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29 April 2020 | Story Prof Francis Petersen. | Photo Sonia Small
Prof Francis Petersen

The COVID-19 pandemic has created profound disruptions in our economy and society.  Due to the challenges of this pandemic, most universities have decided to move from face-to-face classes to online teaching (more accurately defined as emergency remote teaching and learning) so as to complete the 2020 academic year, and to prevent the spread of the virus.

Online learning is the result of careful instructional design and planning, using a systematic model for design and development.  With remote emergency teaching and learning, this careful design process is absent.  Careful planning for online learning includes not just identifying the content to be covered, but also how to support the type of interactions that are important to the learning process.  Planning, preparation, and development time for a fully online university course typically takes six to nine months before the course is delivered.

Emergency teaching and learning is a temporary shift of instructional delivery to an alternative delivery mode due to crisis conditions.  Hence, one cannot equate emergency remote teaching and learning with online learning, nor should one compare emergency remote teaching and learning with face-to-face teaching. What is crucial is the quality of the mode of delivery, and although assessment methodologies will differ between face-to-face teaching and remote teaching and learning, the quality of the learning outcomes should be comparable.

The financial model used in a South African (residential) university consists of three main income sources: (i) the state or government through a subsidy (the so-called ‘block grant’), (ii) tuition fees, and (iii) third-stream income (which is mainly a cost-recovery component from contract research, donations, and interest on university investments). The National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) contributes to the tuition fees through a Department of Higher Education, Science and Innovation Bursary Scheme, providing fully subsidised free higher education and training for poor and working-class South Africans (recipients will typically be students from households with a combined income less than R350 k per annum).  

The negative impact of COVID-19 on the income drivers of the university can, and probably will, be severe.  Although the subsidy from the state or government can be ‘protected’ for a cycle of two to three years through the National Treasury, the pressure on income derived from tuition fees (that component which is not funded through NSFAS) will be increasing, as households would have been affected by the nationwide lockdown and with the economy in deep recession, a significant number of jobs would have been lost. The economic downturn, due to both COVID19 and a sovereign downgrade by all rating agencies, has already negatively impacted local financial markets as well as the global economy. The multiplier effect of this would be that the value of investments and endowments decreases (at the time of writing the JSE was still 20% down compared to the previous year), and philanthropic organisations and foundations will most probably reduce or even terminate ‘givings’ to universities.

Industry, private sector, and commerce will re-assess their funding to universities, whether for research or bursary support.  Overall, it is possible that the income sources for universities can be affected negatively in the short term, but it will definitely have longer-term implications on the financial sustainability of universities.  In this regard, it would be important for universities to perform scenario planning on the long-term impact of COVID-19 on the financial position of the university, and to adjust their strategic plans accordingly.

The major expense item in the university budget is the salaries of staff – this item is a fixed expense, particularly in the short to medium term. Hence, when introducing emergency remote teaching and learning, hence the switch to a different pedagogy and approach, university management did not have sufficient time to restructure the fixed cost part of the budget.  There are certainly other items in the budget which can be reduced, re-allocated or removed, and hence universities should, as a preliminary measure and based on their current financial position, develop a revised or adjusted 2020 budget.

The emergency remote teaching and learning therefore becomes an additional cost. These costs include, amongst others:
• training, development, and assistance to academic staff in converting content to a digital platform and learning management system (LMS),
• procuring data for staff (those who need to interface with the students) working from home,
• expansion of a call centre to guide and assist students,
• the cost of data for students through the reverse billing of data,
• procurement of digital devices (entry-level laptops) for students lacking such devices,
• paying for increased access to e-textbooks provided by publishers,
• payment for copyright clearance of additional material provided online to students,
• re-integration costs of students in terms of social distancing,
• improved hygiene on campus, disinfection of residences and other venues on campus, 360 degree screening (and testing) for the virus, the establishment of quarantine facilities, and the provision of appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). 

Obviously, these costs need to be offset against the fact that residences were not used for some time, with a subsequent decrease in water and electricity usage and savings on catering in the residences.  It should, however, be argued that even if the students were absent from campus and the residences for some time, the salaries of all staff involved with particular functions in relation to residential students, as well as certain fixed and non-controllable costs,  still need to be paid.  When the offset has been assessed, the residual value, i.e. the additional cost, is still a substantial cost to the university due to the implementation of emergency remote teaching and learning.

The question is: who will fund this cost?

The instinctive answer would be: the university.

I would argue that this cost should be borne by the university, the student, and the state (government).  This is a crisis – a global crisis of unprecedented proportions, and in this moment of restrictions on movement, telecommuting, and social distancing, working together is essential to overcome this crisis. Student agency is key, in that they would exhibit the will to positively influence their lives and the environment around them. This is what social justice and fairness are – contributing to the development path of the country.

Although it would be fair to assume that a rebate or pro-rated amount on the residence fees for students should be considered, it would not be an acceptable rationale to apply a rebate on tuition fees, as the 2020 academic programme will be delivered, albeit through a different mode, but ensuring the relevant and appropriate quality.  Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the higher education system will be impacted (at least financially) negatively in the short and medium term, and no country can afford a weak, non-functioning higher education system; hence a fiscal stimulus package from the state (government) would be crucial to assist the sector during the COVID-pandemic and beyond (in the short term).  South Africa has a highly differentiated higher education system, which is one of the legacies of our past history, and historically disadvantaged institutions will be affected the most during this pandemic.

COVID-19 is presenting unique challenges to universities globally, but it also provides us with an opportunity to be innovative, to improve social solidarity, and to co-create new ways of engagements among stakeholders for the greater good of society.  However, without a fiscal stimulus package from government, this pandemic can render our ‘differentiated’ higher education system a massive blow, which will be difficult to recover from. 

 

Opinion article by Prof Francis Petersen, Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Free State


News Archive

Inaugural lecture: Prof. Phillipe Burger
2007-11-26

 

Attending the lecture were, from the left: Prof. Tienie Crous (Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the UFS), Prof. Phillipe Burger (Departmental Chairperson of the Department of Economics at the UFS), and Prof. Frederick Fourie (Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the UFS).
Photo: Stephen Collet

 
A summary of an inaugural lecture presented by Prof. Phillipe Burger on the topic: “The ups and downs of the South African Economy: Rough seas or smooth sailing?”

South African business cycle shows reduction in volatility

Better monetary policy and improvements in the financial sector that place less liquidity constraints on individuals is one of the main reasons for the reduction in the volatility of the South African economy. The improvement in access to the financial sector also enables individuals to manage their debt better.

These are some of the findings in an analysis on the volatility of the South African business cycle done by Prof. Philippe Burger, Departmental Chairperson of the University of the Free State’s (UFS) Department of Economics.

Prof. Burger delivered his inaugural lecture last night (22 November 2007) on the Main Campus in Bloemfontein on the topic “The ups and downs of the South African Economy: Rough seas or smooth sailing?”

In his lecture, Prof. Burger emphasised a few key aspects of the South African business cycle and indicated how it changed during the periods 1960-1976, 1976-1994 en 1994-2006.

With the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an indicator of the business cycle, the analysis identified the variables that showed the highest correlation with the GDP. During the periods 1976-1994 and 1994-2006, these included durable consumption, manufacturing investment, private sector investment, as well as investment in machinery and non-residential buildings. Other variables that also show a high correlation with the GDP are imports, non-durable consumption, investment in the financial services sector, investment by general government, as well as investment in residential buildings.

Prof. Burger’s analysis also shows that changes in durable consumption, investment in the manufacturing sector, investment in the private sector, as well as investment in non-residential buildings preceded changes in the GDP. If changes in a variable such as durable consumption precede changes in the GDP, it is an indication that durable consumption is one of the drivers of the business cycle. The up or down swing of durable consumption may, in other words, just as well contribute to an up or down swing in the business cycle.

A surprising finding of the analysis is the particularly strong role durable consumption has played in the business cycle since 1994. This finding is especially surprising due to the fact that durable consumption only constitutes about 12% of the total household consumption.

A further surprising finding is the particularly small role exports have been playing since 1960 as a driver of the business cycle. In South Africa it is still generally accepted that exports are one of the most important drivers of the business cycle. It is generally accepted that, should the business cycles of South Africa’s most important trade partners show an upward phase; these partners will purchase more from South Africa. This increase in exports will contribute to the South African economy moving upward. Prof. Burger’s analyses shows, however, that exports have generally never fulfil this role.

Over and above the identification of the drivers of the South African business cycle, Prof. Burger’s analysis also investigated the volatility of the business cycle.

When the periods 1976-1994 and 1994-2006 are compared, the analysis shows that the volatility of the business cycle has reduced since 1994 with more than half. The reduction in volatility can be traced to the reduction in the volatility of household consumption (especially durables and services), as well as a reduction in the volatility of investment in machinery, non-residential buildings and transport equipment. The last three coincide with the general reduction in the volatility of investment in the manufacturing sector. Investment in sectors such as electricity and transport (not to be confused with investment in transport equipment by various sectors) which are strongly dominated by the government, did not contribute to the decrease in volatility.

In his analysis, Prof. Burger supplies reasons for the reduction in volatility. One of the explanations is the reduction in the shocks affecting the economy – especially in the South African context. Another explanation is the application of an improved monetary policy by the South African Reserve Bank since the mid 1990’s. A third explanation is the better access to liquidity and credit since the mid 1990’s, which enables the better management of household finance and the absorption of financial shocks.

A further reason which contributed to the reduction in volatility in countries such as the United States of America’s business cycle is better inventory management. While the volatility of inventory in South Africa has also reduced there is, according to Prof. Burger, little proof that better inventory management contributed to the reduction in volatility of the GDP.

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