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25 May 2020 | Story Prof Danie Brand | Photo iStock

What can we say about human rights in the context of celebrations on the idea(l) of African unity?

Some of the stock-in-trade questions that arise are, to me, not interesting. So, for example, to ask whether human rights are indigenous to Africa – in the sense that they come from here (whether they are African) – is senseless. If human rights are indeed rights inherent to every human being – of course they are and of course they do – just as they are indigenous to and come from everywhere where human beings live their lives together.

To ask instead what human rights bring to, can do, or mean for Africa, borders on the insulting. This question suggests that human rights are somehow extraneous to Africa, to be brought as a gift from elsewhere. It suggests, therefore, thinly veiled neo-imperialism.

Far more interesting is to ask what Africa brings to human rights – what human rights are in Africa. To this question there are several well-trodden, but still important answers.

First, as appears clearly from the title of Africa’s central human-rights document, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Africa brings to human rights the idea of collective, or peoples’ rights. Human rights in Africa are embedded in the fights of various African nations and the continent itself against – as Kwame Nkrumah called it – ‘imperialism and its handmaidens, colonialism and neo-colonialism’, fights of peoples for self-determination against external domination. From this arose recognition for the rights of peoples, such as the right to exist; the right to development; the right to self-determination; and the right to freedom from foreign economic domination and exploitation. This is significant, because it is frank about the political nature of rights and the importance of rights for political struggle against continuing oppression and exploitation. 

Second, as also appears from the ACHPR, Africa has brought to human rights the idea that rights have duties as their corollary. This is the idea that rights are not individual, but nested in relationships; that we each have our rights because we live together with others and as members of a broader collective, and so, we have duties towards those others and towards the broader collective. These are duties to regard others, but also to regard the collective, partly again, in its struggle for self-determination and in a sense, recognition. To take account of others, for example, individuals under African human rights law have the duty to exercise their rights “with due regard to the rights of others” and the duty “to respect and consider … fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding, and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance”. To regard the collective, individuals have, among others, the duty “(t)o serve (the) national community by placing (all) physical and intellectual abilities at its service”; “to preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of (their) country and to contribute to its defense in accordance with the law”; and, not surprisingly, the duty “(t)o contribute to the best of (their) abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African unity”. Perhaps more controversially, individuals also have a duty to exercise their rights with due regard to “collective security, morality and common interest” and the duty “(t)o preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity”. This, in turn, is significant, because it suggests a break with, or at least a departure from traditional liberal notions of rights, based on an atomistic vision of the individual and intended for the protection only of individual rights against others.

A third notion brought to human rights by Africa, is perhaps a little less known. In a manifesto adopted at the 1945 Pan-Africanist Congress in Manchester, we find the following arresting phrase as an expression of the Pan-Africanist ideal: “We want the right … to express our thoughts and emotions; to adopt and create forms of beauty.”

Here, I read a right that I have not yet come across elsewhere. This is certainly not only the already deeply entrenched right to freedom of expression and artistic or academic freedom that we are used to in Western notions of rights. Instead, this phrase suggests to me a right to both an epistemology and an ontology – to both understand the world and live in the world as we (choose to) do. How is this different from the notions of peoples’ rights to self-determination and people’s duty to assist in the quest for that self-determination referred to above? There seems to be an element of self-determination at play also in this right to understand and live in the world as we do – it is also the right of peoples to understand and to live as they choose.

What attracts me to this right, apart from the beauty of its formulation, is its self-confidence – the way in which it is asserted without reference to, not relative to, anyone or anything else. A common theme in both the notion of peoples’ rights and of duties correlative to rights in African human rights law, is the importance attached to achievement of self-determination, in a sense of recognition for Africa, its peoples, and the individuals who make up those peoples – that is, self-determination and recognition as against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. Although current conditions of neo-colonialism and the continuance of colonialism in most ways clearly require this oppositional stance and formulation, it does present a problem. It opens both these notions to the charge that they perpetually “reduce (us) to the status of complainants” (Ndebele 2000); that in their oppositional formulation, “the confronted other (imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism) is still recognised as the source of power, even at a time when political power has already been wrestled away from the other” (Van der Walt 2001).

A right to express ideas and emotions and adopt and create forms of beauty – to an epistemology and ontology – is instead asserted on its own terms. It seems a right to understand and live in the world as we (choose to) do, not against, but alongside others. As such, it offers a glimpse of “dispensations of true African cultural recovery and re-orientation” (Falola 2018).

This article was written by Prof Danie Brand - Director: Free State Centre for Human Rights

News Archive

You touch a woman, you strike a rock
2004-11-02

Prof. Engela Pretorius van die Departement Sosiologie in die Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe by die Universiteit van die Vrystaat het die kwessie omtrent feminisme aangespreek tydens haar intreerede met die onderwerp, You touch a woman, you strike a rock: Feminism(s) and emancipation in South Africa .

Prof. Pretorius het gesê: “Die geskiedenis van feminisme oor die algemeen kan in drie fases verdeel word, waarna verwys word as golwe. Eerste-golf-feminisme (19de eeu) het die fokus geplaas op die beskerming van vroueregte in die openbare terrein, spesifiek die reg om te stem, die reg tot onderrig en die reg om middelklas beroepe en professies te betreë.

Vroeë tweede-golf-feminisme word onthou vir hoe dit moederskap geteoretiseer het as synde ‘n onderdrukkende instelling. Slagspreuke van die 1970s was die persoonlike is polities en susterskap is magtig. Prof. Pretorius sê beide slagspreuke bevestig die idee dat vroue universeel onderdruk en uitgebuit word en slegs deur erkenning van dié situasie kan vroue die strukture wat hul onderdruk verander.

‘n Belangrike aspek van die derde golf van die feminisme-teorie is post-moderne feminisme wat diversiteit en verskille onderstreep. Die poging van hierdie feministe is afgestem op alle vorme van onderdrukking. Vroue van kleur het ook hul ontevredenheid uitgespreek gedurende die derde-golf-feminisme. Die feminisme van vroue van kleur word gekenmerk deur verskeie kwessies en talryke intellektuele standpuntinnames wat neerslaga vind in verskillende terme, soos Afrika feminisme of ‘womanism, sê prof. Pretorius.

Afrika-feminisme dui protes aan teen die wit/westerse geskiedenis en die wit/westerse dominansie binne feminisme. Afrika-vroue het besef dat hul onderdrukking verskillend is van dié van wit vroue en daarom is ‘n ander proses van bevryding nodig. Die Westerse feministiese praktyk om swart vroue by die bestaande feministiese ontologie te voeg, is nie voldoende nie omdat hul unieke ondervindings van slawerny, kolonialisme, onderdrukking deur mans en armoede nie uitgedruk word nie.

‘Womanism’ het tot stand gekom as gevolg van ‘n eksplisiete rassekritiek teen feminisme. Dit is ten gunste van die positiewe uitbeelding van swart mense. Dit word gekenmerk deur kulturele kontekstualisasie, die sentraliteit van die gesin en die belangrikheid daarvan om mans in te sluit.

Die geskiedenis van vroue in Suid-Afrika is verwant aan hul geskiedenis van onderdrukking as gevolg van patriargie. Vroue van verskillende rasse, kulture en klasse het patriargie op verskillende wyses in en variërende mate van erns ervaar. Onder voor-koloniale patriargie het vroue min sê gehad oor huwelikskeuses omdat mans dié besluite gedomineer het.

Die Nederlandse en Britse patriargale erfenis het neerslag gevind in die ideologie van die volksmoeder. Onderwyl dit veral manlike skrywers was wat die beeld van die vrou as versorger en tuisteskepper bevorder het, het vroue self ook hieraan ‘n aandeel gehad, sodat die volksmoeder volwaardig deel geword het van die Afrikaner nasionalistiese mitologie. Alhoewel middel- en werkersklas vroue met dié beeld geïdentifiseer het, het nie alle Afrikaanse vroue die ideologie aanvaar nie.

Onder die Victoriaanse erfenis was Britse vroue beperk to die private eerder as die openbare lewe. Die skeefgetrekte onderrigsisteem wat vroue in huishoudelike loopbane gekanaliseer het, die mag van mans oor hul vroue se eiendom en ‘n tekort aan toegang tot mag en geld het verseker dat vroue by die huis gebly het.

Wit Engelssprekende-vroue het die grootste geleentheid gehad om patriargie uit te daag vanweë hul toegang tot onderwys en die blootstelling aan liberale waardes, sê prof. Pretorius. Liberale vroue soos Helen Joseph en Helen Suzman het ‘n belangrike rol gespeel om in 1930 stemreg vir wit vroue in Suid-Afrika te verseker en het voortgegaan om ‘n rol te speel in die bevryding van swart vroue gedurende die vryheidstryd.

Die feminisme wat onder swart vroue ontwikkel het, was ‘n erkenning van die gemeenskaplike stryd met swart mans om die verwydering van die juk van eksterne onderdrukking en eksploitasie. Swart vroue in aktiewe en onafhanlike politiese rolle het tegelykertyd mans se aannames omtrent hul meerderwaardigheid asook die rassewette van die staat uitgedaag. Daarom kan ons sê dat die feminisme wat hier ontwikkel het, te voorskyn gekom het as gevolg van vroue se betrokkenheid by en toewyding tot nasionale bevryding, sê prof. Pretorius.

Institusionalisering is nie herlei tot magsvoordele nie, want gelykheid is nie in beleidsprogramme geïnkorporeer nie. Die hervestiging van sleutel aktiviste van die vrouebeweging in die regering het die stryd om genderbillikheid verander na ‘n projek wat deur die regering gelei word, sê prof. Pretorius. Ongelukkig word terreine van verandering buite die grense van die regering verwaarloos. Dit kan slegs aangespreek word deur ‘n aktiewe en feministiese stem in die burgerlike samelewing.

“Dit is my oortuiging dat formele instellings vir vroue binne die staat oor die lang termyn slegs effektief kan wees indien daar ‘n effektiewe feministiese vroue-beweging buite die staat in stand gehou word wat die grondslag waarop sosiale beleid gevorm word, kan uitdaag en bevraagteken. Daarom, A luta continua (die stryd duur voort),” sê prof. Pretorius.

Mediaverklaring
Uitgereik deur: Lacea Loader
Mediaverteenwoordiger
Tel: (051) 401-2584
Sel: 083 645 2454
E-pos: loaderl.stg@mail.uovs.ac.za
2 November 2004

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