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10 February 2025 Photo Supplied
Prof Theo Neethling
Prof Theo Neethling is from the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State.

Opinion article by Prof Theo Neethling, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State.


In recent days, 14 South African soldiers have died in clashes with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Several analysts argue that this marks a low point for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and that it is almost too late to implement the reforms needed to restore the military to an institution South Africans can once again take pride in. The incident recalls the so-called Battle of Bangui in March 2013 during the Central African Republic civil war — a major defeat for the SANDF that led to the Séléka rebels seizing control of the country.

This article aims to shed light on the challenges facing the South African military.

Following the historic transition of 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy shifted from a stance of conflict with its neighbours to one centred on regional relations built on the principles of common destiny, friendship, cooperation, and conflict resolution. The South African government sought to take on a leadership role on the continent, creating new opportunities for the SANDF as a military instrument.

Towards the end of the Mandela presidency, South Africa’s involvement in peace and security operations became a defining feature of its post-1994 foreign policy. The government demonstrated its firm commitment to regional stability by deploying the SANDF in peacekeeping operations — first in Lesotho in 1998, followed by the DRC in 1999 and Burundi in 2001.

Dwindling defence budget

However, since 1998 it became evident that the SANDF found it increasingly difficult to conduct operations as a declining budget started to constrain the SANDF. This is linked to the fact that between 1995 and 1998, the defence budget was cut by 11.1%, which eventually resulted in a growing mismatch between policy intent and execution. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) South African defence spending had been reduced to less than 3% in the mid-1990s, which boiled down to less than 10% of total government spending. The defence budget then further decreased to 1.54% of GDP in 2004/05 and levelled out in 2014/15 at around 1.2% to 1.1% of GDP.

Despite a dwindling defence budget, the government increasingly expected the SANDF to support the SAPS as murder and death rates rose to levels comparable to — or in some cases even exceeding — those in high-intensity war zones internationally. This has placed the SANDF in an almost impossible position, forced to balance its demanding regional deployments with ongoing appeals from politicians and the public to intervene in crime-ridden hotspots where the SAPS is unable to fulfil its constitutional duty to protect South Africans.

Given these constraints and the changing global and regional geopolitical landscape in which the SANDF operated, the government appointed a task team to draft a second defence review, following the South African Defence Review of 1998, which was finally published as the 2015 South African Defence Review. The task team made it clear that the decrease in funding levels was highly problematic, and that inadequate funding would eventually severely compromise the defence capabilities of the SANDF. They emphasised that the government had to decide on one of two options: approving a greater budget allocation to the SANDF or alternatively opting for a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the budget allocation. One thing was clear: South Africa’s spending was low in terms of comparative international military spending practice. Since 2015 defence spending in South Africa has declined even further to about 0.7% of GDP, which is way below the international norm of more or less 2% of GDP.

Despite its budgetary challenges, in 2023, the SANDF was the fifth largest troop-contributing nation in the UN’s operation in the eastern DRC and played a key role in the SADC operation against insurgents in northern Mozambique from 2021 to 2024. However, considering the history of SANDF operations, a major problem is that the SANDF’s deployments tend to be open-ended, resulting in protracted deployments with serious implications for the defence budget. Moreover, there is no plan to either opt for an adequate defence budget on the one hand, or to scale down the level of political ambition on the other.

It should also be noted that border protection and support for the South African Police Service (SAPS) in internal operations have become increasingly important and demanding in the SANDF’s activities and responsibilities and can even be regarded as among its primary functions. However, a major concern is that the SANDF is too often used as a stopgap in South Africa’s domestic security landscape — hindering its ability to function as a professional, well-equipped armed force with a clear mandate.

For instance, in 2023, politicians called on the SANDF to assist in combating violence linked to zama zamas after the government deployed soldiers in large numbers to curb illegal mining activities. Even local communities expect the government to utilise the SANDF internally, adding pressure on the state to consider such deployments. In this context, the SANDF has little choice but to respond to political calls to assist the SAPS in maintaining internal security. Another recent example of internal deployment was the government’s decision in 2023 to deploy the SANDF to safeguard the coal power plants of South Africa’s major power utility, Eskom.

In conclusion, it should be clear from the above that there is a significant mismatch between what is expected of the SANDF at the political level and its budget and capabilities. The challenge for the SANDF is that defence remains central to its raison d’être, yet it must also be ready to respond to political calls for assistance in peace and security operations across the continent. Additionally, the SANDF is expected to support the SAPS in providing security services in a crime-ridden and fragile South African society — all while operating on a budget of approximately 0.7% of the country’s GDP. It is therefore no surprise that the SANDF is often described as institutionally overstretched and has, in fact, been in a state of ongoing decline for some time.

Critics can rightly argue that the South African government has shown little to no political will to address the SANDF’s financial challenges over the past two decades, contributing to the difficulties its members face in defending themselves against the M23 rebels in the DRC. At the same time, growing fiscal pressures and severe socio-economic challenges leave the government in a weak position to significantly increase the defence budget. Be that as it may, the SANDF’s troubles in the DRC mark a low point for the institution. Perhaps now is the time to reassess both its mandate and funding, particularly in light of the persistent gap between political expectations and available resources.

News Archive

Position statement: Recent reporting in newspapers
2014-10-03

 

You may have read reports in two Afrikaans newspapers, regarding recent events at the University of the Free State (UFS). Sadly, those reports are inaccurate, one-sided, exaggerated and based not on facts, but on rumour, gossip and unusually personal attacks on members of the university management.

Anyone who spends 10 minutes on our Bloemfontein Campus would wonder what the so-called ‘crisis’ is about.

We are left with no choice other than to consider legal action, as well as the intervention of the South African Press Ombudsman, among other steps, to protect the good name of the institution and the reputation of its staff. No journalist has the right to launch personal and damaging attacks on a university and its personnel, whatever his or her motives, without being fair and factual. In this respect, the newspapers have a case to answer.

But here are the facts in relation to the reports:

  1. No staff member, whether junior or senior, is ever suspended without hard evidence in hand. Such actions are rare, and when done, are preceded by careful reviews of our Human Resource Policies, labour legislation and both internal and external legal advice. Then, and only then, is a suspension affected. A suspension, moreover, does not mean you are guilty and is a precautionary action to allow for the disciplinary investigation and process to be conducted, especially where there is a serious case to answer.
  2. At no stage was the Registrar instructed to leave the university; this is patently false and yet reported as fact. We specifically responded to the media that the Registrar does outstanding work for the university and that it is our intention for him to remain as our Registrar through the end of his contract in 2016.
  3. The Rector does not make decisions by himself. Senior persons, from the position of Dean, upwards, are appointed by statutory and other senior committees of the university and finally approved by Council. No rector can override the decision of a senior committee, and this has not happened at the UFS even in cases where the Rector serves as Chair of that committee. The impression of heavy-handed management at the top insults all our committee structures, including the Institutional Forum – the widest and most inclusive of stakeholder bodies at a university – which reports directly to Council on fairness and compliance of selection processes.
  4. In the case of senior appointments, Council makes the final decision. Council fully supports the actions taken on senior appointments, including a recent senior suspension. The fact that one Council member resigns just before the end of his term, whatever the real reason for this action, does not deter from the fact that the full Council in its last sitting approved the major staffing decisions brought before it. The image therefore that the two newspapers try to create of great turmoil and distress at the university, is completely unfounded.

Even if we wanted to, the university obviously cannot provide details about staffing decisions, especially disciplinary actions in process, since the rights of individuals should be protected in terms of the Human Resource Policies and procedures of the UFS. But that does not give any newspaper the right to speculate or state as fact that which is based on rumour or gossip, or to slander senior personnel of the university. For these reasons, we have been forced to seek legal remedy and correction as a matter of urgency.

Make no mistake, underlying much of the criticism of the university has been a distress about transformation at the UFS; in particular, the perception is created that white colleagues are losing their jobs. The evidence points in the opposite direction. Our progress with equity has been slow and we lag far behind most of the former white universities; that is a fact. More than 90% of our professors are white; most of our senior appointments at professorial level and as heads of department are still overwhelmingly white. Reasonable South Africans would agree that our transformation still has a long way to go and only the mean-spirited would contend otherwise. But based on the two Afrikaans newspaper reports, an impression is left of the aggressive rooting out of white colleagues.

In the past few years the academic standard of the university has significantly improved. We now have the highest academic pass rates in years, in part because we raised the academic standards for admission four years ago. We now have the highest rate of research publications, and among the highest national publication rate of scholarly books, in the history of the UFS. We have one of the most stable financial situations of any university in South Africa, with a strong balance sheet and growing financial reserves way beyond what we had before. We now attract top professors from around the country and other parts of the world, and we have the highest number of rated researchers, through the National Research Foundation, than ever before. And after the constant turmoil of a number of years ago, we now have one of the most stable campuses in South Africa. Those are the facts.

The UFS is also regarded around the world as a university that has become a model of transformation and reconciliation in the student body. The elections of our Student Representative Council are only the most visible example of how far we have come in our leadership diversity. Not a week goes by in which other universities, nationally and abroad, do not come to Kovsies to consult with us on how they can learn from us and deepen their own transformations, especially among students.

Rather than focus on what more than one senior journalist, in reference to the article in Rapport of 21 September 2014, rightly called ‘a hatchet job’ on persons and the university, here are the objective findings of a recent survey of UFS stakeholders: 92% endorse our values; 77% agree with our transformation; 78% believe we are inclusive; and 78% applaud our overall reputation index.  Those are very different numbers from a few years ago when the institution was in crisis.

This is our commitment to all our stakeholders: we will continue our model of inclusive transformation which provides opportunities for study and for employment for all South Africans, including international students and colleagues. We remain committed to our parallel-medium instruction in which Afrikaans remains a language of instruction; we are in fact the only medical school in the country that offers dual education and training in both Afrikaans and English for our students - not only English. We provide bursaries and overseas study opportunities to all our students, irrespective of race. And our ‘future professors’ programme is richly diverse as we seek the academic stars of the future.

We are not perfect as a university management or community. Where we make mistakes, we acknowledge them and try to do better the next time round. But we remain steadfast in our goal of making the UFS a top world university in its academic ambitions and its human commitments.

END

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