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14 February 2023 | Story Prof Sethulego Matebesi | Photo Sonia Small
Prof Sethulego Matebesi
Prof Sethulego Matebesi is an Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology at the University of the Free State (UFS).

Opinion article by Prof Sethulego Matebesi, Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology, University of the Free State.
A maxim says it is not enough to know that people have made mistakes; we need to understand why they made the mistakes if we hope to prevent them or others from making the same mistakes.

While South Africans are still trying to make sense of the many lofty promises made about measures to deal with the catastrophic energy crisis over the past four years, unsurprisingly, the restoration of energy security also dominated the 2023 State of the Nation Address (SONA).

Still, the reasons behind the failure of past intervention measures and progress with restructuring the state’s energy utility, Eskom, remain a mystery.

There is enough cause for concern over Eskom’s stance that an ageing fleet of coal-fired power stations that consistently break down is one of the reasons for load shedding. What happened to planning? No wonder the need to achieve quick success in resolving the energy crisis has placed a premium on maintaining citizens’ trust. As a result, the government proposed new initiatives to address the insecurity of the electricity supply by declaring a state of emergency to avert a complete blackout and appointing a new Minister of Electricity within the presidency to lead the government’s short-term energy crisis response. 

President Cyril Ramaphosa has already indicated that the criticism of the Minister of Electricity’s position is misguided. In other words, from the government’s perspective, the impact of its decisions does not matter. To South African citizens, however, it matters a great deal as they have borne the burden of load shedding and the rising cost of living. Above all, those who can cushion the blow of the energy crisis will want to see that the maximum value for public money is achieved.

The energy crisis has been the subject of fierce arguments over the past few years. So too, have deliberations on the government’s capability to deal with the crisis. And although the precise impact of the state of disaster, which began with immediate effect after its announcement in the SONA, cannot be determined at this stage, it is not premature to believe that the energy crisis will become a high-stake bidding game during the 2024 general elections. 

From the responses of the African National Congress (ANC) parliamentarians and alliance partners, one gets the sense that they sincerely wish there could have been a less dramatic option for the electricity minister, who has been touted to serve merely as a project manager.

Disastrous decisions are a recipe for catastrophic events

There has never been a time in South African history since 1994 that our presidents have not faced one scandal or another. After having temporarily thwarted the Phala Phala saga and emerging victorious as leader of the ANC at the 55th National Conference in December 2022, one would assume that President Ramaphosa would have assimilated the lessons from past events.

The post-SONA 2023 political landscape points to a challenging year for Ramaphosa. It is a truism that an organisation’s culture is determined by its leader. And since politics is not an exercise in objectivity, it is for this reason that several expected decisions by President Ramaphosa will determine how he will navigate between being regarded as a heroic figure and a victim of political persecution.

Objectively, it is hard not to agree with critics that a state of emergency will open the floodgates of collusion and corruption, which are distinct problems within South African public procurement. At this point, one wonders if this is not yet another gimmick to extend the patronage network of the presidency.

Another major decision facing President Ramaphosa is the much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle. Deputy President David Mabuza’s announcement that he resigned, only to be asked by the presidency to hang on, provides fascinating insight into how difficult it can become to exercise what some may regard as the mundane task of replacing cabinet ministers. And looking at the organisational footprint of the ANC, I reckon President Ramaphosa will avoid a situation where a cabinet reshuffle becomes another political hot potato from within his own organisation.

There is a fierce power war waging within the ANC. As a result, time will tell whether the president will be brave enough to replace poor-performing ministers instead of using proxies such as the new Minister of Energy. 

And to be clear – why we fail to confront underperforming ministers and public servants is a vexing question.

Indications are that there seems to be no aversion to brevity when it comes to political expediency, but to live up to the responsibility of accelerating structural reforms that significantly impact the country’s growth trajectory positively and reduce policy uncertainty. Continuing to routinely neglect these obligations is bound to create a more extensive trust gap between the government and citizens.

News Archive

Expert in Africa Studies debunks African middle class myth
2016-05-10

Description: Prof Henning Melber Tags: Prof Henning Melber

From left: Prof Heidi Hudson, Director of the Centre for Africa Studies (CAS), Joe Besigye from the Institute of Reconciliation and Social Justice, and Prof Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor at the CAS and guest lecturer for the day.
Photo: Valentino Ndaba

Until recently, think tanks from North America, the African Development Bank, United Nations Development Plan, and global economists have defined the African middle class based purely on monetary arithmetic. One of the claims made in the past is that anyone with a consumption power of $2 per day constitutes the middle class. Following this, if poverty is defined as monetary income below $1.5 a day, it means that it takes just half a dollar to reach the threshold considered as African middle class.

Prof Henning Melber highlighted the disparities in the notion of a growing African middle class in a guest lecture titled A critical anatomy of the African middle class(es), hosted by our Centre for Africa Studies (CAS) at the University of the Free State on 4 May 2016. He is an Extraordinary Professor at the Centre, as well as Senior Adviser and Director Emeritus of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Sweden.

Prof Melber argued that it is misleading to consider only income when identifying the middle class. In his opinion, such views were advanced by promoters of the global neo-liberal project. “My suspicion is that those who promote the middle class  discourse in that way, based on such a low threshold, were desperate to look for the success story that testifies to Africa rising.”

Another pitfall of such a middle-class analysis is its ahistorical contextualisation. This economically-reduced notion of the class is a sheer distortion. Prof Melber advised analysts to take cognisance of factors, such as consumption patterns, lifestyle, and political affiliation, amongst others.

In his second lecture for the day, Prof Melber dealt withthe topic of: Namibia since independence: the limits to Liberation, painting the historical backdrop against which the country’s current government is consolidating its political hegemony. He highlighted examples of the limited transformation that has been achieved since Namibia’s independence in 1990.

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