Opinion article by Prof Theo Neethling, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State.
In recent days, 14 South African soldiers have died in clashes with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Several analysts argue that this marks a low point for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and that it is almost too late to implement the reforms needed to restore the military to an institution South Africans can once again take pride in. The incident recalls the so-called Battle of Bangui in March 2013 during the Central African Republic civil war — a major defeat for the SANDF that led to the Séléka rebels seizing control of the country.
This article aims to shed light on the challenges facing the South African military.
Following the historic transition of 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy shifted from a stance of conflict with its neighbours to one centred on regional relations built on the principles of common destiny, friendship, cooperation, and conflict resolution. The South African government sought to take on a leadership role on the continent, creating new opportunities for the SANDF as a military instrument.
Towards the end of the Mandela presidency, South Africa’s involvement in peace and security operations became a defining feature of its post-1994 foreign policy. The government demonstrated its firm commitment to regional stability by deploying the SANDF in peacekeeping operations — first in Lesotho in 1998, followed by the DRC in 1999 and Burundi in 2001.
Dwindling defence budget
However, since 1998 it became evident that the SANDF found it increasingly difficult to conduct operations as a declining budget started to constrain the SANDF. This is linked to the fact that between 1995 and 1998, the defence budget was cut by 11.1%, which eventually resulted in a growing mismatch between policy intent and execution. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) South African defence spending had been reduced to less than 3% in the mid-1990s, which boiled down to less than 10% of total government spending. The defence budget then further decreased to 1.54% of GDP in 2004/05 and levelled out in 2014/15 at around 1.2% to 1.1% of GDP.
Despite a dwindling defence budget, the government increasingly expected the SANDF to support the SAPS as murder and death rates rose to levels comparable to — or in some cases even exceeding — those in high-intensity war zones internationally. This has placed the SANDF in an almost impossible position, forced to balance its demanding regional deployments with ongoing appeals from politicians and the public to intervene in crime-ridden hotspots where the SAPS is unable to fulfil its constitutional duty to protect South Africans.
Given these constraints and the changing global and regional geopolitical landscape in which the SANDF operated, the government appointed a task team to draft a second defence review, following the South African Defence Review of 1998, which was finally published as the 2015 South African Defence Review. The task team made it clear that the decrease in funding levels was highly problematic, and that inadequate funding would eventually severely compromise the defence capabilities of the SANDF. They emphasised that the government had to decide on one of two options: approving a greater budget allocation to the SANDF or alternatively opting for a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the budget allocation. One thing was clear: South Africa’s spending was low in terms of comparative international military spending practice. Since 2015 defence spending in South Africa has declined even further to about 0.7% of GDP, which is way below the international norm of more or less 2% of GDP.
Despite its budgetary challenges, in 2023, the SANDF was the fifth largest troop-contributing nation in the UN’s operation in the eastern DRC and played a key role in the SADC operation against insurgents in northern Mozambique from 2021 to 2024. However, considering the history of SANDF operations, a major problem is that the SANDF’s deployments tend to be open-ended, resulting in protracted deployments with serious implications for the defence budget. Moreover, there is no plan to either opt for an adequate defence budget on the one hand, or to scale down the level of political ambition on the other.
It should also be noted that border protection and support for the South African Police Service (SAPS) in internal operations have become increasingly important and demanding in the SANDF’s activities and responsibilities and can even be regarded as among its primary functions. However, a major concern is that the SANDF is too often used as a stopgap in South Africa’s domestic security landscape — hindering its ability to function as a professional, well-equipped armed force with a clear mandate.
For instance, in 2023, politicians called on the SANDF to assist in combating violence linked to zama zamas after the government deployed soldiers in large numbers to curb illegal mining activities. Even local communities expect the government to utilise the SANDF internally, adding pressure on the state to consider such deployments. In this context, the SANDF has little choice but to respond to political calls to assist the SAPS in maintaining internal security. Another recent example of internal deployment was the government’s decision in 2023 to deploy the SANDF to safeguard the coal power plants of South Africa’s major power utility, Eskom.
In conclusion, it should be clear from the above that there is a significant mismatch between what is expected of the SANDF at the political level and its budget and capabilities. The challenge for the SANDF is that defence remains central to its raison d’être, yet it must also be ready to respond to political calls for assistance in peace and security operations across the continent. Additionally, the SANDF is expected to support the SAPS in providing security services in a crime-ridden and fragile South African society — all while operating on a budget of approximately 0.7% of the country’s GDP. It is therefore no surprise that the SANDF is often described as institutionally overstretched and has, in fact, been in a state of ongoing decline for some time.
Critics can rightly argue that the South African government has shown little to no political will to address the SANDF’s financial challenges over the past two decades, contributing to the difficulties its members face in defending themselves against the M23 rebels in the DRC. At the same time, growing fiscal pressures and severe socio-economic challenges leave the government in a weak position to significantly increase the defence budget. Be that as it may, the SANDF’s troubles in the DRC mark a low point for the institution. Perhaps now is the time to reassess both its mandate and funding, particularly in light of the persistent gap between political expectations and available resources.