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14 February 2023 | Story Prof Sethulego Matebesi | Photo Sonia Small
Prof Sethulego Matebesi
Prof Sethulego Matebesi is an Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology at the University of the Free State (UFS).

Opinion article by Prof Sethulego Matebesi, Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology, University of the Free State.
A maxim says it is not enough to know that people have made mistakes; we need to understand why they made the mistakes if we hope to prevent them or others from making the same mistakes.

While South Africans are still trying to make sense of the many lofty promises made about measures to deal with the catastrophic energy crisis over the past four years, unsurprisingly, the restoration of energy security also dominated the 2023 State of the Nation Address (SONA).

Still, the reasons behind the failure of past intervention measures and progress with restructuring the state’s energy utility, Eskom, remain a mystery.

There is enough cause for concern over Eskom’s stance that an ageing fleet of coal-fired power stations that consistently break down is one of the reasons for load shedding. What happened to planning? No wonder the need to achieve quick success in resolving the energy crisis has placed a premium on maintaining citizens’ trust. As a result, the government proposed new initiatives to address the insecurity of the electricity supply by declaring a state of emergency to avert a complete blackout and appointing a new Minister of Electricity within the presidency to lead the government’s short-term energy crisis response. 

President Cyril Ramaphosa has already indicated that the criticism of the Minister of Electricity’s position is misguided. In other words, from the government’s perspective, the impact of its decisions does not matter. To South African citizens, however, it matters a great deal as they have borne the burden of load shedding and the rising cost of living. Above all, those who can cushion the blow of the energy crisis will want to see that the maximum value for public money is achieved.

The energy crisis has been the subject of fierce arguments over the past few years. So too, have deliberations on the government’s capability to deal with the crisis. And although the precise impact of the state of disaster, which began with immediate effect after its announcement in the SONA, cannot be determined at this stage, it is not premature to believe that the energy crisis will become a high-stake bidding game during the 2024 general elections. 

From the responses of the African National Congress (ANC) parliamentarians and alliance partners, one gets the sense that they sincerely wish there could have been a less dramatic option for the electricity minister, who has been touted to serve merely as a project manager.

Disastrous decisions are a recipe for catastrophic events

There has never been a time in South African history since 1994 that our presidents have not faced one scandal or another. After having temporarily thwarted the Phala Phala saga and emerging victorious as leader of the ANC at the 55th National Conference in December 2022, one would assume that President Ramaphosa would have assimilated the lessons from past events.

The post-SONA 2023 political landscape points to a challenging year for Ramaphosa. It is a truism that an organisation’s culture is determined by its leader. And since politics is not an exercise in objectivity, it is for this reason that several expected decisions by President Ramaphosa will determine how he will navigate between being regarded as a heroic figure and a victim of political persecution.

Objectively, it is hard not to agree with critics that a state of emergency will open the floodgates of collusion and corruption, which are distinct problems within South African public procurement. At this point, one wonders if this is not yet another gimmick to extend the patronage network of the presidency.

Another major decision facing President Ramaphosa is the much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle. Deputy President David Mabuza’s announcement that he resigned, only to be asked by the presidency to hang on, provides fascinating insight into how difficult it can become to exercise what some may regard as the mundane task of replacing cabinet ministers. And looking at the organisational footprint of the ANC, I reckon President Ramaphosa will avoid a situation where a cabinet reshuffle becomes another political hot potato from within his own organisation.

There is a fierce power war waging within the ANC. As a result, time will tell whether the president will be brave enough to replace poor-performing ministers instead of using proxies such as the new Minister of Energy. 

And to be clear – why we fail to confront underperforming ministers and public servants is a vexing question.

Indications are that there seems to be no aversion to brevity when it comes to political expediency, but to live up to the responsibility of accelerating structural reforms that significantly impact the country’s growth trajectory positively and reduce policy uncertainty. Continuing to routinely neglect these obligations is bound to create a more extensive trust gap between the government and citizens.

News Archive

Q and A with Prof Hussein Solomon on ‘Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa’
2015-05-29

 

Political Science lecturer, Prof Hussein Solomon, has launched his latest book, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: fighting insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram, on Wednesday 26 May 2015 at the UFS.

In his book, Solomon talks about the growing terrorist threat in Africa, with the likes of Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine, and Boko Haram exploiting Africa's vulnerabilities to expand their operations. Explaining both the limitations of current counter-terrorist strategies and possible future improvements, this timely study can be appreciated by scholars and practitioners alike.

Q: If you speak of Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine, and Boko Haram expanding operations, do you see possibilities for their expansion even into South Africa, or is expansion mainly focused on northern African countries?
 
A: All three movements are operating out of their respective countries. Al Shabaab has attacked Kenya and Uganda and tried to attack the 2010 Soccer World Cup in South Africa. So yes, there is a danger that they are here and, more importantly, newer groups like ISIS are recruiting in SA already.
 
Q: If the traditional military response is ineffective, what would be a better approach then?

 
A:
What is important is that the force of arms needs to complement the force of ideas. What is being waged is an ideological battle, and, just as the West defeated Communism ideologically in the Cold War, we need to defeat radical Islamism ideologically. In addition, the military response needs to complement the governance and development responses.
 
Q: External players like the US have insufficient knowledge of the context, what would be the knowledge about context necessary for anyone concerned about the terror problem in Africa?
 
A: Allow me to give you some examples. The US trains African militaries to fight terrorist groups, but, when they return to their countries, they stage a coup and topple the civilian government. The US does not seem to understand that arming a predatory military and training them makes them more predatory and brutal, which results in civilians being recruited by terrorists, as happened in Mali. Similarly, the US sent arms to the Somali government, and members of that government sold those arms to Al Shabaab terrorists, the very people they were supposed to fight. So the Americans do not understand the criminalisation of the African state, which undermines good governance and promotes terrorism.

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