Erikson & Silva, 2009). They are the only ones with capital and are in a position to exploit members of lower economic classes (FEWS, 1999). Dercon and Porter (2007), De la Fuente and Dercon (2008) and Porter (2010) confirm previous findings from other researchers also in Ethiopia where the outcome of displacement shocks vary dramatically between households with little resource base (poor households) compared to “richer” households.

The vulnerability assessment handbook used by FEWS (1999) highlights the fact that households form part of different economies. The same coping strategies possibly affect households differently, for example the sale of small animals might substantially increase the vulnerability of poor households whereas it might not affect richer households at all. Some families may have good linkages with politicians or influential people, which permit them to tap into resources at a higher level of political or economic organization. The same accounts for families with extended families or tribes that provide support to members during times of stress.




Fig. 2.6.. Differences between households responses as a function of resource base  
 Source: FEWS (1999:13).

It can be concluded that the rich among displaced people increase their resources, while the average sell their liquid assets after some time, and if they fail to cope they out-migrate from the present area of displacement. The poor tend to lose all their assets and become vulnerable during the early days of displacement. Hence, wealth at times can influence how displaced people respond to shocks.

### 2.6.1 Community Level Coping

When disaster at community level strikes, there are naturally ways to cope with the unfortunate situation. The most valuable that any community possesses is the human resource. A community that has an empowered human resource through human development is likely to suffer the effects less than an underpowered community when disaster strikes. Human resource development is defined as, “ *represents training and development specifically geared to the bottom line, to developing skills aimed at ensuring the survival and growth of individual work organizations*”, (Wood, 2001: 525). An individual empowered with human capital can better manage natural

resources around as a source of development. Nelson, Adger and Brown (2007:24) define adaptation as a process of deliberate change in anticipation of external changes or stresses. They see adaptation as a core feature of socio-ecological systems that build on the resilience of communities within these systems. Burton (2002:13) sees adaptation as the ability of social and environmental systems to adjust to change and shocks to cope with the consequences of change and shocks.

### **2.6.2 Household Level Coping**

People affected by crises are not passive victims and recipients of aid. To survive and recover they rely primarily on their capabilities, coping mechanisms, resources, and networks – they move in with family members or send their children to other relatives, draw on savings or take loans, move their herd to an area where there is adequate grazing land, switch to drought-resistant crops or send a breadwinner to find work elsewhere.

Even in areas experiencing protracted conflict and involuntary displacement, many people continue to try to pursue livelihoods and economic activities, be it in rural villages terrorized by rebel militias, urban areas inundated with displaced people or refugee camps with few assets. However, many of the strategies that people employ to meet their current food needs undermine their health and well-being, along with their ability to meet future food needs and cope with further crises (WFP, 2003). Assets and/or wealth are regarded stocks or in most cases in rural Africa as livestock – as opposed to income and consumption flows. The poor use these as a means of saving or security against climate or other shocks, but the loss of assets because of shocks is difficult to recover due to poor resourcing and poor livelihoods. The loss of assets (wealth) by deprived livelihoods can compromise their health and socio-economic development in the medium to the long run (De la Fuente, 2007; Porter, 2010).

Few rural families manage to accumulate wealth in the way of liquid assets such as cash or jewellery. Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998) find that few families make use of liquid assets to survive simply because they are too poor to accumulate such assets. On the other hand, some families manage to save some cash and it seems that women play an important role in this regard. Roncoli, *et al.* (2001) find in a study conducted in Burkina Faso that some men entrusted

their spouses with money to save for times of distress. Makoka (2008) also mentions the importance of cash savings as an important *ex-post* coping strategy in Malawi, but he finds that although the people regard asset sales as a major strategy, safety nets remain the major coping mechanism for smallholder farmers in Malawi. The Watts Framework (Fig. 2.6) also indicates that families will first utilise their cash and liquid non-productive assets to smooth consumption. This implies that the threshold for productive livestock sales can be postponed and such families may have a better chance to recover if they are not forced to eventually sell productive livestock under distress.

The difference between productive and non-productive items is founded in the future value of an asset and not necessarily in the current value. Displaced people regard small livestock as a non-productive asset since they sell it routinely to get cash. Household utensil sales on the other hand, confer a much higher degree of stress since utensils are wealth among IDPs (Roncoli, 2001). The deterioration of the terms of trade during displacement (shocks) with most consumption goods complicate the value of livestock for consumption smoothing (De la Fuente, 2007; De la Fuente & Dercon, 2008). Researchers are in agreement that households not only reduce consumption and deplete their assets in the wake of natural shocks, but they also lose the ability to rebuild productive assets and to recover to the same state as before (Carter, Little, Mogues & Negat, 2004; Little, *et al.*, 2006; Baez, 2007; De la Fuente, 2007).

Crisis-affected people often eat fewer, smaller, and less nutritious meals in order to make what they have last longer without depleting their assets. Pastoralists forced to sell their livestock in distress lose their access to milk and meat, receive a low price on the market from livestock sales. They face challenges when they try to replenish their herds in a sellers' market after the drought has subsided. Similarly, families may mortgage their land or otherwise enter into prohibitive debt in order to meet the short-term needs of their families. Worse still, they may turn to illegal forms of income generation, such as prostitution, theft or trafficking or they migrate from their homes to survive, losing access to their primary means of living and the communities and networks on which they would normally rely in times of stress (Jordaan, 2011).

Women and woman-headed households face particular risk from negative coping strategies. Women are most likely to withstand the worst of food shortages, affecting their health as well as the health and long-term potential of their unborn or young children. Women assume new responsibilities for their families' safety, economic well-being, and security, as their husbands seek employment elsewhere or conscript into armed forces. Girls pull out of school first to advantage the boys or face early marriage when household livelihoods are at risk, and women may even risk sexual abuse or enter into prostitution to protect their families' lives and livelihoods (Jordaan, 2011). Protecting and supporting livelihoods as a component of an emergency response has a number of benefits:

- It is instrumental in safeguarding food security and people's productive capacity.
- It builds recovery into the emergency response.
- It contributes to reducing relief dependency and can be cost-effective since families will protect their livelihoods for as long as possible. By the time people need relief to survive, their livelihoods are often already lost and thus they need to rely on relief for much longer.
- It is participatory, responding to what the beneficiaries want and addressing community priorities (WFP, 2002).

## CHAPTER THREE

### FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

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#### **3.1 COMMUNITY PROFILES**

The overall goal of this chapter is to present findings of the field study and to review the secondary data. However, the chapter will start by providing a background of the study areas.

##### **3.1.1 Background to Displacement**

The data collected indicated that the people most affected by displacement during the Land Reform Programme used to work on commercial farms. The majority of them were of alien origin and had no other home besides the farm where they had worked. Most of them were third and fourth generation off-springs of foreign migrant workers staying on the same farm. Following their displacements they had no rural home to fall back on and had no option but to settle illegally on the old farm or anywhere they would find a piece of land and establish temporary structures as shelter. Households inevitably lost their valuable property, food and productive assets, hence led a life of abject poverty. This group was observed at Betty farm, Mutanda and partly at St Stephens's community.

Another new dimension of displacements that was noted during the research at St Stephens was ushered in by the government Operation Restore Order exercise which saw thousands of urban and peri-urban vulnerable households' residential shelters being destroyed, rendering many of them homeless. These again sought refuge on any land they could establish homes, particularly just outside the towns and cities. Property, livelihoods, and dignity were lost in the process. Political polarization between the ruling and opposition parties had been building up since 2000 and flared up in the 2002, 2005, and 2008 elections resulting in ugly political clashes characterised by violence. Political violence resulted in whole Tsvingwe households fleeing their original homes at Envant Farm and becoming displaced households. Such people literally left everything: livestock, food, clothes, and productive assets. Perpetrators of violence immediately looted those.

### **3.1.2 Tsvingwe Camp: Mutasa District**

During focus group discussion, the interviewees indicated that sixty-two households were victims of politically motivated violence in the run-up to the June 2008 presidential election campaign allegedly for supporting the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) party. They faced eviction from Envant commercial farm and thereby losing employment, their property burnt and livestock, food, and identity documents lost and they got sheltered temporarily at Tsvingwe camp where they were residing.

The settlement has a camp set-up where households share one roomed and two roomed houses depending on household size. The area is in climatic region 2 and there is no land for cultivation as the household's settlement; jurisdiction is limited to the house only. The future of the adults, youths, and children in the camp is bleak for they have nowhere to go and authorities are not in a hurry to change their situation. Their major source of income during the research period was gold panning.

### **3.1.3 Betty Community: Mutare District**

During the Land Reform Programme in 2003, the community had their source of livelihood taken away from them after the white farm owner Mr Harry Landos faced eviction from the farm. The former farm-workers lost on land allocation allegedly for being anti-government supporters and a series of violence erupted in the area, and the farmer was killed. The community members would flee at night into the nearby bushes. It was during this process when they lost their food, household property, clothes, and some productive assets. The war veterans who were invading the farm burnt down a few households. Although permitted to reside on the compound by the local authorities, the community lost their major livelihood source, as the farm was no longer functional. The community had access to less than 0.1 hectare that they used as gardens and their land ownership status was not yet formalised because they carried a squatter's label and faced possible eviction at anytime. Their children went up to Grade 7 at school as there was no secondary school nearby, and those who managed to go to secondary temporarily moved out of the community and stayed with relatives who resided near secondary schools.

#### **3.1.4 St Stephens: Makoni District**

About 58 households had their means of livelihood destroyed when the farmer Mr Du Toit got eviction during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 to 2004. The majority of families settled illegally on a piece of land close to Nyazura Township. As vulnerable as they already were, because of land reform, they suffered further when the Government of Zimbabwe unleashed Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. During the operation, the illegal structures they were living in were burnt, and demolished. The local authorities eventually allowed them to stay in structures at St Stephens' compound. Nevertheless, the households had lost their livelihood and the immediate result was food insecurity. The adverse economic environment of 2005 to 2008 worsened their situation. Inflation eroded the money and basic commodities were unavailable. The households had been farm workers all their lives, from generation to generation, and the only livelihood means they were capable of undertaking was farming, yet the households had no ownership or access to land.

#### **3.1.5 Mutanda: Mutare District**

The takeover of Kondozi farm in the Odzi area forced most ex-workers from the farm to search for areas of settlement within 30 kilometres radius of the farms. These households were forcibly evicted from the farm premises and most families left household furniture, clothes, productive assets, food and livestock, which were burnt or seized during the haphazard eviction process. However, they resided on the peripheries of surrounding communities, which were the grazing areas and paddocks for the resident communities. They faced resistance, stigmatization, and victimization from the resident communities because the resident communities regarded them as illegal settlers.

Mutanda is in climatic region 5 and it is a rural settlement. The area is generally dry and only small grain varieties are suitable for the area. The status of IDPs in Mutanda according to local authorities is that of squatters. Their settlement is illegal which means they are susceptible to further eviction at any given moment.

### 3.2 PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA

This chapter presents data collected from the research through household questionnaires and focus group discussion. The data collected looked at the impact of food aid on displaced persons in Manicaland province and how it facilitated the adapting of the five livelihood assets into livelihood outcomes. The researcher looked at understanding household food security, migration trends, asset loss and how food aid impacted on these aspects. The role of food aid in facilitating access to social services, how it enhanced conflict management and its role on spearheading development initiatives was analyzed. This data and discussion will create the basis of the last chapter that bring out important recommendations regarding how food aid has an impact on displaced person if linked to livelihoods assets for use by humanitarian organizations, policy makers and future researches.

### 3.3 IMPACT OF FOOD AID ON DISPLACED HOUSEHOLDS

The communities reported that the displacement, which was a result of the land reform programme and political violence, deprived them of familiar livelihood assets and they found themselves in new areas with unfamiliar livelihood assets. The availability of food aid in displaced communities played a significant role in facilitating their adaptation into the new livelihoods set up.

#### 3.3.1 Livelihood Activities

**Table 3.1: Livelihood income source before displacement**      **Table 3.2: Livelihood income source after the displacement**

H/H livelihood source	Per cent
<b>Waged labour</b>	42.9%
<b>Casual labour</b>	26.1%
<b>Skilled labour</b>	4.9%
<b>Subsistence farming</b>	8.2%
<b>Domestic work</b>	3.3%
<b>Petty trading</b>	14.7%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%

Current livelihood source	Per cent
<b>Petty trading</b>	10.1%
<b>Casual labour</b>	58.9%
<b>Skilled labour</b>	7.6%
<b>Subsistence farming</b>	6.3%
<b>Mining / Panning</b>	1.9%
<b>Unemployed/no income</b>	15.2%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%

Table 3.1 indicates that 43% of the households were engaged in waged labour at commercial farms, where households would get a monthly salary, which was consistent, although income was generally low. Within the same households, 26% would also engage in casual labour as a livelihood option. Fourteen percent of the households engaged in petty trading, eight per cent also practised subsistence farming to compliment other livelihood options the household would be pursuing. Only 4.9% were involved in skilled labour livelihoods. The majority of the displaced population were former commercial farm workers and waged labour was the main source of livelihood. However, they would also alternatively pursue casual labour to increase their income generating activities. The other adult member in the household normally did this.

According to Table 3.2 after facing displacement, livelihood options changed greatly after the farm takeover which was the main source of survival, 59% of the households were in casual labour as their main source of income and livelihood source, 15.2% were not employed and did not have a source of income. The loss of livelihood greatly changed most households' income flows. However, 10.1% was into petty trading. Owing to some developmental programmes for the displaced, 7.6% was practising some skilled labour, 6.3% was into subsistence farming. In Tsvingwe and Betty communities, some households were into illegal gold panning and that constituted about 1.9% of the total households. However, some households might be practising casual labour, petty trading and panning as the households' combination of livelihood options. This therefore indicates that the displacement, which affected their livelihoods, affected their household food security.

The combined livelihood options were because there was no reliable livelihood source for the households. There was an increase in the number of IDPs practising skilled labour due to vocational education activities introduced by IOM as was noted. The interviewees during focus group admitted that they pursued vocational education because they knew that their households had adequate food supply due to the food aid programme that was going on in the communities. Food aid facilitated the acquiring of skills by displaced people hence increasing skills, and then used to create incomes in the household.

Food aid can assist vulnerable groups to acquire skills if combined with vocational training and this will assist in increasing the human capital of the community hence, creating durable

solutions for IDPs. The statistics in table 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 indicates that skilled labour increased from 4.9% to 7.6% due to the presence of food aid in the communities. From the research findings overall food aid assisted IDP to adjust to new sets of livelihood assets. Food aid neutralised the shock of displacements and facilitated the gaining of lost assets as suggested by UNWFP EFSA (2009:9).

### 3.4 SOCIO ECONOMIC STATUS




Fig. 3.1: Percentage of availability and non-availability of local markets for IDPs

According to Figure 3.1 it is noted that regardless of their legal status some IDPs had access to local markets while some did not have access. Mutanda and Betty communities did not have local markets indicating 50 % of IDPs without markets. They relied on shops that were 15km away but St Stephens and Tsvingwe camp had local markets within the community or a market which was less than 5 km away from the community. With this background, IDPs without local markets faced challenges of access to food because they had to travel long distances to purchase food from the shops.

**TABLE 3.3: ACCESS TO MARKETS BY COMMUNITY**

Access to the market	Name of community				Total
	Tsvingwe	Betty	St Stephens	Mutanda	
<b>Access</b>	25	0	25	0	50
<b>No access</b>	0	25	0	25	50
	25	25	25	25	100

Table 3.3 indicates that all households in Tsvingwe and St Stephen have access to markets, but from the focus group discussions it was noted that they could not access the food items on the local markets due to high prices as well as limited income. Food purchased at these shops decreased by 91% (Fig. 3.2), whilst nine per cent indicated an increase.




Fig. 3.2: Purchases at local markets

The decrease in the number of people or purchases at local markets was because in some communities, there were no local markets and livelihood activities changed to such an extent that households did not have the money to buy food from the markets. Some people were getting payment in the form of food or given food after casual labour. These factors reduced the number of people purchasing food from the local markets. Indication was that the introduction of food aid distorted and affected the local market.

This concurs with Gitu's findings in Kenya where food aid adversely affected local markets (Gitu, 2004:48). It was imperative for food aid programmes to consider survival of local markets. A cash transfer intervention could assist in supporting local markets while the IDPs accessed food. Betty and Mutanda communities expressed that availability of food aid in the form of products guaranteed access to food since cash was useless in the absence of markets. In conclusion, cash for food would be ideal for Tsvingwe and St Stephens, which had local markets while distribution of grain and finished product would be ideal for Mutanda and Betty because of limited access to market. Hence, food aid was of great benefit to the IDPs at Betty and Mutanda while those at St Stephens and Tsvingwe could have benefited more if it was a food for cash programme.

### 3.5 FOOD SECURITY AND FOOD STOCKS

TABLE 3.4: CURRENT FOOD STOCKS

Current cereals in stock in kg	Current pulses in kg	Current vegetable oil in /
11.625	0.15815	0.30785

Table 3.4 indicates that most households had an average of 11.625 kg of cereal in stock and 0.15815 kg of pulses and 0.30785 litres of vegetable oil in stock currently.




Fig. 3.3: Community food stock for three month

Fig. 3.3 shows that 98% of the households had food stocks, which would last less than a month, and only two per cent had food stocks that would last up to a month, but fewer than three months. This indicates that the presence of food aid cushions the IDP community during the stress period. Communities have to conduct research to find out which livelihood assets they can utilise, while food aid is still active, for sustainability.




Fig. 3.4: Household food needs in October to April and throughout the year

With the current stocks lasting less than a month according to Fig. 3.4, 58% of the households wanted food aid to be delivered throughout the year because most households lacked a sustaining livelihood activity that provided the household with sufficient food. Forty-two per cent of the households needed food aid from October to April, because during that period of the year, food availability was very low. It was during this time when the households’ food stocks from the previous agricultural season would be finished. Since most households did not have access to

more land for agricultural purposes, their reserves would be finished hence, requesting food from October to April, after harvest. AID agencies could work with local authorities in finding alternative sources of food aid to avoid dependence on food aid throughout the year. If government set policies that assisted IDPs to access some physical assets, such as land as well as engaging the private sector in assisting those IDPs they had provided with land, to be assisted with trainings and inputs, IDPs could attaining durable solutions. This concurred with Guarnieri (2003:3) that food aid should be used to the extent possible to support livelihoods as part of a life saving strategy.

**TABLE 3.5: FOOD SOURCES BEFORE DISPLACEMENT**

<b>Food Source</b>	<b>Per cent</b>
Purchases	38.6%
Own crops	25.7%
Payment in kind	18.8%
Casual labour	11.9%
Livestock and asset sales	5.0%
Cumulative total	100%

Most of the households had employment and waged labour was their main livelihood source before facing displacement. That implied that the households purchased their own food. Table 3.5 shows that 38.6% of the households relied on purchases as a food source, and within the same households 25.7% relied on their own crops as food source. However, 18.8% of the households received their payment in the form of food after working in the fields of legal resident farmers, and this played a major role in ensuring household food security. The households would also engage in some casual labour, while 11.9% of the households engaged in casual labour to get food from it. Only five per cent would sell their livestock or any assets so that they could buy food.

After facing displacement, 38.4% of the households as shown in Table 3.6, lost employment which implied that their food source changed. Casual labour became the main food source. The livestock loss increased from five per cent before displacement to 18 % after displacement which tended to agree with the view by FEWS (1999) as explained by Jordaan (2011:15) that the poor tends to lose all their assets and become vulnerable during the early days of displacements. Indications were that households lost liquid and productive assets because of displacement.

**TABLE 3.6: LOST LIVELIHOODS AFTER DISPLACEMENT**

Losses after displacement	Per cent
Employment	38.4%
Livestock	18.0%
Shelter	3.3%
Food	20.0%
Clothes, Furniture, Identity documents	20.4%
Total	100

**TABLE 3.7: CURRENT FOOD SOURCES**

Current food source	Per cent
Casual labour	39.5%
Partner sales	25.6%
Paid in kind for labour	16.0%
Purchases	6.3%
Borrowing and gifts	12.6%
Total	100

According to Table 3.7, the main source of food in most households was casual labour which translated to 39.5% of household's current food source. Either these households received payment in the form of food after casual labour or they buy food from the casual labour returns. The findings of this research differ from the view that food aid was not a suitable resource when seeking to maintain assets or maintain livelihoods as stated in this research; rather food aid was suitable when seeking to maintain livelihoods as well as maintaining assets among IDPs.

### 3.6 FOOD SECURITY AND HOUSEHOLD FOOD AID

Every household participated in food aid programmes for an average of three to four years after facing displacement.




Fig. 3.5: Household participation in food aid




Fig. 3.6: Duration of participation in food aid




Fig. 3.7: Improvement of food stock since food aid

According to Fig. 3.7, **61%** of the households did not experience an improvement in food stocks since benefiting from the food aid programme in three to four years as indicated in Fig. 3.6 while 39% had their stocks improved. Mutanda and Betty communities received some agricultural inputs to enhance the food security as noted from the focus group discussions. It was in these two communities where the 39% of the household indicated an improvement in food stocks.

This concurs with the UNWFP report (2002:7) that if the food aid programme is linked to food security related activities like farming it results in sustainability hence, reducing IDPs' dependency on food aid. The 61% of the households that did not attain an increase in their food stocks was because they had limited access to land for agricultural purposes, and their main livelihood source, which was casual labour, could only provide food for less than a month as illustrated in Fig. 3.5. Unless food aid interventions in displacement settings integrated community assets such as access to land, access to inputs and skills development IDPs would

always depend on food aid and that could cause dependency as indicated by 58% of the households who required food aid throughout the year as noted in Fig. 3.6.

### 3.7 IMPACT OF FOOD AID PROGRAMMES

#### 3.7.1 Food Aid and Household Integrity




Fig. 3.8: Role of food aid in bringing family together




Fig. 3.9: Reasons for family unity

After facing displacement, most family members scattered around or out migrated in search of livelihood options, food and accommodation. However, during the food aid period, Fig. 3.8 indicates that 87% of the household members came back whilst 13% did not come back. Of the 87% who came back together, Fig. 3.9 shows that 68% came back because food was available, 19% came back because conflicts were resolved and 13% did not come back (6%+7%).

This is in line with Harvey's (2005:2-6) view that IDPs migrate to where food aid is and they also consider protection and safety in migration decision-making. Food aid can create opportunities for peace if mainstreaming of conflict management is done. Food aid programmes can be used to create conducive environment for peace building. From the focus group discussions it was found that those who did not return had found land in other areas using their connections. This brings up another dimension, namely that those who have connections gain access to livelihood assets in other areas where other groups of displaced people cannot access. While food aid plays a significant role in facilitating reunion of families that separated, others use their connections to move out of displacement or illegal settlement to formal areas.

### 3.7.2 Food Aid and Migration

**TABLE 3.8: HOUSEHOLDS WHO MOVED INTO AREAS RECEIVING FOOD AID**

H/H that moved	Per cent
yes	26.0
no	74.0
Total	100.0

Table 3.8 shows that 26% of the IDPs households moved into the area that received food aid during the food aid period. The most significant movement was in Mutanda community in Mutare District with 21% of the 26% of the people who moved. That was mainly because land was available in Mutanda area, and the need for food forced some families to move into the area. Tsvingwe and St Stephens had four per cent of households moving into the area receiving food aid. The reason for fewer or no people moving into Betty, Tsvingwe and St Stephens was because the settlement type was of a hamlet (compound) set-up which did not allow for extra population.

**TABLE 3.9: HOUSEHOLD MOVING INTO AN AREA RECEIVING FOOD AID PER COMMUNITY**

Location	Households which moved into the area receiving food aid		Total
	Yes	No	
Tsvingwe	4	21	25
Betty	0	25	25
St Stephens	0	25	25
Mutanda	21	4	25
Total	25	75	100

According to responses in Fig. 3.9, of all the 25% households, which moved into the area, 14% moved in because food was available and they needed food, ten per cent moved into the area

because there was access to land for shelter construction and agriculture purposes whilst two per cent moved in because there were livelihood options. Fig. 3.10 clearly illustrates these patterns. It could imply that community livelihood assets had a bearing on migration direction trends during displacement. Displaced persons tended to look for areas where there were forms of capital that linked to their abilities, to exploit these and then ended up residing in those areas. If food aid could complement these household choices IDPs would be able to remain in their displaced location and they could end up being re-integrated into the displacement site. That could reduce the cost of relocation as well as the adaptation of new forms of capital in the new settlement if resettlement was to be considered as an option.




Fig. 3.10: Reason for moving into areas receiving food aid

The Table 3.10 shows the reasons of the community for moving into the area receiving food aid. Of the 100% which moved into Mutanda, 52% moved into the area because they wanted to benefit from the food aid programme, whilst 40% came to the area because there was access to land and the remaining eight per cent came as result of availability of livelihood options. However, in communities like Tsvingwe where there was a land restriction and limitation, only four per cent said they moved because they wanted to benefit from the food aid programme. Owing to land limitations in Betty and St Stephens not one family moved into the community during the food aid period.

**TABLE 3.10: COMPARISON OF MOVEMENT BY COMMUNITY**

	What is the reason for moving into the area	
Tsvingwe Camp	In Need Of Food Aid	4%
	Not Moved	96%
Betty farm	Not Moved	100%
St Stephens	Not Moved	100%
Mutanda	In Need Of Food Aid	52%
	Availability Of Livelihoods	8%
	Access To Land	40%

It was noted during the focus group discussions that most IDPs preferred to relocate to areas where there was a good climate, especially climatic region one to three if land and food aid were available. They shared the view that food aid cushioned them from the shock of displacement while they would be exploiting the natural capital (land) which was related to their skills as human capital in areas with a favourable climate where they were then resettled. Given that most displaced former farm workers were agricultural labourers with agricultural-related skills, migrating to areas with a favourable climate was to their advantage as they could easily adapt to the new environment. The impact of the displacement shock would be less compared to migrating to an area with a poor climate that was not linked to their skills and experience. The reason why some IDPs had to move to Mutanda was because land was available, though the climate was hostile. The availability of land, a natural capital, gave hope that of their skills could be used while food was being provided through aid.

It could be concluded that migration patterns for IDPs followed a trend of linkage between their skills as human capital and access to a natural capital. This guaranteed IDPs that they would have livelihood outcomes which were dependent on utilizing their land. The human capital's ability to link to the other four forms of capital determined the destination for temporary or permanent settlement. The availability of alluvial gold in Tsvingwe determined the stay of IDPs regardless of unavailability of land. The gold assisted in the choice to stay at the current location. The availability of casual labour which was linked to the skills of people in St Stephen and Betty determined their stay at that location.

### 3.7.3 Food Aid and Access to Referral Systems and Basic Social Services

#### 3.7.3.1 Schools




Fig. 3.11: School attendances for children in food recipients' districts




Fig. 3.12: Improvement in school attendances per location.

During the food aid period, there was a high increase in school attendance with 92% households confirming an increase in attendance with eight per cent reporting a decrease as indicated in Fig. 3.11. That was above the national attendance which was 80 % (ZIMVAC, 2011:17). Food aid enhanced the availability of food for children hence, they were no longer compelled to assist parents in casual labour to raise more income which would guarantee food security. It allowed IDPs' children to access education like any other children. In Manicaland province, according to ZIMVAC (2011:19), 16% of the children were not attending schools while in IDPs' communities it was eight per cent which indicated that food aid had a great impact on school attendance for IDP children.

**TABLE 3.11: REASON FOR IMPROVED ATTENDANCES DURING FOOD AID PERIOD**

Reasons for improved attendances	Per cent
Access to social basic services	25.4%
More time to pursue livelihood options	26.8%
Nutrition levels of displaced children improved	9.1%
Money used to buy food was channelled to school fees	38.8%
Total	100.0%

According to Table 3.11, the availability of food aid assisted in creating savings in households which was in turn, used to pay fees for children. Food aid had a great impact in facilitating access to basic services for displaced children. Parents could use income from casual labour to procure books hence increasing quality of service.

### 3.7.4 Food Aid and Conflict Management

With the continuity of the food aid programme within the displaced community, there were some conflicts that arose over access to food aid between the host community and the displaced communities. The host community did not benefit from the food aid programme; 43 % indicated that there were conflicts related to food aid, while 57 % did not regard food aid as the only source of conflict.




Fig. 3.13: Conflict between host and displaced communities over food aid




Fig. 3.14: Causes of conflict between IDPS and the host community

Fig. 3.14 illustrates that the main cause of conflicts was that the host community's members wanted to be included in the food aid programme with 35% stating food aid as the main source of conflict of the 43% respondents who indicated conflict in Fig.3.13. However, in Mutanda, the displaced communities resettled within the grazing areas of the host communities, which caused conflict until the District Authorities addressed it. The Tsvingwe IDPs were labelled anti-ZANU PF party and that caused conflicts with the host community. There were some allegations that the former white farmers were the ones supplying food to the displaced communities through donor agencies. That created misconceptions that food aid was a ploy to reverse the land reform programme.

Donor agencies engaged government during the food aid period and consulted the key stakeholder to highlight the objective of the food assistance to displaced persons. With this advocacy, the displaced communities were recognised as well as accepted into the mainstream of the community as a socio-economic group. With that level of advocacy, displaced communities experienced some developmental initiatives which were instrumental in uniting the displaced with the host communities. Food aid facilitated dialogue where it was not available and the integration of the vulnerable host community members resulted in food aid programmes being viewed, as a community programmes not a programme targeting IDP's only. If food aid was to create peace, it needed to be inclusive, especially during targeting. The involvement of the host community was very important for future peaceful coexistence given the environment of mistrust that was prevalent in Zimbabwe due to political difference between ZANU PF and MDC-T. That would demystify the wrong notion of food aid targeting IDPs that host communities had and created an enabling environment for IDPs that was free from harm.

Selective targeting of IDPs who were former farm workers displaced by the land reform for food aid in a community with a host community made up of new farmers who were occupying the farms that displaced households they used to work for, created an impression that IDPs were a special group. The host communities at conflict with IDPs, would end up viewing food aid as a way to build the capacity of the IDPs in a ploy to topple them from influence. Food aid played into the power dynamics of the community in that as a resource it tilted the balance of power in favour of those receiving at the expense of those not receiving. While the main object of food aid was to addresses the filling of the gap of the “haves” and “have nots” the “haves” becoming concerned when the scale of power dynamics tilted as it affected the position that they previously enjoyed.

### 3.7.5 Food Aid and Community Development




Fig. 3.15: How food aid facilitated community development

Fig. 3.15 shows that 87% of the community members acknowledged the developmental initiatives during the food aid period

**TABLE 3.12: THE IMPACT OF FOOD AID ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT**

How food aid help develop community	Per cent
Unite the displaced and the resident community	25.9%
Help initiate any local developmental programmes	33.3%
Displaced in accessing referral system and social basic services	40.7%
Total	100.0%

Table 3.12 indicates that 25.9 % agreed that food aid had an impact on uniting displaced and residence community in community development. Thirty-three per cent agreed that food aid helped in initiating local development programmes and 40.7% of IDPs had access to referral

systems and social services. This meant the residents and IDPs could plan and implement the development programmes together, building on relationships created during food aid intervention. During focus group discussions, participation of IDPs in community development programmes were indicated. This resulted in IDPs getting allocation of space in community gardens in Mutanda, Betty, and St Stephens during the food aid period. However, unity with the host communities was spearheaded by the food aid programme because 20% of the vulnerable host community benefited from the food aid programme. Food aid acted as a connector rather than a divider hence, facilitating their community participation.

### 3.7.6 Food Aid and Household Development

**TABLE 3.13: HOUSEHOLD LOSSES DURING DISPLACEMENT**

Household losses	Per cent
<b>Employment</b>	38.4%
<b>Livestock</b>	18.0%
<b>Shelter</b>	3.3%
<b>Food</b>	20.0%
<b>Clothes, furniture, identity documents</b>	20.4%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%

The interviewed IDPs indicated that after losing employment and facing displacement, Table 3.13, that 18% lost livestock, 20% lost food, and 20.4% lost clothes, furniture and identity documents (inclusive) in the process which meant that some households lost assets. This concurred with Davies (2000), Haile (2005) and Tadesse (2008) that household asset loss was a result of unsustainable livelihood strategies due to displacement. The major loss was employment with 38.4%, food and clothes, furniture and identity documents was a significant loss of 40.4%. Eighteen per cent had their livestock taken away during the evictions from their residents and 3.3% of the displaced persons lost shelter they owned during and after the displacement.

Table 3.2 indicates assets gained by households after the introduction of food aid. The focus group discussions indicated that households' economic status was not the same; rather they differed in their economic background. The rich among IDPs managed to access land using their resources, but the moderate and the poor had to move to illegal settlements. The introduction of food aid assisted in reducing the sale of liquid assets and productive assets. For those who had lost their liquid assets such as small livestock and productive assets such as agriculture tools

managed to recover them as indicated in Table 3.14. This supports the FEWS's (1999) idea of response as a function of resource base.

**TABLE 3.14: ASSET GAINED DURING FOOD AID**

What was acquired	Per cent
<b>Sickle, axe, hoe</b>	33.3%
<b>Bicycle, mobile phone</b>	18.6%
<b>Clothes, furniture</b>	48.0%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%
<b>(e)</b>	

Forty-eight per cent of the households' acquisitions were clothes and furniture to replace those lost during displacement; 33.3% of the households bought some productive tools to enhance their livelihood options; 18.6% acquired bicycles and mobile phones. This concurs with the view that the introduction of food aid during the early days reduces asset loss and promotes asset replacement, as households will be able to use their income for non-food security related purchases. This facilitates the reversal of the views of Watts (1983), Corbett (1988) and Hutchinson (1992) regarding household responses (coping mechanisms) during and after shocks in that food aid can neutralise the impact of the shock by reducing the progression of coping from moderate to extreme through building resilience. Table 3.14 indicates that households prioritised income to non-food security related purchases. This makes food aid to stimulate the reinvestment of liquid assets and reinvestment in productive assets as indicated in Table 3.13.

**TABLE 3.15: INCOME PRIORITISATION IN PURCHASES**

How they acquired	Per cent
<b>After casual labour</b>	48.0%
<b>Money set aside to buy food</b>	52.0%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%

Fifty-two per cent of the households (Table 3.15) made their acquisitions with the money targeted to buy food while 48% used money gained after casual labour, which could indicate that food aid promoted savings. With the introduction and continuity of food aid, households could afford to buy clothes, furniture, hoes, axes, sickles, and bicycles which attributed to an increase in time to pursue other livelihood options. Households were adapting to the prevailing situation

regarded as moderate vulnerability by USAID Food Security and Early Warning Vulnerability Assessment Manual (1999).

### 3.8 COPING STRATEGIES

Coping strategies are indicators of a household's food security. A change in the coping mechanisms within the household determines food aid impact. For the food insecure households, four coping strategies are engaged to address food insecurity and these strategies are the household's change in diet, short-term increase in food supplies, decrease in the number of individuals eating food and reduction in ration sizes. These coping strategies are engaged when households do not have enough food, and do not have enough money to buy food. This research occurred 40 days after the stoppage of food aid. The period being analysed was for 30 days after stoppage of food assistance.

#### 3.8.1 Dietary Change

During a 30-day period, the households relied on less expensive or less preferred foods as a coping strategy as indicated in Fig. 3.16; 45% often relied on less expensive foods or less preferred foods for three to six days a week, whilst 33% sometimes employed the mechanism for one to two days/week and 15% relied on less preferred and less expensive foods on a daily basis. Six per cent seldom relied on the option and only one per cent of the total households interviewed never relied on less preferred and less expensive foods. The high frequency (45%) of households relying on less preferred foods for three to six days a week indicated high food insecurity after termination of food aid.




Fig. 3.16: Household dietary changes over a period 30 day

Of the households, 78% relied on less preferred and less expensive foods from one to six days a week which indicated that the households were then food insecure. Termination of food aid without households being able to depend on their five forms of capital for income can lead to a reversal in assets gained during the food aid period resulting in asset loss. Hence, the exit strategy of food aid has to correlate with the ability of the community to exploit the capital assets.

### 3.8.2 Increase Short Term Household Food Availability

After experiencing food shortages displaced persons households, tend to find ways to increase their households' food reserves or availability. The major strategies employed were borrowing food or relying on help from friends, purchasing food on credit, gathering unusual types or amounts of wild food or hunting or harvesting immature crops. These four coping mechanisms were meant to the increase of household's food availability. Fig. 3.17 is a summary of the findings during the research in four IDP communities of the four coping strategies employed for a 30-day period and observed after 40 days that the food aid programme had stopped among IDPs.




Fig. 3.17: Coping mechanism to increase food availability

Data obtained indicated that 49% of the households seldom used the four coping strategies to increase food availability for the household for one to three days per month. Only 24% sometimes relied on the four strategies to increase food availability while 22% never relied on gathering wild fruits or hunting, harvesting immature crops, mainly because there were no crops

in fields and there were not many wild fruits available during August to December, when the research was done. Of the four main groups of coping strategies, the gathering of wild fruits was the least used of the four main groups of coping strategies because at the time of the research the season provided limited options for wild foods.

### 3.8.3 Decreased Number of People

The third mechanism used by displaced people as a coping strategy was either reducing the number of people consuming food or by sending family members to eat elsewhere or sending some members to beg for food.




Fig. 3.18: Reduction of family members as a copying strategy

Owing to the unavailability of food in most households, Fig. 3.18 indicates that 59% of the households seldom sent members to beg or eat elsewhere for one to three days a week. Thirty-two per cent of the households never sent any household member to beg or eat elsewhere because most households within the displaced population had similar household food insecurity situations hence they had limited households that they could go to beg or eat. Only nine per cent sometimes sent members to beg or eat elsewhere.

### 3.8.4 Rationing Strategies

The fourth and most used method, according to the findings, is when households attempt to manage the shortfall by rationing the food available to the household (cutting portion size or number of meals, favouring certain household members over others or skipping whole days without eating).




Fig. 3.19: Rationing of food as a coping strategy

Fig. 3.19 shows that 37% of the households sometimes employ ration strategies for one to two days a week and 20% of the households for three to six days a week. These high percentages indicated that it was the most common coping strategy in most displaced persons' households. Twenty-seven per cent seldom rationed their food supply as coping mechanism. Eight per cent reduced portion sizes daily, and even skipped a day without eating. During focus group discussions women indicated that they were the ones that were mostly affected as they would be striving for the survival of their children.

TABLE 3.16: FREQUENCY OF COPING STRATEGIES

Coping Strategy	Never	Seldom(1-3 days/month)	Sometimes (1-2 days/week)	Often(3-6 days/week)	Daily	Total %
Dietary change (f)	1	6	33	45	15	100
Increase in short term food availability	22	49	24	5	1	100
Decrease in people (g)	32	59	9	0	0	100
Rationing strategies (h)	8	27	37	20	8	100

The main coping strategies most frequently practised were dietary change and rationing of food quantities for household consumption from three to six days a week or on a daily basis. These two practices were very common in households interviewed as indicated in Table 3.16. However, increase in short-term food availability was dependent on food availability and access. That also varied with the season, wild fruits and availability of planted crops.

The findings of this research concur with Maxwell and Frankenberger (1992) that all those various strategies were used together among IDPs. Observations from the focus group discussions indicated that the relationship between IDPs and their ability to exploit their

livelihood assets determined their adaptive capacity. Hence, IDPs who had some assets did not adopt some of the coping strategies employed by those who did not have. It was clear that Betty farm IDPs had 33% of their households who had never adapted to any of the four coping strategies. That could be attributed to the gardens that they had with perennial water as well as the level of education of most household heads which put them in a better position than the other three communities.

### **3.9 DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS**

The focus group discussions indicated that displacement removed the affected households from familiar forms of capital to a new set of capital. The adjustment to a new set of capitals, if not cushioned by food aid, usually resulted in asset loss as well as failure to cope with the new area's income sources hence, increasing vulnerability. There were marked differences noted between hurriedly displaced populations as they did not have time to choose their destination, and those who were given ample time to move. They moved to areas where there was linkage between their human capitals and the other four forms of capitals. From the study, the Mutanda community of Mutare district was given ample time to move, and they adjusted well in the illegal settlement as opportunities were available. Though climatic conditions affected their food security, they managed to adjust as food aid mitigated their food shortages.

In a displaced settlement such as Betty and St Stephens, the families had been detached from the source of income that used to guarantee their food security, that is, the employer. The changes in the transforming structures by new land policy, led to denial of access to basic services by former farm workers and their status changed from farm labourers to squatters (IDPs). This new status denied the former farm workers access to land for cultivation and access to shelter. The introduction of food aid facilitated dialogue, though unintentionally hence, resulting in formalisation of their stay in St Stephens. However, further research will possibly ascertain the relationship between migration and livelihood assets.

The research indicated that food aid had both direct and indirect impact on IDPs in Manicaland province. Both direct and indirect impact of food aid had positive and negative impact results.

It was noted that households that experienced double displacement struggled to cope even if they were provided with food aid. Their confidence to find a lasting solution in food security could be guaranteed by being given access to permanent land. During focus group discussions, the displaced households expressed dissatisfaction with some of the food basket items, like bulgur wheat; lintels and sorghum that were distributed had little up take during the first days of food distributions.

The impact of food aid had little financial significance in that no substantive amount of money was generated from another alternative income though the social protection seemed to have been positively impacted. There were no huge loss of liquid and productive assets during the food aid period, but rather there was an increase in labour; reduction in household cost and diet change. This concurs with Watts (1983), Corbett (1988), and Hutchinson's (1992) model for household response in Jordaan's (2011) unpublished research in that food aid facilitated adaptation and prevented divestment in form of loss in liquid and productive assets among IDPs. Food aid increased resilience and the ability of households to cope with the impact of displacement shock based on discussions with the affected households in that they had not intended to move from the current location and they were advocating for formalisation of their stay in these illegal settlements.

A remarkable improvement in socio-economic welfare of displaced persons during the research was observed. The findings indicated that 87% of households came back together during the food aid period and 58% of the interviewees confirmed that it was a result of food aid. This is in agreement with the view by Harvey (2005:5) in that food aid, which is a protection intervention, is taken into consideration in decision-making for migration destination. School attendances during the food aid period as indicated in figure 3.7.3.2 was at 92 %, which is above the national attendance that is 80% (ZIMVAC, 2011:17). The fact that 38.8% of the interviewed household used money that was used to buy food towards paying the school fees for their children is a confirmation of a good practice that food aid impacted positively.

Observations were that there was no integration of the host (resident) community in the food aid programme and that created hostilities between the IDPs and the host community. A targeting ratio was later designed by humanitarian agencies where they would include 20% of the

vulnerable legal residential community as beneficiaries of food aid. This neutralised the negative impact that food aid had created in all the four communities. This view supports the observation by UNWFP (2003) that identification of food aid needs of the host communities plays a significant role in uniting feuding parties in conflict related displacement. Food aid played a role in facilitating local integration of the displaced persons with the host community. The decision made by the local government to formalise IDPs at St Stephen and Tsvingwe could be an indicator that the positive co-existence that was prevailing during the food aid period guaranteed local integration.

Community development initiatives such as schools construction at St Stephens's Primary School and Marpo Primary School in Betty and community gardens were achieved through integrating a food aid component. The IDPs and host community agreed that all food beneficiaries should work in development activities at no cost in a bid to increase the community's physical capitals. Their hosts and IDPs worked together in rehabilitation of the schools with fair distribution of duties. This facilitated access to education for IDP children in that the host community was no longer barring their children from attending school for the reason that their parents were new arrivals and they did not play a role in the school construction. Displacement situations provided both constraints and potential opportunities for supporting livelihoods related to food aid. IDPs might have limited access to land, livestock, jobs or other sources of livelihood during their stay at a place of safety, which limited their ability to pursue livelihood strategies hence, provision of food aid led to reduced vulnerability.

The human capital, which includes skills and abilities, had an influence on migration as displaced peoples' education level and work experience hindered them from moving into areas, which required some form of education to survive or specialised skills. The households ended up moving onto farms and rural areas as their level of education could fit well in livelihoods options available in those areas. However, food aid assisted in giving IDPs opportunities to pursue the development of human capital in the form of skills and educational development due to the guarantee of food security it provided at household level. Displaced persons managed to pursue vocational education during the food aid period.

### **3.10 COMMUNITY DRIVEN ALTERNATIVES TO FOOD AID**

The communities were of the opinion that security of tenure affected the confidence in utilizing their local forms of livelihood assets during the food aid period, but the formalization of their stay, for example at St Stephens would assist in building their confidence hence, exploiting physical capital such as land for gardening which would enhance food security.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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#### 4.1 CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it can be noted that the provision of food aid has both positive and negative impacts on the IDPs. The provision of food aid contributes positively towards the displaced communities in the sense that it offers food relief to people which is of utmost importance especially in times of displacement and to people settled in areas with unfavourable conditions for farming. It gives the IDPs a sense of food security and the people start to engage in other areas of life which are important such as sending their children to schools. The provision of food aid increases a sense of belonging to the once uprooted and marginalised IDP communities as they feel worthy by being cared for. The IDPs are able to retain their few possessions instead of selling them in order to acquire food. Generally the provision of food aid means that the diet of the people is enhanced. There is improved communication amongst the communities. The various meetings held by the food aid providers brought unity and integration amongst the people as they would be having one goal, that of receiving food aid and they could put whatever differences they had aside. According to the research, there can be improved relations between the host communities and the IDPs as a result of food aid programmes if proper targeting is done.

The chief weakness of food aid programmes is that they offer short-term relief and yet it has long-term negative effects such as crippling the IDPs as they can no longer be self-sustainable but become more and more dependent on the food aid providers. This dependence syndrome is very dangerous as it means that in the long run such communities cannot live without assistance, thus adding to their vulnerability and worse still, there is room for exploitation and manipulation. It may also increase conflicts and malice in the society if it appears that certain groups of people are benefiting more than others.

According to 75% of the IDPs' interviews, displacement caused by the land reform programme had an impact on the food security situation, as agriculture was an economic base for Zimbabwe.

With the introduction of food aid, it can be concluded, based on the findings above that the assistance had a huge impact on increasing food stock levels at household level; improved welfare of displaced persons; facilitated access to basic social services; assisted in facilitating adaptation to a new set of livelihood assets.

The food stock that the people had during the research which could last less than a month to three months was from food aid not their own production. Hence, food aid had an important role in cushioning displaced persons' households by maintaining their food stock during the displacement shock. The food security situation in displaced communities improved significantly during the food aid period. A conclusion based on the research findings is that food aid assisted in building resilience among IDPs and facilitated adaptation by hindering the disposal of liquid and productive assets. There was a noted increase in household labour and reduction in household costs. Food aid supported the sustainability of livelihood interventions in displaced communities with the thriving Betty farm gardening activities supporting this view, as 33% of interviewees acknowledged that they had never employed any coping strategies.

Security of tenure is the most significant contributory factor hindering community driven effective alternatives to food aid programmes among IDPs. If not addressed un-formalised, IDPs in Manicaland will have challenges in finding alternative ways to address their food insecurity because of denied access to livelihood assets in their current area of residence.

## **4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **4.2.1 Humanitarian Organisations**

- Developmental projects should be introduced alongside food aid to provide self sustaining long-term solutions to household and community development. This will foster a quick exit of food aid programmes in IDP communities.
- Inclusion of residential community in food aid programmes plays a significant role in neutralizing the conflict that might arise between the IDPs and the resident community

especially in cases where the hosts are the perpetrators, while the IDPs are the victims. This will play a significant role in encouraging integration and unity in IDP communities.

- Food for assets interventions addresses food insecurity by giving IDP opportunities to engage in food security interventions such as irrigation construction and conservation farming, which will result in food secure households. If these are expanded they will reduce the period of food aid assistance in IDP communities
- The exit strategy for food aid should be cognizant of the ability of the households to survive based on support of available livelihood assets. This will reduce negative coping strategies after the suspension of food aid.
- Food aid can be used as a connector as well as a tool to foster dialogue of feuding groups during displacements. Humanitarian organization should take advantage of the relationship built during the food aid period to create dialogue as this will result in peaceful coexistence between IDPs and the resident community.

#### **4.2.2 Policy Makers**

- Provision of skills training linked to food aid to economically active IDPs household members should be supported in order to widen options on durable solutions such as livelihood incomes.
- There should be land advocacy for the displaced people so that they also get permanent and well documented title deeds for any residential place and land for agricultural purposes during emergency phases when programmes such as food aid that cushion them from the shocks of displacement, will be implemented. This shortens the period for food aid interventions as well as reducing over reliance on food aid.
- Food aid should facilitate opportunities for access to documentation of IDPs which will create avenues for other opportunities such as access to education, land and loans which require national identification documents as prerequisites.

- The use of cash transfers could be more appropriate in areas with local markets to support local business. This is because food is available, but not accessible. Food aid facilitates accessibility where food is not available.

#### **4.2.3 Future Research**

- Further research is required in trying to link the relationship between migration destinations of IDPs and food aid.
- A justification on why IDPs are treated as a special group that need food aid while other vulnerable groups are experiencing food insecurity, but not being targeted needs more research on how this affects social integration.
- The linkage between livelihood assets access and food aid still need further research as this can assist IDPs to attain durable solutions for their food insecurity.

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# APPENDIX

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## Focus group discussion guideline questions

### Introduction

The purpose of this focus group discussion is to collect data for research purposes on the impact of food aid among displaced people. Feel free to express your view.

An audio recording will be done for this one-hour focus group discussion and this will not be shared with anyone. It is for research purpose only.

### Questions

1. How would you describe the general welfare of most households before the period of food aid in relation to?

- a. Health access
- b. Education attendances and access
- c. Livelihoods options
- d. Asset disposal

2. How would you describe the general welfare of most households during the period of food aid in relation to?

- a. Health access
- b. Education attendances and access
- c. Livelihoods options
- d. Asset disposal

3. What are the major gains of the community from food aid programmes?

4. What has been                      affected by the introduction and continuity of food aid programme?

5. Could you describe how the majority of the host (residential) community is accessing food?

6. How are the IDPs (New arrival) accessing food?

7. Could you describe any significant differences and similarities in the way the two groups have availability, accessibility and utilization of food.

8. What were the most significant positive and negative results of food aid during the displacement first three month?

9. In the first months of displacement, how did the community cope with food insecurity problems?
10. What contribution did food aid have in supporting the coping mechanisms or destroyed them?
  - a. How prepared are you to face the future without food aid?
  - b. Was food aid relevant?
  - c. Do you have any suggestion on how food aid could add value in community driven initiatives?

Thank you for giving your time

## 5.2 Household Questionnaire

### Impact of food AID on IDPs Questionnaire

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Data collector: \_\_\_\_\_  
District: \_\_\_\_\_ Community: \_\_\_\_\_

#### Introduction

My name is Wonesai W Sithole I am a student at the University of Free State and conducting research on the impact of food aid among displaced people in Manicaland Province. Your household has been selected from all households in the area for this interview. This survey is carried out to understand the impact of food aid among displaced people in Manicaland Province in Zimbabwe, thus:

- To review the food security situation of displaced communities in Manicaland Province.
- To document the impact of the food aid programmes on displaced communities.
- To document other community driven effective alternatives to food aid.

The survey is voluntary and the information that you give will be confidential. The information will be used for research, but neither your name, nor any other names, will be mentioned in the research. There will be no way to identify that you gave this information.

Could you please spare some time (around 45 minutes) for the interview?

#### Section A- Household Demographics

1. Sex of Household head? 2. Age of H/H in years \_\_\_\_\_
- 1=Male ☐
- 2=Female ☐
3. Marital status of H/H? 1=single ☐ 2=married ☐ 3=separated ☐ 4=divorced ☐
- 5=widowed ☐
4. Level of education completed? 1 =none ☐ 2=some primary ☐ 3=finished primary ☐
- 4=some secondary ☐ 5=finished secondary ☐
- 6=post secondary ☐ 7=literacy certificate ☐
5. Indicate the number of members in the H/H \_\_\_\_\_

<5years	5 – below 18years	18- below 30 years	30- below 40 years	40- below 50 years	50+	Total

6. Is any adult in your household chronically ill ( $\geq 3$  months) or mentally/physically disabled? (*Circle the appropriate response*)

a. Yes b. no

Article II.

7. If yes indicate how many:

a. Chronically ill: \_\_\_\_\_

- b. Physically challenged : \_\_\_\_\_  
 c. Mentally Challenged \_\_\_\_\_

8. Is there any orphan in your household (*under 18 years of age*)  
 a. Yes b. no

9. If yes how many?  
 Single Orphan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Double orphan \_\_\_\_\_

#### Section B- Household food source and participation in food support interventions

9. Has your household participated in any form of food support programmes? 1=yes ☐ 2=no ☐

10. If yes, fill in the table below

Project intervention	Duration of the programme	Commodities received	Current participation in programme	Comments
IDP feeding				
School feeding				
Home Based Care /OVC				
Vulnerable Group Feeding				
OTHER				

11. What was the source of livelihoods for this household two years ago (2009)? (Multiple Responses allowed)

- a. Casual Labour ☐ b. Wage labour ☐  
 c. Petty trading ☐ d. Subsistence farming (crop or animal rearing) ☐  
 e. Commercial farming (crop or animal rearing) ☐ f. Domestic work ☐  
 g. Skilled labour (Carpentry, plumbing, electrician, bricklaying, building) ☐ h. Artisans ☐  
 i. Unemployed; no source of income ☐ j. No source of income, bartering or selling of assets ☐  
 k. No source of income, borrowing ☐ l. Regular national or international remittances ☐  
 m. No direct source of income: rely on assistance from friends ☐  
 n. Mineral mining/panning and sales ☐ o. Other \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

12. What are the current forms of livelihood for the H/H? (Multiple Responses allowed)

- a. Casual Labour ☐ b. Wage labour ☐  
 c. Petty trading ☐ d. Subsistence farming (crop or animal rearing) ☐  
 e. Commercial farming (crop or animal rearing) ☐  
 f. Domestic work ☐ g. Skilled labour (Carpentry, plumbing, electrician, bricklaying, building) ☐  
 h. Artisans ☐ i. Unemployed; no source of income ☐  
 j. No source of income, bartering or selling of assets ☐ k. No source of income, borrowing ☐

**l. Regular national or international remittances** ☐

**m. No direct source of income: rely on assistance from friends** ☐

**n. Mineral mining/panning and sales** ☐

**o. Other** \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

**13. What were the H/H sources of food before facing displacement? (Multiple Responses allowed)**

**a. Gift** ☐

**b. Purchase** ☐

**c. Livestock sales** ☐

**d. Food aid** ☐

**e. Payment in kind (for labour or services provided)** ☐

**f. Own crops** ☐

**g. Casual labour** ☐

**i. Barter Sales** ☐

**j. Asset Sales** ☐

**k. Other specify,** \_\_\_\_\_

**14. What are the current sources of food for most H/H? (Multiple Responses allowed)**

**a. Gift** ☐

**b. Purchase** ☐

**c. Livestock sales** ☐

**d. Food aid** ☐

**e. Payment in kind (for labour or services provided)** ☐

**f. Own crops** ☐

**g. Casual labour** ☐

**i. Barter Sales** ☐

**j. Asset Sales** ☐

**k. Other specify,** \_\_\_\_\_

**15. What are the current food stocks in your H/H? Cereals** \_\_\_\_\_ **kg**

**Pulses** \_\_\_\_\_ **kg**

**Veg oil** \_\_\_\_\_ **litres**

**16. How long will the current food stocks last?**

**a. Less than a month** ☐

**b. 1 to 3 month's** ☐

**c. more than 3 to 6 months** ☐

**d. Up to 12 months** ☐

**e. Do not have any stocks** ☐

#### **Section C- Household displacement status**

**17. Have you faced any form of displacement within the past five years? Yes** ☐ **No** ☐

**18. If yes, what was the reason. (Multiple Responses allowed)**

**1= Natural disaster** ☐ **2= forced eviction** ☐

**Other (specify)** \_\_\_\_\_

**19. What have you lost since displacement?**

**1= loss of employment** ☐ **2= loss of land** ☐

**3= loss of livestock** ☐ **4= loss shelter** ☐ **5= loss of food** ☐ **6=other specify** \_\_\_\_\_

**Obviously some respondents will mark more than 1 of these options!**

#### **Section D- Impact of food aid on displacements**

**20. Do you have any intention of migrating from this area? 1=yes ☐ 2=no ☐**

**21. If yes what are the reasons for moving**

1. No access to land for cultivation/accommodation ☐
2. No livelihood options ☐
3. Food insecurity ☐
4. No access to basic social services (education, health) ☐
5. Conflicts with the host (resident) community ☐
6. Forced movement from local authorities, government, village heads ☐
7. Still prone to natural or man made causes of displacement ☐
8. Others \_\_\_\_\_  
(Multiple Responses allowed)

**22. Are there some households that are moving into the area receiving food aid? 1=yes ☐ 2=no ☐**

**23. If yes to 22, what are their reasons**

1. In need of food aid ☐
2. Availability of livelihoods options ☐
3. Access to land ☐
4. Permitted by local authorities ☐
5. Other \_\_\_\_\_  
(Multiple Responses allowed)

**24. Do you think food aid brought families members who had been scattered around in search of livelihood or food, back together?**

**1=yes ☐ 2=no ☐**

**If yes or no state the reasons why?**

1. Most family members came back together ☐
2. Conflicts were resolved among families ☐
3. Others \_\_\_\_\_

**25. Is there any improvement of food stocks from own production since benefiting from food aid?**

**1= yes ☐ 2= no ☐**

**26. Are there any local markets that sell food in this area? 1= yes ☐ 2=no ☐**

**27. If yes has there be an increase/decrease in purchases of food commodities from the community?**

**1= increase ☐ 2=decrease ☐**

**28. Were there any conflicts between the resident community and the displaced population over food aid programmes? 1=yes ☐ 2=no ☐**

**29. If yes describe \_\_\_\_\_**

**30. When should food aid be delivered in order to enable people to maintain constructive livelihoods?**

1. throughout the year ☐
2. The first 6 months of the year ☐
3. from October to April ☐
4. from May to September ☐
5. Other options \_\_\_\_\_

**31. Did food aid help develop the community?    1=yes ☐    2=no ☐**

**32. If yes, how did it help?**

1. Unity with the host community ☐
2. Local developments programmes are being initiated ☐
3. Access to referral systems and any basic services has been improved ☐
4. Other \_\_\_\_\_

**(Multiple Responses allowed)**

**33. If no to 31, what has been affected by the introduction and continuity of food aid programme?**

**This question will require some probing – it will be necessary to ask this as part of an interview (and not simply to be filled in by the respondent).**

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**34. What productive assets did you acquire during the time the H/H has been receiving food aid?**

<b>Fishing nets</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Canoes</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Axe</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Sickle</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Panga/Machete</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Mortar/pestle</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Hoe</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Ox Cart</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Tractor</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Hand Mill</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Bicycle</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Harrow</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Plough</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Sewing machine</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Hammer mill</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Mobile phones/ landline</b> <input type="checkbox"/>

**(Multiple Responses allowed)**

**35. If yes, how do you account the acquisition of them?**

1. Acquired after casual labour ☐
2. Money used to buy food was used to acquire the assets ☐
3. Other \_\_\_\_\_

**36. Is there any improvement in school attendance by most children from H/H affected by displacement?    1= yes ☐    2 = no ☐**

**37. If yes what could be the reason school attendance increased?**

1. Money used to buy food is now being channelled to school fees ☐
2. Nutrition levels of children has been improved during food aid programme ☐
3. More time in pursuing livelihoods options which provide money for school fees ☐
4. Access to basic social services has been improved ☐

**(Multiple Responses allowed)**

**Section E – Coping strategy**

**38.**

<b>Coping strategies</b>					
In the past 30 days, how frequently did your household resort to using one or more of the following strategies in order to have access to food? <b>SELECT ONE ANSWER PER STRATEGY.</b>					
	<b>Never</b>	<b>Seldom (1-3 days/mo)</b>	<b>Sometimes (1-2 days /wk)</b>	<b>Often (3-6 days/wk)</b>	<b>Daily</b>
<b>a. Skip entire days without eating?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>b. Limit portion size at mealtimes?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>c. Reduce number of meals eaten per day?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>d. Borrow food or rely on help from friends or relatives?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>e. Rely on less expensive or less preferred foods?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>f. Purchase/borrow food on credit?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>g. Gather unusual types or amounts of wild food / hunt?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>h. Harvest immature crops (e.g. green maize)?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>i. Send household members to eat elsewhere?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>j. Send household members to beg?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>k. Reduce adult consumption so children can eat?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>l. Rely on casual labour for food?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>

Thank respondents for their time!!