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25 October 2021 | Story Prof Motlatsi Thabane
Eswatini

Opinion article by Prof Motlatsi Thabane, Research Fellow, Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State

Eswatini (Swaziland) gained independence from Britain in September 1968. Under colonial rule, it was part of a triad of South African High Commission Territories with Botswana and Lesotho. The British started arrangements for granting independence to the three territories at around the same time, but Eswatini received its independence two years after the other two, which received their independence within the same week – Botswana on 30 September 1966, and Lesotho four days later on 4 October 1966.

Transition from colonial rule to independence
An important part of the explanation for the delay in Eswatini’s gaining of  independence was that there was no agreement between the British government and Paramount Chief (as he was styled under colonial rule) Sobhuza II on the one hand, or regarding a political system by which Eswatini would be ruled after gaining independence, on the other hand.

Under colonial rule, the institution of chieftainship in Lesotho had been greatly weakened by alcoholism among the senior chieftainship in particular, and chiefs had become deeply unpopular as a result of collaborating with colonial rulers in the oppression and exploitation of society. In Botswana, chiefs remained powerful and allowed for modernisation of the institution, including educating chiefs and the general population. Eswatini was different. From the beginning, the chieftainship remained strong, popular, deeply conservative, and the king succeeded in incorporating Swazi culture and traditional power structures, both of which he dominated, into the colonial system.   

As they left the High Commission Territories, the British wanted to leave – as they managed to do for Lesotho – independent Eswatini as a constitutional monarchy where power would be exercised by elected representatives of the people. In this, the British were supported by Eswatini’s small middle-class politicians and Eswatini’s small working class. For his part, driven by a seemingly sincerely-held totalitarian and paternalistic vision in which everything had to be done according to Swazi culture that put all power – ritual, political, spiritual, economic – in his hands in the negotiations, Sobhuza II wanted, and held out for a post-colonial political dispensation in which all power rested with him.

The fact that the British were opposed to this, caused a delay in Eswatini’s independence. What is important for modern Eswatini is that the king succeeded. An important concession he was forced to make was a constitutional provision allowing for multi-party democracy, and the right of the people to elect men and women of their choice to represent them in the country’s legislature. However, he countered and undermined even this constitutional provision by establishing his own political party to contest pre-independence elections.

A political theoretical examination of documents explaining the political system that King Sobhuza II wanted, would reveal a much more dangerous authoritarian rule than was, in fact established.

From King Sobhuza II to King Mswati III
In 1973, after independence, the monarch even removed the multi-party concession, suspended the Constitution, and issued a decree that gave him all the power in Eswatini society. This is the dispensation that King Mswati III inherited when he ascended the throne in 1986, following the death of his father in 1982. There must have been hope that the young king would liberalise politics and life in Eswatini. But these hopes have been dashed, because although there have been changes in the country’s constitutional arrangement since Sobhuza II’s death, it was largely cosmetic, and intended to make absolute monarchical rule less unappealing to the eye and ear – with phrases such as ‘monarchical democracy’ – and otherwise intended to entrench the king’s power even further.

From what King Sobhuza II left when he died in 1982, and throughout King Mswati III’s 35-year rule, the royal family have amassed enormous amounts of wealth. Means of amassing this wealth included what can best be described as the payment of tributes in the form of company shares, charged to companies that invest in Eswatini. In other countries, wealth such as this accrues to state coffers. The Eswatini state has established a fairly well-kept registration database for citizens and residents, which enhances tax collection.

Together with Lesotho and South Africa, Eswatini is counted among the top-ten most unequal societies in the world. Wealth distribution is heavily skewed in favour of a limited few among the traditional and modern elites. Poverty in the rural areas is estimated at 70%, and extreme poverty is estimated at 25%.

Politically, with the exception of a limited few among the ruling group, all social groups chafe under a most pervasive oppression. This oppression has been challenged, led by various organisations, particularly during King Mswati III’s reign. The state has reacted to all of these with unrestrained brutality not only intended to punish specific individuals and organisations, but also to secure the seemingly near-total acquiescence in much of society.

Explaining the current political unrest
According to sources, origins of the current unrest lie in the kingdom’s financial crisis, which has meant, for example, that the government is unable to pay public sector wages. Politically, the unrest is a result of the oppression described above. It is not spontaneous but has been building up over the years.

Where the current unrest will lead to, is unclear. Popular demands in the current protests vary and have oscillated between the establishment of a constitutional monarchy at the most moderate, and the stepping down of the king at the most radical. As always, it is possible that for some, the payment of wages would be considered adequate and sufficient response by the king; if this is done, such groups would be happy to have things continue as they have done before the uprising.

Possibilities exist for division within groups that want moderate change. The king’s hold on power is so all-encompassing and pervasive that he has at his disposal a choice of many meaningless concessions that he can make, which some moderates might consider enough to cease their participation in the protest. For those seeking more radical change, the abdication of the king’s is unlikely; groups seeking change along those lines might differ in their methods of achieving the goal, and in the length of time they are prepared to hold out for such a reform. The longer these demands go unfulfilled, the more likely damaging divisions may appear in this group.

Exit routes to current unrest?
As a 19th century revolutionary put it many years ago, the chances for change happening in societies such as Eswatini increase tremendously when beneficiaries of the existing socio-economic system themselves begin to question such a system. That is to say, when such beneficiaries realise that the distribution of power and wealth benefiting them need to change in order for them to survive as a privileged grouping. It is a difficult proposition with serious implications, and one which cannot be avoided when its time has come.

There are a few signs of this in Eswatini that cannot be dismissed on the grounds of quantity. However, the political system remains intact, with reporting on the uprising beginning to be dominated by statements claiming that the army has restored order.

We have to hope that the people of Eswatini will achieve change and the future they want, which they have been crying for over many years. Army and police brutality must stop. The www (internet) in the 21st century is a basic human right and must be restored.  

Solidarity and condolences
The world, AU, SADC, SACU member states, and all of us must stand in solidarity with the people of Eswatini. Our condolences, thoughts, and prayers go to wives, husbands, children, friends, and relatives of those killed in this brutality.

This article was written after the anti-monarchy demonstration in June and July 2021 which saw estimated nearly 69 losing their lives. Now unrest has flared-up spearheaded by students, civil servants and transport workers.

News Archive

Helen Zille delivers memorial lecture
2008-09-04

 

The annual CR Swart Memorial Lecture was recently delivered by Ms Helen Zille, leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), on the Main Campus of the University of the Free State (UFS) in Bloemfontein. The topic was: "Opposition politics in South Africa: Past, present and future". At the lecture were, from the left: Prof. Gerhardt de Klerk, Dean: Faculty of the Humanities, Prof. Teuns Verschoor, Acting Rector of the UFS, and Ms Zille.
Photo: Stephen Collet

ADDRESS BY HELEN ZILLE
LEADER OF THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
C.R. SWART COMMEMORATIVE LECTURE
UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE
BLOEMFONTEIN
THURSDAY AUGUST 28, 2008
 
Opposition politics: past, present and future
 
Introduction
 
I am honoured to be delivering the C.R. Swart Commemorative Lecture tonight, named after the University’s first Chancellor and a former State President. This lecture series started in 1968, my matric year, and 40 years on it is a great privilege for me to join a long list of distinguished speakers in addressing this forum. I am here in my capacity as the leader of the largest opposition party to speak in a lecture inaugurated to mark the establishment of a chair in political science at this university, so I presume that no disclaimers are needed when I say I will be discussing politics. In fact, the theme of my address is: “Opposition politics: past, present and future”.
 
Fourteen years after our first democratic election, we stand at a crossroads in South Africa. Many people are deeply concerned and with good reason.
 
But, despite many disturbing developments in recent months, we can still choose to take the high road to an open, opportunity society, in which we realise our rights and fulfil our obligations under the supreme law of the land: the Constitution. Alternatively, if we fail in this quest, we will take the low road to a closed, patronage-driven society.  
 
In closed societies, the rule of law and the sovereignty of the Constitution cease to count for anything. Instead, they are replaced by the rule of a cabal. What do I mean by “cabal”? It is a small, closed circle whose members aim to entrench their power and enrich themselves; an elitist faction accountable to no-one, and no law, but itself. A cabal typically justifies its self-serving actions and decisions in the name of the greater good, of which they are, of course, the sole arbiters and interpreters.
 
In closed societies, controlled by cabals, democratic rights and freedoms are systematically eroded; the space for debate and contestation is closed down, and opportunities are horded and exploited by the ruling elite to further its own interests.
 
In South Africa today we face a critical choice. It is a choice between a society in which the government sees it as its duty to protect everyone’s rights, or a government that sees its role as the selective dispenser of rights, usually on the basis of various arbitrary criteria, particularly political connections.
 
Along the high road, the law of the Constitution prevails; along the low road, the law of the jungle reigns, and might is right. Along the low road, one’s position in society is determined by one’s subordinate status to a leader or a leadership clique. Along the high road, it is protected in terms of a constitutional contract.
 
That is what the British jurist Sir Henry Maine meant when he wrote about the progression in modern civilisation, “from status to contract”. In the ancient world individuals were generally trapped in an immutable power hierarchy, bound by birth and tradition to groups that determined their social status and limited their choices and actions. In the modern one, individuals become autonomous beings free to make contracts and associations with whomever they please. A key role of governments in such societies is to extend opportunities so that more and more people can use their freedom, to improve their lives and achieve any position on the basis of hard work and ability, not the circumstances of their birth.
 
In my view, the single most important task of opposition parties going into the future is to ensure that we progress from status to contract; that we follow the high road to a constitutional society in which we all protect and promote each other’s rights to be the best we can be, individually and collectively.
 
Opposition in the past: keeping minorities involved in politics
 
Ten years ago, my predecessor as Leader of the Democratic Alliance, Tony Leon, addressed this forum on the subject of “The place and role of opposition politics and parties in South Africa”.
 
In fact, when he gave this lecture in 1998, the Democratic Alliance did not exist. The Democratic Party (DP), which he then led, was small. In the first democratic election of 1994, it won just 1.7% of the vote, and managed to gain only seven seats in the 400-seat National Assembly.
 
The DP attracted much less support than the other opposition parties. In that election, the National Party (NP) obtained 20.5% of the vote, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) took nearly 11%.
 
When Tony Leon spoke here in 1998, he said: “…I have set the interim goal for my party to become the second party of South Africa’s political realm. Not that we will forever be satisfied with the position. But one step at a time”.
 
It is notoriously difficult for opposition parties to make progress in countries that emerge from liberation struggles; the party of liberation symbolises the hopes and aspirations -- the very identity -- of oppressed people. In this context, opposition parties struggle to establish their legitimacy and right to exist. Where opposition does survive, it is often on the basis of competing group-based nationalisms, rather than on alternative visions and policies for the future of that society. It is no wonder that opposition in emerging democracies so often withers and dies. Trapped in minority group politics, associated with an old order, robbed of legitimacy, its supporters retreat and either seek association with the new patronage-based system or simply withdraw from the process altogether, thereby entrenching single party dominance controlled by the ruling elite of the majority group.
 
This could so easily have been South Africa’s fate: a governing party espousing one brand of racial nationalism versus an opposition espousing another brand of racial nationalism, permanently trapped in a dwindling opposition role because of demographics. A situation where the majority cabal was immune from the Constitution’s checks and balances to prevent power abuse, simply relying on racial mobilisation and solidarity to entrench their power, irrespective of performance. In fact, this still remains a risk to South Africa’s future unless we can win support for an alternative vision.
 
The dead-end of contesting racial nationalisms was the fate South Africa had to avoid if our Constitution was to mean anything. That is why it was critical for our predecessor party to attain the provisional but crucial goal of becoming the major alternative to the ANC. We did so in 1999 on a very modest component of the vote -- just 9.5% -- but a five fold increase over the election five years earlier. In 2004, the Democratic Alliance (DA), the party born from the merger of the New National Party (NNP) and the DP, added to these gains, securing 12.5% of all votes cast.
 
In large part, this growth was achieved by marshalling and consolidating the support of minority voters. Realistically, given South Africa’s history, and a liberation struggle lasting many decades, it was not feasible for an opposition movement to attract significant numbers of majority voters so early in our democracy. We had to face that reality. As Tony Leon remarked in his C.R. Swart lecture, “to remain effective, opposition parties need to consolidate support among their key constituencies, albeit minority ones -- for the time being”. This was necessary to ensure that minority constituencies did not withdraw from politics or public participation, as they have done in all failed democracies.
 
In societies that have undergone a transition from minority rule, and where there is a great diversity of races, classes, and ethnicities, one of the first symptoms of democratic failure is when minorities pull out of public life. The big shift that must occur if complex plural societies are to become constitutional democracies, is that all citizens, whether they associate themselves with minorities or majorities, must understand and claim their rights, and in particular, must respect and defend each others’ rights. 
 
Majority groups, who can dominate political systems by their weight of numbers, understandably take longer to embrace constitutionalism than minorities, who often know instinctively that the Constitution and the rule of law are their only armour against power abuse and arbitrary action by representatives of majority groups.
 
Unless a government understands that its role is to protect rights, not dispense rights, and unless a government understands that the institutions of state must remain independent of the ruling party, (and indeed limit the power of the ruling party), power abuse becomes inevitable. Power abuse, once it starts also increases exponentially. Being a member of a demographic majority offers no protection against power abuse by a small leadership cabal. Once power abuse has begun, it quickly becomes irreversible. Ask the majority of Shona-speaking people in Zimbabwe. They may have turned a blind eye to the massacre of the Ndebele in the 1980s because they assumed that the government would never turn on them. They were wrong.
 
The point about the indivisibility of rights and the irreversibility of power abuse was most famously made by the Lutheran Pastor, Martin Niemöller, who was imprisoned and narrowly escaped execution by the Nazis. He is most famous for his statement on the indivisibility of rights. He wrote:
 
First they came for the Jews
and I did not speak out
because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for the Communists
and I did not speak out
because I was not a Communist.
Then they came for the trade unionists
and I did not speak out
because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for me
and by then there was no-one left to speak.
 
It is still difficult for many South Africans to envisage a South Africa where we speak up for each others’ rights. It is still usually accepted, for example, that Afrikaners have a duty, alone, to promote and protect their language and culture. This is a fundamental fallacy. Everyone must protect each others’ language and cultural rights (among all other rights) because these are constitutional rights, and constitutional rights are indivisible. 
 
Indeed, the most crucial role for the opposition in South Africa is to become the party for all the people who wish to claim their own rights, and protect the rights of others. This seems like such an obvious point but it is generally misunderstood. I was speaking about our vision to a film-producer the other day, who happens to be black, and he said to me: “Helen, I wish you would say these things for my people”. I said: “I say these things for everyone. The Constitution is there for everyone. When I speak about defending and claiming rights and preventing power abuse, I do not only speak for people who look like me”. It is at times like this that I realise what a long road we must still travel before the assumptions of constitutionalism become internalised in our society. And the role of the opposition is to lead that long march.
 
Opposition in the present: creating a party for all the people
 
How best do we do this? There is only one way in politics and that is to mobilise support, to build a party that is seen as a viable and credible alternative for all South Africans; a party that can win elections and demonstrate open, accountable government in practice, and implement policy solutions that yield better results in improving the lives of all South Africans. That is what we have been trying to achieve in Cape Town and the other local authorities that we govern, and I know the results are starting to show.
 
Holding regular elections does not automatically mean a country can call itself a democracy. The true test of a democracy is whether power can change hands peacefully through the ballot box. If voters return the same party to power every election, irrespective of its performance, or if a dominant party refuses to accept defeat in an election, believing it has a divine right to rule, then checks and balances on power abuse become meaningless. Indeed power abuse becomes inevitable.
 
To prevent this, the DA must be able to challenge the ANC for power.  Defeating the ANC for its own sake is not the issue.   The point is to take South Africa out of the dead end of race mobilisation and contestation, to a real choice between alternative policies to create a better life for all.
 
This sounds obvious, but it is a monumental challenge.
 
It is far easier to demonstrate this in practice where we can win elections. But for the most part we have to build our base by doing an excellent job in our role as official opposition.
 
Far too many South Africans are still embarrassed by the concept and practice of a tough, muscular opposition. They believe in the politics of ingratiation -- as if this will achieve better results. It may make you popular with those in power, but it rarely changes anything. It is, as someone once said, like feeding steaks to a crocodile in the hope that it will become a vegetarian.
 
The role of the parliamentary opposition is to ask the difficult questions; to expose corruption and mismanagement; to hold government to account; to think ahead and to present alternatives on all policy issues.
 
Opposition in the future: defending the Constitution
 
However, the most important task of the opposition in South Africa today is to provide a rallying point for all those who understand that defending the Constitution is the greatest political imperative our country faces.
 
In the early- to mid-1990s, South Africa’s major challenge was to bring together political rivals, after decades of conflict, to negotiate a way in which a complex, plural society could live together in peace, without group domination and power abuse. Getting historical adversaries around a table, exchanging words and ideas rather than gunfire, was a remarkable achievement.
 
Even more remarkable though was the end result. We reached a consensus settlement, forged rather than forced, that did away with the sovereignty of Parliament, so open to abuse by a parliamentary majority able to pass any law it likes irrespective of its effects on others. We understood that being in a majority does not necessarily mean being right or being just; that power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. So we replaced the sovereignty of Parliament with the sovereignty of the Constitution, requiring that a majority party’s decisions be tested against a Bill of Rights, with a Constitutional Court and a range of other mechanisms to prevent the abuse of power by a ruling majority. This was the essence of the revolutionary change that came to South Africa in the mid-1990s. It often seems as though the new ruling majority has not internalised the significance of this shift.
 
Of course, the Constitution, although it is internationally admired, was the product of compromise. As such, it is neither perfect nor pristine. But it is a good deal better than it might have been; and, again this attests to the crucial role of opposition in providing alternatives with sufficient muscle to force compromise.
 
One of the crucial moments in our constitutional negotiations came when both the National Party and the ANC proposed that the ten constitutional court judges should be appointed by the President and his cabinet. The Chief Justice, too, would be appointed directly by the President. If this had happened, it would have meant the ruling party effectively handpicking its own judges, rendering the most important safeguard of our rights subject to political manipulation by the ruling party.  
 
It was sustained opposition by a few negotiators, led by Tony Leon that saw this proposal jettisoned. The Democratic Party tabled a series of amendments – the effect of which was to create a Judicial Service Commission (JSC), whose members, comprising representatives from government, parliament, the judiciary, the legal profession and academia, would recommend judges for appointment by the President. The Judicial Service Commission was established in terms of Section 178 of the Constitution.
 
The creation of a Judicial Service Commission was by no means an ideal solution, but as a mechanism for judicial appointments, it is infinitely preferable to the model of direct political appointments so favoured by majority parties.
 
From the moment the Constitution was adopted, it became the opposition’s duty to defend it.  
 
When I spoke on a related theme at the University of the Witwatersrand, a student raised the following point:
 
“When people are living in poverty, they aren’t interested in constitutions.  They are interested in houses and jobs and services.  Constitutions and laws have no significance for them”.
 
This is a profound question, and my answer is this.  You cannot eat the law but you cannot have enough food for everybody unless there is law.  You cannot live in the Constitution but you will never have good housing for all unless there is a good Constitution.  Jobs and services for the poor will never come unless there is the rule of the law.
 
The rule of the law protects everyone but especially the poor and the weak.  In the jungle, the weak must always submit to the strong.  The dominant lion walks wherever he wants and everyone else must get out of his way.  That is the law of the jungle.  In constitutional human society, the weak have the same rights as the strong.  When the traffic light is red, the billionaire in his BMW must stop; when the light is green, the beggar on his bicycle may pass through.  That is the rule of the law. It has implications for every transaction in society.
 
The Constitution protects all of our liberties and guarantees equal rights for all, weak and strong, rich and poor.  The rule of just law is not some sort of ornament, not an embellishment on our civilisation:  it is the bedrock of our civilization.  Without the rule of law, we could never have developed our commerce, science, technology and art.  Without it, we would not have brick houses or clean running water in our homes or sewage works or electricity or flour mills and bakeries.
 
That is why it is so important to defend the Constitution.
 
To be sure, there are aspects of the Constitution we would like to change, but constitutional change should never be entered into lightly because of the importance of constitutionalism.
 
There is another reason why we should tread carefully, and that is because the ascendant faction in the ANC, grouped around the party president, Jacob Zuma, understands that it is the Constitution that stands in the way of absolute power. It is the Constitution that makes everyone equal before the law and limits power abuse. And there are increasing signs that Zuma’s faction does not like these limitations. There are very disturbing indications that he and his supporters increasingly regard the Constitution as a nuisance to be swatted away like an irritating fly.
 
In December 2006 Zuma said: “The ANC is more important than even the Constitution of the country”. That same month he pronounced: “Once you begin to feel you are above the ANC, you are in trouble”. Disturbingly, these remarks suggest an allegiance to “the higher law of the party”. In other words, what the party decides is superior to the rule of law. This usually refers to the will of the small cabal that controls the party which believes it has a monopoly on truth, insight and morality. Despite the disastrous legacy of this doctrine across the world, it has captured the fevered imagination of many; hence, Zuma’s fanciful claim that that “the ANC will rule South Africa until Jesus comes again”.
 
The higher law of the party is what a privileged group of individuals invoke when their narrow interests come into conflict with the Constitution. The higher law of the party leaves little room for opposition, both from within the ruling party or from opposition parties.
 
Speaking in Umtata last year, Zuma argued the country shouldn’t have opposition parties simply because there have to be opposition parties. This statement goes against one of the founding provisons of the Constitution, which notes that the Republic of South Africa is a “soveriegn, democratic state, founded on...a multiparty system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openess”.
 
In fact, Zuma went further and said that opposition parties had no right to exist if they could not formulate better policies than the ruling party. Needless to say, according to Mr Zuma, the ANC has the right to decide whose policies are better. “If the ANC has the best policies”, he asked, “what is the problem?” “If everyone supports the ANC, then there is no problem. That is except if you want a debate at a university’s debating society, because no one has proposed better policies than us.”  
 
Of course, Zuma’s disregard for the Constitution is also motivated by personal factors. He faces a corruption trial and if he is found guilty and given a sentence of more than 12 months it will prevent his becoming the next President. His supporters are determined to make sure that does not happen, and they too have been making ominous sounds, profoundly at odds with our constitutional order.
 
On 16 June, the President of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema said, “We are prepared to take up arms and kill for Zuma”.  On 21 June, Young Communist League national secretary, Buti Manamela promised that if Zuma did not become President, “there will be hell to pay”. 
 
Meanwhile, the ANC Secretary-General, Gwede Mantashe, told an ANC Youth League conference earlier this year that investigations against the Judge-President of the Cape High Court, John Hlophe, were “psychological preparation of society so that when the Constitutional Court judges pounce on our president we should be ready at that point in time”. He also said, “Our revolution is in danger; we must declare to defend it to the end.” Later he confirmed he was concerned about “counter-revolutionary forces”, including, in his view, the Constitutional Court, the United Democratic Movement, the IFP and the DA.
 
Taken together, these statements appear to form part of a strategy to smear and diminish the Constitutional Court because it threatens to uphold the rule of the law in the Zuma trial and so block his ascent to the state presidency.
 
Zuma’s backers are willing to subvert the institutions of the Constitution for the benefit of the ruling party. There is nothing unique about this. Almost every liberation movement has done the same thing after attaining power. Liberation movements make very bad democratic governments for one key reason: liberation struggles are about attaining power. Constitutional democracy is about limiting power. And no liberation movement seems willing to accept that.
 
 
The ANC like so many other liberation movements that try to become political parties, believes it has the monopoly on morality and a divine right to rule.  The quest for absolute power makes internal conflict for positions of power inevitable and vicious, and the ruling cabal then seeks to eliminate challenges to its control from within and without. It begins to use the instruments of the Constitution, not only against the opposition, but against challengers it faces inside its own party.
 
That is what we are seeing now: power-hungry individuals pretending they exemplify the liberation struggle, and invoking it to justify the seizure of constitutional instruments that are actually supposed to limit their power.
 
What is the role of the opposition in this case?  To summarise: our role is deceptively simple to describe but exceptionally difficult to fulfil. We must convince more and more South Africans that it is in their interests to protect the Constitution from the ruling party’s abuse of power. It is to persuade people that being in a demographic majority will not protect them from the consequences of power abuse by an increasingly small cabal that seeks to project its interests as the interests of a majority, and uses race mobilisation to disguise its real intentions. Our role is to offer real policy alternatives that provide real opportunities for all who are prepared to use them to improve their lives, in a society where there is a link between effort and reward. It is to win elections where we can, and to demonstrate our policies in action. We must be a catalyst that brings together all those who understand that limits on power are essential for the welfare of the people, so that South Africa can become a sustainable democracy with a growing economy.
 
In the medium term, as the consequences of the ANC’s assault on the Constitution are felt more widely, the remarks I am making tonight will seem obvious. But unless we hear them and act on them now, it could be too late. This is why the DA’s goal is to realign politics and re-shape the configuration of political parties, drawing a clear line between those who believe in constitutionalism and those who do not.
 
This realignment will not hinge on opposition parties alone, since it is not just opposition parties that care about the Constitution. There are many in the ANC who want to defend the Constitution and who are appalled by the growing trend of anti-constitutionalism in their own party. But it will take them a long time to make the essential break because allegiance to a liberation movement becomes part of one’s identity and the bonds are strong.
 
It is therefore vital to form a coalition of opposition parties which understands our joint responsibility to defend the Constitution, to offer hope to voters and bring them out in large numbers in next year’s election. I and my party have been working hard behind the scenes to secure this outcome.
 
In truth, the response to this call has been limited. One opposition leader remarked that such a coalition is a bad idea because we shouldn’t gang up on the ANC. I was muted in my response to this statement because it is not appropriate for opposition parties, at this crucial juncture, to waste time and resources fighting each other. But I thought, at minimum, I had to point out how truly ludicrous it is to suggest that an attempt to curb the power of a party that already has a 74% majority in Parliament amounts to “ganging up”. This kind of response demonstrates to me that, despite all that has happened, some parties still have not fathomed what the role of opposition is in South Africa today.
 
I suspect that the real reason for this lukewarm response is that the leaders of individual parties do not wish to abdicate their own fiefdoms. After all, it is easier – and far less risky – to defend a dunghill than it is to move a mountain.
 
Whatever happens at the 2009 election, we must strive to prevent the ANC from attaining a two-thirds majority because this is the essential minimum required to protect the Constitution, and prevent a shrinking cabal entrenching itself in power.  If we can do this, we will prevent South Africa from going down the well-trodden path of centralisation, cronyism, corruption and criminalisation that has been the lot of many failed states on our continent that could not make the transition from a liberation struggle to a stable constitutional democracy.  
 
Apart from our role as opposition, we must build on our record in government. We started this process by winning power in Cape Town in 2006 and in other local authorities, primarily in the Western Cape. We need to build on this base in 2009, by winning the Western Cape and showing what aligned co-operative governance can achieve between a provincial administration and local authorities. We are determined that people should experience what difference open, opportunity-driven governance makes in their lives. An opposition victory in at least one province will also help the ANC to get used to losing elections, so that we do not face the spectre of a Kenya or a Zimbabwe, where the so-called liberation parties refused to accept defeat at the polls, and used political blackmail and threats of violence to stay in power.   When that happens, it is clear that constitutional democracy has failed.
 
As Tony Leon put it in 1998, it is one step at a time. If we achieve our goals in 2009, the next target is the local elections of 2011, when we must aim to win power, alone or in coalitions, in major metropolitan areas throughout South Africa. If we succeed in doing this, and with the chaos in the ANC predictably continuing as the power-mongers continue their internal struggle with the constitutionalists, the stage will be set for a fundamental realignment of politics to bring together all those who understand that respect for the rule of law and the Constitution, is the only thing that will prevent the implosion occurring in Zimbabwe today.
 
I have no doubt that by that time, the disastrous consequences of Zuma’s doctrine of the “higher law of the party” will be far more obvious to many more people and an ANC loss at the polls will be a realistic prospect by 2014.
 
The ANC can be dislodged from power. The Constitution can prevail. It depends on us. We can learn through our own bitter experience, or we can use the opportunity of learning from the experience of others, and apply the relevant lessons to our own situation. It is my role, and the role of my party, to ensure that there is no South African who can one day say: “I did not know. Why didn’t anyone warn us?” We have to make the choices crystal clear. We are and we will keep on doing so. But then it is over to every citizen, to register as a voter, to go out on election day, and to make that crucial choice. After all, in a democracy, people get the government they deserve.
 

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