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Budget Speech Opinion 2025
Dr Ambrosé du Plessis and Terrance Molobela, Lecturers in the Department of Public Administration and Management, University of the Free State.

Opinion article by Dr Ambrosé du Plessis and Terrance Molobela, lecturers from the Department of Public Administration and Management, University of the Free State.


The mechanistic administrative cog stemming from the sixth administration, through which policy development and implementation took place, has created a false sense of reality regarding the African National Congress (ANC)’s authoritative position in South Africa’s political landscape. The notion that the ANC remains the central political force in the country is increasingly proving to be a fallacy, especially in the face of the changing dynamics within the so-called Government of National Unity (GNU). Even though President Cyril Ramaphosa dutifully signed off on key legislative acts such as the National Health Insurance (NHI), the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA), and the Expropriation acts, the ANC, and indeed the broader GNU, have grossly underestimated the complexities of coalition politics.

One of the clearest illustrations of this miscalculation was the latest budget ‘negotiations’, which exposed the growing fractures within the governing coalition. With the budget tabled just two hours before presentation, it became evident that the coalition parties – especially the ANC – are facing a harsh political reality. In a move that has shocked GNU parties, the decision to raise value-added tax (VAT) by 2% has turned into a bone of contention. This cutthroat measure, aimed at generating an additional R58 billion, has sparked fierce opposition from within the very government it seeks to support. The bitter VAT debate has led to a near standstill in the budget process, with some GNU parties staunchly opposing it, while others view it as a necessary evil.


New can of worms

The proposal to raise VAT is indicative of a deeper issue. It is, quite frankly, a regressive measure in an economy already battling a cost-of-living crisis. Raising VAT disproportionately impacts the lower and middle classes, who spend a higher percentage of their income on consumption. This move is naïve at best. VAT might raise substantial sums, but it does little to stimulate the economy or promote productivity, both of which are sorely needed to grow South Africa’s GDP and reverse the country’s economic downturn. At this moment in time, the country cannot afford to further burden a shrinking tax base.

In addition, the VAT conundrum has opened a new can of worms. The Democratic Alliance’s (DA) publicly proposed budget goes beyond the initial 2% VAT increase, challenging the secrecy with which the failed budget was concluded. More importantly, it questions the political and financial ideological foundation on which the initial budget was compiled by the ANC, led by Minister of Finance Enoch Godongwana. There can be no doubt that the DA’s shadow budget, particularly its cost-containment measures, has thrown a spanner in the works of a deep administrative state. At this juncture, the lingering question is – can the true Minister of Finance please step forward? With various proposed budgets from the GNU parties, one can only wonder if the GNU is now officially facing a Pinocchio dilemma. This identity crisis emerged when the ANC indicated that it would now turn to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – who also opposes the 2% VAT increase – to approve the budget, although the EFF recently rejected the call for negotiations with the ANC and considered it a general discussion. From this stance, it is clear that the coalition game will be played both within and outside the borders of the GNU.

One cannot help but ponder how divergent political ideologies and principles are affecting government expenditure and revenue collection. Gone are the days when the ANC held a dominant, almost unquestionable position in government, able to dictate the terms of the national budget. Today, the ANC's reduced majority has forced it into an awkward position of compromise and negotiation, with the Minister of Finance increasingly serving as a ceremonial figure rather than an authoritative decision-maker. In years past, the State of the Nation Address (SONA) and the subsequent budget speech were seamless events under ANC leadership. But now the budget process has become an all-consuming political battleground, with ideological differences and party interests shaping every decision.

GNU a ‘death sentence’

The ANC's once-solidified grasp on the country's governance is now being tested in ways the party never anticipated. The ruling coalition is no longer a harmonious entity, but a group of political adversaries forced into uneasy alliances for the sake of governance. The impact of this fractured cooperation is glaringly evident in the stalling of critical national decisions such as the budget. What was once a party-centred process where consensus was driven by a unified political party, has now become a multi-party endeavour marked by negotiation, delay, and endless political wrangling.

Reflecting on the experience of the 1996 Government of National Unity led by Nelson Mandela, one sees a stark contrast. Despite hostilities within the tripartite alliance, that government was still able to implement policies and drive the country forward. However, the current GNU coalition partners have yet to demonstrate a similar level of cooperation and trust. In fact, the words of former Deputy President FW de Klerk seem eerily prophetic today. In his 1996 resignation statement, De Klerk described the GNU as a ‘death sentence’ for a meaningful government consensus. He feared that continued participation in the coalition would weaken the National Party’s influence and undermine democratic governance.

In many ways, these words echo the current state of the GNU. The budget process has become a metaphor for a government on the brink of collapse. Consultation among the political parties within the GNU has become a source of paralysis rather than progress. The government’s inability to align itself on critical issues such as the national budget, which totals more than R2 trillion, raises serious questions about its ability to move forward.

The so-called marriage of inconvenience between the coalition partners appears increasingly centred on securing positions rather than creating policies to address the pressing needs of South Africa’s citizens. The budget, a document that should have been a focal point of discussion since the formation of the coalition, has been delayed until the 11th hour. This delay in addressing the country’s fiscal needs points to a broader failure within the GNU. The South African economy, already battered by years of stagnation and underperformance, cannot afford further dithering.

The contemporary GNU, much like the former one in 1996, may have reached its breaking point. The promise of multi-party democracy and consensus-based governance is being undermined by the very factions that have come together in the name of unity. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the continued negotiations around the budget have become a form of political ‘death row’ for the current administration, with no clear path forward. As South Africa teeters on the edge of a political and economic crisis, the time for a new direction, grounded in pragmatism and focused on national interests, has never been more urgent. As South Africa stands at a critical juncture, with the deadline of 12 March 2025 rapidly approaching, the political landscape is poised for a moment of truth. Reports have indicated that the cabinet has reached an agreement on the finality of the budget, but conflicting statements from political leaders, particularly from the DA, suggest that this agreement is not yet a certainty. DA leader John Steenhuisen has publicly declared that no final agreement has been reached and that the parties are still working towards a resolution. For the country, the stakes could not be higher.

This raises significant questions about the future of coalition governance and the state of South Africa's fragile political economy. Several plausible scenarios could unfold, each with distinct consequences for the political stability and economic viability of the nation.

Scenario 1: A unified agreement – A lifeline for the political economy

In the first scenario, we imagine that the cabinet's agreement is genuine, aimed at averting risks to public confidence and the broader market. If the market-driven partners within the GNU recognise the overwhelming importance of a stable budget, they may choose to align their interests. With political stability hanging in the balance, the realisation may set in that South Africa is simply ‘too big to fail.’ This would, in theory, prevent a collapse into chaos, as the GNU partners, acknowledging the nation's susceptibility to political upheaval, would avoid creating conditions for widespread instability.

While this scenario seems like the ideal outcome, history suggests that political cooperation within the GNU has often been fraught with difficulty. The question is whether these partners can truly put national interests before political rivalries.

Scenario 2: The ANC’s secret deal – A recipe for distrust?

Alternatively, there is the possibility that the African National Congress (ANC) has reached a clandestine agreement with the EFF behind the backs of their coalition partners. This scenario would fracture the GNU, erode trust, and create a toxic environment of distrust in coalition governance. If the ANC manages to secure its hold on power, it risks alienating the markets, which would likely lead to a downward economic spiral. The longer this instability persists, the more vulnerable the country will become to a potentially catastrophic collapse in investor confidence.

Scenario 3: DA’s contradiction – The death of coalition unity

In a third possible scenario, the DA contradicts the agreement reached by the cabinet, exposing the extent of disunity within the GNU. This situation would further highlight the lack of trust among coalition partners, and the DA might find itself either paralysed within the coalition, or removed entirely, or even decide to withdraw from the GNU. This shift would trigger an intense debate about South Africa’s continued political economic stability.

South Africa’s economy, already vulnerable to shocks, would find itself in even deeper turmoil if this scenario were to play out. The markets would respond negatively, and the ripple effect would undoubtedly extend to the lives of everyday South Africans.

The real impact on South Africans

Regardless of which scenario unfolds, one thing is certain: the consequences for South Africa’s citizens will be profound. The allocation of funds to government institutions, provinces, and municipalities is likely to be severely affected by any political instability. Without a clear and stable budget, public services will suffer, leading to disruption in the functioning of provincial governments and municipalities. This, in turn, would delay public spending, putting vital services at risk and exacerbating the inequalities, poverty, and unemployment that already plague the country.

News Archive

MBA Programme - Question And Answer Sheet - 27 May 2004
2004-05-27

1. WHAT MUST THE UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE (UFS) DO TO GET FULL ACCREDITATION FOR THE MBA PROGRAMMES?

According to the Council on Higher Education’s (CHE) evaluation, the three MBA programmes of the UFS clearly and significantly contribute to students’ knowledge and skills, are relevant for the workplace, are appropriately resourced and have an appropriate internal and external programme environment. These programmes are the MBA General, the MBA in Health Care Management and the MBA in Entrepreneurship.

What the Council on Higher Education did find, was a few technical and administrative issues that need to be addressed.

This is why the three MBA programmes of the UFS received conditional accreditation – which in itself is a major achievement for the UFS’s School of Management, which was only four years old at the time of the evaluation.

The following breakdown gives one a sense of the mostly administrative nature of the conditions that have to be met before full accreditation is granted by the CHE:

a. A formal forum of stakeholders: The UFS is required to establish a more structured, inclusive process of review of its MBA programmes. This is an administrative formality already in process.

b. A work allocation model: According to the CHE this is required to regulate the workload of the teaching staff, particularly as student numbers grow, rather than via standard management processes as currently done.

c. Contractual agreements with part-time staff: The UFS is required to enter into formal agreements with part-time and contractual staff as all agreements are currently done on an informal and claim-basis. This is an administrative formality already in process.

d. A formal curriculum committee: According to the CHE, the School of Management had realised the need for a structure – other than the current Faculty Board - where all MBA lecturers can deliberate on the MBA programmes, and serve as a channel for faculty input, consultation and decision-making.

e. A system of external moderators: This need was already identified by the UFS and the system is to be implemented as early as July 2004.

f. A compulsory research component: The UFS is required to introduce a research component which will include the development of research skills for the business environment. The UFS management identified this need and has approved such a component - it is to take effect from January 2005. This is an insufficient element lacking in virtually all MBA programmes in South Africa.

g. Support programmes for learners having problems with numeracy: The UFS identified this as a need for academic support among some learners and has already developed such a programme which will be implemented from January 2005.

The majority of these conditions have been satisfied already and few remaining steps will take effect soon. It is for this reason that the UFS is confident that its three MBA programmes will soon receive full accreditation.

2. WHAT ACCREDITATION DOES THE UFS HAVE FOR ITS MBA PROGRAMME?

The UFS’s School of Management received conditional accreditation for its three MBA programmes.

Two levels of accreditation are awarded to tertiary institutions for their MBA programmes, namely full accreditation and conditional accreditation. When a programme does not comply with the minimum requirements regarding a small number of criteria, conditional accreditation is given. This can be rectified during the short or medium term.

3. IS THERE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THE ACADEMIC CORE OF THE UFS’s MBA PROGRAMMES?

No. The UFS is proud of its three MBA programmes’ reputation in the market and the positive feedback it receives from graduandi and their employers.

The MBA programmes of the UFS meet most of the minimum requirements of the evaluation process.

In particular, the key element of ‘teaching and learning’, which relates to the curriculum and content of the MBA programmes, is beyond question. In other words, the core of what is being taught in our MBA programmes is sound.

4. IS THE UFS’s MBA A WORTHWHILE QUALIFICATION?

Yes. Earlier this year, the School of Management – young as it is - was rated by employers as the best smaller business school in South Africa. This was based on a survey conducted by the Professional Management Review and reported in the Sunday Times Business Times, of 25 January 2004.

The UFS is committed to maintaining these high standards of quality, not only through compliance with the requirements of the CHE, but also through implementing its own quality assurance measures.

Another way in which we benchmark the quality of our MBA programmes is through the partnerships we have formed with institutions such as the DePaul University in Chicago and Kansas State University, both in the US, as well as the Robert Schuman University in France.

For this reason the UFS appreciates and supports the work of the CHE and welcomes its specific findings regarding the three MBA programmes.

It is understandable that the MBA review has caused some nervousness – not least among current MBA students throughout the country.

However, one principle that the UFS management is committed to is this: preparing all our students for a world of challenge and change. Without any doubt the MBA programme of the UFS is a solid preparation.

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