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25 May 2020 | Story Dr Munyaradzi Mushonga | Photo Supplied
Dr Munyaradzi Mushonga

As we virtually celebrate Africa Month in 2020, it is worth reflecting on the journey of the African university as a reminder of where we are coming from, where we are today, and where we are going. The emergence and development of university education in Africa can be conceptualised in four distinct phases, namely the pre-colonial university (before 1900), the colonial university (1900-c.1960), the developmental (post-colonial) university (1961-c.1980), and the market (entrepreneurial)/crisis-era university (1980-present). If we follow this scheme, with the Coronavirus and COVID-19 in our midst, the African university is entering the fifth phase. Just a week into the pandemic, African universities were already experimenting with various online learning and teaching approaches to keep the academic programme afloat, away from the walled university. 

Higher education on the African continent long antedates the establishment of Western-style universities in the 19th century and is traceable to the 3rd century BC. The oldest university still in existence is Al-Azhar in Egypt, founded in 969 AD. It is regarded as one of the leading Islamic HE institutions in the world today. Not only did the idea of higher learning begin in Africa, but the spread of universities into “Western Europe was mainly through the traffic of knowledge and ideas that flowed across the Strait of Gibraltar from North Africa” (Tisani, 2005:2). 

Colonial universities were a product of the European colonisation of Africa and most of these emerged after the Second World War. Their mandate was to reorient European colonies through the idea of ‘colonial development’ as well as to “cultivate and sustain indigenous elites” moulded along European traditions; elites that would be crucial in maintaining links with the former colonial powers after the departure of the physical empire from Africa (Munene, 2010:400). Thus, colonial universities were among the major instruments and vehicles of cultural westernisation and assimilation, bent on removing the hard disk of previous African knowledge and memory, and downloading into it a software of European memory. Today, the continent remains dominated by universities shaped by the logics of colonialism. It is this resilient colonial university that decoloniality seeks to disrupt and to plant in its place an African university steeped in epistemologies of the Global South. 

Following the retreat of the physical empire, African states established development-orientated universities. It was readily accepted that HE was capable of contributing to the social, cultural, and economic development of Africa. As such, many universities were initially generously funded and supported by the state. However, this commitment only lasted for about a decade or so. The ‘independence’ university was overly concerned with first – ‘Africanising’ the public service, and second – with the anti-colonialist aspiration of taking over and ‘Africanising’ positions within the institution. The more nationalism turned into a state project, the more pressure there was on the developmentalist university to implement a state-determined and state-driven agenda, and the more this happened, “the more critical thought was taken as subversive of the national project” (Mamdani, 2008). Resultantly, the university lost its original mandate and the international policy environment did not help matters, as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund suggested that ‘Africa did not need university education’ and called for the privatisation of public universities. 

The fate of the ‘developmental university’ was sealed in 1990 when the World Conference on Education for All prioritised elementary education. The increasing frustration with the perceived failure of the ‘developmental university’ on the one hand, and changed Western priorities and the inevitable influence of Western aid and Western academic organisations on the other hand, gave rise to the market (entrepreneurial)/crisis-era university. Since the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, many African universities have been under pressure to liberalise, following the retreat of the state in the provision of education. This led to various forms of disputes and contestations (#FeesMustFall is one of them) – contestations centred on the meaning, purpose, and mission of an African university (Zeleza and Olukoshi, 2004:1) in a fast decolonising yet liberalising environment. 

Today, with the Coronavirus and COVID-19 in our midst, one thing is certain – the pandemic will have a lasting impact on all national institutions, the African university included. It is not possible to predict the kind of university that might emerge both during and beyond the pandemic. However, the following questions might help us imagine such a university. What kind of university do we have (now/today)? What kind of university do we want? What kind of university do we need? What kind of university can we afford? These are transhistorical questions that have informed all previous versions of the university. Clearly, the COVID-19 pandemic is sure to give birth to another crisis-era university. While such a university will be dictated by the prevailing socio-economic and socio-political ideologies and landscapes shaped by the pandemic, we should also refuse to allow the pandemic to define such a university for us. The COVID-19 pandemic should only be used as a stage for a ‘great leap’ forward. The pandemic offers the African university a fresh start. Yet, we must, as some Kovsies have already cautioned, guard against the temptation to respond to crises in particularist and isolationist fashions. It is time to overcome. It is time to unite. It is time to grab the bull by the horns. It is time for Africa’s place in the sun. #ONEAFRICA.  

This article was written by Dr Munyaradzi Mushonga, Programme Director: Africa Studies, Centre for Gender and Africa Studies 


News Archive

Inaugural lecture: Prof. Phillipe Burger
2007-11-26

 

Attending the lecture were, from the left: Prof. Tienie Crous (Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the UFS), Prof. Phillipe Burger (Departmental Chairperson of the Department of Economics at the UFS), and Prof. Frederick Fourie (Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the UFS).
Photo: Stephen Collet

 
A summary of an inaugural lecture presented by Prof. Phillipe Burger on the topic: “The ups and downs of the South African Economy: Rough seas or smooth sailing?”

South African business cycle shows reduction in volatility

Better monetary policy and improvements in the financial sector that place less liquidity constraints on individuals is one of the main reasons for the reduction in the volatility of the South African economy. The improvement in access to the financial sector also enables individuals to manage their debt better.

These are some of the findings in an analysis on the volatility of the South African business cycle done by Prof. Philippe Burger, Departmental Chairperson of the University of the Free State’s (UFS) Department of Economics.

Prof. Burger delivered his inaugural lecture last night (22 November 2007) on the Main Campus in Bloemfontein on the topic “The ups and downs of the South African Economy: Rough seas or smooth sailing?”

In his lecture, Prof. Burger emphasised a few key aspects of the South African business cycle and indicated how it changed during the periods 1960-1976, 1976-1994 en 1994-2006.

With the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an indicator of the business cycle, the analysis identified the variables that showed the highest correlation with the GDP. During the periods 1976-1994 and 1994-2006, these included durable consumption, manufacturing investment, private sector investment, as well as investment in machinery and non-residential buildings. Other variables that also show a high correlation with the GDP are imports, non-durable consumption, investment in the financial services sector, investment by general government, as well as investment in residential buildings.

Prof. Burger’s analysis also shows that changes in durable consumption, investment in the manufacturing sector, investment in the private sector, as well as investment in non-residential buildings preceded changes in the GDP. If changes in a variable such as durable consumption precede changes in the GDP, it is an indication that durable consumption is one of the drivers of the business cycle. The up or down swing of durable consumption may, in other words, just as well contribute to an up or down swing in the business cycle.

A surprising finding of the analysis is the particularly strong role durable consumption has played in the business cycle since 1994. This finding is especially surprising due to the fact that durable consumption only constitutes about 12% of the total household consumption.

A further surprising finding is the particularly small role exports have been playing since 1960 as a driver of the business cycle. In South Africa it is still generally accepted that exports are one of the most important drivers of the business cycle. It is generally accepted that, should the business cycles of South Africa’s most important trade partners show an upward phase; these partners will purchase more from South Africa. This increase in exports will contribute to the South African economy moving upward. Prof. Burger’s analyses shows, however, that exports have generally never fulfil this role.

Over and above the identification of the drivers of the South African business cycle, Prof. Burger’s analysis also investigated the volatility of the business cycle.

When the periods 1976-1994 and 1994-2006 are compared, the analysis shows that the volatility of the business cycle has reduced since 1994 with more than half. The reduction in volatility can be traced to the reduction in the volatility of household consumption (especially durables and services), as well as a reduction in the volatility of investment in machinery, non-residential buildings and transport equipment. The last three coincide with the general reduction in the volatility of investment in the manufacturing sector. Investment in sectors such as electricity and transport (not to be confused with investment in transport equipment by various sectors) which are strongly dominated by the government, did not contribute to the decrease in volatility.

In his analysis, Prof. Burger supplies reasons for the reduction in volatility. One of the explanations is the reduction in the shocks affecting the economy – especially in the South African context. Another explanation is the application of an improved monetary policy by the South African Reserve Bank since the mid 1990’s. A third explanation is the better access to liquidity and credit since the mid 1990’s, which enables the better management of household finance and the absorption of financial shocks.

A further reason which contributed to the reduction in volatility in countries such as the United States of America’s business cycle is better inventory management. While the volatility of inventory in South Africa has also reduced there is, according to Prof. Burger, little proof that better inventory management contributed to the reduction in volatility of the GDP.

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