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07 March 2022 | Story Sanet Madonsela | Photo supplied
Sanet Madonsela is a PhD Candidate in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies. She is also the Chairperson of the South African Association of Political Science's Emerging Scholars Research Committee and the Projects and Events Coordinator for the International Association for Political Science Students

Opinion article by Sanet Madonsela, PhD Candidate in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State.
On the 24 February 2022 the world woke up to the news of Russia announcing its’ “special military operation” to “demilitarise” and “deNazify” Ukraine. This announcement was followed by a sophisticated, all-out attack by land and air. As Russia began its invasion, the rest of the world watched in anguish, contemplating the unavoidable international political and economic implications. 

There are competing views as to why Russia invaded Ukraine. Some argue that the attacks were based on Ukraine’s desire to join NATO, while others link the invasion to the Minsk agreements. The Minsk agreements are two treaties signed in 2014 and 2015 aimed at ending the war in Donbass. To provide a bit of context one needs to go back to 2014.

Resolution to recognise Donetsk and Lugansk

Moscow was angered that its candidate lost Ukraine’s presidential mantle in elections in 2014. This resulted in Donetsk and Luhansk announcing their autonomy from Kiev. In September of that year the government of Kiev and the separatist leaders agreed to a 12-point ceasefire called Minsk I. Despite the signing of the agreement, the fighting continued resulting in Russia, Ukraine and the
Special Monitoring Mission of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signing Minsk II. The agreement called on Ukraine to control the state border, constitutional reform and decentralisation. Despite an election held in 2018 in the eastern regions, the US and the EU have refused to recognise the legitimacy of the vote, thus, violating the agreement. The OSCE has reported significant daily increases in ceasefire violations in the affected areas since February 2014. While the US is not a signatory, it has expressed the importance of implementing the agreement. Instead of accepting the existing agreement, Ukraine allegedly never implemented its provision thereby incensing Moscow as well as ethnic Russians in Ukraine. 

On 16 February 2022, the Russian parliament adopted a resolution requesting Putin to recognise Donetsk and Lugansk. This agreement was signed on 21 February 2022 and followed by a request to deploy armed forces. Inevitably the conflict dynamics have escalated. 

While some believe themselves to be immune to the conflict, economists warn that it will have far-reaching global consequences as armed conflict tends to disrupt supply chains and increase the price of food and gas. They predict a further increase in oil prices per barrel as Russia is the world’s largest natural gas exporter and the second largest exporter of crude oil. This is important as oil prices directly impact transportation, logistics, and air freights. On Thursday, 24 February, global oil prices past $105 per barrel warranting these predictions. In addition, Russia is the world’s largest supplier of palladium, a material used by automakers for catalytic converters and to clean car exhaust fumes, a delay which would affect auto production. It is worth noting that Ukraine is a major provider of wheat, corn, and barley. A lack of yellow maize, or even a slowdown in production, could result in an increase of meat prices. 

Exports and sanctions 

Combined, Russia and Ukraine export more than a third of the world’s wheat and 20% of its maize. They also account for 80% of global sunflower oil exports. They supply all major international buyers, as well as many emerging markets. In 2020, 90% of the African continent’s $4 billion agricultural imports from Russia were wheat and 6% sunflower oil. South Africa does not produce enough wheat and is heavily reliant on imports from these countries. It imported more than 30% of its wheat from these two countries over the past five years. 

Western states have announced a coordinated series of sanctions aimed at Russian elites; however, critics warn that they may be ineffective as the country’s economy is large enough to absorb even the most severe sanctions. Its central bank has more than $630 billon in foreign reserves and gold. Its sovereign wealth accounts for an additional $190 billion. Russian debt accounts for a mere 20% of its gross domestic product (GDP). 

The European Commission’s president, Ursula Von der Leyen, states that the bloc would target Russia’s energy sector by preventing European companies from providing Russia with the technology needed to upgrade its refineries. The US Department of Treasury has committed itself to prevent Russia’s state-owned Gazprom from raising money to fund its projects in the US. It is worth noting that Russia and Ukraine’s imports and exports to the US account for less than 1%, while Europe and Russia are interdependent. The EU needs Russian gas, while Russia needs the EU’s money. Some warn that the EU’s decision could be detrimental as it receives over a third of its natural gas from Russia. This is used for home heating and energy generation. These fears were intensified when the natural gas price in Europe increased by 62% on 24 February. It is believed that Russia has been preparing for economic isolation for years and that it could better absorb the sanctions than Europe’s ability to reduce its dependence on Russia’s oil, gas, and coal. Despite all these, Gazprom announced that its gas exports to Europe were continuing as normal. 

While the world watches with bated breath as the conflict rages there are some promising signs. Russian and Ukrainian delegates are currently meeting on the border with Belarus to start a dialogue and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called on Israel to serve as a mediator between himself and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Let us pray that reason prevails.

News Archive

CR Swart Memorial Lecture: Mr Cecil le Fleur
2006-08-08

Khoe and San call for government to speed up policy dialogue with indigenous communities  

 Mr Cecil le Fleur, leader of the National Khoe-San Consultative Conference and member of the executive management of the National Khoe-San Council, has called for a national policy on indigenous peoples to protect the human rights and special needs of indigenous people in South Africa.

 Mr Le Fleur delivered the 38th CR Swart Memorial Lecture on the Khoe and San at the University of the Free State (UFS).  He commended the UFS for its serious approach to the Khoe and San and for initiating initiatives such as a research project on the Griqua in which various aspects linked to language, -culture, -history, - leadership, their role in the South African community (past and present) and the conservation of their historical cultural heritages will be covered.   

 “The policy dialogue with indigenous communities initiated by government in 1999 and supported by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), has been exceedingly slow, owing to political and bureaucratic problems,” said Mr Le Fleur.

 According to Mr Le Fleur the slow pace is also impacting negatively on the United Nations’ efforts to expand the international standards and mechanisms for human rights so as to include the special needs of indigenous peoples.

 “The successful adoption of a South African policy would probably have a major impact on the human rights culture of Africa and, more specifically, on the UN system,” he said.

 “South Africa has a powerful moral authority internationally and is willing to use this authority in multilateral forums. At this stage, however, South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) may not take an official position on UN instruments and declarations pertaining to indigenous issues, until the Cabinet has resolved its own domestic policy position,” he said. 

 According to Mr le Fleur it therefore came as a great surprise when the DFA brought out a positive vote in the UN for the adoption of the "Draft Declaration on the Rights of indigenous Peoples" in June this year, even before the completion of the policy process. 

 Policy consolidation in South Africa is the primary key to creating a new policy climate in Africa in order to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.  “The existing constitution of the Republic of South Africa is one of the most liberal on the continent, and embraces the concept of redress of past discrimination.  It already includes a clause (Section 6) making provision for the protection of language rights for Khoe and San peoples - the fist peoples of southern Africa,” he said. 

 “If South Africa can effectively integrate this ‘third generation’ of collective rights within an existing democratic constitution, this will send a clear message to Africa and the world that indigenous rights are a necessary component of human and civil rights in modern democracies,” he said.

 Mr Le Fleur proposed an institutional framework based on set principles that would satisfy the needs and aspirations of the Griqua and other first indigenous peoples in South Africa.  “The proposed framework was based on the notion of vulnerability as a result of colonialism and apartheid, which stripped us of our indigenous identity, cultural identity and pride as people.  This injustice can hardly be addressed within the existing mechanisms provided by the current text of the Constitution,” he said.

 Mr Le Fleur also proposed that the principles of unique first-nation status, as recognised in international law, should be applied in the construction of the framework of the constitutional accommodation for the Khoe and San. 

 Mr Le Fleur further proposed that the Khoe and San’s indigenous status in constitutional terms must be separate from the constitutional acknowledgement of their status as a cultural community, as envisaged in sections 185 and 186 of the Constitution of 1996.

 According to Mr Le Fleur, the suggested mechanism should make provision for structures such as:

  •  A statutory representative council for First Indigenous Peoples of South Africa at a national level;
  • a separate Joint Standing Committee on Indigenous and Traditional Affairs, in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces on which the Khoe and San can be represented;
  • a representative structure for the Khoe and San in the legislature of each relevant province; and
  • ex officio membership in the relevant structures of local government.

Media release
Issued by: Lacea Loader
Media Representative
Tel:   (051) 401-2584
Cell:  083 645 2454
E-mail:  loaderl.stg@mail.uovs.ac.za 
24 August 2006


- Full lecture
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