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29 March 2021 | Story Prof Theo Neethling | Photo Johan Roux
Prof Theo Neethling is from the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State

The Cabo Delgado province in the northernmost part of the long Mozambican seaboard is now home to Africa’s three largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects; these projects have attracted many of the world’s major multinational energy companies, accompanied by massive LNG investments. There can be little doubt that the discovery of rich LNG reserves is a potential game changer for Mozambique’s economy and the development agenda of the country. It is potentially an opportunity for the rapid advancement of a country that currently ranks close to the bottom of the United Nation’s Human Development Index. World Bank data annually ranks Mozambique as among the poorest countries in the world.

Mozambique ‘has hit the jackpot’

Since 2011, rich LNG reserves have been discovered off the coast of Cabo Delgado in the Rovuma Basin. With the discovery of major offshore gas fields, many observers have been prompted to suggest that Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world, ‘has hit the jackpot’ – and recently, it has been claimed that by the mid-2020s, Mozambique could become one of the top ten LNG producers globally. Together, the gas projects are estimated to be worth $60 billion, and this could obviously revolutionise Mozambique’s economy of $15 billion.

However, despite the billions in investments by major multinational energy companies since 2012, the people of Cabo Delgado are yet to see the material benefits from these projects. One of the biggest risks for international investors in the LNG industry is the many unknowns associated with the threat posed by the militant Islamic movement, Ansar al-Sunna, which has especially been active in the Cabo Delgado province since 2017. Whereas Ansar al-Sunna, locally known as Al-Shabaab, initially advocated the ‘purification’ of Islam in Mozambique by preaching a moving away from the practices of the mystical traditions of Muslim Sufis – who are the majority of Muslims in Mozambique – and projecting Sufis as degenerate, the movement eventually made it clear that its goal was to impose Sharia law (Islamic law) in Cabo Delgado.

Since independence in 1994, the central government of Maputo has lacked a monopoly over the means of violence in its territory and its long coastline. In this context, Renamo regularly clashed with the central government in a 16-year civil war that claimed more than a million lives. Fast forward to the future – Ansar al-Sunna with its ISIS links now poses the main security threat to the Mozambican government and its armed forces.

The situation has gone from bad to worse

The escalation of violence and armed conflict since early 2020 has raised some pressing questions over the future of LNG investments, and even put the future of the LNG industry at high risk. Obviously, the foreign companies with their substantial investments feel threatened, especially at the current stage where final investment decisions have to be taken.

In recent months, the situation in Cabo Delgado has gone from bad to worse. In November 2020, dozens of people were reportedly beheaded by Islamic militants in northern Mozambique. Now the beheadings and bloodshed have spread to the town of Palma; taking the bloodshed to another level. This is not good news for the LNG industry in Mozambique, as Palma is supposed to become the manufacturing hub where hundreds of skilled workers will be located.

Amid the development of an increasingly alarming human rights situation towards the end of last year, including the killing of civilians by insurgents, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, has appealed for urgent measures to protect civilians in what she described as a “desperate” situation and one of “grave human rights abuses”. She also stated that more than 350 000 people have been displaced since 2018.

In conclusion, there is little doubt that Islamist insurgents have managed to increase the scale of their activities in Cabo Delgado, and that the lack of governance and a proper security response by both the Mozambican government and Southern African leaders make this a case of high political risk, which can potentially jeopardise the successful unlocking of the country’s resource wealth. Until now, the main LNG installations and sites have not been targeted or directly affected, but the security risks to these vast investments – and Mozambique’s development potential – are certainly on the increase and posing a threat to the LNG industry.

Opinion article by Prof Theo Neethling, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State 

 


News Archive

Central SRC constitution for UFS approved by Council
2005-07-20

University of the Free State Fact Sheet

1. The Council of the University of the Free State (UFS) on 10 June 2005 unanimously approved the establishment of a Central Student Representative Council (CSRC)  to constitute a legitimate basis for the democratic participation of students of all three of its campuses in the governance of the university.

2. In a major breakthrough and transformation step for student governance, the Central SRC will include representatives of the main campus in Bloemfontein, the Vista Bloemfontein campus and the Qwaqwa campus of the UFS.

3. The need to establish the Central SRC follows the incorporation of the Qwaqwa campus into the UFS in January 2003 and the incorporation of the Vista campus in Bloemfontein into the UFS in January 2004.

4. The constitution of the Central SRC is the outcome of a consensus reached during a lengthy process of negotiation between the SRCs of the three UFS campuses, indirectly involving diverse student formations such as Sasco, ANCYL, YCL, Pasma, SASO, SADESMO, AZASCO, SCO, HEREXVII, KovsieAlliance, ACDP, etc. Independent constitutional and political experts facilitated key parts of the negotiation process.

5. In this process, the UFS management went out of its way to ensure the participation of all student formations, especially Sasco and the ANC Youth League, as well as the duly elected SRC officials of the three campuses.

6. With the establishment of a Central SRC, the UFS has adopted a federal student governance model whereby the CSRC is the highest representative student body on matters of common concern for all students. The three campuses of the UFS will retain SRC structures for each campus with powers and responsibilities for matters affecting the particular campus.

7. The central SRC will have 12 members made up of delegates of the different campus SRCs, including the presidents of these three SRCs. In total, the main campus will have 5 representatives, the Qwaqwa campus will have 4 representatives and the Vista campus will have 3 representatives. This ratio ensures a strong voice for the smaller campuses in the central SRC.

8. This arrangement will be reviewed after a year to make allowance for the phasing out of undergraduate (pipeline) students at the Vista campus, as was agreed in the negotiations preceding the incorporation of that campus into the UFS.

9. From these 12 members a central SRC president will be chosen on a quarterly basis to represent the general student body at Executive Management, Senate and Council.

10. The historic official inauguration of the first Central SRC is scheduled to take place in early August 2005.

11. This event, like the adoption of a broadly negotiated new constitution for the main campus SRC, represents a  breakthrough in that all three campus SRCs delegations and all relevant student organizations have been part of the process and have accepted the outcome of the process.

20 July 2005

 

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