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25 May 2020 | Story Prof Danie Brand | Photo iStock

What can we say about human rights in the context of celebrations on the idea(l) of African unity?

Some of the stock-in-trade questions that arise are, to me, not interesting. So, for example, to ask whether human rights are indigenous to Africa – in the sense that they come from here (whether they are African) – is senseless. If human rights are indeed rights inherent to every human being – of course they are and of course they do – just as they are indigenous to and come from everywhere where human beings live their lives together.

To ask instead what human rights bring to, can do, or mean for Africa, borders on the insulting. This question suggests that human rights are somehow extraneous to Africa, to be brought as a gift from elsewhere. It suggests, therefore, thinly veiled neo-imperialism.

Far more interesting is to ask what Africa brings to human rights – what human rights are in Africa. To this question there are several well-trodden, but still important answers.

First, as appears clearly from the title of Africa’s central human-rights document, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Africa brings to human rights the idea of collective, or peoples’ rights. Human rights in Africa are embedded in the fights of various African nations and the continent itself against – as Kwame Nkrumah called it – ‘imperialism and its handmaidens, colonialism and neo-colonialism’, fights of peoples for self-determination against external domination. From this arose recognition for the rights of peoples, such as the right to exist; the right to development; the right to self-determination; and the right to freedom from foreign economic domination and exploitation. This is significant, because it is frank about the political nature of rights and the importance of rights for political struggle against continuing oppression and exploitation. 

Second, as also appears from the ACHPR, Africa has brought to human rights the idea that rights have duties as their corollary. This is the idea that rights are not individual, but nested in relationships; that we each have our rights because we live together with others and as members of a broader collective, and so, we have duties towards those others and towards the broader collective. These are duties to regard others, but also to regard the collective, partly again, in its struggle for self-determination and in a sense, recognition. To take account of others, for example, individuals under African human rights law have the duty to exercise their rights “with due regard to the rights of others” and the duty “to respect and consider … fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding, and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance”. To regard the collective, individuals have, among others, the duty “(t)o serve (the) national community by placing (all) physical and intellectual abilities at its service”; “to preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of (their) country and to contribute to its defense in accordance with the law”; and, not surprisingly, the duty “(t)o contribute to the best of (their) abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African unity”. Perhaps more controversially, individuals also have a duty to exercise their rights with due regard to “collective security, morality and common interest” and the duty “(t)o preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity”. This, in turn, is significant, because it suggests a break with, or at least a departure from traditional liberal notions of rights, based on an atomistic vision of the individual and intended for the protection only of individual rights against others.

A third notion brought to human rights by Africa, is perhaps a little less known. In a manifesto adopted at the 1945 Pan-Africanist Congress in Manchester, we find the following arresting phrase as an expression of the Pan-Africanist ideal: “We want the right … to express our thoughts and emotions; to adopt and create forms of beauty.”

Here, I read a right that I have not yet come across elsewhere. This is certainly not only the already deeply entrenched right to freedom of expression and artistic or academic freedom that we are used to in Western notions of rights. Instead, this phrase suggests to me a right to both an epistemology and an ontology – to both understand the world and live in the world as we (choose to) do. How is this different from the notions of peoples’ rights to self-determination and people’s duty to assist in the quest for that self-determination referred to above? There seems to be an element of self-determination at play also in this right to understand and live in the world as we do – it is also the right of peoples to understand and to live as they choose.

What attracts me to this right, apart from the beauty of its formulation, is its self-confidence – the way in which it is asserted without reference to, not relative to, anyone or anything else. A common theme in both the notion of peoples’ rights and of duties correlative to rights in African human rights law, is the importance attached to achievement of self-determination, in a sense of recognition for Africa, its peoples, and the individuals who make up those peoples – that is, self-determination and recognition as against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. Although current conditions of neo-colonialism and the continuance of colonialism in most ways clearly require this oppositional stance and formulation, it does present a problem. It opens both these notions to the charge that they perpetually “reduce (us) to the status of complainants” (Ndebele 2000); that in their oppositional formulation, “the confronted other (imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism) is still recognised as the source of power, even at a time when political power has already been wrestled away from the other” (Van der Walt 2001).

A right to express ideas and emotions and adopt and create forms of beauty – to an epistemology and ontology – is instead asserted on its own terms. It seems a right to understand and live in the world as we (choose to) do, not against, but alongside others. As such, it offers a glimpse of “dispensations of true African cultural recovery and re-orientation” (Falola 2018).

This article was written by Prof Danie Brand - Director: Free State Centre for Human Rights

News Archive

Stem cell research and human cloning: legal and ethical focal points
2004-07-29

   

(Summary of the inaugural lecture of Prof Hennie Oosthuizen, from the Department of Criminal and Medical Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of the Free State.)

 

In the light of stem cell research, research on embryo’s and human cloning it will be fatal for legal advisors and researchers in South Africa to ignore the benefits that new bio-medical development, through research, contain for this country.

Legal advisors across the world have various views on stem cell research and human cloning. In the USA there is no legislation that regulates stem cell research but a number of States adopted legislation that approves stem cell research. The British Parlement gave permission for research on embryonic stem cells, but determined that it must be monitored closely and the European Union is of the opinion that it will open a door for race purification and commercial exploitation of human beings.

In South Africa the Bill on National Health makes provision for therapeutical and non therapeutical research. It also makes provision for therapeutical embryonical stem cell research on fetuses, which is not older than 14 days, as well as for therapeutical cloning under certain circumstances subject to the approval of the Minister. The Bill prohibits reproductive cloning.

Research on human embrio’s is a very controversial issue, here and in the rest of the world.

Researchers believe that the use of stem cell therapy could help to side-step the rejection of newly transplanted organs and tissue and if a bank for stem cell could be built, the shortage of organs for transplants would become something of the past. Stem cells could also be used for healing of Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s and spinal injuries.

Sources from which stem cells are obtained could also lead to further ethical issues. Stem cells are harvested from mature human cells and embryonic stem cells. Another source to be utilised is to take egg cells from the ovaries of aborted fetuses. This will be morally unacceptable for those against abortions. Linking a financial incentive to that could become more of a controversial issue because the woman’s decision to abort could be influenced. The ideal would be to rather use human fetus tissue from spontaneous abortions or extra-uterine pregnancies than induced abortions.

The potential to obtain stem cells from the blood of the umbilical cord, bone-marrow and fetus tissue and for these cells to arrange themselves is known for quite some time. Blood from the umbilical cord contains many stem cells, which is the origin of the body’s immune and blood system. It is beneficial to bank the blood of a newborn baby’s umbilical cord. Through stem cell transplants the baby or another family member’s life could be saved from future illnesses such as anemia, leukemia and metabolic storing disabilities as well as certain generic immuno disabilities.

The possibility to withdraw stem cells from human embrio’s and to grow them is more useable because it has more treatment possibilities.

With the birth of Dolly the sheep, communities strongly expressed their concern about the possibility that a new cloning technique such as the replacement of the core of a cell will be used in human reproduction. Embryonic splitting and core replacement are two well known techniques that are associated with the cloning process.

I differentiate between reproductive cloning – to create a cloned human embryo with the aim to bring about a pregnancy of a child that is identical to another individual – and therapeutically cloning – to create a cloned human embryo for research purposes and for healing human illnesses.

Worldwide people are debating whether to proceed with therapeutical cloning. There are people for and against it. The biggest ethical objection against therapeutical cloning is the termination of the development of a potential human being.

Children born from cloning will differ from each other. Factors such as the uterus environment and the environment in which the child is growing up will play a role. Cloning create unique children that will grow up to be unique individuals, just like me and you that will develop into a person, just like you and me. If we understand this scientific fact, most arguments against human cloning will disappear.

Infertility can be treated through in vitro conception. This process does not work for everyone. For some cloning is a revolutionary treatment method because it is the only method that does not require patients to produce sperm and egg cells. The same arguments that were used against in vitro conception in the past are now being used against cloning. It is years later and in vitro cloning is generally applied and accepted by society. I am of the opinion that the same will happen with regard to human cloning.

There is an argument that cloning must be prohibited because it is unsafe. Distorted ideas in this regard were proven wrong. Are these distorted ideas justified to question the safety of cloning and the cloning process you may ask. The answer, according to me, is a definite no. Human cloning does have many advantages. That includes assistance with infertility, prevention of Down Syndrome and recovery from leukemia.

 

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