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21 September 2022 | Story Dr Olivia Kunguma. | Photo Supplied
Dr Olivia Kunguma
Dr Olivia Kunguma, left, and Dr Mmaphaka Tau from DiMTEC.

Opinion article by Dr Olivia Kunguma, Disaster Management Training and Education Centre for Africa, University of the Free State, and Dr Mmaphaka Tau, Managing Director: Resilience 4 Development Institute (Pty) Ltd.


On 11 September 2022 a tailings dam wall collapsed at the abandoned Jagersfontein diamond mine in the Free State’s Kopanong Local Municipality, unleashing a thick grey sludge. 

The mine is in the Xhariep District Municipality, which is home to about 5 800 people. Following the dam burst, more than 400 people were affected, 51 houses were destroyed, and critical infrastructure was affected. 

The dam burst at the mine, which was established in the 1800s and to date has been owned by several mine moguls, led to serious devastation in the community. Within hours of the event the media had already dubbed it the “Jagersfontein disaster”. 

But the media cannot loosely report it as a “disaster”. It is not the appropriate classification according to the Disaster Management Act. There is a need for governing institutions and their legislation to be respected and recognised, as this will improve on governance. South Africa has good policies, but implementation is, in certain areas, lacking. Hereunder, we note that there is inappropriate use of terminology, which depicts the inadequate understanding of the disaster risk management function.

What is a disaster?

The DMA defines a “disaster” as a progressive, sudden, widespread, natural, or man-made occurrence that causes or threatens to cause death, disease or injury, damage to the environment, and disruption of life. According to the Act, it is of a magnitude that “exceeds the ability of those affected by the disaster to cope with its effects using only their resources”. At the international level, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) developed a terminology guide that aims to promote a common understanding and usage of disaster management concepts. It assists the authorities and the public (in this case, by “public” we refer mainly to the media) in educating the populace.

For the dam burst to be termed a “disaster”, several steps must be adhered to within South African jurisprudence: 

The National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) must first assess the magnitude and severity of the event, and then classify it as a local, provincial, or national disaster. This assessment also considers the provisions of Section 2 (1)(b) of the DMA, stating that the Act does not apply to an occurrence that can be dealt with in terms of other legislation. The rationale of the above is that the National Disaster Management Framework of 2005 (NDMF) provides that disaster management plans must be developed by relevant organs of states and other entities, who are the custodians of certain hazards or activities to manage disaster risks in their areas of legislative responsibility. For example, mining-related activities are the responsibility of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy. This department’s mission is clear: to regulate, transform and promote the mineral and energy sectors. 

Since the event or incident occurred in a local sphere of government (Kopanong Local Municipality), it can then be classified as a local disaster subject to the satisfaction of the provisions of Section 2(1)(b). According to Section 23(4) of the DMA, an event can be classified as a “local disaster” if it affects a single local metropole, district, or municipality, and that entity can deal with the event effectively. The district municipality and the local municipality are responsible for the coordination and management of the local disaster. 

If the event has not been declared as a local state of disaster, other existing legislation, contingency arrangements, or by-laws can guide the management of the event in line with the appropriate contingency arrangements. Other government spheres and state organs can still assist with the management of the event in line with the applicable disaster risk management plans called for under the National Disaster Management Frameworks. 


Dr Mmaphaka Tau 

Of critical importance and aligned to the thrust of the District Development Model is the provision of Section 54 (4) of the DMA, which asserts that “irrespective of whether a local state of disaster has been declared in terms of section 55, a national or provincial organ of state, or another municipality or municipal organs of state are not precluded from providing assistance to a municipality to deal with a local disaster and its consequences”. 

In the same way, and on the strength of section 23 of the DMA, suppose the event has been classified as a local disaster: there are added benefits to dealing with the occurrence, especially in the face of a lack of robust disaster risk management plans and the dearth of disaster risk management implementation capacity both for coordination (by Disaster Management Centres) and mainstreaming (by relevant organs of state and other entities). In that case, the municipal council may declare a local state of disaster by notice in the provincial gazette (See Section 55 of the DMA).

The disaster declaration will then provide for measures such as, but not limited to:
• Available resources such as facilities, vehicles, and funding are released; 
• Personnel of the organs of the state are released to render emergency services; 
• Evacuation of the affected population to temporary shelters;
• The regulation of movement;
• The dissemination of information; 
• The maintenance and/or installation of temporary lines of communication; and 
• The suspension of or limiting of alcohol in disaster-stricken areas.
Therefore, until all the above processes have been followed, the Jagersfontein dam burst can only be termed a “disaster” without the ability to apply the above measures.

Who is responsible, and how can we move forward?

Jagersfontein Developments (Pty) Ltd owns the mine, implying that it should be their primary responsibility, as the asset owner, to actively contribute to the management of the occurrence of an incident. Even the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, rightfully stated that the responsibility of compensating affected individuals would be placed on the mine owners. According to the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 and its regulations, “the employer must take reasonable measures to ensure that no person is injured as a result of the failure of any dam wall”. It was reported that the company was warned of the tailings exceeding the authorised waste volumes. But the company did not attend to the warning. It is also assumed that the company is aware of the policies, legislation and standards they should adhere to, such as the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM), which strives to achieve the goals of zero harm to people and the environment, mine safety, and to mitigate catastrophic failure through tailings management. Fortunately, the company has taken full responsibility and has accepted liability. They have also refrained from calling Jagersfontein a ‘mine’, opting to call it a “processing facility”. Perhaps this also has legal implications. 

Nonetheless, besides the company taking full responsibility, the government must also play its part and make sure that policies, legislation, standards, etc. are implemented, and that there is full compliance. 
They cannot wait for a catastrophic event to occur and then start pointing fingers. This scenario calls for an embracing of the principles and practices of risk-informed development, which calls for an understanding of development that considers multi-faceted, dynamic, interdependent, transboundary, simultaneous, and systemic risks. It thus describes a shift in mindset – across sectors and stakeholders – from managing single hazards to incorporating existing and future risks in all development processes from the outset, and therefore choosing development pathways that prevent the creation of risks. The Jagersfontein case study is a classic case of an ignored Risk Informed Development (RID) approach, which is gravely regrettable.

The limited understanding of the various stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, and the misinterpretation of important terminology, call for robust capacity development programmes driven by the National Disaster Management Centre in collaboration with Provincial and Municipal Disaster Management Centres. There is also a palpable need for a firm implementation of Priority 1 (Understanding Disaster Risk) of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which states that policies and practices for disaster management should be based on an understanding of risks in all dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard characteristics, and the environment. 

News Archive

Media: Sunday Times
2006-05-20

Sunday Times, 4 June 2006

True leadership may mean admitting disunity
 

In this edited extract from the inaugural King Moshoeshoe Memorial Lecture at the University of the Free State, Professor Njabulo S Ndebele explores the leadership challenges facing South Africa

RECENT events have created a sense that we are undergoing a serious crisis of leadership in our new democracy. An increasing number of highly intelligent, sensitive and committed South Africans, across class, racial and cultural spectrums, confess to feeling uncertain and vulnerable as never before since 1994.

When indomitable optimists confess to having a sense of things unhinging, the misery of anxiety spreads. We have the sense that events are spiralling out of control and that no one among the leadership of the country seems to have a definitive handle on things.

There can be nothing more debilitating than a generalised and undefined sense of anxiety in the body politic. It breeds conspiracies and fear.

There is an impression that a very complex society has developed, in the last few years, a rather simple, centralised governance mechanism in the hope that delivery can be better and more quickly driven. The complexity of governance then gets located within a single structure of authority rather than in the devolved structures envisaged in the Constitution, which should interact with one another continuously, and in response to their specific settings, to achieve defined goals. Collapse in a single structure of authority, because there is no robust backup, can be catastrophic.

The autonomy of devolved structures presents itself as an impediment only when visionary cohesion collapses. Where such cohesion is strong, the impediment is only illusory, particularly when it encourages healthy competition, for example, among the provinces, or where a province develops a character that is not necessarily autonomous politically but rather distinctive and a special source of regional pride. Such competition brings vibrancy to the country. It does not necessarily challenge the centre.

Devolved autonomy is vital in the interests of sustainable governance. The failure of various structures to actualise their constitutionally defined roles should not be attributed to the failure of the prescribed governance mechanism. It is too early to say that what we have has not worked. The only viable corrective will be in our ability to be robust in identifying the problems and dealing with them concertedly.

We have never had social cohesion in South Africa — certainly not since the Natives’ Land Act of 1913. What we definitely have had over the decades is a mobilising vision. Could it be that the mobilising vision, mistaken for social cohesion, is cracking under the weight of the reality and extent of social reconstruction, and that the legitimate framework for debating these problems is collapsing? If that is so, are we witnessing a cumulative failure of leadership?

I am making a descriptive rather than an evaluative inquiry. I do not believe that there is any single entity to be blamed. It is simply that we may be a country in search of another line of approach. What will it be?

I would like to suggest two avenues of approach — an inclusive model and a counter-intuitive model of leadership.

In an inclusive approach, leadership is exercised not only by those who have been put in some position of power to steer an organisation or institution. Leadership is what all of us do when we express, sincerely, our deepest feelings and thoughts; when we do our work, whatever it is, with passion and integrity.

Counter-intuitive leadership lies in the ability of leaders to read a problematic situation, assess probable outcomes and then recognise that those outcomes will only compound the problem. Genuine leadership, in this sense, requires going against probability in seeking unexpected outcomes. That’s what happened when we avoided a civil war and ended up with an “unexpected” democracy.

Right now, we may very well hear desperate calls for unity, when the counter-intuitive imperative would be to acknowledge disunity. A declaration of unity where it manifestly does not appear to exist will fail to reassure.

Many within the “broad alliance” might have the view that the mobilising vision of old may have transformed into a strategy of executive steering with a disposition towards an expectation of compliance. No matter how compelling the reasons for that tendency, it may be seen as part of a cumulative process in which popular notions of democratic governance are apparently undermined and devalued; and where public uncertainty in the midst of seeming crisis induces fear which could freeze public thinking at a time when more voices ought to be heard.

Could it be that part of the problem is that we are unable to deal with the notion of opposition? We are horrified that any of us could be seen to have become “the opposition”. The word has been demonised. In reality, it is time we began to anticipate the arrival of a moment when there is no longer a single, overwhelmingly dominant political force as is currently the case. Such is the course of history. The measure of the maturity of the current political environment will be in how it can create conditions that anticipate that moment rather than seek to prevent it. We see here once more the essential creativity of the counter-intuitive imperative.

This is the formidable challenge of a popular post-apartheid political movement. Can it conceptually anticipate a future when it is no longer overwhelmingly in control, in the form in which it is currently, and resist, counter-intuitively, the temptation to prevent such an eventuality? Successfully resisting such an option would enable its current vision and its ultimate legacy to our country to manifest in different articulations, which then contend for social influence. In this way, the vision never really dies; it simply evolves into higher, more complex forms of itself. Consider the metaphor of flying ants replicating the ant community by establishing new ones.

We may certainly experience the meaning of comradeship differently, where we will now have “comrades on the other side”.

Any political movement that imagines itself as a perpetual entity should look at the compelling evidence of history. Few movements have survived those defining moments when they should have been more elastic, and that because they were not, did not live to see the next day.

I believe we may have reached a moment not fundamentally different from the sobering, yet uplifting and vision-making, nation-building realities that led to Kempton Park in the early ’90s. The difference between then and now is that the black majority is not facing white compatriots across the negotiating table. Rather, it is facing itself: perhaps really for the first time since 1994. Could we apply to ourselves the same degree of inventiveness and rigorous negotiation we displayed leading up to the adoption or our Constitution?

This is not a time for repeating old platitudes. It is the time, once more, for vision.

In the total scheme of things, the outcome could be as disastrous as it could be formative and uplifting, setting in place the conditions for a true renaissance that could be sustained for generations to come.

Ndebele is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town and author of the novel The Cry of Winnie Mandela

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