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13 December 2024 Photo Supplied
Dr Solomon Chibaya
Dr Solomon Chibaya, lecturer in the Department of Education Management, Policy, and Comparative Education, University of the Free State.

Opinion article by Dr Solomon Chibaya, lecturer in the Department of Education Management, Policy, and Comparative Education, University of the Free State.


Friday 13 December 2024 marks a crucial moment in South African education law. All stakeholders are awaiting the decision regarding implementation of the contentious sections 4 and 5 of the Basic Education Amendment Bill. After President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the Bill into law, he delayed implementation of the sections on language and admission policies for three months. This was meant to allow for consultation on proposals for resolving the conflicts around the contested sections.

The main issue around the language and admission policies is that the Bela Act allows the provincial heads of departments to have the final say on these policies after the school governing bodies (SGBs) have developed them. Some SGBs see this as their powers being usurped, which contradicts the democratisation of school governance. However, cases in which the powers of SGBs have been abused in ways that led to exclusionary language and admission policies presents the need for oversight of these critical school policies.

Friday 13 December 2024 is the deadline for the resolution.

One cannot avoid thinking about the implications of the different possible outcomes of the decision beyond 13 December. The president could approve the Act without any changes, or clauses 4 and 5 could be returned to the National Assembly for reworking.

If approved

If the Act is to be approved with the two contentious clauses in their current form, there will be a barrage of court cases from opponents of the decision. Over the past few months preceding the signing of the Bela Bill and after it was signed on 13 September 2024, the DA, AfriForum and other lobby groups have promised to take the matter to court. In such a scenario, all parties must prepare themselves for long, vicious and contentious court battles that have enormous implications for the political context defined by the Government of National Unity (GNU).

What will add further fuel to the fire is that at the helm of the department in which the Act is being debated is a DA minister, Minister Siviwe Gwarube. Will she toe the line and follow the law as expected by her office? Or will she follow the direction of her political party, which has been clear about how much it abhors the Act, especially in relation to its current form? She could find herself in the firing line.

If approved in its current form, beyond 13 December 2024, the Act will appease proponents who have been clear about their support for it. Proponents of the Bela Act, such as the ANC (which has been campaigning for it to be embraced by all), SADTU (which on countless matches in support of the Act and have even threatened the president with litigation if they do not get their way), and other political parties like the EFF and the MK Party will be vilified. Considering this, the country’s polarisation is apparent and is a potential and real threat to the GNU/coalition.

If sent back

The DA, AfriForum, and other lobby groups, especially those who want clauses 4 and 5 overhauled, will celebrate, but only for a moment. At least they can battle against the Act’s current form in the National Assembly. Rather than the rigour and expenses surrounding litigation, the different sides must now use their different lawmakers to make a case for them.

The results from the last votes on the BELAB held on 16 May 2024 showed that 223 votes were in favour of and 78 votes against the bill. If these results are anything to go by, there is little change the National Assembly would make to the Act. It will boil down to votes, and the scale will be lopsided. We will be heading for litigation and threats.

At the centre of this is the child whose best interest we are supposed to looking out for. Beyond Friday 13 December 2024, our focus will move away from the child to the National Assembly, the courtrooms, the never-say-no law firms. All eyes will be on the political space. 

News Archive

Academic delivers inaugural lecture on South African foreign policy
2007-08-06

 

In her inaugural lecture Prof. Heidi Hudson from the Department of Political Sciences, focused on the impact that Pan-Africanist sentiments have had on South Africa’s foreign policy. She also put the resulting contradictions and ambiguities into context. At her inaugural lecture were, from the left: Proff. Frederick Fourie (Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the UFS), Heidi Hudson, Engela Pretorius (Vice-Dean: Faculty of The Humanities) and Daan Wessels (Research Associate in the Department of Political Science).
Photo: Stephen Collett

Academic delivers inaugural lecture on South African foreign policy

“We are committed to full participation as an equal partner … opposed to any efforts which might seek to project South Africa as some kind of superpower on our continent. … the people of Africa share a common destiny and must therefore … address their challenges … as a united force...” (Mbeki 1998:198-199).

Prof. Heidi Hudson from the Department of Political Science referred to this statement made by president Mbeki (made at the opening of the OAU Conference of Ministers of Information in 1995) when she delivered her inaugural lecture on the topic: South African foreign policy: The politics of Pan-Africanism and pragmatism.

One of the questions she asked is: “Can the South African state deliver democracy and welfare at home while simultaneously creating a stable, rules-based African community?”

She answers: “South Africa needs to reflect more critically and honestly on the dualism inherent in its ideological assumptions regarding relations with Africa. South Africa will always be expected by some to play a leadership role in Africa. At the moment, South Africa’s desire to be liked is hampering its role as leader of the continent.”

In her lecture she highlighted the ideological underpinnings and manifestations of South Africa’s foreign policy. Throughout she alluded to the risks associated with single-mindedly following an ideologically driven foreign policy. She emphasised that domestic or national interests are the victims in this process.

Prof. Hudson offers three broad options for South Africa to consider:

  • The Predator – the selfish bully promoting South African economic interest.
  • Mr Nice Guy – the non-hegemonic partner of the African boys club, multilaterally pursuing a pivotal but not dominant role.
  • The Hegemon - South Africa driving regional integration according to its values and favouring some African countries over others, and with checks and balances by civil society.

She chooses option three of hegemony. “Politically correct research views hegemony as bad and partnership as good. This is a romanticised notion – the two are not mutually exclusive,” she said.

However, she states that there have to be prerequisites to control the exercise of power. “The promotion of a counter-hegemon, such as Nigeria, is necessary. Nigeria has been more effective in some respects than South Africa in establishing its leadership, particularly in West Africa. Also needed is that government should be checked by civil society to avoid it sinking into authoritarianism. The case of business and labour coming to an agreement over the HIV/Aids issue is a positive example which illustrates that government cannot ignore civil society. But much more needs to be done in this regard. South Africa must also be very careful in how it uses its aid and should focus potential aid and development projects more explicitly in terms of promoting political stability,” she said.

Prof. Hudson said: “It is also questionable whether Mbeki’s Afro-centrism has in fact promoted the interests of ordinary citizens across Africa. Instead, elite interests in some countries have benefited. But ultimately, the single most important cost is the damage done to the moral code and ethical principles on which the South African Constitution and democracy is founded.

“In the end we all lose out. More pragmatism and less ideology in our relations within Africa may just be what are needed,” she said.

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