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The SANDF is shaken: Now is the time to revisit its mandate and means

10 February 2025 Photo Supplied

Opinion article by Prof Theo Neethling, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State.

In recent days, 14 South African soldiers have died in clashes with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Several analysts argue that this marks a low point for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and that it is almost too late to implement the reforms needed to restore the military to an institution South Africans can once again take pride in. The incident recalls the so-called Battle of Bangui in March 2013 during the Central African Republic civil war — a major defeat for the SANDF that led to the Séléka rebels seizing control of the country.

This article aims to shed light on the challenges facing the South African military.

Following the historic transition of 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy shifted from a stance of conflict with its neighbours to one centred on regional relations built on the principles of common destiny, friendship, cooperation, and conflict resolution. The South African government sought to take on a leadership role on the continent, creating new opportunities for the SANDF as a military instrument.

Towards the end of the Mandela presidency, South Africa’s involvement in peace and security operations became a defining feature of its post-1994 foreign policy. The government demonstrated its firm commitment to regional stability by deploying the SANDF in peacekeeping operations — first in Lesotho in 1998, followed by the DRC in 1999 and Burundi in 2001.

Dwindling defence budget

However, since 1998 it became evident that the SANDF found it increasingly difficult to conduct operations as a declining budget started to constrain the SANDF. This is linked to the fact that between 1995 and 1998, the defence budget was cut by 11.1%, which eventually resulted in a growing mismatch between policy intent and execution. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) South African defence spending had been reduced to less than 3% in the mid-1990s, which boiled down to less than 10% of total government spending. The defence budget then further decreased to 1.54% of GDP in 2004/05 and levelled out in 2014/15 at around 1.2% to 1.1% of GDP.

Despite a dwindling defence budget, the government increasingly expected the SANDF to support the SAPS as murder and death rates rose to levels comparable to — or in some cases even exceeding — those in high-intensity war zones internationally. This has placed the SANDF in an almost impossible position, forced to balance its demanding regional deployments with ongoing appeals from politicians and the public to intervene in crime-ridden hotspots where the SAPS is unable to fulfil its constitutional duty to protect South Africans.

Given these constraints and the changing global and regional geopolitical landscape in which the SANDF operated, the government appointed a task team to draft a second defence review, following the South African Defence Review of 1998, which was finally published as the 2015 South African Defence Review. The task team made it clear that the decrease in funding levels was highly problematic, and that inadequate funding would eventually severely compromise the defence capabilities of the SANDF. They emphasised that the government had to decide on one of two options: approving a greater budget allocation to the SANDF or alternatively opting for a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the budget allocation. One thing was clear: South Africa’s spending was low in terms of comparative international military spending practice. Since 2015 defence spending in South Africa has declined even further to about 0.7% of GDP, which is way below the international norm of more or less 2% of GDP.

Despite its budgetary challenges, in 2023, the SANDF was the fifth largest troop-contributing nation in the UN’s operation in the eastern DRC and played a key role in the SADC operation against insurgents in northern Mozambique from 2021 to 2024. However, considering the history of SANDF operations, a major problem is that the SANDF’s deployments tend to be open-ended, resulting in protracted deployments with serious implications for the defence budget. Moreover, there is no plan to either opt for an adequate defence budget on the one hand, or to scale down the level of political ambition on the other.

It should also be noted that border protection and support for the South African Police Service (SAPS) in internal operations have become increasingly important and demanding in the SANDF’s activities and responsibilities and can even be regarded as among its primary functions. However, a major concern is that the SANDF is too often used as a stopgap in South Africa’s domestic security landscape — hindering its ability to function as a professional, well-equipped armed force with a clear mandate.

For instance, in 2023, politicians called on the SANDF to assist in combating violence linked to zama zamas after the government deployed soldiers in large numbers to curb illegal mining activities. Even local communities expect the government to utilise the SANDF internally, adding pressure on the state to consider such deployments. In this context, the SANDF has little choice but to respond to political calls to assist the SAPS in maintaining internal security. Another recent example of internal deployment was the government’s decision in 2023 to deploy the SANDF to safeguard the coal power plants of South Africa’s major power utility, Eskom.

In conclusion, it should be clear from the above that there is a significant mismatch between what is expected of the SANDF at the political level and its budget and capabilities. The challenge for the SANDF is that defence remains central to its raison d’être, yet it must also be ready to respond to political calls for assistance in peace and security operations across the continent. Additionally, the SANDF is expected to support the SAPS in providing security services in a crime-ridden and fragile South African society — all while operating on a budget of approximately 0.7% of the country’s GDP. It is therefore no surprise that the SANDF is often described as institutionally overstretched and has, in fact, been in a state of ongoing decline for some time.

Critics can rightly argue that the South African government has shown little to no political will to address the SANDF’s financial challenges over the past two decades, contributing to the difficulties its members face in defending themselves against the M23 rebels in the DRC. At the same time, growing fiscal pressures and severe socio-economic challenges leave the government in a weak position to significantly increase the defence budget. Be that as it may, the SANDF’s troubles in the DRC mark a low point for the institution. Perhaps now is the time to reassess both its mandate and funding, particularly in light of the persistent gap between political expectations and available resources.

News Archive

Media: ANC can learn a lesson from Moshoeshoe

2006-05-20

27/05/2006 20:32 - (SA)
ANC can learn a lesson from Moshoeshoe
ON 2004, the University of the Free State turned 100 years old. As part of its centenary celebrations, the idea of the Moshoeshoe Memorial Lecture was mooted as part of another idea: to promote the study of the meaning of Moshoeshoe.

This lecture comes at a critical point in South Africa's still-new democracy. There are indications that the value of public engagement that Moshoeshoe prized highly through his lipitso [community gatherings], and now also a prized feature in our democracy, may be under serious threat. It is for this reason that I would like to dedicate this lecture to all those in our country and elsewhere who daily or weekly, or however frequently, have had the courage to express their considered opinions on pressing matters facing our society. They may be columnists, editors, commentators, artists of all kinds, academics and writers of letters to the editor, non-violent protesters with their placards and cartoonists who put a mirror in front of our eyes.

There is a remarkable story of how Moshoeshoe dealt with Mzilikazi, the aggressor who attacked Thaba Bosiu and failed. So when Mzilikazi retreated from Thaba Bosiu with a bruised ego after failing to take over the mountain, Moshoeshoe, in an unexpected turn of events, sent him cattle to return home bruised but grateful for the generosity of a victorious target of his aggression. At least he would not starve along the way. It was a devastating act of magnanimity which signalled a phenomenal role change.

"If only you had asked," Moshoeshoe seemed to be saying, "I could have given you some cattle. Have them anyway."

It was impossible for Mzilikazi not to have felt ashamed. At the same time, he could still present himself to his people as one who was so feared that even in defeat he was given cattle. At any rate, he never returned.

I look at our situation in South Africa and find that the wisdom of Moshoeshoe's method produced one of the defining moments that led to South Africa's momentous transition to democracy. Part of Nelson Mandela's legacy is precisely this: what I have called counter-intuitive leadership and the immense possibilities it offers for re-imagining whole societies.

A number of events in the past 12 months have made me wonder whether we are faced with a new situation that may have arisen. An increasing number of highly intelligent, sensitive and highly committed South Africans across the class, racial and cultural spectrum confess to feeling uncertain and vulnerable as never before since 1994. When indomitable optimists confess to having a sense of things unhinging, the misery of anxiety spreads. It must have something to do with an accumulation of events that convey the sense of impending implosion. It is the sense that events are spiralling out of control and no one among the leadership of the country seems to have a handle on things.

I should mention the one event that has dominated the national scene continuously for many months now. It is, of course, the trying events around the recent trial and acquittal of Jacob Zuma. The aftermath continues to dominate the news and public discourse. What, really, have we learnt or are learning from it all? It is probably too early to tell. Yet the drama seems far from over, promising to keep us all without relief, and in a state of anguish. It seems poised to reveal more faultlines in our national life than answers and solutions.

We need a mechanism that will affirm the different positions of the contestants validating their honesty in a way that will give the public confidence that real solutions are possible. It is this kind of openness, which never comes easily, that leads to breakthrough solutions, of the kind Moshoeshoe's wisdom symbolises.

Who will take this courageous step? What is clear is that a complex democracy like South Africa's cannot survive a single authority. Only multiple authorities within a constitutional framework have a real chance. I want to press this matter further.

Could it be that part of the problem is that we are unable to deal with the notion of "opposition". We are horrified that any of us could become "the opposition". In reality, it is time we began to anticipate the arrival of a moment when there was no longer a single [overwhelmingly] dominant political force as is currently the case. Such is the course of change. The measure of the maturity of the current political environment will be in how it can create conditions that anticipate that moment rather than ones that seek to prevent it. This is the formidable challenge of a popular post-apartheid political movement.

Can it conceptually anticipate a future when it is no longer overwhelmingly in control, in the form in which it currently is and resist, counter-intuitively, the temptation to prevent such an eventuality? Successfully resisting such an option would enable its current vision and its ultimate legacy to our country to manifest itself in different articulations of itself, which then contend for social influence.

In this way, the vision never really dies, it simply evolves into higher, more complex forms of itself. If the resulting versions are what is called "the opposition" that should not be such a bad thing - unless we want to invent another name for it. The image of flying ants going off to start other similar settlements is not so inappropriate.

I do not wish to suggest that the nuptial flights of the alliance partners are about to occur: only that it is a mark of leadership foresight to anticipate them conceptually. Any political movement that has visions of itself as a perpetual entity should look at the compelling evidence of history. Few have survived those defining moments when they should have been more elastic, and that because they were not, did not live to see the next day.

I believe we may have reached a moment not fundamentally different from the sobering, yet uplifting and vision-making, nation-building realities that led to Kempton Park in the early 1990s. The difference between then and now is that the black majority is not facing white compatriots across the negotiating table. Rather, it is facing itself: perhaps really for the first time since 1994. It is not a time for repeating old platitudes. Could we apply to ourselves the same degree of inventiveness and rigorous negotiation we displayed up to the adoption or our Constitution?

Morena Moshoeshoe faced similarly formative challenges. He seems to have been a great listener. No problem was too insignificant that it could not be addressed. He seems to have networked actively across the spectrum of society. He seems to have kept a close eye on the world beyond Lesotho, forming strong friendships and alliances, weighing his options constantly. He seems to have had patience and forbearance. He had tons of data before him before he could propose the unexpected. He tells us across the years that moments of renewal demand no less.

This is an editied version of the inaugural Moshoeshoe Memorial Lecture presented by Univeristy of Cape Town vice-chancellor Professor Ndebele at the University of the Free State on Thursday. Perspectives on Leadership Challenges In South Africa

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