---

Opinion article by Dr Solomon Chibaya, lecturer in the Department of Education Management, Policy, and Comparative Education, University of the Free State.

The main issue around the language and admission policies is that the Bela Act allows the provincial heads of departments to have the final say on these policies after the school governing bodies (SGBs) have developed them. Some SGBs see this as their powers being usurped, which contradicts the democratisation of school governance. However, cases in which the powers of SGBs have been abused in ways that led to exclusionary language and admission policies presents the need for oversight of these critical school policies.

Friday 13 December 2024 is the deadline for the resolution.

One cannot avoid thinking about the implications of the different possible outcomes of the decision beyond 13 December. The president could approve the Act without any changes, or clauses 4 and 5 could be returned to the National Assembly for reworking.

If approved

If the Act is to be approved with the two contentious clauses in their current form, there will be a barrage of court cases from opponents of the decision. Over the past few months preceding the signing of the Bela Bill and after it was signed on 13 September 2024, the DA, AfriForum and other lobby groups have promised to take the matter to court. In such a scenario, all parties must prepare themselves for long, vicious and contentious court battles that have enormous implications for the political context defined by the Government of National Unity (GNU).

What will add further fuel to the fire is that at the helm of the department in which the Act is being debated is a DA minister, Minister Siviwe Gwarube. Will she toe the line and follow the law as expected by her office? Or will she follow the direction of her political party, which has been clear about how much it abhors the Act, especially in relation to its current form? She could find herself in the firing line.

If approved in its current form, beyond 13 December 2024, the Act will appease proponents who have been clear about their support for it. Proponents of the Bela Act, such as the ANC (which has been campaigning for it to be embraced by all), SADTU (which on countless matches in support of the Act and have even threatened the president with litigation if they do not get their way), and other political parties like the EFF and the MK Party will be vilified. Considering this, the country’s polarisation is apparent and is a potential and real threat to the GNU/coalition.

If sent back

The DA, AfriForum, and other lobby groups, especially those who want clauses 4 and 5 overhauled, will celebrate, but only for a moment. At least they can battle against the Act’s current form in the National Assembly. Rather than the rigour and expenses surrounding litigation, the different sides must now use their different lawmakers to make a case for them.

The results from the last votes on the BELAB held on 16 May 2024 showed that 223 votes were in favour of and 78 votes against the bill. If these results are anything to go by, there is little change the National Assembly would make to the Act. It will boil down to votes, and the scale will be lopsided. We will be heading for litigation and threats.

At the centre of this is the child whose best interest we are supposed to looking out for. Beyond Friday 13 December 2024, our focus will move away from the child to the National Assembly, the courtrooms, the never-say-no law firms. All eyes will be on the political space.