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01 September 2020 | Story Dr Cecile Duvenhage

Opinion article by Dr Cecile Duvenhage, Lecturer in the Department of Economics and Finance, University of the Free State

Awards and bailouts

The World Travel Awards recognised the state-owned enterprise (SOE), South African Airways (SAA), as Africa’s leading airline – every year from 1994 to 2015. However, behind the scenes, the flag carrier has repeatedly been given lifelines thanks to government guarantees. The last year that the SAA made a profit was in 2011.

Over the past decade, more than R16,5 billion in taxpayers' money was spent on bailouts for the airline. In the February 2020 budget, the government set aside R16,4 billion, of which R11,2 billion was for SAA’s debt-servicing costs. 

The SAA has been fighting for its survival since it entered into voluntary business rescue in December 2019 and is facing liquidation after specialists were appointed at the end of April 2020 to try to save the airline.  

How did SAA end up in this mess?

After the government deregulated the domestic airline industry in 1991, SAA lost its national market share (of 95%), especially to Comair and FlySafair. The airline was also hit on its African routes, where Ethiopian Airlines started to erode its competitive position. Theoretically speaking, deregulation breaks the market power of a monopoly, and inefficiency will put you out of business in a competitive environment. 

Add the component of poor management and suspect tenders (pertaining to the former SAA chairperson Dudu Myeni’s plan to buy several Airbus planes, sell them to a local company, and then lease the planes back), and debt starts to snowball. Additional poor management decisions include the desperate saving measures on essential expenditure, which led to the buying of ‘fake parts’. Unnecessary sponsorships (ATP tennis), given a tight budget, reflect poor management decisions by SAA. 

Surely, the weak rand played a role in the profitability of SAA, but also for the competitors who managed to survive due to efficient management. 

So, what are the cards on the table? 

The cards include liquidation, foreign direct investment (FDI), and a rescue package under Section 16 of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA).

The liquidation of the airline will reduce future ongoing operational losses but will require the payment of creditors who rely on the so-called ‘implicit guarantee’ of ongoing funding by the state. Thus, debt claims cannot be avoided, as would be the case with conventional companies. Besides, there is no consensus regarding the liquidation cost – ranging from R2 billion to R60 billion.

Another card is the ‘restart’ of a new SAA, with a smaller international network. This airline needs to be financed by new investors, which might include large international airlines. In this case, the SA government will hold a minority stake, which requires a change of legislation to allow larger GDI into SA airlines. In attracting FDI, the SAA could be revived as a smaller international franchisee airline in cooperation with a larger international airline.

A further card is the option of using citizens’ pension as a business rescue package for the SAA under Section 16 of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA). 

Section 16 of the Public Finance Management Act

The purpose of the PFMA is “(t)o regulate financial management in the national government and provincial governments; to ensure that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of those governments are managed efficiently and effectively; to provide for the responsibilities of persons entrusted with financial management in those governments; and to provide for matters connected therewith.”

In terms of Section 16 of the PFMA, the Minister can authorise the use of funds, including the National Revenue Fund (NRF), to finance expenditure of an ‘exceptional nature’ which is currently not provided for and which cannot, without serious prejudice to the ‘public interest’, be postponed to a future Parliamentary appropriation of funds.  

Thus, Section 16 allows the Minister of Finance to sidestep normal budgetary appropriation processes in an emergency to make money available for items of an ‘exceptional nature’ or unforeseen circumstances.

Exceptional and short-term orientated

Exceptional is synonymous with abnormal, atypical, and extraordinary. However, the improvement of the financial position of SAA through recapitalisation has been constantly on the government’s agenda since the February 2017 budget. Four months later (1 July 2017), the National Treasury published a media statement titled Government transfers funds from National Revenue Fund to South African Airways. The argument was that the SAA needed to be recapitalised to allow the airline to pay back its commitment to Standard Chartered Bank, thereby sidestepping a default.  

How exceptional is inefficiency and poor management over a period of ten years, and how biased would such a transfer decision be towards public interest (that favours transparency and accountability), can be asked?

According to the July 2017 media statement, “default by the airline would have prompted a call on the guarantee, leading to an outflow” (take note: not will lead to an outflow) from the NRF and possibly resulting in higher awareness of risk related to the rest of the SAA's guaranteed debt.

The statement also adds that several options have been explored and given the nature of the problems at the SAA, Section 16 of the PFMA “had to be used as the last resort”. According to Minister Mboweni, the government is currently also considering several options, including that the government retains a percentage of the issued share capital in the new airline, finding private equity or strategic partners to take up shareholding in the new SAA, or approaching international or local funding institutions. Of course, local funding institutions include the National Revenue Fund.


Thus, the government may – and possibly already has – partly fund the recapitalisation of the airline using the NRF. Accusations from the Democratic Alliance (DA), an opposition party, state that the former Finance Minister, Malusi Gigaba, used R3 billion of emergency provisions to recapitalise the SAA in 2017.

The DA recently requested confirmation whether the SA Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni, had again made ‘unlawful’ use of Section 16 in committing to provide and disburse public money for the SAA’s restructuring. The DA also asked the court to interdict SAA and its rescue practitioners (Siviwe Dongwana and Les Matuson) from using the money by any means. The application for the interdict has in the meantime been withdrawn, given the government’s commitment not to use Section 16.

Minister Tito Mboweni’s cards

Although Mboweni indicated that he would protect the efforts of those “who work day and night to make a success of this country”, he is up against a loaded team of government, SAA, and rescue practitioners. The minister expressed a preference for closing the SAA down, but Cabinet has given its backing to a business rescue plan.

The minister recently said that he did not authorise the ‘use’ of funds from the NRF for emergency funding, although he did not exclude the possibility of approaching ‘institutions’ to invest pension funds for this purpose. 

The impact and implication of using NRF

What is in a name, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet? What is in a name, ‘using’, ‘investing’, or ‘mobilising’ pension funds? Do you smell a rose or a rat? Either way, it still boils down to the possibility of ‘getting access’ to the pension funds of hard-working SA citizens to bail out a straggling, poor-managed SOE.

Looking at the poor track record of the SAA and the bleak future of aviation in general (due to the global recession and impact of COVID-19), would an individual, conservative investor opt to invest in SAA? Only political allies making a political decision in their best interest, or aggressive investors being promised high returns on their investment, will take the bait. 

My next concern – will the new, restructured SAA be able to generate profit to remunerate the invested ‘institutions’, given that it currently has only five planes to fly? 
For a start, was the R3 billion emergency allocation (dated back to 2017) retrieved and paid back to the NRF? Hill-Lewis, representing the DA, argued that if the SAA had spent the funds (of 2020), the country and the public purse will be irreparably harmed. Thus, the money may not be retrieved, which will lead to anarchism in the country.

Most parties agree that the SAA remains a strategic asset to South Africa and to its role as the flag carrier, where it assists as an economic enabler with benefits across a wide range of economic activity. However, the parties do not agree on the finance model regarding the bailout of the SAA.

The new SAA needs to generate high profits in a competitive environment to be efficient and cost-effective in its management. Thus, the money need not be forthcoming from a future stream of ‘already recruited’ pension contributions of so-called ‘institutions’. If the latter is indeed the case regarding the generation of income, it reminds me of the activities associated with a pyramid scheme.

SAA, please do not fly us to doom.

News Archive

Media: ANC can learn a lesson from Moshoeshoe
2006-05-20


27/05/2006 20:32 - (SA) 
ANC can learn a lesson from Moshoeshoe
ON 2004, the University of the Free State turned 100 years old. As part of its centenary celebrations, the idea of the Moshoeshoe Memorial Lecture was mooted as part of another idea: to promote the study of the meaning of Moshoeshoe.

This lecture comes at a critical point in South Africa's still-new democracy. There are indications that the value of public engagement that Moshoeshoe prized highly through his lipitso [community gatherings], and now also a prized feature in our democracy, may be under serious threat. It is for this reason that I would like to dedicate this lecture to all those in our country and elsewhere who daily or weekly, or however frequently, have had the courage to express their considered opinions on pressing matters facing our society. They may be columnists, editors, commentators, artists of all kinds, academics and writers of letters to the editor, non-violent protesters with their placards and cartoonists who put a mirror in front of our eyes.

There is a remarkable story of how Moshoeshoe dealt with Mzilikazi, the aggressor who attacked Thaba Bosiu and failed. So when Mzilikazi retreated from Thaba Bosiu with a bruised ego after failing to take over the mountain, Moshoeshoe, in an unexpected turn of events, sent him cattle to return home bruised but grateful for the generosity of a victorious target of his aggression. At least he would not starve along the way. It was a devastating act of magnanimity which signalled a phenomenal role change.

"If only you had asked," Moshoeshoe seemed to be saying, "I could have given you some cattle. Have them anyway."

It was impossible for Mzilikazi not to have felt ashamed. At the same time, he could still present himself to his people as one who was so feared that even in defeat he was given cattle. At any rate, he never returned.

I look at our situation in South Africa and find that the wisdom of Moshoeshoe's method produced one of the defining moments that led to South Africa's momentous transition to democracy. Part of Nelson Mandela's legacy is precisely this: what I have called counter-intuitive leadership and the immense possibilities it offers for re-imagining whole societies.

A number of events in the past 12 months have made me wonder whether we are faced with a new situation that may have arisen. An increasing number of highly intelligent, sensitive and highly committed South Africans across the class, racial and cultural spectrum confess to feeling uncertain and vulnerable as never before since 1994. When indomitable optimists confess to having a sense of things unhinging, the misery of anxiety spreads. It must have something to do with an accumulation of events that convey the sense of impending implosion. It is the sense that events are spiralling out of control and no one among the leadership of the country seems to have a handle on things.

I should mention the one event that has dominated the national scene continuously for many months now. It is, of course, the trying events around the recent trial and acquittal of Jacob Zuma. The aftermath continues to dominate the news and public discourse. What, really, have we learnt or are learning from it all? It is probably too early to tell. Yet the drama seems far from over, promising to keep us all without relief, and in a state of anguish. It seems poised to reveal more faultlines in our national life than answers and solutions.

We need a mechanism that will affirm the different positions of the contestants validating their honesty in a way that will give the public confidence that real solutions are possible. It is this kind of openness, which never comes easily, that leads to breakthrough solutions, of the kind Moshoeshoe's wisdom symbolises.

Who will take this courageous step? What is clear is that a complex democracy like South Africa's cannot survive a single authority. Only multiple authorities within a constitutional framework have a real chance. I want to press this matter further.

Could it be that part of the problem is that we are unable to deal with the notion of "opposition". We are horrified that any of us could become "the opposition". In reality, it is time we began to anticipate the arrival of a moment when there was no longer a single [overwhelmingly] dominant political force as is currently the case. Such is the course of change. The measure of the maturity of the current political environment will be in how it can create conditions that anticipate that moment rather than ones that seek to prevent it. This is the formidable challenge of a popular post-apartheid political movement.

Can it conceptually anticipate a future when it is no longer overwhelmingly in control, in the form in which it currently is and resist, counter-intuitively, the temptation to prevent such an eventuality? Successfully resisting such an option would enable its current vision and its ultimate legacy to our country to manifest itself in different articulations of itself, which then contend for social influence.

In this way, the vision never really dies, it simply evolves into higher, more complex forms of itself. If the resulting versions are what is called "the opposition" that should not be such a bad thing - unless we want to invent another name for it. The image of flying ants going off to start other similar settlements is not so inappropriate.

I do not wish to suggest that the nuptial flights of the alliance partners are about to occur: only that it is a mark of leadership foresight to anticipate them conceptually. Any political movement that has visions of itself as a perpetual entity should look at the compelling evidence of history. Few have survived those defining moments when they should have been more elastic, and that because they were not, did not live to see the next day.

I believe we may have reached a moment not fundamentally different from the sobering, yet uplifting and vision-making, nation-building realities that led to Kempton Park in the early 1990s. The difference between then and now is that the black majority is not facing white compatriots across the negotiating table. Rather, it is facing itself: perhaps really for the first time since 1994. It is not a time for repeating old platitudes. Could we apply to ourselves the same degree of inventiveness and rigorous negotiation we displayed up to the adoption or our Constitution?

Morena Moshoeshoe faced similarly formative challenges. He seems to have been a great listener. No problem was too insignificant that it could not be addressed. He seems to have networked actively across the spectrum of society. He seems to have kept a close eye on the world beyond Lesotho, forming strong friendships and alliances, weighing his options constantly. He seems to have had patience and forbearance. He had tons of data before him before he could propose the unexpected. He tells us across the years that moments of renewal demand no less.

  • This is an editied version of the inaugural Moshoeshoe Memorial Lecture presented by Univeristy of Cape Town vice-chancellor Professor Ndebele at the University of the Free State on Thursday. Perspectives on Leadership Challenges In South Africa

 

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