Civilian-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC), Implementation and Application within the SANDF Reserve Force

by

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Schalk-Willem van der Merwe, hereby present for consideration by the Disaster Risk Management Training and Education Centre for Africa (DIMTEC) within the Faculty of Natural and Agricultural Science at the University of the Free State (UFS) my mini-dissertation in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in Disaster Management.

I sincerely declare that this mini-dissertation is my own work, and that no other person has published a similar study from which I might have copied and at no stage will this work be published without my consent and that of the Disaster Risk Management Training Education Centre for Africa (DIMTEC). All the resources or quotes are indicated in the text and acknowledged in the list of references.

Views, opinions, and proposals expressed herein should be attributed to the author and not to the Disaster Risk Management Training and Education Centre for Africa.

Schalk-Willem van der Merwe

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ABSTRACT

The South African National Defence Force is the 18th largest troop-contributing nation to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Civil-military cooperation is by no means a new concept to the SANDF as there has been some citing of it within SANDF literature as far back as 2009. However, so far it has failed to gain serious traction within the organisation. The Defence Review of 2015 paved the way in a limited extent for CIMIC but stopped short of providing proverbial meat to the bone.

This study aimed to develop the understanding with regards to the subject matter and more so what CIMIC is and what it is not. It also explores the benefits associated with having CIMIC structures in place, both within the international and the local arena, by means of assessing different models for CIMIC. The thesis presents an analysis with regards to CIMIC in the South African context. Not everything in the military is CIMIC, but CIMIC could possibly play a key role in every encounter of the military. During Peacekeeping operations every encounter, the SANDF makes could possibly be seen as a CIMIC activity or potentially create problems when dealing with "hearts and minds".

This research found the following key recommendations which include: the proposition for CIMIC to be housed within the J Ops, as the division deals with deployment of SANDF forces from each arm of service and maintains staff competency within the relevant arm. All deployed troops should at least have a basic understanding of CIMIC, which can be obtained at no significant cost initially from online training/E-learning. CIMIC should play a more prominent role in the Disaster Management sphere and be integrated into the Disaster Management centers at all levels, in an attempt to meaningfully contribute to its mandate domestically focusing *inter alia* the well-being, prosperity and upliftment of the people. The synergy between CIMIC structure and the Disaster Management sphere will address key defence goals to protect and safeguard South Africa and its people.

CIMIC should be incorporated from the start of an operation at the planning phase and not as an afterthought. As the South African economy is reliant on regional peace and stability, CIMIC can assist in the promotion of regional and continental stability. CIMIC operatives could transition from the military in to the civilian life with transferable skills, thus providing an exit strategy of CIMIC soldiers to a career after the SANDF with portable qualifications into the humanitarian field. Having a hybrid system with both professional soldiers and reserve soldiers as a supplement a

CIMIC structure within the SANDF to both be a financially sound and prudent, where the SANDF does not have to maintain such specialists full time but use them when required. Finally, CIMIC will marry the SANDF and the humanitarian aspirations, establishing appropriate partnerships to facilitate appropriate response with greater accountability.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AJP 9:	Allied Joint Publication NATO Civil Military Co-operation Doctrine (NATO, 2003)
AJP:	Allied Joint Publication
AMIS:	African Union Mission in Sudan
ANC:	African National Congress
AO:	Area of Operation
AU:	African Union
CA:	Civil Affairs (US concept)
CAF:	Canadian Armed Forces
Capt:	Captain
CAR:	Central African Republic
CCOE:	CIMIC Centre of Excellence (Netherlands)
CIMIC:	Civil Military cooperation
CMO:	Civil Military Operations
CMOC:	Civil-Military Operations Centre
Col:	Colonel
DAFF:	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DMA:	Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 (Republic of South Africa)
DMAF:	Disaster Management Advisory Forums
DoD:	Department of Defence
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo

DRM:	Disaster Risk Management
EC:	Eastern Cape Province
EU:	European Union
FACA:	Central Africa Armed Forces
FARDC:	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GOGF:	Gift of the Givers Foundation
GP:	Gauteng Province
HQ(s):	Head Quarter(s)
IATF:	Influence Activities Task Force (Canadian Armed Forces)
IDP:	Internally Displaced People
IGO(s):	Intergovernmental organisations
IO:	International Organisations
IPI:	Indigenous Populations and Institutions
ISAF:	International Security Assistance Force
ISS:	The Institute of Security Studies
J Ops:	Joint Operations Division
JDP:	Joint Doctrine Publication (UK MOD)
JFC(s)/JTFC(S):	Joint Force Commander(s)
JP 3-57:	Joint Publication 3-57. United States of America Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013)
MCDA:	Military and Civil Defence Assets
Med Bn GP:	Medical Battalion Group(s)
MNMCC:	Multinational Military Operations and Coordination Center

MOD:	Ministry of Defence (Great Britton)
MS:	Milestone
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO-CIMIC:	Civil-Military **Cooperation** (Tactical/ Operational Level)
NGO(s):	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPO:	Not for Profit Organisation
OCHA:	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OP:	Operation(s)
OSOCC:	UN On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
PKO:	Peacekeeping Operations
PMG:	Parliamentary Monitoring Group
POTI:	Peace Operation Training Institute
PSO:	Peace Support Operation(s)
PSYOPS:	Psychological Operations *aka* Psychological Warfare
Ret:	Retired
RF:	Reserve force
RFC:	Reserve Force Council
SA:	South Africa
SAAF:	South African Airforce
SADF:	South African Defence Force (pre-27 April 1994)
SADR:	South African Defence Review
SAMC:	South African Medical Corps (1913-1979)
SAMHS:	South African Military Health Service

SAMNS:	South African Military Nursing Service
SAN:	South African Navy
SANDF:	South African National Defence Force
SAPS:	South African Police Service
SAPSD:	South African Protection and Support Detachment
SAR:	Search and Rescue
SSR:	Security Sector Reform
UK:	United Kingdom
UN DPKO:	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNITAR:	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UN:	United Nations
UN-CIMIC:	Civil-Military **Coordination**
UN-CMCoord:	UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
UNDAC:	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNOCHA:	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USIP:	Unites States Institute of Peace
USA:	United States of America
VIP:	Very Important Person
ToG:	Trinity of Gravity

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide the introduction to the topic and the research background in an attempt to understand the context and importance of this research. This will be followed by the research problem and the subsequent discussion on the research questions which will guide this research undertaking throughout.

1.1. BACKGROUND

The study will be focusing on Civil Military Cooperating (CIMIC) both during time of crisis such disaster or civil upheaval and operational. Exploring the *raison d'etre* and benefit it could hold for the SANDF and broader society if implemented correctly. The CIMIC concept and relevancy will be discussed in greater detail further down within the section **STUDY AREA** and the **Literature review.** CIMIC plays a significant role within the modern military as a tool to serve the commander in accelerating the desired end state which should be incorporated as early as the planning stages as such CIMIC will form the interface between the military forces during Peacekeeping operations and allied organisations such as developmental, humanitarian, political and rule-of law as each a separate entity of equal importance. Making CIMIC a critical element in UN related operation as the application of force is not always a *panacea* where a holistic approach is needed.

The Constitution of South Africa was adopted on the 8th of May 1996, paving the way for the formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), with the primary function to protect and defend the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and ensure the sovereignty of country's territory – both sea and land – and its people. The SANDF was established in 1994 and from the then South African Defence Force (SADF), which was in itself established from the Union Defence Force in 1957 (Wessels, 2010). Additionally, Wessels (2010) wrote that the SANDF comprised, not only the previously "white" SADF, but also the Defence forces of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, as formal /regular forces as well as the military wings of the African National Congress (ANC) - uMkhonto weSizwe, and Pan-Africanist Congress - Azanian People's Liberation Army. Additionally certain KwaZulu-Natal self-protection units were included in the integration. Wessels (2010) reported that there was a total of eight organisations amalgamated form the SANDF and it took several years to complete the amalgamation process to make the SANDF what it is today.

South Africa is bordered by 6 countries: Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho (land locked by South Africa). The SANDF has approximately 78 050 active duty (permanent force) with an additional ~16 000 reserve force soldiers with in the four arms of service. Global Fire Power (2017) ranks the SANDF 46th out of the 133 countries assessed in terms of a power index (an algorithm comprising of factors beyond just military, such as economy, infrastructure resources to name a few of the 50 variables listed).

Table 1-1 Regional comparison of military forces

Country	Power Index	% of GDP Spend	Active duty Members	Reserve Forces
Source	GlobalFirepower.com (2017a)	(The World Bank, 2017c)		
RSA	46	1.1	78000	16000
Namibia	127	4.2	9500	6000
Botswana	107	3.3	9000	0
Zimbabwe	81	2.2	30000	22000
Mozambique	109	1.0	11200	0
Angola	51	3.0	107000	68500
Swaziland	*N/A*	1.8	*N/A*	*N/A*
Lesotho	*N/A*	1.8	2110 Kruger and Martin (2013)	0

Currently, South Africa contributes the most peacekeepers and policing towards the United Nations (UN) missions of all Sub-Saharan countries, bar the contribution of Zambia which is similar to that of South Africa. South Africa is the 12th most significant African peacekeeper contributing nation as listed by the United Nations (2017). As of December 2017, the SANDF contributed 1199 troops to peacekeeping, in comparison to the second highest SADC contributing nation, Zimbabwe, with 97 troops. The PMG (2004) noted from the Defence Portfolio Committee meeting that the 2004 budget for peacekeeping amounted to R 701,125,050.00. Stupart (2017) noted that the funds spent by the SANDF on AU and UN missions gets refunded by the UN to the fiscus (National Treasury). However, it is not guaranteed that the refund would always be allocated back to the SANDF, affecting *inter alia* equipment serviceability in the long run with

money supporting these operations coming from the SANDF budget which could have been for renewal of equipment.

Defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, during her 2017 budget speech in the Parliament, has bemoaned the fact of underspending on the DoD. She added that the government's aspirations for the military far exceed the budgetary allocations. Additionally, the Minister reported on the steady decline of the SANDF by 5% in real terms (GDP) over the past 20 years (Radebe, 2017) budgetary contribution to the SADNF over time as seen in Figure 1-1. These impacts are further exacerbated by what the Defence Review (2015) labels as major international commitments in peacekeeping operations as seen below. Figure 1-1 shows the Defence spending over the period of 1960 to 2016, with some notable indicators: The armed struggle was initiated at the end of 1961; border conflict also known as the Bush War (1966-1989) near the end of the Bush War the was a crescendo in the armed struggle (concurrent increase in sped seen) followed by integration in the early 2000s, and a dramatic decline in expenditure since 1988.

Figure 1-1South African Defence spend as % of GDP (The World Bank, 2018)

The Department of Defence is broadly structured as below (Figure 1-2), which provides a conceptual framework for the nonmilitary reader of the Department of Defence and the individual arms of services. The Defence Act 42 of 2002 Section 12§1(a-d) makes provision for four arms of service within the SANDF (South Africa, 2003):

1. South African Army
2. South African Airforce (SAAF)
3. South African Navy (SAN)

4. South African Military Health Service (SAMHS)

Figure 1-2 Department of Defence Structure (SAAF, 2014)

1.1.1. South African Army

The South African Army is currently structured into 11 formations as seen below in Figure 1-3. The formations are pretty much self-explanatory in terms of function by name. However, the Defence Review (2015) but states that the realistic implementation of the force design will take approximately 30 years to fully implement. The Defence Review (2015) envisages the SA Army to be a major component to the landward defence of the nation, with an additional function of supporting the maritime defence strategy.

Figure 1-3 South African Army Structure (South African Army, 2013)

The operational elements of the SA army will be grouped under a Land Command, with all combat element to be grouped in brigades into three divisions. Each of those divisions will have a specific focus, with special elements under direct control of the Land Command (**Error! Reference source not found.**).

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│Mechanised││Motorised││Contingency││Specialised││  Critical   │
│ Division ││Division ││ Division  ││  Units   ││Infrastructure│
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│Armoured ││6 X Motorised││1 x Airborne││  CIMIC   │
│ Brigade ││ Brigades  ││ Brigade  ││          │
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│Mechanised││ Division ││1 x Air-Landed││ PSYOPS  │
│ Brigade ││  Troops  ││ Brigade  ││          │
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┌─────────┐           ┌──────────┐
│Motorised│           │1 x Sea-Landed│
│ Brigade │           │  Brigade │
└─────────┘           └──────────┘
┌─────────┐           ┌──────────┐
│ Division│           │Divisional│
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
Figure 1-4 Figure 1 4 SA Army Land Command (Defence Review, 2015)

1.1.2. South African Airforce

The South African Air Force (SAAF) is the second oldest commonwealth air force in the world, established in 1912 as the South African Aviation Corps. The official naming of the South African Air Force was only done post-World War I, in1920. The SAAF, has had an illustrious past with involvement in both world wars, the *Berlin Airlift* (1948-1949) and the Korean War (1950-1953) (SAAF, 2014). The Mandate of the SAAF is to provide and manage the air defence capability of the Department of Defence (DoD) on behalf of the SANDF. (SAAF, 2014a). The Defence Review (2015) makes provisions for an Air Command similar structured as the Land Command. The Air Force 'Force Design' will seek to establish five capabilities:

1. Command and Control Capability
2. Air Support Capability
3. Air Mobility Capability
4. Maritime Combat Support Capability
5. Deployable Support Capability

1.1.3. South African Navy (SAN)

The SAN can trace their roots back to 1861 to the Port Elizabeth Naval volunteer unit and the later Natal Naval Volunteers in 1885, which served to protect Durban harbor, with their six-inch guns. The SAN saw action in the South African War (1899-1902) and the Zulu Rebellion (1906), and later both world wars and the later Bush War. However, the first permanent naval forces were inaugurated only after the first world war on the 1st of April 1921 with three ships (South African Navy, 2018a). South Africa is endowed with a dual identity that of sea and land and situated amongst vital shipping routes within the South Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean and Southern Oceans covering a coastline of approximately 3000kms.South Africa is also responsible for monitoring, control and enforcement of state authority within the Exclusive Economic Zones for the Prince Edward Island Group and Marion Island (1000km) southeast of Port Elizabeth, which in itself is a sizable area of approximately 4,34 million Km^2 (South African Navy, 2018b). As such, SA has a maritime-dependent economy as the aforementioned maritime interests and responsibilities (Defence Review, 2015).

The Defence Review requires the development and/or improvement in six core capabilities for the SAN. The core capabilities required for Fleet Command are as follow:

1. Autonomous Surface Warfare
2. Submarine
3. Patrol (Inshore and Offshore)
4. Combat Support
5. Marines (Naval Infantry)
6. Mine Warfare

In comparison to other arms of service, the SAN has suffered the greatest neglect under the *Apartheid-era* SADF. SAN are using antiquated equipment obtained in the 1950's and 1960's. Respectively of these vessels, six vessels have since sunk. In 1982 (President Kruger) around the same time the other two frigates (President Pretorius and President Steyn) became unserviceable which must have been a major blow to the SAN. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2018) lists these vessels as the only vessels with a tangible blue water combat capability(deep sea) both vessels played a major part in cross border special Forces operations (Söderland and Steyn, 2018). Furthermore, additionally any rejuvenation attempts we halted by the arms embargo toward the Apartheid state at the time. The Institute for Defence Studies and

Analysis (2018) indicated that, during 1985, 15 vessels were decommissioned due to cost constraints. This in turn reduced the SAN to a 'brown water navy', referring to the lack of blue water combat capability (deep sea) and being limited to riverine or littoral environments.   A *Post-Apartheid* Naval overhaul took place in 1999, which represented what the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (2018) termed a "quantum leap" which transformed the SAN into a regional Naval powerhouse with amongst other equipment four frigates and three submarines were acquired. This leap in modern-era equipment was not sufficiently supported by the budget for ongoing use and maintenance, and this had a major impact on the availability of the frigates and submarines. 2016 ushered in another budget cut to the tune of R147 million which hamstrung the ability to maintain the blue water navy at operational readiness levels (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2018). Despite the adverse funding the SAN are expanding the fleet (surface vessels) by seven additional craft which were later reduced to 4 vessels (DefenceWeb, 2018a).

1.1.4. South African Military Health Service (SAMHS)

The predecessor to the SAHMS was the South African Medical Corps (SAMC) formed in 1913 and the later establishment of the South African Military Nursing Service (SAMNS) in 1914, which was later merged into the Department of Public Health Post-World War I. SAHMS' predecessor was involved in both world wars, the Korean war and the Bush war (SAMHS, 2018). Currently, the SAHMS consist of 5 Formations with a General Support Base (SAMHS, 2012):

1. Mobile Military Health Formations (Five Medical Battalion Groups)
2. Tertiary Military Health Formation (3 Major Hospitals and other institutes)
3. Area Military Health Formation (in each province)
4. Military Health Training Formation
5. Military Health Formation

It is not uncommon for the SAMHS to man public health infrastructure in times of crisis within South Africa such as during health care strikes (industrial action), with the most recent case in the North West Province which was further compounded by civil unrest (defenceWeb and Reuters, 2018). None of the Arms of Service are immune to budgetary constraints, with 74% of the SAMHS budgets going towards salaries, despite being to second smallest arm of service with massive infrastructure in the form of hospitals etc. (defenceWeb, 2016a). SAMHS will also need

to restructured under the Defence Review (2015). It is envisaged that SAMHS would be under a medical command with three Medical Brigades and a level 4 hospital. Each Medical Brigade will consist of 3 Medical Battalion Groups (Med Bn GP) a level 3 Hospital and Specialist services bar one brigade which will have an additional 3 Med Bn GPs. These three brigades will support the Land Command's mechanised, motorised and contingency divisions. However, the brigade supporting the contingency brigade will also be responsible for support of both the SAN and SAAF hence the one Brigade with three additional Med Bn GP allocation.

1.2. STUDY AREA

Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) is where military and civilian agencies connect, interact and interface. CIMIC application could be broad such as during peace time where the military assists with disaster relief efforts or the contribution to infrastructure or quality of life. Contributions such as demining/ordinance disposal during or after conflict situations, assisting communities back to relative normality of daily life by means of establishing access to previous agricultural land, transport routes, or infrastructure development are examples of CIMIC. Close co-operation between all parties are essential to assist local authorities rebuilding the social aspects and restore normal way of life for the population (NATO 2011), which are often referred to as post-conflict reconstruction and development.

The South African Defence Review (SADR) (Defence Review, 2015) emphasizes the need for the armed forces who act as peacekeepers to play a prominent role in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building throughout Africa. Interaction between the military and the civil structures to achieve afore mentioned mission's objectives are imperative should one seek a unified approach. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has identified the need for a coordinated approach, interacting and managing relationships ranging from national to local governments as well as International Organisations (IO) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), with the CIMIC capability being the solution to this complex set of players working in the same setting and in need of coordination (NATO, 2003). The earliest recorded formalized CIMIC actions by NATO were in the Balkans conflict of the 1990's (1991-2001) (Hangya, 2014).

Furthermore, Hangya (2014) discusses the elaborate process of the development of the NATO doctrine, and especially the CIMIC doctrine, from the inception (AJP-9) and the subsequent move

from Level 1 document to Level 2 and an update Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.9 (NATO, 2013):

> "The multiple dimensions of modern military operations are all influenced by CIMIC, as their focus is on the civil environment. Not everything in the military is CIMIC, but CIMIC can play a key role within NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach" (pg. vii.)

What one may want to achieve is a symbiotic merger between the current AJP-3.4.9 and the needs of the SANDF, thus being able to come up with an African solution to an African need/challenge/problem. The SADR 2015 sees CIMIC as part of the Army Force Design (Milestone 4 Defence Strategic Trajectory: Responding to Challenges), grouped along with the Psychological Warfare capability as a specialized element within the land ward force (Defence Review, 2015).

CIMIC as a study area is similar to Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in the form of multi-disciplinary elements involvement. As it will be shown in the literature review chapter, some of the core elements in CIMIC are community/stakeholder engagement (operational and during peacetime, humanitarian efforts, peace building etc.). At the core of this study will be the SANDF, primarily due to its ever increased involvement in both Chapter VI and VII Operation throughout the African continent (Mlambo and Motimele, 2014). It's a well-known fact that the SANDF is in a state of decline as briefly eluded to in the previous section (Mapisa-Nqakula, 2016; Heleta, 2017) and the army has to do more with less resources. As such, it is important to study the CIMIC in the South African context and try to find the best way for its introduction and integration within the SANDF as the future involvement of the SANDF is likely to have a strong component of CIMIC in every deployment.

1.3. STUDY OVERVIEW

1.3.1. Significance of the study

The Defence Review makes reference to the need to develop CIMIC within the SANDF. Additionally, Figure 1-4 provides some context as to its placements. Throughout this, one senses the need for the SANDF to do more with less, with CIMIC which will be an enabler to the SANDF as it allows for a better coordinated response but still only a cog in a much greater machine to achieve this desired end state both operationally and within the borders of South Africa.

Reflecting of the "Trinity of Gravity" (ToG) as mooted by Barlow, (2010) arguing against the notion that an insurgency force has a center of gravity, the proverbial head of the snake but rather a trinity which must be emasculated to achieve success. During the initial phases of "revolution" the leaders will be the only center of gravity of the organisation, upon the initiation of armed conflict or insurgency this has shifted to a ToG comprising of three element the leadership, the people and finances. The SANDF during Peacekeeping operation will be unable to intervene during the early stages unless it will be within the borders of the SA. CIMIC will play an important part addressing the "people" part of the equation which may be the local populous supporting the enemy (in addition to other modalities both intrinsic and extinct to the SANDF) or oppressed by such enemy where the fighting force will address the enemy.

When it comes to CIMIC in the domestic context and managing/responding to local disaster response within the borders of South Africa or in SADC region, CIMIC will provide for a more seamless and coordinated response in order to restore some form of normality if already proven channels are already in place prior to the event.

1.3.2. Study Objectives

The main objective of this study is to establish how and which method should be used to introduce CIMIC into the SANDF. The additional study objectives for this study are:

a) Understanding the concept of CIMIC and what CIMIC is not.
b) Establish the benefits of CIMIC for the Military.
c) Understanding the place and use of CIMIC in the modern military.
d) Look into different models for CIMIC in foreign militaries.

1.3.3. Study Assumptions

The following assumptions was informed by this study:

1. A Positive attitude towards CIMIC
2. Limited exposure to the field of study
3. Lack of understanding regarding the full potential of CIMIC

1.3.4. Study Limitations

As with any research of this type there are bound to be limitations as well as challenges experienced by the author and this research was not immune to such challenges. The following limitations are noted:

1. Studying a single organisation may affect later generalizations beyond this organisation;
2. The nature of the SANDF and the flow of information in military organisations provides a challenge for academic research;
3. The DOD corporate communications seem to be dysfunctional with the lack of information flow and frequency of updates of their websites;
4. Some pertinent information may be restricted or of great security classification precluding access and ability to study such information;
5. Struggling to access willing participants interested in interviews.

1.4. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS

1.4.1. Problem Statement

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the Reserve Force (RF) have yet to develop their CIMIC portfolio despite all the benefits that such structures provide to the military institutions. The major stumbling blocks are related to funding. Currently, the SANDF is funded to the tune of approximately 1.1 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (The World Bank, 2017b). In comparison to the other SADC (Southern African Development Community) countries, it is the most underfunded military, with the second largest staff compliment behind Angola also see **Error! Reference source not found.** (The World Bank, 2017a).

The SADR 2015 (Defence Review, 2015) have made provision for CIMIC as a specialized unit, under the Land Command (South African Army), albeit the focus is only directed at operational capabilities of the SANDF landward force (thus external). The CIMIC concept is not totally foreign to the SANDF; however, CIMIC has never been operationalized. The Reserve Force Council (RFC) has tasked the CIMIC portfolio to constitute a framework for a CIMIC structure on behalf of the RFC, as a potential to introduce CIMIC into the SANDF. This study will critically explore how this can be done effectively.

1.4.2. Research Question

This study has two main questions. In addition, the second question has a number of sub-questions. These are listed below:

- Given the challenges faced by the SANDF, especially the financial shortcomings and operational commitments, should CIMIC be one of its priorities?
- How and why should CIMIC be introduced and implemented?
    - o How should CIMIC be introduced?
    - o What is the value of CIMIC during peacekeeping operation and post-conflict reconstruction?
    - o How can CIMIC and the SANDF humanitarian assistance and disaster relief aspirations be married?
    - o Is there greater value in domestic CIMIC opposed to the international/cross border CIMIC engagement?

1.5. STUDY OUTLINE

This research will consist of nine chapters. Table1-3 presents the research report outline:

Table 1-2 Study Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction	The Introduction provided a trough background to the study, which includes *inter alia* the research problem and subsequent research questions, limitations etc.
Chapter 2: Literature Review	The following section will explore the contemporary literature on CIMIC and its various applications and models and where there would be blurring of the lines between common functions.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology	Chapter three describes the methodology used during this study by means of a discussion on the research design, sampling and measurements instruments

Chapter 4: The Study Area	An In-depth look at the SANDF and the path the Defence review is plotting for the future, looking at CIMIC and its future within the defence force
Chapter 5: Research Findings	Chapter 5 deals with the findings from the documents review as well as questionnaires (data).
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations	Focusing on the finding as established in Chapters five and six to provide a conclusion to the reader in addition to evidence-based recommendations. To achieve the objectives in the Introduction.
Bibliography	The complete reference list of sources used within this study using the Harvard reference style.
Appendices	Contains the relevant information supporting the study as well as reinforcing sections with in the chapters.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review will comprise of a scholarly review with regards to the subject of CIMIC in relation to the various applications of CIMIC within different militaries throughout the globe which will be focused on the SANDF and South African context. The purpose of such a review is to gain a baseline knowledge of the subject matter with regards to the most current theories and views. In addition to the aforementioned, the review could also potentially contribute validity and reliability (Mouton, 2014) and to limit the duplication of academic work. As one may establish how other scholarly work contributed to similar topics in addition to how such work were conceptualised and conducted, with close attention to be paid to the instruments used for such purpose which will ultimately contribute to the aforementioned validity and reliability.

2.1. WHAT IS CIMIC IN THE MODERN MILITARY?

De Coning (2007) identifies the shift in peacekeeping to peacebuilding brought about in the 21st century. Previously, peacekeeping was about maintaining the *status quo* whereas peacebuilding in the 21st century provides greater dimension to the operations as it's a more comprehensive approach comprising of: DDR, facilitation of the transitional to interim and the eventual democratic government, judicial reforms, retraining and reforms within policing. Additionally, De Coning (2007) points out that the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding came with the addition of the civilian element to these operations.

Peacebuilding is by no means a new paradigm. It was brought to prominence in the 1970s by Johan Galtung in an attempt to address the "root cause" of the conflict thus having greater chance for success, whereas peacekeeping essentially addresses only the symptom. Since the introduction of peacebuilding, it has grown to encompass DDR as previously mentioned by de Coning (2007), as well as rebuilding of civilian institutions and the inherent structures such as political, economic, judicial and civil society (Weiss and Kalbacher, 2008). It stands to reason that with so many role players involved throughout the process that there needs to be a driving force behind these actions ensuring that all role payers move in the corrected strategic direction. CIMIC is the face of the military which facilitates interactions between the role players (military and civilian actors). In the UN-CIMIC training by the Peace Operations Training Institute, de Coning and Holshek, (2012) define UN-CIMIC as:

"Civil-military coordination provides the interface between political and security objectives on the one hand, and humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding objectives on the other. The civil-military nexus is at the locus of any complex peace operation, and it is critical to the ability of the mission to have a holistic impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform" (pg. 13).

Furthermore, an alarming finding by De Coning and Holshek (2012) points out that the majority of troop contributing countries do not adequately prepare their UN Staff officers for this role, making it difficult to be successful in this tasking. The authors additionally indicated two reasons in having a well-established and capable CIMIC capability; primarily, the complexity of peace operations requires sophisticated coordination amongst the actors, programmes and operations all running concurrently, which may be interdependent for success. Secondly, the demand outstrips the purse strings in most operations and the SANDF is no different, with effective coordination one will be able to do more with less. A fair example to make within this regard maybe the SAMHS conducts a medical outreach providing family, dental or primary health care to a specific village, if there was a lack of coordination amongst NGO role players one may find a duplication of the same service in close succession, where are the medical outreach could have had a farther reach by means of coordination.

De Coning and Holshek (2012) empathize the need for a skilled CIMIC officer to bridge, understand and manage the complexity of parallel action when dealing with peace operations and the concurrent humanitarian actions taking place. However, there is a clear distinction between CIMIC and being as armed humanitarian. For instance, the South African Defence Rieview (2015) refers to the provision of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction by peacekeepers during and after a military operation. As Heleta (2016) quite rightly points out, this would be contrary to humanitarian principles - Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence (also, see Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 2010; Heaslip, 2012). The military may fall short on key aspects here but in the same breath also excel at others.

There is no doubt about the ever-increasing role and effectiveness the militaries (domestic and foreign) can have during times of not only disaster be it natural or technological but also humanitarian crisis in addition to more standard interventions. The Oslo Guidelines we created after two years work in 1994 and subsequently has been updated again in 2007 after what they term unprecedented deployment of military forces in support of humanitarian missions (UNOCHA,

2007), which is aimed at humanitarians this will be discussed in greater detail in **Error! Reference source not found.**.

2.2. NATO-CIMIC VS. UN-CIMIC

It would be prudent for the reader to understand the nuances between NATO-CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) and that of UN-CIMIC (Civil-Military Coordination). UN-CIMIC and UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) are two Complementary Concepts for Civil-Military Coordination similar in nature with different acronyms with CMCoord often used within OCHA when dealing with complex emergencies (UNOCHA, 2015b), Error! Reference source not found. below will bring some clarity to the matter. As it will become evident during this review that Peace operations never happen in isolation of either role player whence the need for coordination some additional clarity will be provided under the heading CIMIC and Peace Building/Peace Operations. The United States of America (USA) use the term Civil Military Operations (CMO). UN peacebuilding differ from NATO or European Union (EU) operation in two aspects, the contrast provided by de Coning, (2007):

1. UN Operations are often based on consent from the parties involved. Often only deployed after a ceasefire or peace agreements. These actions are in support of the implementation of the afore-mentioned peace agreement.

2. Military forces are deployed as part of a multi layered approach to security policing and along with civil actors.

Figure 2-1 Civil-Military relations: A plurality of concepts (United States Institute of Peace, no date)

NATO or EU forces, often referred to as coalition forces, are deployed to what the author class contested areas as peace enforcement operations in an attempt to ensure the signing of a cease fire or peace deal. de Coning (2007) makes use of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the military action there as an example to this. It may be pertinent to note that there is a distinct difference in the identification and operations of each organization despite both being able to deploy military assets to achieve a common goal, this common goal shared between the two organisations are a commitment to international peace and security. This greater cooperation has been building since the early 1990s with regards to crisis management and peace support operations partially due to the complexity such operations and global security (NATO, 2016).

In short, NATO-CIMIC (which includes EU) is motivated as the mandated entity (military) to establish cooperation between itself and the civilian actors in their Area of Operation (AO). With the UN-CIMIC paradigm being the maximization of impact of the two entities (Civil and Military) during UN peacebuilding operation, bearing in mind that all the role players during a peace building operation may not be UN entities but also Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) and other NGOs (de Coning, 2007). The AU currently has no CIMIC doctrine and has resolved to make use of the applicable UN policies (de Coning, 2007; UNOCHA, 2015d).

2.3. NATO DOCTRINE (AJP 3.4.9)

The Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.9 (NATO, 2013), provides direction for implementation by member countries at all levels ranging from tactical to strategic level, and spelling out the doctrine for the member countries. It mainly deals with principles and practices, training and education but as previously eluded to only limited to NATO members (Freers, 2014). NATO has recognised the changes in the 21st century's strategic environment when dealing with conflicts and disasters and that the solution to such emergencies cannot solely be that of the military as the strategic environments comprise of numerous different ideological, religious and ethnic drivers.

With the establishment of the CIMIC doctrine, NATO aims to have a comprehensive approach to these strategic changes and the link between the Civil and Military environment to achieve what NATO class the "*desired end state*". CIMIC is seen by NATO as an integral part of modern multidimensional operation. NATO's has a comprehensive approach to today's crisis and the subsequent crisis management; the approach has a three-tiered approach previously eluded to (NATO, 2013):

1. Strategic and political level where NATO aims to building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors such as UN agencies and or other International organisations (IO);
2. Operational level, where the priority to cooperate with other non-military actors in the planning for complex operations where civil military interaction will be needed;
3. Tactical/theatre level the lower level of decision making where force commanders are empowered to cooperate and coordinate with organisations on the grounds which may be both governmental or NGOs or FBOs.

2.3.1. The Components of CIMIC

The AJP 3.4.9 (NATO, 2013) the succesor of the AJP 9 (NATO, 2003) which primarily targeted operational level augmented by the then NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide assisting in the planning of operations additionally a later publication dealt with the tactical level (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) (Hangya, 2014). This author refers to these "predecessor" documents as basic however covering the full spectrum of NATO CIMIC. The AJP 9 document went through two drafts to ratify the comments from NATO member states and thus the AJP 3.4.9 was born.

The AJP 3.4.9 lists the four core components that are needed for CIMIC capability to be functional and achieve the NATO mandate, which could be extrapolated to South African paradigm too:

1. Policy, doctrine and concepts.
2. The understanding of the afore-mentioned policies, doctrine and concepts together with the will and capacity.
3. CIMIC assets (Personnel) which should be trained and competent with the CIMIC field and Joints elements (multiple arms of service) present in the area of operations (theatre)
4. Logistical support which will ensure operational ability

2.3.2. Instructional handbooks/texts

As previously eluded with regards to the strategic documents (AJP 3.4.9), these handbooks are essentially frameworks to assist the user departing from strategic issues translated into operational actions. The CIMIC field handbook by the Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CCOE, 2012) is a great example of such handbooks, where the CCOE covers content from the strategic level to the tactical level. The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (2013) CIMIC Capabilities Handbook doesn't cover the entire span of the CCOE (2012) publication, but only reserve forces matters. These two publications do intersect at the point of basic concepts, structure and methodology. de Coning & Holshek (2012) produced a structured online course for the Peace Operations Training Institute (an international NGO based in the United States of America) covering numerous aspects of CIMIC with the comprehensive guide as the study material, spanning beyond the confines of the course itself and proving to be very useful, this publication was later revised into a second edition to have a greater focus of peacekeeping operations (Holshek and de Coning, 2017).

2.4. HUMANITARIAN CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION AND UN CMCOORD

The researcher had a brief introduction to the Oslo Guidelines - Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief- (UNOCHA, 2007) under the heading of "**Error! Reference source not found.**" It was eluded that the initial Oslo Guidelines were published in 1994. De Coning (2017) de Coning, (2007) produces some insight of the additional guidelines that were published between the 1994 and the 2007 republications of these guidelines were:

1. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (UNOCHA, 2001);

2. Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (UNOCHA, 2003);

3. Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2004).

The aim of UN-CIMIC is maximise the exploitable opportunities which will act as to enable civilian organizations and more especially the host nation to allow the peace process to unfold and achieving the mission objectives which were set at the onset of the mission. These opportunities should be guided by the afore mentioned guidelines in order to be aligned with humanitarian principles (United Nations, 2010). Additionally, the point of indirect support is stressed as has been seen before and echoed by UNOCHA (2015d). We have previously discussed the differences in terminology and some of the related nuances, now with the introduction of CMCoord (UN-CMCoord) as opposed to the terminology already being discussed (UN-CIMIC), having a closer look at the provided definition below one will be drawn to the similarities as previously provided however be attentive to the AO (UNOCHA, 2015e):

> "*UN-CMCoord is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from cooperation to co-existence. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.*" (pg. 7)

During the time of disaster, the first to deploy on a significant scale is the national military of the affected country, also seen is the growing trend of foreign nations having the military respond to assist in relief effort as a primary response. Using the April 2015 Nepali earthquake as an example of deployed forces, initially the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team deployed to support military to military and civil-military coordination. The Nepali government promptly established the Multinational Military Operations and Coordination Center (MNMCC), foreign military liaison officers represented in the MNMCC can be seen in Table 2-1 were from the following countries (UNOCHA, 2015a):

Table 2-1 MNMCC foreign military liaison officers represented.

Algeria	Canada	Israel	Singapore	Thailand
Bangladesh	China	Japan	Spain	UK
Bhutan	India	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	USA

Cook, Shrestha and Htet (2016) summarised in their report titled: "International Response to 2015 Nepal Earthquake Lessons and Observations" that a total of 34 countries responded physically to the earthquake of which 18 countries also sent their military teams to assist in Search and Rescue (SAR). Additional Cook, Shrestha and Htet (2016) established by means of interviewing local military personal that air assets were the most critical and important contribution provided by foreign forces, particularly due to the inaccessibility of the terrain and remoteness od certain of the affected areas. UNOCHA (2015) reported in their Humanitarian Aid Response report that more traditional ways of delivering aid had to be use such as porters and pack animals to reach all those affected. Bringing into context the infographic below produced by the UNOCHA showing the air assets provided by foreign forces.

Figure 2-2 Foreign Military Deployed Air Assets (UNOCHA, 2015c)

2.4.1. UN-CMCoord Tasks during Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies

UNOCHA (2015d) identifies the three elements in coordination during time of crisis albeit it be any form of disaster or emergency as information sharing, task division and planning. The five UN CMCoord essential tasks to achieve these three key elements are:

1. Establish and sustain dialogue with military forces.
2. Establish a mechanism for information exchange and humanitarian action with military forces and other armed groups.
3. Assist in negotiations in critical areas of humanitarian-military interaction.
4. Support development and dissemination of context-specific guidance for the interaction of the humanitarian community with the military.
5. Monitor activity of military forces and ensure positive impact on humanitarian communities.

2.5.   DISASTER/HUMANITARIAN RELATED LITERATURE

De Coning (2007) brings to light the evolution of peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War era, using the term "whole-of-government missions" - UN integrated missions - where additional civilian actors have increasingly become involved in such operations, with a country wide focus of support for elements such as political stability, legal system, human rights and health to name a few. He brings a balanced discussion on strategic CIMIC and operational CIMIC, additionally providing some insight in the conceptual confusion between these two modalities. Rietjens et al. (2007) provide a framework (Galbraith's typology of generic mechanisms for achieving co-ordination) for dealing with complex emergency during humanitarian operations.

Barakat, Deely and Zyck (2010) studied four historical conflicts (Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam and El Salvador) spanning approximately 100 years of evaluation of contemporary models of stabilization and the shortfalls thereof, especially what they labelled overt securitisation of aid with the aim to "purchase" security. The key point they make is that stability operations need a fundamental adaptation to be successful. Haugevik & de Carvalho (2007) focus their discussion on the obstacles for CIMIC during multinational and inter-agency operations, with a core focus and desire to develop a framework for assessment of such operations. Some of the parameters discussed are about measurement working procedure, challenges associated with divergent terminologies and the challenge of overcoming the gap and intricacies of information sharing

sentiments shared by Heaslip (2011). In addition, Heaslip (2012) identifies the stark resemblance between military and humanitarian organizations' supply chains during disaster response. However, the civil-military logistical coordination during such missions was identified as a learning point for future missions with the author highlighting the benefits of such coordination.

Thompson (2010) takes a more positive look at the trends of mutual assistance as the "modern cast" of relief efforts comprising of but not limited to NGO's, host nation, multinational militaries and private volunteer organisations. Highlighting the individual skillsets brought to the table during relief efforts, this article has a very narrow focus on the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the United States military forces' evolvement in relief efforts. Additionally, the author cites that the availability of funding and resources (both assets and consumables) along with logistical chains can be major assets in limiting the deaths associated with a disaster and managing the casualties associated. An opposing viewpoint was provided by Collinson et al. (2010) who assessed the evolution of international stabilisation agendas and discussed the elements of stabilization, critiquing the involvement of the military beyond the humanitarian aspects and highlighting the ethical dilemma of military involvement in the political level. Therein lies the rub with greater military involvement working alongside NGOs, to the point where the role of the military is obscured in the sense where it acts as a humanitarian organization. Whereas humanitarian organisations have to prescribe to the humanitarian principles - Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 2010; Heaslip, 2012) - the military may fall short on key aspects here but in the same breath also excel at others. There is no doubt about the ever-increasing role and effectiveness the militaries (domestic and foreign) can have during times of disaster, hence the need for such role players and the military to integrate or cooperate how the militaries engage with these players in these spaces is crucial for success of their engagement.

Disaster and humanitarian response play a prominent role in a peacetime. The SANDF played an important role in cyclone Dando in the north eastern regions of South Africa in 2012, with a similar occurrence exactly a year later where adverse weather conditions caused widespread flooding in Mpumalanga and Limpopo regions (Rakoma, 2013) closely followed by the reoccurring floods in Mozambique over the past few years (defenceWeb, 2013; Helfrich, 2015b). The 2014 Defence Review had a paradigm shift within the SANDF with a new "secondary focus" on disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and search and rescue in addition to the functions such as peace support operations (Mlambo and Motimele, 2014). These types of functions were seen as secondary functions up until the SADR 2014 despite the value proposition the SANDF provides as a peace time military. The SANDF Overarching Annual Strategic Statement 2014 (South Africa, 2014)

listed within the medium term strategic framework within two different outcomes, namely that of Outcome 3 (All people in South Africa are and feel safe) which additionally mentions Peace support and general military assistance operations, whereas Outcome 11 supports Outcome 3 (Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world). Outcome 3 and 11 is where the CIMIC function will find its traction.

van Weezel (2011) conducted an investigation into the capabilities of nations with regard to CIMIC or similar concepts. Her study found that CIMIC was well integrated in the NATO forces with application during both operational and humanitarian deployments. Representing the ability to learn from our North Atlantic counterparts in these additional secondary functions required from the SANDF since the 1998 Defence Review at an accelerated pace.

2.5.1. SANDF and Humanitarian Assistance

The SANDF has taken part in disaster relief efforts in recent years. This is enabled by the Defence Act (South Africa, 2003) §18(1)(a) for dealing with the permissible deployment and use of the SANDF as well as the political authorizations and notification. §18(1)(a) deals with the deployment of the SANDF in the preservation of life/health and property during an emergency or humanitarian relief actions. How this objective is being achieved we have in part discussed under Operation Arabella and Operation Chariot.

In addition to the Defence act the SANDF has committed within the Defence Review (2015) as part of "Goal's and Tasks" to two key tasks listed amongst the eight are:

1. Assistance in disaster relief which is later qualified to large scale humanitarian operations;

2. Contributing to the social upliftment.

There are numerous examples of the SANDF and the humanitarian organization Gift of the Givers cooperating in humanitarian assistance especially to disaster areas (UN-CIMIC functions). Some for these notable action as are providing airframes for the delivery of essential supplies to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia (Department of Deference, 2011; Gift of the Givers Foundation, 2011), as well as numerous cooperative examples between the two organizations with the Mozambique floods (Gift of the Givers Foundation, no date).

2.5.2. Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP)

The Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) also known as Humanitarian Accountability Principles was born out of the need to be accountable to the affected population which in essence is the primary stakeholder The HAP has come a long way since 2013 after being 10 years in the development and transitioning from discourse to practice, furthermore it was shown that should the Humanitarian organisation be accountable to the primary recipients there will be a subsequent "better" product with enhanced effectiveness being delivered. The Rwandan genocide was reported as the catalyst for the move towards greater accountability and professionalization around humanitarianism (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 2013). HAP (2013) has brought about six benchmarks to achieve accountability within a humanitarian organisation:

2.5.2.1.   Benchmark 1: Establish and deliver on those Commitments

The humanitarian organisations with the participation of the shareholders establish commitments according to needs of the community to which they will be held to account

2.5.2.2.   Benchmark 2: Staff Competency

Staff competency is crucial on delivering on commitments made as competencies will translate into quality, with the organisations staff is their biggest asset.

2.5.2.3.   Benchmark 3: Sharing of Information/ Transparency

Sharing of information about the humanitarian organisation to the people they are assisting so for recipients to provide informed consent, and relevant stakeholders. Such information must be timely, relevant and clear.

2.5.2.4.   Benchmark 4: Handling of Complaints

Recipients/stakeholders are empowered to make complaints in a safe manner as well as to receive feedback in fair time on such complaints. Additionally, seeking feedback of the recipients to reinforce practice or curb actions which is unwanted by the population.

2.5.2.5.   Benchmark 5: Participation

The organisations are responsive to the views and concerns of the stakeholders and takes onboard such concerns or feedback which is ultimately translated into policy or programs.

2.5.2.6.   Benchmark 6: Learning and Continual Improvement

Monitoring and evaluating the activities and projects to try and improve the services.

It only stands to reason as to why HAP and CIMIC may be related with the possibility of these two entities not always marring up however in an ideal world there should be a closer alignment, we have earlier discussed armed humanitarianism trends by militaries as highlighted by Heleta (2016). Polman (2011) conducted research on the booming humanitarian movements around conflicts zones, spanning numerous conflicts, which found that very little of donor funding actually reaches the intended recipient. Even more disturbing, the topic of "*aid as a weapon of war*" furthermore stresses the need for ethical introspection and critical analysis or the untended consequences.

2.6. CIMIC AND PEACE BUILDING/PEACE OPERATIONS

The 2008 UN Doctrine reclaimed the use of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) as a concept when dealing with consent-based operations, as the term has taken on different meaning between different nations and authorities. However, there were many variations and different concepts similar to the traditional PKO which described the use of lightly armed soldiers acting as a third party between two recognisable parties. Later, the Brahimi report (United Nations, 2000) introduced the term Peace Operation as a post-Cold War era term dealing with UN Operations, with the advent of UN and AU missions which eventually adopted the use of Peace Support Operations (PSO). After the 9/11 terror attack the US made use of the term Stability and Reconstruction Operations whilst the EU moved to make use of the Crisis Management Operations. It is only fair to realize the effect of the plethora of different terminology could affect inter-operability between nations so with the advent of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO, 2008) and the Capstone doctrine was an attempt to formalize the terminology amongst other aspects it reaffirms the Basic Principles of UN Peacekeeping (de Coning, Detzel and Hojem, 2008).

Peace building and peace operations, along with humanitarian/disaster relief, are taking prominence within the SANDF as indicated above by the SANDF Overarching Annual Strategic Statement 2014 (South Africa, 2014). de Vries (2013a; 2013b) explicitly highlights the need for CIMIC due to fact that application of the SANDF during recent time in peacekeeping and post-conflict monitoring and reconstruction on the African continent (see SANDF Operations later in this chapter). The same sentiments are echoed by Lloyd & Van Dyk (2011), with a significant emphasis on cooperating between civilian and military role players to achieve the desired operational success. Livingstone (2008) describes the evolution and challenges associated with

the transformation of CIMIC from a wartime model to peace support operations with a clear distinction of civilian vs. military functions. Additionally, the CIMIC team operates as part of a bigger team of different military modalities (Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Police) with the local populous. For the CIMIC functionaries to be truly effective within the team and have an overall contribution to the mission, there is a need to fully integrate them in terms of intelligence and psychological operations to avoid duplication which may amount to wasted efforts or subversion of other efforts.

2.6.1. Basic Principles of UN Peacekeeping

The three basic principles for UN PKO has been in place for more the six decades to maintain international peace and security. The three principles are interconnected and complementary to each other very much similar to a Venn diagram are (UN DPKO, 2008):

1. Consents of the Parties;
2. Impartiality;
3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

2.6.1.1.   Consents of the Parties

UN peacekeeping operations will only deploy to country once the organisation received commitment from the opposing sides with the acceptance of the establishment of a political process as well as the acceptance of PKO mandates in support of the political process. Such agreements provide a foundation and establishes freedom within the PKOs' mandate. Should such agreements be absent it will essentially make any PKO a third party to the conflict which in turn devolve the operation into a peace enforcement operation (de Coning, Detzel and Hojem, 2008). The Capstone document (UN DPKO, 2008) makes it clear that the initial consent must be an ongoing process to maintaining consent through the entire operation. As the one or more parties may have begrudgingly provided such consent due to international pressure.

2.6.1.2.   Impartiality

Impartiality is fundamental in maintaining consent from the parties involved, it will be pertinent to point out the there is a difference between impartiality with regards to neutrality and inactivity. UN Peacekeepers should be impartial in dealing with the parties involved within the conflict but not neutral in performance of the mandate established during the consent phase. Essentially act as

a referee at a sport match penalizing the other team for infractions of the rules on both sides, thus it must not condone infractions within the peace process from either side. Failure when dealing with the impartiality as a peacekeeper will not deal a major blow to the peace process but also the forces legitimacy and credibility (UN DPKO, 2008).

2.6.1.3.   Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

PKO deployments often encounter the presence of criminal gangs and militias that found a footing within the state of civil breakdown with such organisations often opposed to the peace process, within such scenarios the mandate often provides greater discretion in dealing with the scenario or encounter. The principle of self-defence has been a cornerstone of any UN PKO since its inception in the 1956 dealing with the Suez crisis (Hatto, 2014). Again, we reflect back to the previous section, **Error! Reference source not found.**, the use force at tactical level is authorised from a Security Council level and does not necessarily require the consent from the aggrieving parties only as a last resort in self-defence or defence of civilians and not as a military victory or defeat. The application of force will always come with a political consequence and should be a means of last resort after other interventions failed, such force needs to be proportional to the threat as well as in an appropriate manor.

2.6.2. UN/AU Complex Peace Operations

Renwick (2015) identifies and clarifies the African Union (AU) comprising of 54 African states which excluded Morocco, establishes PSO with the authorization of the Peace and Security Council (15 members, no permanent members) where the AU differ from the UN there is no stipulation for impartially as with the UN (Basic Principles of UN Peacekeeping) with the possibility of activation without a peace accord and against the will of the "host" nation in serious situations such as genocide and crimes against humanity/war crimes.

Furthermore, Renwick (2015) highlights the ever increasing mandate of the African peacekeepers on the continent ranging from civilian protections to counter insurgency/terror hence the dependency on partnerships between the UN and AU. The UN has a regular peacekeeping budget in contrast the AU that often has to seek donor funding to fund such missions purportedly 2.3% for the AU budget comes from the AU members (Williams, 2015). These funding issues hampers rapid deployment or sustaining deployed troops over protracted periods.

Holshek and de Coning (2017) write about the two prominent types of UN/AU Complex Peace Operations/Missions: Protection Operations and Peacebuilding Operations. Protection Missions such as the Operation Cordite-Sudan, when the SANDF was part of UNAMID (Darfur, 2007-2016) was initially solely and AU mission where the primary focus was to protect the civilian population and to create an environment for discussions so that a peace agreement can take place. This is contrary to the standard method of operation where the peacekeeping force will deploy post the signing of a peace agreements and often without the agreement of all parties involved (also see Operation Vimbezela – CAR and Operation Cordite-Sudan).

Peacebuilding Operations are operations where forces are deployed post peace agreement with the mandate assist the parties within the peace agreements and help with the consolidation of the process. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention are closely aligned with each other. However, there is an increase in hybrid type of missions which are not solely protection missions nor peacebuilding operations, with Holshek and de Coning (2017) using MONUSCO (also see Operation Mistral - Democratic Republic of Congo as well as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali as examples.

2.6.3. CIMIC Operative Principles during Peace Operations

Holshek and de Coning (2012) advocate for the following core principles pertaining to Peace Operations for CIMIC operations which are derived from the UN Policy on CIMIC in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (United Nations, 2010):

- **The Primacy of Civilian Authority**: Civil authority is at the core of all UN Missions and as such the military head of a particular operation (Force Commander) is but at the fore in only but one aspect under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General which carries the responsibility for the entire UN mission. The force Commander forms part of the leadership the UN Peace keeping mission in additional to four other participants in the leadership team (UNOCHA, 2015e)

- **The Military is Supporting and Not Supported**: The military force shall take a lead role in security in its area of operations and subsequently support other civil-led aspects of the mission. Hence the need for a thorough understanding of the civilian efforts of the mission as well as what the current political and social context that those efforts are undertaken in. which is will enable the military to make a constructive contribution to the mission.

- **The Military as Enabler**: the goal of CIMIC is to maximize opportunities and take advance of such opportunities to create an environment in which civilian organisations and other similar role players are better enabled to achieve their own goals. With a special

focus on the host nation and local communities to achieve the mission goals faster. *The Military as an Enables* can take multiple form such as coordination, training, logistical support, reconstruction and demining are pertinent examples. Should the Military wholeheartedly adopt this tenet it will effectively working itself out of its own job (desired end state)

- **Indirect versus Direct Support**: within UN CMCoord terms this is referred to as the cookie, truck and Bridge model (UNOCHA, 2015e), where the military provides face to face support or humanitarian actions(direct support) which is generally frowned upon, one step removed would be indirect assistance which may involve transporting relieve goods or personnel (support by means of a third party). The bride is the final part of the model and essentially infrastructure support roads, bridges, airspace coordination etc. Direct support is an avenue of last resort in times of dire need where no other suitable alternative is available.

- **Managing Civil-Military Interaction and Transition**: essentially a two-pronged management tool to manage operational and tactical interaction between Military and civilian actors. Lastly to achieve a synergistic effect with the limited resources of each agency available to move from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

2.7. WHY DO WE NEED CIMIC?

It may be evident in military history that there has been at least some degree of civil-military cooperation through the age (Hangya, 2014) with a poignant example provided in the CA section in this chapter, despite the late addition of CIMIC in the NATO structures and lexicon. The flow of sequence has been blurred in recent decade's conflicts when conflict preventions, peace keeping and peace building often take place in a simultaneous fashion (Celik, Guttieri and Hoffman, 2005).

The complexity and mutual dependence between the military forces and civilian agencies such as the IPI, NGO, IOs etc. (see Figure 2-3) has become not only a necessity but also a requirements. Celik, Guttieri and Hoffman, (2005) made the example of this interdependence with the case of refugee-return citing that such an operation could possibly involve up to 12 different agencies/organisations to facilitate. In addition, to the refugee example provided the authors' link the success of the Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina directly to the actions of CIMIC in bridging the divide between the military forces and the humanitarian and IPIs.

Koerner (2017) quantified a force multipliers as a "capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force…" CIMIC acts as a force multiplier during PKO with Skidd, (2005) the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as an example that such force multiplication could only be actualised with adequate funding, which is also a common short coming within the SANDF (DefenceWeb, 2016a). Skidd, (2005) warns that CIMIC is not a *panacea* but rather a force multiplier in addition in being another tool in the arsenal of the commander to reach the desired end state. To follow on from the previous statement it may be pertinent to note what is a force multiplier in the sense of CIMIC as a force multiplier, Holshek and de Coning (2017) summarised that CIMIC contributes to the mission by providing understanding of the battlefield into what capabilities and capacities should be brought to bear in addressing the drivers of the applicable conflict or crisis with the aim to minimise the use of military actions in assisting the IPIs. A prime example of the CIMIC as a force multiplier is in the affective and efficient way in the way CIMIC manages information.

One of the core competencies of a CIMIC officer should be the ability to communicate both intrinsically (military structures) and extrinsically (civilian organisations) at the appropriate level to which it was/will be communicated on (partner, tactical, operational, strategic level). Holshek and de Coning (2017) warn against the generation of separate reports for either the military or civilian environment as it may contribute to a situation of miss trust unless due to necessity.

2.8. CIMIC VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

It is important to note that CIMIC and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are not interchangeable and as much as it looks and operates to a similar standard. However, one of the core belief within CIMIC is that of transparency where there is no intention to influence partner organizations as is the case with PSYOPS (NATO, 2007). In the Defence Review (2015), CIMIC and PSYOPS form part of the Land command as previously mentioned under specialised units, grouping CIMIC and PSYOPS together is in line with global trends Nations such as Belgium, Denmark and Hungary and to a limited extent   the USA prefer grouping these modalities together citing the overlapping of structures and tasks of these units (van Weezel, 2011). Faucher *et al.*, (2012) make a poignant example that but the PSYOPS and CIMIC essentially both are in the "*business*" of conveying a message the population on generic terms.

NATO (2007), using the AJP 3.10.1(A), which is the Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, defines PSYOPS as:

> Planned psychological activities using methods of communications and other means directed to approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behavior, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. (Pg1-1).

Haig and Hajdu (2017) differentiates between the peace time operations and active conflict operations for PSYOPS. During the conflict the aim of PSYOPS are to deter and intimidate the enemy force whereas on today's "*battlefield*" of PSO where the goal is that of obtaining support of the population which are more often than not neutral in nature. Similarly, Szûcs (2009) writes that during peace operations PSYOPS publicizes what CIMIC does amongst other actions. Nissen (2011) discusses Psychological Actions PSYACTs, defining them as actions that are conducted by a non-PSYOPs personnel aimed at effecting behavior of a target audience with the spectrum of such actions ranging from the more extreme such as raids, strikes and/or show of force operations by combat forces to other end of the spectrum that includes consent winning activities done by CIMIC functionaries.

The Canadian Armed forces in their Psychological Operations manual describes the inter-operability between CIMIC and PSYOPs where CIMIC units may need to make use of the PSYOPS communication capabilities to access the populous. Additionally, the two modalities may have an exchange of information in terms of mutual support which in order to develop plans and assess the impact of operations. The authors also made the point CIMIC operations could reinforce PSYOPS activities, with the latter using CIMIC to reinforce the messages produced/disseminated (Canadian Forces, 2004). Furthermore Canadian Forces (2004) foresee that PSYOPS may support CIMIC operations in the following five ways:

1. Development of Information with regards to current state (health, state of mind and physical characteristics) within the area of operation.
2. Information disseminations with regards to the welfare and safety of the local civilian population.
3. Influence the attitude towards the said military and perception of receiving assistance
4. During humanitarian operations in the form of disaster relieve such as seen with media support (publicity)
5. Conducting operational assessments post interactions

6. Support of CIMIC staff when dealing with displaced persons in the form of emergency relocation.

2.9. CIMIC VERSUS CIVIL AFFAIRS

Roman (2015) elaborates the idea that CIMIC develops tasks for the U.S. military considered to be aligned to Civil Affairs (CA) as they primarily related to support of the civil side of the operation, however there are nuances differences between the two modalities despite the tasking's to be overlapping in nature. However, where the clear distinction comes to CIMIC which has a greater. Roman (2015) echoes the traditional doctrine that CIMIC concentrates on the humanitarian aspects of the mission and the interactions between those players, in addition to the supervision of civilian interaction between other aspects/branches/functionaries of the military. The NATO concept attempt to minimize overlapping and replication and hence to node of interaction between organizations external to the military to meet humanitarian needs. One may see the clear departure between CIMIC and CA in the mandate of CA (within the US Military context) the CA unit functions with the military aim of civil interactions with the local population so to obtain civilian help for the military mission (Roman, 2015).

Joint Chiefs of Staff, (2013) in the Joint Publication 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs clarifies "*CA specialize in indirect approaches in support of traditional warfare*" pg. IV-1. In addition to this of the core responsibilities are listed as follows by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2013):

1. CA forces assess the civil environment;
2. Identify and engage with key authorities and other influential civilians; build civil relationships;
3. Identify factors fostering instability; and conduct CA operations to achieve joint force commander's objectives or build partnership capacity in support of strategic goals.

Holshek and de Coning (2017) found the US CA largely found themselves within the US Army reserve force with roots tracing back to the frontier days during the Second World War and the 19th century there was a greater composition of permanent force soldiers than the reserve force components

2.10. CIMIC MODELS USED IN FOREIGN MILITARIES

NATO required a standardisation of doctrines, concepts and methods of operation as a form of standardization to fully achieve intra-operability with what Celik, Guttieri and Hoffman, (2005) refer to as Compatibility, Interchangeability and Commonality within the allied nations ranging in all spheres of the military machinery such as administrative, procedural, operational material to achieve the desired Compatibility, Interchangeability and Commonality ensuring such activities will avoid a "*modern tower of Babel*". This might be a point for consideration for AU states contributing troops to AU or UN/AU hybrid missions to developing CIMIC in the future on a ground of communality.

Despite the aforementioned, Celik, Guttieri and Hoffman (2005) conducted a comparison between UK armed forces, Canada and the US which has well establish CIMIC doctrine and structures described the nuanced differences between each. **Figure 2-3** below shows the ideal functioning/ interactions between CMIC and CMO as well as CMCoord seen earlier in this chapter.


Figure 2-3 Overlapping Areas of Concern for CIMIC, CA, CMOs and CMCoord (Celik, Guttieri and Hoffman, 2005)

2.10.1.   United States of America Military Model

NATO doctrine makes use of CIMIC; the US military equivalent is CMO. The US doctrine has various phases ranging from strategic to tactical, at strategic level requiring a Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) to build relationships on a national level with the role players such as the government or national power in addition to international aid organisations to achieve the strategic objectives for the mission. Additionally, the JP 3-57 identifies the need for greater integration in seeking resolution of national security issues, by means of security forces, diplomatic channels, informal and economic solutions. In part the challenges of the modern conflicts can be address with a closer relationship and coordinated response between the Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), National and Local governmental bodies, NGOs, IOs as well as the private sectors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2013) have noted the explosion in number and capacity of such organisations over the last decade, with the need to leverage such organisations or what is termed non-military tools. JP 3-57 requires the CMO should be tailors to the need in addition acting in as a synergistic, cumulative, integrative member to the team so to achieve the desired CMO forces between the host nation and IO and NGO partners. With the accomplishment of this desired of interaction based on trust and mutual understanding, that it will accelerate the end state to civilian transition with a diminishing of the associated risks.

CMO should negotiate, mediate and collaborate to reach consensus with the aim of creating conditions for success. for the affected use of CA, the JPC should embed such units within the military machine ranging from Military Police, Military Health services, engineering services, special forces etc. and the hoist nation as well as what the document classes Indigenous Populations and Institutions (IPIs) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).

2.10.1.1.   Civil Military Operations

CMOs are by no means solely conducted by CA functionaries, they may involve *inter alia* forces conduction operations ranging from national to tactical level which may happen before, during or after a military operation/actions or in complete absence of military actions and may combine engineering medical specialist or veterinary services to name a few (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). CMO contribution to the military contribution may include some or all of the following aspects:

1. By means of the synergistic inter actions/cooperation a plethora of entities assisting in the stabilization of the host nation.
2. Information dissemination between the local leaders and role-players in the host nation.

3. Assessing impact of information operations as well as assigning the "*mood on the ground*" post intervention on the target population.

2.10.1.2.　CMO and level of interaction

As mentioned before by the US CMO doctrine by the Joint Chiefs of Staf, (2013), the conduct of CMO happens at multiple level, with each level having different needs or outcomes to be achieved however, it is critical that all the CMO activities should be mutually support each other and have a joined vision. Strategic level CMO has a bigger picture approaches which is long term in nature aligned to the overall mother body in this case of the US military would be the Department of Defence and the global campaigns and political in nature which should be in line with the national objectives. Operational focuses on the now and short term in the future. The operational level is where there will be the most inter action and coordination amongst IO, NGOs and IPIs with the JFC. The US Military sees this interaction and coordination as securing or acting in support of the security operation with the aim of such programs to build relationships and act in mitigation of military force requirements.

The JP3-57 additionally links these short-term goals to actions such as health service infrastructure, feeding schemes, management of IDP schemes and support of the local police force operations. Advancement of government legitimacy is a key part of the short-term goals and should be a priority to the JFCs. The identifying and prioritizing of the short-term goals should be the utmost priority amounts the CIMIC/CMO parties to integrate in to the military objectives and planning. The document speaks of information management will form key part in the cooperation process for obvious and prior stated reasons as such information will be invaluable for not only commanders this level but also the inter-organisational operability and coordination.

"Tactical" is where one will see on the ground inter action with CIMIC/CMO teams, often there will what the NATO AJP9 term a "CIMIC House" or the AP3-57 a Civil-military Operations Center (CMOC) which will form the nodal point for the organisations to interact amongst each other but also as an entry point for the local population (also see Figure 2-4 Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center). Coordination around foreign humanitarian assistance takes place here as well as the support for the civil administration in the area. In colloquial terms this can be seen as the "*coalface*" where agencies and receive information ranging from insurgent activity and threat assessment to atmospheric and geographical data. Information regarding change indicators will be generated from the tactical level from early consideration by the JFC to take

appropriate actions in support or managing crises. These change indicators should be managed on a case by case basis and beyond the scope of this research.


UNICEF

World Food Programme

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

High Commissioner for Refugees

Other UN agencies

Military

UN

CMOC

NGOs

USG Agencies

Red Cross

CARE

Doctors of the World

Save the Children

International Rescue Committee

Other relief and benefit organizations

OFDA/DART

USAID

Country team

American Red Cross

International Committee of the Red Cross

Other Red Cross bodies

Legend

CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere	UN	United Nations
CMOC	civil-military operations center	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
DART	disaster assistance response team	USAID	United States Agency for International
NGO	nongovernmental organization		Development
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	USG	United States Government

Figure 2-4 Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center (Gramatikov, 2015)

2.10.2.   Canadian Model

Similar to the CA and the incorporation of reserves in the US forces (Holshek and de Coning, 2017), the Canadian model also makes use of reserve for staffing CIMIC functions. Skidd (2005) warned of only having CIMIC as an ad hoc function and emphasised the need for both reserves and professional soldiers (Permanent Force) in a certain sense as to merge the capabilities and abilities of such soldiers. Wat is interesting to note is the requirement to join a CIMIC unit in the Canadian armed forces requires the rank of Sargent amongst other (Canadian Army, 2017)

Maclachlan (2016) found that CIMIC was a key role player in the effective utilisation of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) both domestically and internationally. Additionally, the Canadian

CIMIC structures and doctrine is a combination of three foreign military's CIMIC doctrines (UK, US Marine Corps and German armed forces). With and exclusion of both the Canadian Navy and Air Force as both these entities does not participate in CIMIC structures

CIMIC units as accommodated within the Influence Activities Task Force (IAFT) which is a reservist unit on full time basis, the IAFT has steward ship of both CIMIC and PSYOPS (Maclachlan, 2016; Canadian Army, 2018). Furthermore, the IAFT forms part of the disaster response team of the CAF but seems to only operate at a tactical level. According to the research done by Maclachlan (2016), it seems that the CAF doctrine is not yet fully aligned with the AJP 3.4.9 yet as the current doctrine pre-dates the AJP 3.4.9 publication.

2.10.3.   UK (British Armed Forces) Model

The UK Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00 (The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2009) claim that CIMIC represents the tactical and operational level of the integrated approach which take in to account the what they the need for a "unified multi agency effort" to achieve the military mission, which will the JTFC to guide the operational space for mutual benefit to both the civilian and military agencies. (Celik, Guttieri and Hoffman, 2005) reports that the UK CIMIC doctrine closely resembles that of the NATO doctrine with a slight variation in the wording thereof, with a greater focus on humanitarian issues.

Prior to the AJP 3.4.9 (NATO, 2013) JDP 3-90 was the UK doctrine for CIMIC but since the AJP 3.4.9 wholly replaced and superseded the JDP 3-90 however still carries dual numbering between these two organisation. Thus, the UK have wholly incorporated the NATO doctrine as its own.

2.11.   SANDF OPERATIONS

2.11.1.   International Deployments

Heleta (2017) empathized that the South African constitution makes provisions for the SANDF to protect the territorial integrity and provide boarder security in addition to support peace operations in Africa, additionally the author elaborates on the peacekeeping missions over the past two decades in the article which is listed and elaborated on below. Issues with regards to funding and funding models and the problems associated with these deployments is discussed in the previous chapter with regards to the back ground of the SANDF. Funding is not only received from RSA

Treasury but also from the RSA Department of International Relations and Cooperation for such actions, but therein lies the rub, with Heleta (2017) identifying that the running cost has to come from the SANDF as some of the "hidden cost" consist of pre-deployment training (and other training), infrastructure, equipment and maintenance.

The latest SANDF Defence Review, (2015) makes mention to the SANDF's role in "regional and continental peacekeeping" and "development and other ordered tasks" which will in some cases blur the task of the SANDF in terms of humanitarian actions provided on the international stage, Heleta (2016) has equated this to "armed humanitarianism"; in support, Doctors Without Borders (2016) urged not only the South African policy makers but also the broader public to take due regards for the humanitarian principles (also see Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination and UN CMCoord) especially during conflict. Skidd (2005) makes similar assertions in the Canadian context by dispelling the myth that CIMIC practitioners in the military should not have the idea of hands on humanitarian assistance in the form of building schools and distributing aid as its contrary and undermines the CIMIC structure in enchanted force protection.

2.11.1.1. Operation Cordite-Sudan

The war in Darfur started in February 2003. In July 2004 the SANDF arrived as part of the peacekeeping operation, the SANDF be remain involved until early 2016 in various forms and throughout the transition from African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the western regions of Darfur. The AU mission was later terminated and progressed to a UN mission UN African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) during December 2007/January 2008 (Dickens, 2016; Department of Defence, no date a). The Department of Defence (no date) published in a media statement that this was the first AU-UN hybrid mission with defenceWeb (2016) finding that the cost of Operation Cordite was approximately R400 000 000.00 to support the 800 deployed troops per year. South Africa gets reimbursed for these expenses by the UN. However, these funds rarely find their way back to the Department of Defence (Stupart, 2017).

2.11.1.2. Operation Mistral - Democratic Republic of Congo

SANDF involvement in the DRC dates back to 1999. However, 2003 saw an influx of troops when the number of personnel were increased from 48 to approximately 1000 and later an additional 500 thus totalling 1500 under the banner of United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) (Department of Defence, no date). MONUC was concluded on 28 May 2010 to which

UN resolution 1925 to create the current mission MONUSCO effective 1 July 2010 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017a, no date).

MONUSCO is currently the biggest peacekeeping operation underway in the world with defenceWeb (2016a) reporting 20000 troops on deployment in 2016. As of December 2017, MONUSCO still holds the title of largest peacekeeping operation, with the total number of troops at 18136 uniformed personnel (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017a). Wingrin (2017) reports the cost of the Operation Mistral to be estimated at close on R1Bn (R979 253 751.00) for the Financial year 1 April 2017 till 31 March 2018 the South African tax payer (SANDF). In addition to reporting on the budgets and the constraints Wingrin (2017) indacted that a interdepartmental task team was formed looking at ring fencing such funding as what is received by the UN.

2.11.1.3.   Mission Thebe

An SA Army peacebuilding mission to the DRC facilitated training of the troops from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) since August 2013 (Machete, 2014). defenceWeb (2015) contradicts Machete (2014) by reporting that Mission Thebe has being ongoing in since 2011. It may be pertinent to note that Mission Thebe is separate from MONUSCO deployment (OP Mistral), which is of an unusual nature but purportedly in line with the Angola/DRC/RSA tripartite agreement. Gibson (2016) reports that Angola is also in the process of training troops. Mission Thebe is rumoured to cost approximately R60 mil per year with request for additional funding requested to the turn of R185mil (defenceWeb, 2016d). Mission Thebe is marred in controversy where in 2016 there was an increase in instructor numbers without the proper cabinet approval and budgetary support Gibson (2016) clarifies that such an oversight removes legitimacy of such a mission. Very limited information is publicly on the topic of Mission Thebe

2.11.1.4.   Operation Fiber and Curriculum – Burundi

Operation Fibre was a sole SANDF commitment outside of the AU and UN, with the SANDF acting in a mediation role during the peace process within Burundi (PMG, 2003), in support of the Arusha Agreement (van Rooyen, 2009). OP Fibre was conducted between October 2001 until April 2003, and again in December 2006 to December 2009 (DefenceWeb, no date).

The primary function of OP Fibre were VIP protection for returning political leaders which would be participating in the Burundi Transitional Government under the South African Protection and

Support Detachment (SAPSD), with the establishment of the AU and the subsequent involvement of the AU and UN in Burundi in May 2003 (van Rooyen, 2009). With the evolvement of the UN/AU the overall designation for the UN operation were United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) the operation was named Curriculum which initially had a deployment of 701 troop which were later increased to 1266. However, the mandate, did not include VIP protection with a later memorandum of understanding signed between the AU and SANDF to enable the South African forces to act within this role outside of Bujumbura (DoD, no date) hence the concurrent or over lapping operations. ONUB was enacted as a Chapter VII operation by means of resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004 and successfully completed by December 2006 (Boutellis, 2015)

2.11.1.5.   Operation Vimbezela – CAR

The SANDF signed a memorandum of understanding as far back as 2007 with the renewal during 2012 with the understanding that the SANDF will provide military training to the Central African Republic's Armed Forces (FACA). The memorandum goes beyond just the provision of military training and allows for *inter alia*, self-defense and the protection of human life and assistance to the Government in achieving DDR (implementation and planning) as well as a Security Sector Reform (SSR) program. Op Vimbezela was envisaged to last five years 2013-2018 (PMG, 2017). defenceWeb (2017) reported that 1181 FACA soldiers we trained during Operation Vimbezela in aspects such as: Basic Military Training, Infantry, Logistics, first aid, Special Forces and English.

In may be pertinent to note that the "Battle of Bangui" occurred during Op Vimbezela that 15 elite soldiers for Special Forces and Airborne regiments lost their lives with an additional 27 injured. The SANDF forces (200) had to content with a numerically superior enemy force of 600 heavy armed rebels in a 36 hour battle (Helfrich, 2017). With Hofstatter and Oatway (2013) reporting that the enemy combatants suffered approximately 50% loss of manpower.

Concurrently during Op Vimbelezala, media reports suggest was Operation Morero which Minister Nkoana-Mashabane (Minister of international relations and co-operation) answered during parliamentary questions dating back to 2011 of which the SANDF has refused to answer questions on. Op Morero was allegedly aimed at protecting south African interests within the region and provide VIP protection services (Special Forces contingent) to the CAR President Bozize (Cronje, 2013; Styan, 2013; Africa Check, 2013).

2.11.1.6.   Operation Copper – Mozambique Cannel

Operation Copper commenced in January 2011 as the SANDF's naval response to the Somalia pirates extending their area of operation with a hijacking of a Mozambican fishing vessel Vega 5 (December 2010). The SANDF deployed various Naval and air assets in combating the piracy threat within the Mozambican water and stationed at Pemba in northern Mozambique (Depertment of Defence, no date). The operation continued until July 2012 only due to the cost implications with using the Naval frigates, with Wingrin (2015) reporting on the deployment of Offshore Patrol Vessels as an alternative to the frigate deployment on a rotational basis as a cost saving strategy. The SANDF was the mayor contributor to Op Copper with the addition of Mozambican and Tanzanian forces in support. With the decrease in pirate activity in the area, the SAAF withdrew from Op Copper in 2015 along with their 370 uniformed staff (Helfrich, 2015b).

2.11.2.   Internal Operations

2.11.2.1.   Operation Pyramid – Border security

Op Pyramid is also known as Project Pyramid, with a multiagency approach to border security in South Africa and a precursor to the Boarder Management Agency. DefenceWeb (2017a) noted that Boarder Management Agency is expected to become operational in 2018 but at the time of publication has yet to take effect. Op Pyramid was launched in June 2015 in conjunction with the South African Police service and Department of Home Affairs, covering the sea, land and airports (Netshirembe, 2015). Furthermore, Netshirembe (2015) reported that:

> The launch of Operation Pyramid announces the start of an on-going operational initiative in the borderline environment that seeks to improve the overall coordination and cooperation between government and civil society partnership to secure our country's land, air and maritime borderline.

This essentially goes much further than community engagement as this encompasses CIMIC. At the same time, however, this engagement is lacking the lexicon within the military at this stage.

2.11.2.2.   Operation Corona

Op Corona was instituted to protect and defend the territorial integrity of the republic of South Africa, which is principally a landward operation supported by the SAAF (Helfrich, 2015a).

Established in the 2011 with the deployment of 3 companies (x3 ~ 142 soldiers) on the Mozambican and Zimbabwean borders, currently numbered at 15 companies and active on all landward borders (defenceWeb, 2018c).

2.11.2.3.   Operation Arabella

Community assistance missions commonly get conducted under Op Arabella such as Search and Rescue (landward and maritime), medical evacuations as well as assisting wildlands firefighting by means of aerial bombardment mainly making use of rotor assets (Martin, 2018b).Operation Arabella is currently ongoing on a continuous basis.

2.11.2.4.   Operation Chariot

This is SANDF's disaster support and humanitarian assistance operation both internally and externally (Netshirembe, 2014). Op Chariot has in the past provided bridges to isolated communities post flooding as was the case 2011 when several bridges (bailey bridges) we constructed for the communities of Mthatha (EC), Nquqhu (EC) and Hammanskraal (GP). Additionally, in the same year Martin (2012) documented that the SANDF also assisted in the fight against the spreading of hand foot and mouth disease in KwaZulu-Natal as a joint venture with Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) we amongst some of the related operations within 2011.

During 2014 whilst Mothutlung in the North West Province was experiencing a water crisis the Defence Force assisted by means of water tankers to the affected community in support of National Disaster Management, However the Department of Defence, (2014) in a media statement indicated that these resources would remain under the control of the Joint Operations Headquarters it may be noted that such cases these actions will fall outside the Scope of the Oslo Guidelines. The Department of Defence Annual Report FY 2016/2017 (South African Ministry of Defence, 2017) additionally list numerous bridge building and water deliver interventions trough out 2016 mostly focused within the Eastern Cape Province. More recently the SNADF has mobilized elements in assisting with the meteorological conditions (drought) in the Western Cape (Department of Defence, 2017b).

2.12.   MILITARY CULTURE

Military culture speaks to the collective activities more precisely in relation to the collective activities and shared goals of the organisation, and how this organisations goes about achieving such goals. "Military culture eventually directs, shapes, informs and provides the context to every single military action ,whether of an organisational or operational nature, and irrespective of how big or small the action is" (Vreÿ, Esterhuyse and Mandrup, 2013). Thus, in short you culture will determine your ability to succeed, should it find the balance between internal cohesion as derived from the warfighting and external legitimacy as the organisation serves society. Internal cohesion and external legitimacy will shape military culture which in turn will determine of civil military relations/interaction, influence organisational effectiveness and value base of the organisation. The *raison d'être* of the SANDF has long departed from the pure fighting machine to a more multi-spectrum solution to the needed of South Africa and as such should be reflecting within the culture.

We need to consider the change in the application of the military as such the military contribution to the non-traditional mission it finds itself in, with a departure of paradigm of a waring organisation which is either preparing, deterring or conducting warlike operations. The core of military culture is what Vreÿ, Esterhuyse and Mandrup, (2013) termed as organised violence and the concept of constant planning, preparation for the application of such violence (force) and forms the basis of the induction and socialisation of new members in to this culture. With the authors pointing out the further the functionary is from the enemy the more corporate the structures and cultures become however still connected to the "application of force", using the example of military planners in a city capitol, with an understanding what the implication and the gravitas of such force will be. The military cannot solely achieve their mission without civilians which may be within the organisation which may include but not limited to logisticians, finance and administration personnel, political advisors, medical, religious professional staff etc. With the proximity to the application of force being constantly blurred with type of modern warfare with a 360 Degree battlefield where there is essentially no safe space within theatre as what was seen in the Iraq and the Afghan war with suicide bombers and vehicle based improvised explosive devices, inflicting damage in the rear echelon.

It will only stand to reason as to why military culture is important and as to how and why it relates to CIMIC. The point has be thoroughly made through and the previous chapters as to the inter dependence of the military and civilian/civil actors as well as the similar but different CIMIC

training (CIMIC vs CMCoord), the days of conventional lines of fighting is passed along the cold war mindset and the 360 degree battlefield of today is "crowed" by multiple actors both military and no military. There needs to paradigm shift within he organisations away from combat operations when dealing in humanitarian missions for instance with Vreÿ, Esterhuyse and Mandrup, (2013) proposing that such specific skills can be counterproductive as more general skills are needed. The reinforced case for CIMIC is thus that a purely war fighting force will be inadequate for the modern-day challenges

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will focus on the methodology used in this study. The chapter will present and explain to the reader the qualitative research method that was used. Additionally, representations will be made with regards to sampling, data collection and analysis, reliability and validity of data and study.

3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1.1. Qualitative Research

This study will be using a qualitative approach, making use of two facets: questionnaires, which will be augmented by the review of existing literature and publicly available reports. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2006) summarise qualitative research as fundamentally a descriptive form of research as it covers an array of interpretative techniques which seeks to come to terms with a phenomenon in the social world. Furthermore, the authors reinforce the point by indicating the qualitative research could successfully be used in the description of amongst other groups, organisations or processes, as in this case. Babbie (2014) describes social research as servicing many purposes; he narrows it down to three key purposes: exploration, description and explanation. Often, there are a combination of these three purposes present in a study. Therefore, we will explore the topic and applications of CIMIC within the SANDF and other militaries to build the case for the SANDF and dispel some misconceptions. Exploratory case studies can find approximate answers to the question posed (Babbie, 2014).

3.1.2. Case Study

The decision to make use of intrinsic case study (Creswell, 2007) in this research is eloquently explained by Wedawatta, Ingirige and Amaratunga (2011):

> Case study is documented as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident

Which naturally flowing into our current case in hand and the phenomena namely CIMIC and its applications. Intrinsic case study design (qualitative), as Bryman et al. (2014) indicate, is a type of design that involves detailed and extensive in-depth analysis of the case (Harvard University, 2008). Leedy & Ormrod (2010) explain the value of case study research because of its unique or exceptional nature that promotes understanding or informs practice in subsequent situations. Johansson (2011) similarly made use of a qualitative case study, which motivated by highlighting the difficulty in examining the CIMIC concept in a statistical manor, in this case participant opinion. The author examined "The effectiveness of CIMIC in peace operations" by the division of the concept into three mechanism namely communication, force preparation

3.2. DATA COLLECTION

3.2.1. Participant Sampling

Sampling for this study was done through non-probability sampling, purposive sampling and snowball sampling, where individuals known to the researcher were approached and their referrals followed up on. Once saturation was reached social media channels related to military matters were employed with subsequent follow up, where individuals did provide additional contact persons. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2006) attribute this selection to convenience/simplicity and economy. As in the case of this research, Babbie (2014) motivates for purposive sampling which is also known as judgmental sampling. Purposive sampling is the selection of the participants on the basis of their knowledge on the subject and relating to the purpose of your study, in this case military personnel with operational experience or relevant experience in disaster response. It may not account for the whole population but would suffice to make generalisations of the study population (Robson, 2005; Babbie, 2014).

Snowball sampling was done in an attempt to reach a greater population similar to those selected in the purposive sample. Bhat (2019) refer to snowball sampling form of chain referral where a primary data source refers the researcher to an additional source that may contribute meaningfully essentially with the sample size increasing at each level of referral when the population is not known similar to a multilevel marketing scheme. Babbie (2014) justifies the use of snowball sampling when potential participants may be difficult to find in addition to will increase the sample population, as in the case with SANDF staff across the country. Question 20 of the survey contributed to the snowball sampling (appendices)

3.2.2. Qualitative Survey Questionnaires

Research interviews and/or questionnaires are an important tool in the qualitative researcher's arsenal for data collection and widely used with qualitative research (Qu and Dumay, 2011). Often in qualitative research the researcher deals with non-numerical data which can be extracted in numerous ways such as observations, questionnaires, documents and or interviews, to name a few options within the social scientist's repertoire (Jacob and Furgerson, 2012). The use of multiple methods in the pursuit of data collection can be a powerful tool in case study research (Leedy and Ormrod, 2010; Alshenqeeti, 2014).

Babbie (2014) notes that even though the name suggests a collection of questions that the typical questionnaire has almost an equal number of statements to the respondent to consider, and adds flexibility in the design and overall interesting. Generally, when looking at types of questions they may be either open ended or closed-ended questions. Closed-ended questions most certainly provides for a uniformed response such as yes, no, and ranges of agreement to disagreement, whereas opened-ended questions require great coding prior to computer analysis. The author additionally warns that this may lead to misunderstanding and subject to interpreter/researches' bias. Another worrying option is that a respondent may provide information which may be totally irrelevant to the research project, despite that open-ended questions forms the foundation of qualitative surveying and often used exclusively by such researchers (Babbie, 2014)

A well-known online survey tool (Survey Monkey) was used for distribution initially directly (via email) to potential respondents, followed or preceded by telephonic communications. The survey had a combination of open and close-ended questions, which required some form of coding (see appendices Survey Template). Additionally, some participants who were willing to contribute beyond the questionnaires provided a written submission either out of free will or on further query post questionnaire on the proviso that the participant provided contact information (in essence foregoing anonymity) which added a broader questioning and greater explanation of the sub-contexts of their own scenario/organisation, numerous participants that was known by the researcher prior to conducting the study also engage in electronic communications with the author in applications such as WhatsApp etc.

3.2.3. Research Questionnaire

The research questionnaire will be discussed within this section which will discuss the not only the information to be gathered but also address pertinent issues such as validity and reliability. At the tail end of this section we will explore in greater detail the relationship between validity and reliability and where they intersect.

3.2.3.1. Questionnaire Format

The questionnaire had a few core sections and relevant contingency questions:

1. Demographical data
2. Understanding of CIMIC or UN CMCoord
3. Humanitarian related actions of the SANDF know to the participants and level of involvement.
4. General attitudes towards CIMIC
5. Way forward for CIMIC in the SANDF
6. Additional suggestion or talking points form participants

The method of delivery/administration was by means of online platform (self-administered) to be able to circulate widely (see appendices Survey Template).

3.2.4. Data Validity

Robson (2005) summarized that validity from a realist perspective specifically within the qualitative research context, refers to the accuracy of the study results and if it really captures and corresponds to the actual current state. However, some authors argue that the very nature of qualitative nature does not lead itself well to statistical calculations for validity however there are other methods available to ensure validity in such cases (Brink, 2007).

Babbie (2014) defines validity as: are we actually measuring what we stated we are measuring within this study whereas Leung (2015) attributes validity to the appropriateness of the "tool", data and process. Validity has four facets associated with it: face validity, criterion related validity, construct and content validity. "Face validity" was the best described by Brink (2007) as the most obvious but also the weakest which is based on intuitive judgement made by subject matter experts but goes on to emphasize that this should not be considered an adequate alternative to

other forms but rather the first step in assessing validity. Babbie (2014) refers to "criterion validity" as predictive validity, whereas Brink (2007) separates the two elements, with predictive validity as one element of criterion validity with the other being concurrent validity. Criterion validity is checking your instrument against another which is known to be valid.

"Construct validity" is ensuring that your instrument measures what it intends to measure. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2006) claim that the use of multiple criterions of measure is comparable with triangulation in map and compass navigation to establish a more precise location. Content validity refers to the volume of a measurement as well as the range of meanings covered within the content. Babbie (2014) uses the example of assessing mathematical ability but only using a singular concept such as addition or subtraction or multiplication indicating the lack of content validity, in such case where as the researcher measuring mathematical ability used all of the above with the addition of division the measurement would have greater content validity.

Leung (2015) brought to fore the argument that there is a lack of consensus in assessing qualitative research as there are so many forms and variations of qualitative research sentiments echoed by Nasrabad (2018). Despite this, Leung (2015) put forward two schools of thought with regards to the evaluation one of which focused and places emphasis on the methodology and the other placing greater value in the evaluation of the results all in the aim of achieving validity and reliability specifically for qualitative research in the medical field.

Kitto, Chesters and Grbich (2008) emphasises six elements to assess the quality of qualitative research:

1. Is there clarification and justification around the purpose of the study?
2. Was there procedural consistency and precision (rigor)?
3. Is the sample used representative of the population or appropriate?
4. Was there correct interpretation made from the data (interpretive rigor)?
5. Reflexive and evaluative rigor present?
6. Would you be able to make generalizations and could it be transferable (results)?

One method employed to achieve validity was having multiple participants as well as aligning the finding with the literature review. The reoccurrence of certain themes during the question assured the author that validity is being obtain. The research tool (questionnaire) we constructed using the research question and sub questions in mind to measure what was needed to answer the

Research Question (construct validity), additionally appropriate respondents we sought so to meaningfully contribute a form of criterion-related validity. Content validity was achieved by a throughout literature review and exploration relevant resources to the subject matter.

3.2.5. Data Reliability

Babbie (2014) asserts that reliability relates to the fact that if you apply the same technique in a reparative fashion you will have the same or consistent results with Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2006) concurring but stated it slightly differently with the indication that if a research finding can be repeated it will be reliable. A rudimentary method to explain reliability is using weight if you ask multiple people to estimate your weight you will get a wide range of answers which is actually guesses and would seldom provide an accurate answer however stepping on a scale at the gymnasium multiple times will provide consistently the same result thus making it a reliable method of assessing your weight albeit it may not be accurate. Reliability issues in social studies are a common problem with the author indication even more so in the case of a single observer is the source of the data which may be attributed to subjectivity. Due to the qualitative nature of the study some of the questionnaire questions will be open ended with the minority being closed ended question. As for the document analysis these are well published and reliable at the time of this study, however this would only apply for that review period of that document or publication especially relating to NATO AJPs.

Nobel (2014) speaks to reliability within qualitative research as have a four pillared ability approach (Credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability). Credibility is having confidence in the findings of a particular study which the author explains as having three tenants to achieve credibility such as prolonged engagement in the particular research setting which may be a stumbling block for all novice researchers. Triangulation in the sense of multiple data sources such as in the case with this research making use of NATO doctrine, and other think tank sources such as the CCOE, Peace Operation Training Institute (POTI) and UN related material augmented by Interviews of key stakeholders and other related training materials on the subject matter. Nobel (2014) additionally emphasize that triangulation has been previously applied to assess validity in the past. Final the last tenant of credibility is peer debriefing in this case by means of supervisor support and feedback.

Transferability speak the extent to which the findings may be applied to other similar cases, for instance other AU contributing nations taking part in UN/AU hybrid missions on the continent in

establishing CIMIC functions. Because this study has had the main focus of the SANDF it will have limited transferability without first considering the broader picture of the second subject matter, however core principle will remain. Dependability is achieved by means of auditing by means of an external party by the evaluations of the conclusion in either the form of research supervision or assessment in addition to prior to publication of the work. The extent of Confirmability is obtained should the finding be challenged if it stands up to scrutiny in this sense does it aligned to current NATO doctrine or UN publications with justifiable deviation should that be the case supported by a solid methodology as well as data.

3.2.6. Relationship between reliability and validity

Both are closely related and both needs to be considered when using a research instrument. Reliability is part of validity as if an instrument does not measure in a reliable fashion one cannot consider your result valid, *Figure 3-1 An Analogy to Validity and Reliability* (Babbie, 2014)below is a great visualization of the relationship between validity and reliability and an adaptation of a figure by the same name from Babbie (2014).

What we have thus far established is that we would want both within our study, this is where the author introduces the tension between these two modalities where the researcher has to trade off validity against reliability and *vice versa* and Babbie (2014) conclude that there are often no clear way in measuring a concept as it may be done in several different ways.

Figure 3-1 An Analogy to Validity and Reliability *(Babbie, 2014)*

3.2.7. Data Analysis

3.2.7.1. Coding and Analysis

Some of the questions undertaken by the participants were close-ended which simplifies the analysis of such questions such as the Demographical data (Question 2 & 3) or 'have you received any CIMIC training' (Question 7). Babbie (2014) defines coding as the processing of data in the raw from which may be in multi formats (recordings, oral etc.) the questionnaires were all electronic which populated each question to a tab within a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet, containing the written responses provided by the respondents.

The literature collected within the literature review, reviewed and incorporated into the study was used to compare and contrast the responses by the respondents. For some questions latent content (method) were used to extrapolate meaning for the entire response by the respondent (content analysis), such as the case where the responses were codded according to appropriateness of the intended actions or past actions looking into appropriateness and irrelevant response color-coded (pink) and essentially discarded. Where responses proved to be meaningful, they were also color coded green in the emerging themes looked for extracted for discussion in the **Error! Reference source not found.** under the appropriate headings. An

appropriate example would be Question 16: 'Please motivate in your opinion, should the SANDF incorporating CIMIC into SANDF structures? If possible, include hurdles to overcome in such process.' Here, four distinct themes came to the fore (Joint Operations Division, Funding, Reserve Force, Disaster Management act) was witnessed and discussed. Similarly, where the responded were asked (Question 17): Where will the greater value be in terms of CIMIC within the operational environment or "domestic" CIMIC related functions? Bering in mind neither is mutually exclusive. Where the participants' motivated or could have dispelled the CIMIC notion, where the results were discussed and made into a pie chart (see Figure 5-5 Operational, Domestic or parallel system for CIMIC in the SANDF). The majority of the coding on the open-ended questions consisting of looking for the puzzle pieces provided by the respondents' and making it into a workable format.

Content analysis was also used to analyze responses, content analysis which is the study of recorded communications in this case the questionnaire as a whole response throughout the questionnaire against what was found during the literature review. Which is important for triangulation and ensuring validity and reliability of the study thus ensuring that the eventual findings are not out of touch with the existing literature and current best practice.

3.3. RESEARCH ETHICS

Bryman *et al.* (2014) list the four ethical issues pertaining to this type of research and the fifth added by the author as:

1. Would there be harm to participants.
2. The lack of informed consent.
3. The invasion of privacy.
4. Deception.
5. Organizational harm.

Additionally, it is stated by Bryman *et al.* (2014) that these ethical transgressions are often overlapping such as the case where one cannot fully has informed consent if deception is present. However, this study will have fewer ethical consideration in comparison to research where experiments are conducted, albeit it is not completely free of such consideration as one will need to have willing participants which consents to participation within the study. Additionally, the

author will ensure the sanitization of the data to a level of anonymity so not to disclose identities of the participants in the final report when dealing with *inter alia* quotes or aspects from the research questionnaires. Where applicable, participants will be numbered and be only identifiable by the number after the questionnaire. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of the Free State prior to conducting the research project.

4. THE STUDY AREA

This chapter will provide a detailed overview of the SANDF, based on the publicly available information comprising *inter alia* composition of the SANDF's organisation and structure, demographic, etc. The chapter will also provide a brief discussion with regards to the vision and mission of the SANDF for the future. The defence force as has been stressed earlier is in dire need to arrest the decline of the past decade or so. The Defence Review (2015) presents three policy pathways in terms of pursuit of the defence objectives.

Option 1: Maintain the current course, as so known as "***do nothing***" which would require the SANDF to redesign its defence capability and scale down to limit the decline currently experienced with a greater inward focus in terms of domestic requirements and territorial and sovereignty defence some of the limited capabilities to be in place for option 1 is:

1. A greater tooth-to-tail ration which is light and cheap, essentially that the ration between fighting soldiers (tooth) and the support (tail) are lessened.
2. Reduction in the leadership group in terms of command structure and command corps.
3. Reliance on lesser and unsophisticated operating systems which will have the obvious benefits
4. Overall reduction in force size
5. Decrease in domestic and international commitments
6. Greater dispersion for the SANDF (geo-footprint)

Operationally what would a SANDF look like under this Policy Option? Essentially the SANDFs' Landward capability will be solely lighter infantry based with primary takings of internal operations, whereas for the SAAF it will translate into only consisting of a light tactical mobility. The Maritime capability would diminish to a shore based maritime defence capability of the South African territorial waters concurrent on a reduction in Special Forces capabilities to suit the current need.

Option 2: Independent Expansion would make the achievement of MS 4 possible albeit it be over a much greater time period.

Option 3: Expand in Partnership would enable the achievement of the Defence Capability Renewal priorities at a greater pace which would be determined by the number of strategic partners that are brought onboard to facilitate the expansion in addition to funding streams.

4.1. BACKGROUND

4.1.1. Organisation and Structure

Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 below give a macroscopic view of the Ministry of Defence and Military Veteran Affairs in a top-down approach which flows from one to the other to provide an in-depth understanding of the organisation. However, the author will not *per se* have an elaborate discussion on each of the sections within the organisational organogram but limit the discussion to the relevant section.


*Figure 4-1 DOD Marco Organisational Chart level 0 and 1*(Department of Defence, 2017a)

Figure 4-2 Department of Defence Composition (Department of Defence, 2017a)

The leadership structure at the apex consist of the commander-in-chief which is the democratically elected President of the Republic of South Africa and in a hierarchical structure flows to the Minister of Defence and Veteran Affairs, followed by the Chief of the SANDF, which is the most senior military commander. The Chief of the SANDF has four supporting Generals in the four arms of service (Army, Navy, SAAF and SAMHS) in addition to the four divisions (Defence Intelligence, Corporate Staff, Joint Operations and Defence Inspectorate). Joint Operations Division (J Ops) will be discussed again later in Chapter 5 and 6 as it has a prominent role within

the SANDF and particularly to CIMIC albeit it CIMIC in its current plan will form part of the Land Command.

4.1.2. Demographic

Global Fire Power (2016) writes that the SANDF has a total of 94,050 military personnel (78,050 active service versus 16,000 reserve personnel). The PMG (2015) placed the reserve force numbers closer to 22,576 with a subsequent milestone to be reached set at 25,000 and an ultimate goal of having 82,00 in addition to expressing concern with the average of a reserve force member at 39 years indicating a desire for the average age to be closer to 29 so not to compromise frontline action, with Heitman, (2019) placing the average age of an infantry soldier at 37 going on to discuss the financial implications of having older soldiers vs younger soldiers in term of dependents etc.. DefenceWeb (2014) presents slightly more up to date figures showing a nebulous decline in the SANDF force strength over the time period from the 2014 to 2018, from 78,707 to 78,050 as listed by Global Fire Power before. It may be noteworthy to indicate to the reader that the total figures listed below have a shortfall of 4,033 personnel. It seems that DefenceWeb (2014) neglected to list specify other divisions under the Chief of the SANDF (numbers include civilian personnel) Figure 4-2 Department of Defence Composition (*Department of Defence, 2017a)*

Figure 4-3 SANDF Total Force Strength (defenceWeb, 2014)

4.2. STRATEGIC OVERVIEW/ DEFENCE REVIEW

The Defence Review 2015 maps defence policy and strategic trajectory for the following 20-30-year time frame, and the second such document of its type since democracy preceded by the Defence Review of 1998. The current review was brought about by the identification of the change in not only the strategic environment but also the pace of change in the continental peacekeeping obligation that the SANDF is facing, nevertheless these core factors are underpinned by the pursuit of our very own national interest (Defence Review, 2015).

The goals of the SANDF will be aligned to the national security strategy, national interests as well as the foreign policy so to achieve the constitutionally mandated functions. These constitutionally mandated functions are achieved by a combination of four goals and supplemented by 13 tasks in support of these goals as stipulated by the Defence Review (2015) as seen below in **Error! Reference source not found.**

Figure 4-4 Defence Goals and Tasks (Defence Review, 2015)

The SANDF has a defensive posture. However, it is required to maintain offensive capabilities to fulfill the strategic mandate. The integration between to two states of readiness will not only be achieved by maintaining a balance/flexible force but also by means of technology to achieve this state. The Review envisages a sustainable funding model labeled "Sustainable Future Force" and stipulates an "urgent need to move towards 40:30:30 funding ration, 40% of the budget allocation for staff funding with the balance split equally 30% each between operating and capital cost. DefenceWeb, (2017) places the current staffing cost at 57%, indicating a distance from the desired 40% target, which would be a remarkable feat considering 71% of the SANDF is infantry and thus manpower "heavy". Heitman, (2019) in a recent publication cited that only four of the NATO countries spend 40% or less on personnel with the NATO average at 51.72%, later the author brings the reader's attention to the operational tempo of peace support operation and border security duty (22 companies) bemoaning the understaffed battalions especially the reserves. Heitman, (2019) concludes that the SANDF should 8.5 Battalions short of what is currently required making the 40% target possibly unobtainable in the foreseeable future.

4.3. DEFENCE CAPABILITY RENEWAL PRIORITIES

The Five-Year planning priorities to restore the defence capability of the SANDF is a departure from the Defence Review of 1998, where the review was done with the projected budget in mind where the 2015 version had a broader mindset to "right the wrongs" created with the previous review (DefenceWeb, 2017c).

4.3.1. Milestone 1: Arresting the Decline

Essentially, the initial arrest of the decline will come through bringing the staffing cost to in line with the 40:30:30, in real term this means a reduction in staff to approximately 66,000 total force. The reduction in staffing can be achieved through multiple means presented by the defence review such as an ultimate reduction in staff (retirement, retrenchments etc.) or additional funding provided or a combination approach. Additional suggestion is made that the SANDF should receive reimbursement for the peace keeping deployment to UN/AU missions (a bugbear of the SANDF for a few years now.

Organisational interventions required under Milestone 1 to be instituted concurrently with the previous objectives noted are:

1. Positioning of the Defence Secretariat as seen in Figure 4-1Figure 4-2.
2. Establishing a legal framework to function within to enact the Defence review 2015.
3. Restructuring the SANDF, which goes beyond the traditional paradigm of reconstruction but rather speaks to command and control structures and relevant issues related thereto.
4. Procurement system Reform in the form of decentralisation to the lowest possible level to ensure procurement capability across the organisation.
5. Reduction in Supernumerary Staff within the SANDF to 2% or less,
6. SANDF to "*Grow their own timber*" in terms of better recruitments, retainment and development of bright young minds within the service.
7. Retaining of Military Specialists and Professional staff which is sought after in the civilian job market.
8. Having a refocus on military discipline and the disciplinary processes and system.
9. Integrated Information Technology systems, integrated with other departments such as national treasury
10. Greater cooperation with the Defence industry to coordinate capability and technologies.

11. Revitalisation of the Defence acquisition system.
12. Removal and disposal of aged equipment and munitions
13. Greater focus on facilities management in the form of a *Defence Facilities Master Plan (Defence Review, 2015)*.

4.3.2. Milestone 2: Rebalance the Defence Force

Milestone (MS) 2 will need to build on the achievement in Milestone 1 in both the organisational and capability interventions. The Defence Review (2015) stipulates the three core achievements of Milestone 1 to be in place before the progression of the turnaround strategy in terms of Milestone 2 which consists of the:

1. 40:30:30 so to provide financial maneuverability within the organisation.
2. UN/AU troop reimbursement for peace keeping missions.
3. Appropriated Defence Funding.

Some of the targets set for MS 2 just in terms of the staff complement of 101 000 employees comprising of 64 000 Regulars and an increase of 10 000 Reserves to 25 000 with a civilian staff component of 12 000 (also see Figure 4-5). MS 2 additionally requires 97 Combat units within the four arms of service as well as at least 1.6% of GDP funding (also see Figure 4-6). Finally, for MS 2 the SANDF will be required to stat graduating Commissioned offices from the military academy at approximately 200 candidates per year, comprising of both Reserve and Regulars. Which will be the corner stone before the progression to MS 3 can take place.

Capability interventions during MS are ambitious to say the least ranging from development of the special operations community within the SANDF. Concurrently the development of the SAAF airlift capacity which proven a dire need in recent conflicts, as well as aerial refueling capability and finally the rotary air wing medium lift capacity. The SAMHS in conjunction with the SAAF are earmarked for the development of an aviation medical facilities but doesn't specify fixed or rotor wing. Maritime and Air domain awareness needs to develop to meet the needs of the country for multiple such as interdiction and surveillance and maritime protection capability. The RSA has maritime warning obligation which needs to be fulfilled hence the need in MS 2 for the development of a hydrological survey capability (Defence Review, 2015).

4.3.3. Milestone 3: Capacitate the Defence Force

Targets in terms of funding and staffing for MS 3 can be seen below in both Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 to provide a helicopter view with the development and changes between milestones. The Defence Review (2015) with every milestone seeks to develop additional capability of expand on already in place capabilities from the previous MS and MS 3 is no different, the most notable are the and new entries are heavy-combat capability which includes element of rejuvenation of the landward logistic vehicle fleet and indirect fire support which must be rapidly deployable. The Notable target for the SAAF within MS 3 is the development of air combat capability mainly with weapon augmentations and combat helicopters amongst others. Additionally, the Defence academy needs an increase of approximately 100 candidates per year to meet the requirements of 300 graduate's pre-year and a further growth of another 100 candidates with the following milestone.

4.3.4. Milestone 4: Responding to Strategic Challenges

The desire end state of the Defence Review is an army able to respond to plethora of challenges presented in a modern society. MS 4 develops further on the heavy combat capabilities, the final capabilities that require development will be those of ground-based air defense and combat engineers which will further contribute to combat units totaling 158 (Figure 4-5) (Defence Review, 2015).

4.3.5. Milestone 5: Limited war and Insurgency

MS 5 isn't necessary a milestone per se in the development plan but rather a contingency should the strategic environment deteriorate to such an extent require limited war. And a strategic realignment of efforts with defence obligations being place secondary to the development of a war force.

Figure 4-5 Defence Development Trajectory

Figure 4-6 Financial requirements for the Defence Development Trajectory

4.4. CONCLUSION

Chapter four has provided a strategic overview for the future of the SANDF by the Defence Review 2015 which seems like a mammoth task in addition to corrections from the 1998 Review. Defence Review has not been without its detractors. However as of 2018's DOD Annual report there has yet be a funding allocation for the implementation of Milestone 1: Arresting the Decline raising grave concerns, with attempts being made to address the objectives which doesn't require funding underway (DoD, 2018). With DefenceWeb, (2018) reporting that the Defence review as funding for such seems not to be a current priority.

Therefore, the author can assume the implementation of Option 1(see introduction to chapter): the do-nothing approach will come to pass seemingly contrary to the political aspirations for the SANDF and their foreign policy. The Joint Standing Committee on Defenses' chairperson was quoted as saying "South Africa will have to agree to a significantly reduced level of defence ambition for the future and correspondingly reduce expectations for the defence function" (defenceWeb, 2018b) with other outspoken critics such as Martin, (2018a) stating the defence review is dead, whereas Daniels, (2019) has more candid words in reference to the Defence Review "It has a defect that was undetected during birth. The plan to arrest the decline, declined itself".

5. RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter will focus on the data collected, topics covered amongst others include aspects such as exposure and understanding of CIMIC and UN CMCoord followed by aspects around Humanitarian integration and general attitudes towards CIMIC. The final section in this chapter will looking into E-Learning available which included free courses available in an attempt to bridge the gap.

5.1. RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

Five participants were selected initially with proximity to the RFC which the followed snowball sampling for those participants, three potential participants failed to contribute despite verbal commitment. Once this initial source of core participants was exhausted a follow on to an additional six participants were approached, one participant was often recommended to the researcher approximately four time often during telephonic conversations (this participant) was known to the author prior to the study and provided valuable insights. Following   as well as recommended participants from the snowball sampling social media sites were used which possible participants frequents. While numerous individuals were approached to participate in the research directly, the author was astounded at the lack of willingness to participate. A possible cause for the lack of participation could be attributed to the specialised nature of the research.

A total of 32 respondents from the SANDF partook in the CIMIC study. Their contributions were insightful and informational. As it was expected, the Army, as the largest arm of service, was the largest contributor of respondents, as seen below in Figure 4-7. Whereas the seniority of the participants within the organisation is reflected in Figure 4-8.

Figure 4-7 Participation within the Arms of Service.

Figure 4-8 Participants' Rank

5.2. CIMIC EXPOSURE

A slight majority of the respondents (55.3%) lacks formalized CIMIC training. When it comes to the senior officers, the majority has received formalized CIMIC training. Multiple respondents have indicated that CIMIC forms part of a theoretical module in either the junior command or staff duties programme. There was a slight variation between the CIMIC vs CMCoord exposure, with lower numbers (38.71%) confirming exposure to the CMCoord course. Organizationally, it seems the closer the person is to a strategic level, the greater the probability of some exposure to CIMIC or CMCoord.

However, organisations such as the Peace Operations Training Institute not only provide online education with regards to CIMIC but also other related courses, which is free of charge from military personnel from the African continent(which will be fully explored later in this chapter (5.7 Online resources) as how this organisation can contribute to the SANDF . This may be pertinent to note as 70% of the respondents have operational experience in either the field of disaster response or peacekeeping where such CIMIC/CMCoord skills will prove invaluable in such operations.

5.3. CIMIC/UN CMCOORD COMPREHENSION

CIMIC comprehension was fair amongst the participants. As noted, before, most respondents have received some form of training within either CIMIC or UN CMCoord. However, it can be argued that while the respondents had an understanding of CIMIC, many could only superficially explain the specific details of what CIMIC entails. This could be attributed to the nomenclature as being fairly self-explanatory. With 25% of the respondents that elected not to elaborate further on this question which may be contributing number of reasons to which the author cannot speculate.

There was a very low exposure to UN CMCoord training, with participants reporting a 38.71% exposure rate. This was surprising due to the multiple engagements with UN Missions the SANDF has had over the past years, with some currently ongoing. What was remarkable to note from the results was that four respondents (12.9%) reported exposure prior to deployment; two reported online education with an overall operational exposure at 67.74% within the study population, conversely of respondents with operational exposure only two has had CIMIC

exposure/experience. This exposure was seen with the younger participants from the study population.

5.4. HUMANITRAIAN INTEGRATION

5.4.1. Disaster Related

Whilst exploring the working relationship between the SANDF and humanitarian organisations, it was noted that there was a very low rate of affirmation that this integration takes place between humanitarian organisations and the SANDF, 58% of the respondents either skipped this question or answered in the negative.

Whereas the 41.93% of the respondents who had operational dealings with NGOs proved insightful to say the least. Two respondents (6.45%) mentioned local support during time of crisis within the boundaries of South Africa; while the respondents didn't provide a detailed explanation to the response, they indicated the integration between other national departments (non-Military) to aid in the delivery of basic services. The other respondents referenced the 2007 nursing strike where the SAMHS played a role in propping up the national health system which was well publicized at the time. One respondent reflected on the working relationship between *Gift of the Givers* and the army, where there was assistance in the distribution of food and water to affected communities as well as a combined SAR effort. While specific detail was not provided, it is important to note that *Gift of the Givers* are prolific in the humanitarian scene working both locally and abroad to assist during natural disasters and other situations that negatively affect communities. The respondent going on to describe the integration between the SANDF that he has conducted as a member of SAMHS as "… full spectrum of support" citing the *inter alia* HIV/AIDS prevention, hygiene and life skills campaigns.

There were two themes that emerged in addition what was discussed earlier, one positive and one negative. Numerous of the respondents reported combined planning exercises, multinational training or planning exercises which are multi-agency and combined military (local and foreign). This provides a glimmer of hope. Moving toward the negative theme, a respondent recognized the benefits of a close working relationship between the military and NGOs but described the possibility of the unpredictable nature and listed security concerns. He labelled the working relationship with NGOs as dangerous, which in itself is contradictory in nature. While some external operations do have inherent risks, but looking at the local operations, collaboration with

NGOs during crises can only assist both the SANDF and NGOs provide support and assistance. Furthermore, where respondents had operational exposure with NGOs, there was often skepticism. The respondents qualified this by bringing the attention to the fact that both organisations lacked an understanding of the others' capabilities and understanding of the other organization, with a hesitance for cooperation. Most worrying was the respondent who noted that the major challenge he experienced was the competition amongst NGOs for exposure and donations and establishing dominance.

To quote one respondent: "It is therefore of paramount importance that a cooperation committee is established to coordinate the work. This will ensure that both sides are aware of the tasks." The crux of the matter is that inadvertently the respondent makes a motivation for what in the literature is called a "Civil-Military Coordination Centre" or a nodal point for a coordinated response in such operations. Civil-Military Coordination Centre or CIMIC is a purely military concept which is driven by military.

Conversely, should the establishment be driven by a humanitarian organization, it would have a slightly different nomenclature predominantly Humanitarian Operations Centre or Humanitarian Information Centre. Often, this process will be driven by OCHA (Cedric de Coning, 2007). It is therefore undoubtedly of significant value to all organisations to align with OCHA in times of disaster and a starting point for the SANDF in terms of potential "partners" should they want to have a combined humanitarian response, especially during UN mandated missions. Bringing the discussion back to the respondents' comments where organisations vie for the limelight during humanitarian crisis, it is important to remember that not all organisations choose to align with OCHA during times of disaster. However, this shouldn't be seen as a disqualifying factor as the military should assess if there is mutual benefit in operating with such organization, providing there is accountability (see Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP)) and an ethical basis for operation.

5.4.2. Peacekeeping Operations/Missions

The respondents were asked if there were integration with humanitarian organisations during PKO in their own experience. The most notable theme identified was that the majority of such integrations were limited to the provision of security for such organisations. Humanitarian work is dangerous, as Hoelscher, Miklian and Nygard (2017) demonstrate in the diagram below. The size

of the red bubbles is determined by the number of attacks both lethal and non-lethal attacks on humanitarian and aid workers.


Figure 4-9 Aid worker attaches 1997-2014 (Hoelscher, Miklian and Nygard, 2017).

It may be pertinent to touch on the politicization of humanitarian aid as such protection provided may affect the perceived impartiality of NGOs and should be approached with caution by either party. Heleta, (2016) and Hoelscher, Miklian and Nygard (2017) bring to the fore the topic of "militarization" of aid. The latter authors draw the readers' attention to the risk of embedding with the military, which may lead to greater humanitarian insecurity during conflict. This may be perceived as not being impartial by the local populations, which is also a view supported by UNOCHA (2015). Thus, such situations need to be managed with surgical precision.

5.5. DIRECT, INDIRECT AND INFRASTRUCTURAL SUPPORT

Why do we need CIMIC? , was previously touched on in chapter two. But there needs to be a clear distinction when it comes to which support is acceptable and that will vary according to the nature of the crisis. What may be acceptable in one situation would be totally detrimental in another. For example, UNOCHA (2015a:85) points out that

"Humanitarian assistance follows the sole purpose to save lives, while military forces usually carry out civil-military operations (be it civic action, civil affairs, CIMIC, civil-military operations, or others) based on the needs of the force and the mission (acceptance, security, intelligence, etc.)".

Direct support is the face-to-face interaction between the military force and the recipient of the goods, with indirect support comprising of logistical assistance such as transporting of goods or personnel of aid agencies. Indirect support activities are often not visible or to the sole benefit of the affected population. A prime example may be providing air traffic control services, power generation or infrastructure maintenance and repair by military personnel to the affected population as was the case in Haiti with the military providing air traffic control post the catastrophic earthquake in 2010 (Carpenter, 2010).

5.5.1. Disaster Relief and Response

The respondents were asked: "During Disaster Response, do you think the military should provide direct, indirect or infrastructure support ("Cookie, truck and Bridge model"). During domestic (RSA) disasters, the military is usually at the forefront of the initial response and this has been normalized to be expected by the population. There are countless examples in local media sources of military intervening within the country to provide assistance. What complicates disaster response in the geopolitical arena is where there is an ongoing disaster which may be acute/rapid onset or slow progress where the limes may become blurred with what is acceptable of a supporting military force such as the SANDF in PKO. The UNOCHA advocates for direct assistance only as a last resort, which is in line with the Oslo Guidelines and has a legal obligation to provide life-saving support in the absence of political or humanitarian support. Of the participants that answered the afore-mentioned question, 22.58% had an accurate understanding of the complexities of how to approach the situation, with three participants (9.67%) choosing not to provide an insight by not answering the question.

5.5.2. Peacekeeping Operations/Missions

PKO has evolved to been more encompassing and broader in definition. A more apt term for such operations would be Peace Operations, of which PKO is only an element in the continuum. It may be pertinent to note that the SANDF has been involved in 14 such missions since 1999 and often is the largest of the force contributors (Martin, 2019). Additionally, Holshek and de Coning (2017) noted that UN Peace Operations are currently the most prevalent form of such operations across

the globe. Peace Operations could possible entail any of the following elements to some degree or another (Hatto, 2014):

- Humanitarian assistance
- Elections supervision
- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
- Governmental support in safety and security (rule of law) and establishing legitimate and effective government and institutions.

Similarly, in the previous section where the question put to the participants were: "During Peacekeeping/ Enforcement do you think the military should provide direct, indirect or infrastructure support". Again, we saw a very limited understanding, with only 21.86% of the respondents having a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter of when which type of support would be appropriate. It seems that the majority of the respondents work from the premise that military must be everything to everyone form the responses seen, where such force should rather have a chest of tools much like a tradesman instead of a single solution to every problem. Holshek and de Coning (2017) in the POTI manual for Civil-Military coordination said that the "civil-military coordination in general is more interested in actively addressing the drivers of conflict and instability rather than countering threats." It may be wise for the military to understand that it is a cog in a machine during such operations, with many other agencies assisting in the efforts which may mostly be out of sight for the rank and file.

5.6. GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS CIMIC WITHIN THE SANDF

The overall attitude towards CIMIC was overwhelmingly positive to say the least, with 92.3% of respondents answering the question doing so with a positive affirmation thereof. 81.25% of the respondents contributed to this section, with a singular individual having negative attitude towards CIMIC, which will be assessed and explored in the in some detail towards the end of the section. Some of the emerging themes extracted from the participants' answers below will be explored in further detail.

5.6.1. Barriers identified by respondents

By far the greatest obstacle identified by the respondents with regards to CIMIC was that of funding. One respondent stated that the SANDF was in "survival mode" which is not a secret as

was discussed earlier in this piece as seen in *Table 1-1 Regional comparison of military forces*, where the defense spend in South Africa is on par with Mozambique seen from a % of GDP spent, in addition to the decline as seen in Figure 1-1South African Defence spend as % of GDP (The World Bank, 2018). Another respondent noted that the average age of infantry soldiers are too high, further contributing to the financial strain. Heitman (2019) notes that the average age of an infantry soldier is 37 years, while the global average ranges from 23-25. This has major cost implications for the SANDF. The financial burden on the SANDF has been thoroughly covered in Chapter 1. Therefore, this will not be discussed any further, apart from quoting Heitman, a foremost military analyst, author and journalist (IOL News, 2009):

> "[The SANDF] … is unravelling, and that will unravel ever more quickly as equipment runs out of useful life, as pilots leave for lack of flying and technical personnel for better salaries, and as experienced officers retire and good junior officers leave in disgust".

Organisational structure was also identified by the respondents, who asserted that the key focus of the SANDF currently is primarily towards regional PKO but the army is organizationally structured, trained and equipped for combat roles. Due to this, the army has to draw from collateral capabilities to fulfill its current objectives, and would require significant restructuring to align with Defence review objectives. This aligns with sentiments echoed throughout this thesis but numerous authors. "Collateral capabilities" refers to functions provided for a mission which is not necessarily a capability of the military itself but deployed in support of the military. The term (Collateral capabilities) turned out to be confusing and used in multiple ways; as used by SANDF publications, it often refers the support of different arms of service between one another. A reasonable example would be the SAAF making use of the SAMHS medical personnel during a flood rescue operation in Mozambique.

5.6.2. Placement of CIMIC

Three participants (9.37%) specifically noted that such function should find a home within the reserve forces. According to the US model, CA are well established within the reserve forces of the US especially the US Army as we previous noted in Chapter 2, in section 2.9 CIMIC versus Civil Affairs and aligned to CIMIC functions. What motivated such comments is the pool of expertise that sits within the reserve force where individuals straddle a military function and that of a citizen, and where one may have the benefits of certain specialities but not having to support them on a full-time basis. But the argument of whether such function should solely reside on either

the par-time or professional component of the military shouldn't be mutually exclusive in nature. A balance should be considered where a core element could be located within the professional body and supported by a reserve component as a cost-saving measure, which has the necessary skills to deal with the relevant crisis of deployment but without the burden of full-time maintaining such skills or individuals.

One respondent noted that CIMIC already exist within the SANDF, siting with National Joint Operations Division (J Ops), which was not known to other participants and the author. J Ops falls under the Chief of the defence force (see Figure 1-2 Department of Defence Structure (SAAF, 2014), which is responsible for joint operations as the name implies between different arms of service or multiple arms of service. This enables a closer working relationship between the arms of service which individually have their own culture and traditions. Essentially, currently the arms of service provides the trained and equipped individuals which will deploy (operationally or as part of training) under the J Ops Division with the only exception the afore mentioned to this being the Special forces Brigades (Department of Defence, 2014b). However, multiple respondents (22.22%) who were in favour of the CIMIC paradigm also indicated that this would be the perfect home for such structure within the SANDF. Moreover, 33.33% of the respondents motivated that all arms of service should obtain such ability which seems to be tending towards J Ops Division which will be utilising such personnel. The diagram (*Figure 4-10*) below displays the participants' opinion towards where CIMIC should find a home within the SANDF.


Figure 4-10 Respondents' suggested CIMIC placement within SANDF

The strategic vision of the SANDF as set out by the Defence Rieview (2015) has CIMIC positioned under the Land Command, thus solely within the SA Army (see Figure 1-4). Under specialised units the only specialised units mentioned are CIMIC and Psyops. Going back to the term "collateral capabilities" in the military, having this function solely within the land command may be a shortcoming for future endeavours when it comes to the functioning of CIMIC, where J Ops would both be a more suitable home and elevate the stature.

5.6.3. Domestic CIMIC

Before we delve in to the aspects of domestic CIMIC it may be prudent to reflect on the domestic CIMIC activities of the German army in comparison to what is happening within the SANDF and South Africa. Voget (2008) reflects on the local nature of the German armed forces' CIMIC activities, emphasising the domestic CIMIC focus on strengthening ties between all levels of government ranging from the national government which in the German example is termed federal, down to local government at municipal level, with focus areas such as counter terrorism and disaster risk management (both natural and technological disasters). Paying close attention to seamless cooperation with local competent authorities (civil/civilian) in addition to this, the German armed forces are moving towards what the author terms a "*modern intervention army*".

I would make an argument that this method of domestic CIMIC isn't far off form what currently is happening within the South African context. However, in the German example there are CIMIC related HQs in major centres around the country. Therefore I would like to bring the reader's attention the Disaster Management Act of South Africa (DMA) (South Africa, 2002) which makes provision for the Intergovernmental Committee on Disaster Management (ICDM) (Chapter 2) which is at the national level and later a National Disaster Management Advisory Forum. The DMA §37. (1) and § 51. (1), makes provision respectively for provincial and local (municipal) disaster management advisory forums (DMAF).

The Disaster Management Framework (South Africa, 2005) which operationalises the Act specifies that the DMAFs provides a mechanism for all key stakeholders and role players to consult one another and provide a coordinated approach with regards to Disaster Risk Management. The framework specifically mentions defence as part of the ICDM but not in subsequent sections, which may be a shortcoming. However, an easy entry into the system can emulate the German model. Should there be a crisis the SANDF will integrate into the applicable

disaster management centre; but, the opportunity for understanding and workflow to have been streamlines would have been lost and essentially the working relation will be a trial by fire.

The respondents had mixed feelings with regards to whether CIMIC should be applied domestically or externally. Related question asked: "Where will the greater value be in terms of CIMIC within the operational environment or "domestic" CIMIC related functions?" with the cavate that as previously mentioned they are not mutually exclusive of one another. The results below (*Figure 4-11*) reflect the participants' views on either modality. However, none of the respondent referred to Disaster Management (organisation) or drew inference there. One respondent indicated a need for a similar system to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This may indicate the absence of awareness regarding there structures within the Republic of South Africa.


Figure 4-11 Operational, Domestic or parallel system for CIMIC in the SANDF

5.7. ONLINE RESOURCES

We have disused numerous sources of online training throughout this document, as a cost-effective method of improving the skills available to the modern soldier. A greater emphasis should be placed on online education and not solely on attendance-based education and development of soldiers. Online education is by no means a panacea for the financial woes of the

SANDF but a useful addendum into the PKO and Disaster Response sphere. Below we will briefly discuss some nuances between different courses that may be taken for personal development mostly without cost to the individual (including the SANDF). Examples of such certificates will be provided in the Appendices where applicable.

5.7.1. Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI)

POTI is a public charity based in the United States of America, which is an independent not-for-profit organization (NPO). The organisation provides online self-directed learning opportunities for PKO, humanitarian relief and security operations. The organisation boast that its platform has reached 170 nations and trained thousands of individuals (Peace Operations Training Institute, 2019). The UN Special Committee on PKO has endorsed POTI stating: The program is an E-learning platform for African Peacekeepers as well as other developing regions within the Caribbean and Latin America. Language options available range from English, Portuguese, French and Spanish. The Special Committee on PKO is quoted:

> The Special Committee fully supports the further development and delivery of such e-learning and training initiatives and also encourages Member States to support them through voluntary financial contributions (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2018:87).

The following list contains some of the free courses available to African Peacekeepers currently which often comes with reference material to be downloaded such as a textbook in addition to online lectures (POTI, 2019):

- Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations
- Core Pre-deployment Training Materials
- The Role of United Nations Police in Peace Operations
- Courses on Gender awareness
- Humanitarian Concepts and Human Rights
    - Ethics in Peacekeeping
    - Human Rights and Peacekeeping
    - International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
    - Protection of Civilians
- Mission Components, Operations, and Procedures
    - CIMIC in Peace Operations

> o Humanitarian Relief Operations
>
> o Peacebuilding
>
> • Logistics

The list is by no means exhaustive. It may be pertinent to note the proviso of free education does not apply to military of the developing countries for which such courses price in the approximate $70 USD range.

5.7.2. Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE)

CCOE, based in the Hague (Netherlands) provides mainly residence-based training but it also provides free courses on CIMIC available to anybody on the E-learning platform. The courses provided by CCOE are accredited with POTI for further education and training purposes (CCOE, 2019). CCOE provides awareness courses in CIMIC focusing on:

- Introduction to CIMIC, CMI, NATO and the Comprehensive Approach
- CIMIC Core Functions:
    - o Civil-Military Liaison
    - o Support of the force
    - o Introduction to CIMIC, CMI, NATO and the Comprehensive Approach

The courses provided are complimentary and scaffolds into one another. Additionally, they provided a rich repository for online resources on CIMIC and CMI in addition to their self-published CIMIC handbook which was recently updated.

5.7.3. Unites States Institute of Peace (USIP)

The courses provided by USIP is online based ranging from instructor-led courses providing a level of difficulty for each course. The following formats of courses are available, leaning tending towards the civil narrative instead of being purely military orientated:

- Micro-Course which is self-directed learning to what one may describe as an introductory course often limited in duration to three hours, with an emphasis on a foundational overview of the study content.
- Online Self-Paced Course which is slightly longer in duration with additional reading material, or

- Online Instructor-Led Courses which has a fixed duration and run at predetermined intervals

USIP provides a plethora of Micro-Courses (United States Institute of Peace, 2019). For brevity I will only highlight the most relevant for the discussion at hand:

- Introduction to Peacebuilding
- Conflict Analysis
- Preparing for Peacebuilding

Self-Paced E-learning topics provided by USIP is comprehensive to say the least but not all relevant to the military especially at tactical level however some of the following education programs may prove useful to the military student even more so for the CIMIC operative:

- Conflict Analysis
- Introduction to Peacebuilding
- Strategic Peacebuilding
- **UN-CMCoord**

All online courses have a required exit exam in order to complete the course and not all courses are free. The institution provided more than just online education despite the discussion being limited to online/ E-learning pertinent to the discussion at hand.

5.7.4. United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)

The Institute was established more than fifty years ago with the aim to empower diplomats from the member states to navigate the diplomatic landscape. UNITAR has since evolved to encompass a variety of training, focusing currently on achieving sustainable development (UNITAR, no date). There is a limited number of web-based courses presented at no cost to the user. The training catalog has seven focus areas grouped round themes such as Peace, People, Planet and Multilateral Diplomacy, to name a few. The peacekeeping courses as seen below do involve costs to the user:

- Achieving Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation: A Road to a Call for Peace
- Protection of Civilians in Peace Operations
- Introduction to Peace Operations

The aforementioned three courses have typically a duration of approximately 4 weeks at $250 USD.

5.8. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In terms of views expressed by the participants during the survey the following findings were made:

- A mediocre understanding regarding CIMIC.
- Partial exposure towards CIMIC and/or UN-CMCoord professionally.
- Free online recourses not fully exploited by SANDF forces/research participants despite abundant availability, which shouldn't be seen as an indictment on the participants but rather an opportunity.
- General positive attitude towards CIMIC and CMI by the majority of participants, but lacking full understanding what it would entail.
- Limited understanding regarding "domestic" and functioning of disaster managements structures.
- The majority of the respondent recommend CIMIC for all arms of service which is closely followed by J Ops.
- Ever-so-often bemoaning lack of funding and decline within the Armed forces (SANDF).

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. CONCLUSIONS

The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) published the South African Army Vision 2020 in 2008. In it, it reflects on the counter insurgency campaign in southern Afghanistan and the irregular tactics used by the opposing forces, where an individual may present as a combatant momentarily during the application of force and suddenly blend back into the population substantially increasing the risks of collateral damage. Therefore, an emphasis should be placed on information and intelligence. Thus, the authors place a significant emphasis on Psyops and CIMIC during such non-kinetic operations stating that these two modalities are as essential in such operations as kinetic firepower (Institute for Security Studies, 2008).

The introduction of CIMIC into the SANDF is a foregone conclusion as set out by the Defence Review (2015), which will be a set in the right direction. On the road to implementation there will be many opportunities to reinvent the wheel which will be costly and wasteful. The use of available resources and literature such as the AJP 9, the European CIMIC centres of excellence and friendly nations in addition to fora such as the CIOR (form the reserve force) the degree of success will be determined by not only political will but also financial ability. Not every everything in the military is CIMIC, but CIMIC could possibly play a key role in every encounter of the military (CCOE, 2012). During PKO, every encounter the SANDF makes could possible seen as an CIMIC activity or potential torpedo to the ability of the force when "dealing with heart and mind". The modality of domestic CIMIC versus that of CIMIC in the operations theatre such as during PKO neither of which are mutually exclusive and both would be to benefit of the SANDF and the country as a whole and not only fully aligned with the Defence Goals and Tasks but also appropriate according to the Defence Act.

The SANDF has had some success with construction of bridges in the Eastern Cape, water purification in the Vaal and similar quick intervention projects but this should be seen as being done on an *ad hoc* basis and not part of an overarching strategy and thus not mooting the argument of CIMIC (C Hepburn 2018, personal communication, 28 November). Col (ret) Hepburn also notes the resistance from the higher command regarding CIMIC may be attributed to a lack of comprehension and the associated benefits.

Once the reader has a thorough understanding of CIMIC and how it articulated in the all military structures, that CIMIC will contribute significantly to the Defence Goals and Tasks (Figure 4-4 Defence Goals and Tasks (Defence Review, 2015) across all four Goals within multiple tasks. Financial relieve will not be forth coming to the SANDF within the foreseeable future as was shown with the lack of funding for the Milestone 1 to arrest the decline within the SANDF and are likely to persist till some form of economic stability return to South Africa. The financial picture is further compounded by the State-owned enterprises such as Eskom and South African Airways constantly calling on treasury for financial assistance.

6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings presented in the study, the researcher proposes the following recommendations:

1. Currently, the proposition for CIMIC to be housed within the Land command is problematic, as functionaries should come from all arms of service and therefore J Ops would be more appropriate as the division deals with deployment of SANDF forces from each arm of service which maintains staff competency within the relevant arm.

2. Education and Training are a low hanging fruit and all deployed troops should at least have a basic understanding of CIMIC which can be obtained at no significant cost initially from online training/E-learning.

3. CIMIC should play a more prominent role in the Disaster Management sphere and integrate into the Disaster Management centers at all levels. In an attempt to meaningfully contribute to its mandate domestically focusing *inter alia* the well-being, prosperity and upliftment of the people. The synergy between CIMIC structure and the Disaster Management sphere will address the Defence Goals both Goal 1 Defend & Protect South Africa and Goal 2 Safeguarding South Africa (Figure 4-4 Defence Goals and Tasks (Defence Review, 2015). And in part Goal 4 Task 12: Assist Civil Authority and Task 13: Contribute to the Development of SA and its People

4. CIMIC should be incorporated from the start of an operation at planning phase and not as an afterthought. As the South African economy is reliant on regional peace and stability, aligning with the Defence Goals Goal 3 Promoting Peace & Security.

5. CIMIC operatives could transition from the military in to the Civilian life with transferable skills. Thus, providing an exit strategy of CIMIC soldiers to a career after the SANDF with portable qualifications into the humanitarian field.

6. Having a hybrid system with both professional soldiers and reserve soldiers as a supplement a CIMIC structure within the SANDF to both be a financially sound and prudent, where the SANDF does not have to maintain such specialist full time and use on a pre required need.

7. CIMIC will marry the SANDF and the humanitarian aspirations establishing appropriate partnerships to facilitate appropriate response with greater accountability.

8. CIMIC is needed now more than ever before, with having to do more with less within the financial constraints that are plaguing the SANDF as a whole.

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8. APPENDICES

8.1. APPENDIX A: RESEARCH SURVEY (QUESTIONAIRE)

Civilian-Military Co-operation (CIMIC), implementation and application within the SANDF Reserve Force.

1. Name and Surname (optional)

[   ]

2. Arm of Service

○ Army

○ Air Force

○ Navy

○ Military Health Service

3. Rank

[   ]

4. Other Affiliation (i.e. RFC etc.)

[   ]

5. I have understood the context and my participation is voluntary (should you have contributed by means of interview or correspondence you may with draw at any time).

○ Yes

○ No

6. What is your understanding regarding CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation)?

[text box]

7. Have you received any training regarding CIMIC

○ Yes

○ No

If YES please elaborate on the nature of the training (Provider, Duration, method of instruction etc.)

[text box]

8. Have you received any training regarding UN CMCoord (Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination)?

○ No

○ Yes

If YES please elaborate on the nature of the training (Provider, Duration, method of instruction etc.)

[text box]

9. Do you have operational experience in terms of disaster response, peacekeeping, Peacebuilding or similar?

○ No experience

○ Yes

○ If YES please elaborate as much as possible...

10. What was the Integration or working relationship with other humanitarian organizations during the disaster Response?

○ No Applicable

○ No

○ YES

Please provide clarity with regards to you answer

11. What was the Integration or working relationship with other humanitarian organizations during the Peacekeeping mission?

○ No Applicable

○ No

○ YES

Please provide clarity with regards to you answer

12. What was the Integration or working relationship with other humanitarian organizations during the Peacebuilding mission?

○ No Applicable

○ No

○ YES

Please provide clarity with regards to you answer

13. During Disaster Response, do you think the military should provide direct, indirect or infrastructure support ("Cookie, truck and Bridge model" (UNOCHA, 2015). Please elaborate on your answer.

14. During Peacekeeping/ Enforcement do you think the military should provide direct, indirect or infrastructure support ("Cookie, truck and Bridge model" (UNOCHA, 2015). Please elaborate on your answer.

15. During Peacebuilding do you think the military should provide direct, indirect or infrastructure support ("Cookie, truck and Bridge model" (UNOCHA, 2015). Please elaborate on your answer.

16. Please motive in your opinion should the SANDF incorporating CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation) into its structures? If possible, include hurdles to overcome in such process.

17. Where will the greater value be in terms of CIMIC within the operational environment or "domestic" CIMIC related functions? Bering in mind neither is mutually exclusive.

18. In which arm of service should CIMIC be situated or should there be elements in all arms of service. (operationalization).

19. (Optional) you are welcome to provide information to facilitate follow up or clarifying questions (email or telephone number)

20. Would you be able to provide detail another individual within the SANDF structure that may contribute meaningfully to this research, as well as contact information if possible

DONE

UNITED NATIONS

OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

Mr Schalk-Willem van der Merwe

has completed the

UN-CMCoord eCourse: Working in Natural Disasters

conducted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Josef Reiterer
Chief
Civil-Military Coordination Section
Emergency Services Branch

11-Apr-2018

Peace Operations Training Institute

awards

Lieutenant S van der Merwe

this

Certificate of Completion

for completing the course of instruction

International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict

02 February 2016

Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Executive Director
Peace Operations Training Institute

This training was provided through funding from our sponsors to students identifying themselves as African nationals who are members of the military, police, or gendarmerie.

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