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21 September 2022 | Story Dr Olivia Kunguma. | Photo Supplied
Dr Olivia Kunguma
Dr Olivia Kunguma, left, and Dr Mmaphaka Tau from DiMTEC.

Opinion article by Dr Olivia Kunguma, Disaster Management Training and Education Centre for Africa, University of the Free State, and Dr Mmaphaka Tau, Managing Director: Resilience 4 Development Institute (Pty) Ltd.


On 11 September 2022 a tailings dam wall collapsed at the abandoned Jagersfontein diamond mine in the Free State’s Kopanong Local Municipality, unleashing a thick grey sludge. 

The mine is in the Xhariep District Municipality, which is home to about 5 800 people. Following the dam burst, more than 400 people were affected, 51 houses were destroyed, and critical infrastructure was affected. 

The dam burst at the mine, which was established in the 1800s and to date has been owned by several mine moguls, led to serious devastation in the community. Within hours of the event the media had already dubbed it the “Jagersfontein disaster”. 

But the media cannot loosely report it as a “disaster”. It is not the appropriate classification according to the Disaster Management Act. There is a need for governing institutions and their legislation to be respected and recognised, as this will improve on governance. South Africa has good policies, but implementation is, in certain areas, lacking. Hereunder, we note that there is inappropriate use of terminology, which depicts the inadequate understanding of the disaster risk management function.

What is a disaster?

The DMA defines a “disaster” as a progressive, sudden, widespread, natural, or man-made occurrence that causes or threatens to cause death, disease or injury, damage to the environment, and disruption of life. According to the Act, it is of a magnitude that “exceeds the ability of those affected by the disaster to cope with its effects using only their resources”. At the international level, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) developed a terminology guide that aims to promote a common understanding and usage of disaster management concepts. It assists the authorities and the public (in this case, by “public” we refer mainly to the media) in educating the populace.

For the dam burst to be termed a “disaster”, several steps must be adhered to within South African jurisprudence: 

The National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) must first assess the magnitude and severity of the event, and then classify it as a local, provincial, or national disaster. This assessment also considers the provisions of Section 2 (1)(b) of the DMA, stating that the Act does not apply to an occurrence that can be dealt with in terms of other legislation. The rationale of the above is that the National Disaster Management Framework of 2005 (NDMF) provides that disaster management plans must be developed by relevant organs of states and other entities, who are the custodians of certain hazards or activities to manage disaster risks in their areas of legislative responsibility. For example, mining-related activities are the responsibility of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy. This department’s mission is clear: to regulate, transform and promote the mineral and energy sectors. 

Since the event or incident occurred in a local sphere of government (Kopanong Local Municipality), it can then be classified as a local disaster subject to the satisfaction of the provisions of Section 2(1)(b). According to Section 23(4) of the DMA, an event can be classified as a “local disaster” if it affects a single local metropole, district, or municipality, and that entity can deal with the event effectively. The district municipality and the local municipality are responsible for the coordination and management of the local disaster. 

If the event has not been declared as a local state of disaster, other existing legislation, contingency arrangements, or by-laws can guide the management of the event in line with the appropriate contingency arrangements. Other government spheres and state organs can still assist with the management of the event in line with the applicable disaster risk management plans called for under the National Disaster Management Frameworks. 


Dr Mmaphaka Tau 

Of critical importance and aligned to the thrust of the District Development Model is the provision of Section 54 (4) of the DMA, which asserts that “irrespective of whether a local state of disaster has been declared in terms of section 55, a national or provincial organ of state, or another municipality or municipal organs of state are not precluded from providing assistance to a municipality to deal with a local disaster and its consequences”. 

In the same way, and on the strength of section 23 of the DMA, suppose the event has been classified as a local disaster: there are added benefits to dealing with the occurrence, especially in the face of a lack of robust disaster risk management plans and the dearth of disaster risk management implementation capacity both for coordination (by Disaster Management Centres) and mainstreaming (by relevant organs of state and other entities). In that case, the municipal council may declare a local state of disaster by notice in the provincial gazette (See Section 55 of the DMA).

The disaster declaration will then provide for measures such as, but not limited to:
• Available resources such as facilities, vehicles, and funding are released; 
• Personnel of the organs of the state are released to render emergency services; 
• Evacuation of the affected population to temporary shelters;
• The regulation of movement;
• The dissemination of information; 
• The maintenance and/or installation of temporary lines of communication; and 
• The suspension of or limiting of alcohol in disaster-stricken areas.
Therefore, until all the above processes have been followed, the Jagersfontein dam burst can only be termed a “disaster” without the ability to apply the above measures.

Who is responsible, and how can we move forward?

Jagersfontein Developments (Pty) Ltd owns the mine, implying that it should be their primary responsibility, as the asset owner, to actively contribute to the management of the occurrence of an incident. Even the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, rightfully stated that the responsibility of compensating affected individuals would be placed on the mine owners. According to the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 and its regulations, “the employer must take reasonable measures to ensure that no person is injured as a result of the failure of any dam wall”. It was reported that the company was warned of the tailings exceeding the authorised waste volumes. But the company did not attend to the warning. It is also assumed that the company is aware of the policies, legislation and standards they should adhere to, such as the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM), which strives to achieve the goals of zero harm to people and the environment, mine safety, and to mitigate catastrophic failure through tailings management. Fortunately, the company has taken full responsibility and has accepted liability. They have also refrained from calling Jagersfontein a ‘mine’, opting to call it a “processing facility”. Perhaps this also has legal implications. 

Nonetheless, besides the company taking full responsibility, the government must also play its part and make sure that policies, legislation, standards, etc. are implemented, and that there is full compliance. 
They cannot wait for a catastrophic event to occur and then start pointing fingers. This scenario calls for an embracing of the principles and practices of risk-informed development, which calls for an understanding of development that considers multi-faceted, dynamic, interdependent, transboundary, simultaneous, and systemic risks. It thus describes a shift in mindset – across sectors and stakeholders – from managing single hazards to incorporating existing and future risks in all development processes from the outset, and therefore choosing development pathways that prevent the creation of risks. The Jagersfontein case study is a classic case of an ignored Risk Informed Development (RID) approach, which is gravely regrettable.

The limited understanding of the various stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, and the misinterpretation of important terminology, call for robust capacity development programmes driven by the National Disaster Management Centre in collaboration with Provincial and Municipal Disaster Management Centres. There is also a palpable need for a firm implementation of Priority 1 (Understanding Disaster Risk) of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which states that policies and practices for disaster management should be based on an understanding of risks in all dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard characteristics, and the environment. 

News Archive

Power interruptions: Information for internal communication
2008-01-31

As part of the UFS’s commitment to address load shedding, the management would like to communicate the following:

The UFS mainly deals with the power interruptions by way of (a) the possible installation of equipment (e.g. generators) and (b) operational arrangements to ensure the functioning of the UFS in spite of power interruptions.

During the past week progress was made on both fronts. The information that follows resulted from a meeting of a task team of Physical Resources led by Mr Nico Janse van Rensburg, which took place on Monday 28 January (this task team naturally focuses on physical solutions) and a discussion by Exco on Wednesday 30 January 2008. Exco discussed the recommendations of the mentioned task team in respect of physical aspects, as well as the operational arrangements proposed by faculties.

Physical solutions

A Main Campus

1. New emergency power installations already approved:

Last week Exco gave its approval for the design and installation of emergency power equipment in all the large lecture-hall complexes to proceed immediately.

In all these cases

  • load surveys have been completed and a start has been made with the ordering of equipment and the process of appointing contractors. (Exco approved the adjustment of normal tender procedures in an attempt to expedite completion.)
  • generators with 20-30% more capacity than required for the current load are being ordered.
  • provision is being made for the connection of lights and at least one wall plug to the emergency power.
  • the expected construction time is 16 weeks (except in the case of the Flippie Groenewoud Building where it is 6 weeks).

The above-mentioned concerns lecture halls/ venues in the following buildings: Examination Centre, Flippie Groenewoud Building, Stabilis, Genmin and the Agriculture Building.

As far as the Agriculture Building is concerned, a larger generator (larger than required for lecture venues only) is being ordered in view of simultaneously providing essential research equipment (refrigerators, ovens, glasshouses) with emergency power within 16 weeks.

2. Investigation into the optimal utilisation of present emergency power installations

All the emergency power systems are being investigated on the basis of a list compiled in 2006 to determine whether excess capacity is available and whether it is possible to connect additional essential equipment or lights to it.

The electrical engineer warns as follows:
“Staff members must under no circumstances overload present emergency power points.

A typical example of this is a laboratory with 10 power points of which 2 points are emergency power outlets. Normally a fridge and freezer would, for example, be plugged into the two emergency power points, but now, with long load-shedding interruptions, a considerably larger number of appliances are being plugged into the power point by means of multi-sockets and extension cords. In the end the effect of such connections will accumulate at the emergency generator, which will then create a greater danger of it being overloaded and tripping, in other words, no emergency power will then be available.”

3. Requests and needs addressed directly to Physical Resources or reported to Exco via the line managers.

All the physical needs and requests addressed directly to Physical Resources or submitted to Exco via the line managers are being listed, classified and considered technically in view of their being discussed by the task team on Monday 11 February.
The information will (a) lead to recommendations to Exco regarding possible additional urgent emergency power installations, and (b) be used in the comprehensive investigation into the UFS’s preparedness for and management of long power interruptions.

Requests that can easily be complied with immediately and that fit into the general strategy will indeed be dealt with as soon as possible.

4. Purchase of loose-standing equipment: light, small, loose-standing generators, UPSs as solutions to/ aids during power interruptions

Exco approved that

a) faculties and support services accept responsibility themselves for the funding and purchase of loose equipment such as, for example battery lights, should they regard these as essential.
b) UPSs (uninterruptible power supplies) that faculties and support services wish to purchase to combat the detrimental effect of unexpected power interruptions on computer equipment) can (as at present) be purchased from own funds via Computer Services.
c) UPSs (uninterruptible power supplies) that faculties and support services wish to purchase to combat the detrimental effect of unexpected power interruptions on other types of equipment can normally be purchased from own funds with the consent of the line manager concerned.
Note: Please just make sure of the appropriateness of the equipment for a specific situation: it is not a power supply that can bridge a two-hour power interruption.)
d) small, loose-standing generators can be purchased from own funds via Physical Resources and installed under their supervision.
e) laptop computers can , where necessary, be purchased from own budgets. The availability of second-hand laptop computers must be taken into account.

B Vista

No major problems have been reported to date. The situation is being monitored and will be managed according to need. The same guidelines that apply to the Main Campus will naturally also apply to the Vista Campus.

C Qwaqwa

The situation is receiving attentions and solutions have already been found for most problems.

D General

1. All-inclusive project
A comprehensive investigation into the UFS’s preparedness for and management of long power interruptions will be launched as soon as possible. Available capacity will be utilised first to alleviate the immediate need. The needs assessment to which all faculties and support services have already contributed is already an important building block of the larger project.

2. Building and construction projects currently in the planning and implementation phase
The need for emergency power for projects such as the new Computer Laboratory is being investigated proactively and will be addressed in a suitable manner.

3. Liaison with Centlec
Attempts at direct and continuous liaison are continuing in an attempt to accommodate the unique needs of the UFS.

4. HESA meeting and liaison with other universities
A representative of the UFS will attend a meeting of all higher education institutions on 11 February. The meeting is being arranged by HESA (Higher Education South Africa) to discuss the implications for the sector, the management of risks and the sector’s response to government.

5. Internal communication
It is the intention to communicate internally after every meeting of the task team, which will take place on Mondays. Strategic Communication will assist in this regard.


 

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