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Budget Speech Opinion 2025
Dr Ambrosé du Plessis and Terrance Molobela, Lecturers in the Department of Public Administration and Management, University of the Free State.

Opinion article by Dr Ambrosé du Plessis and Terrance Molobela, lecturers from the Department of Public Administration and Management, University of the Free State.


The mechanistic administrative cog stemming from the sixth administration, through which policy development and implementation took place, has created a false sense of reality regarding the African National Congress (ANC)’s authoritative position in South Africa’s political landscape. The notion that the ANC remains the central political force in the country is increasingly proving to be a fallacy, especially in the face of the changing dynamics within the so-called Government of National Unity (GNU). Even though President Cyril Ramaphosa dutifully signed off on key legislative acts such as the National Health Insurance (NHI), the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA), and the Expropriation acts, the ANC, and indeed the broader GNU, have grossly underestimated the complexities of coalition politics.

One of the clearest illustrations of this miscalculation was the latest budget ‘negotiations’, which exposed the growing fractures within the governing coalition. With the budget tabled just two hours before presentation, it became evident that the coalition parties – especially the ANC – are facing a harsh political reality. In a move that has shocked GNU parties, the decision to raise value-added tax (VAT) by 2% has turned into a bone of contention. This cutthroat measure, aimed at generating an additional R58 billion, has sparked fierce opposition from within the very government it seeks to support. The bitter VAT debate has led to a near standstill in the budget process, with some GNU parties staunchly opposing it, while others view it as a necessary evil.


New can of worms

The proposal to raise VAT is indicative of a deeper issue. It is, quite frankly, a regressive measure in an economy already battling a cost-of-living crisis. Raising VAT disproportionately impacts the lower and middle classes, who spend a higher percentage of their income on consumption. This move is naïve at best. VAT might raise substantial sums, but it does little to stimulate the economy or promote productivity, both of which are sorely needed to grow South Africa’s GDP and reverse the country’s economic downturn. At this moment in time, the country cannot afford to further burden a shrinking tax base.

In addition, the VAT conundrum has opened a new can of worms. The Democratic Alliance’s (DA) publicly proposed budget goes beyond the initial 2% VAT increase, challenging the secrecy with which the failed budget was concluded. More importantly, it questions the political and financial ideological foundation on which the initial budget was compiled by the ANC, led by Minister of Finance Enoch Godongwana. There can be no doubt that the DA’s shadow budget, particularly its cost-containment measures, has thrown a spanner in the works of a deep administrative state. At this juncture, the lingering question is – can the true Minister of Finance please step forward? With various proposed budgets from the GNU parties, one can only wonder if the GNU is now officially facing a Pinocchio dilemma. This identity crisis emerged when the ANC indicated that it would now turn to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – who also opposes the 2% VAT increase – to approve the budget, although the EFF recently rejected the call for negotiations with the ANC and considered it a general discussion. From this stance, it is clear that the coalition game will be played both within and outside the borders of the GNU.

One cannot help but ponder how divergent political ideologies and principles are affecting government expenditure and revenue collection. Gone are the days when the ANC held a dominant, almost unquestionable position in government, able to dictate the terms of the national budget. Today, the ANC's reduced majority has forced it into an awkward position of compromise and negotiation, with the Minister of Finance increasingly serving as a ceremonial figure rather than an authoritative decision-maker. In years past, the State of the Nation Address (SONA) and the subsequent budget speech were seamless events under ANC leadership. But now the budget process has become an all-consuming political battleground, with ideological differences and party interests shaping every decision.

GNU a ‘death sentence’

The ANC's once-solidified grasp on the country's governance is now being tested in ways the party never anticipated. The ruling coalition is no longer a harmonious entity, but a group of political adversaries forced into uneasy alliances for the sake of governance. The impact of this fractured cooperation is glaringly evident in the stalling of critical national decisions such as the budget. What was once a party-centred process where consensus was driven by a unified political party, has now become a multi-party endeavour marked by negotiation, delay, and endless political wrangling.

Reflecting on the experience of the 1996 Government of National Unity led by Nelson Mandela, one sees a stark contrast. Despite hostilities within the tripartite alliance, that government was still able to implement policies and drive the country forward. However, the current GNU coalition partners have yet to demonstrate a similar level of cooperation and trust. In fact, the words of former Deputy President FW de Klerk seem eerily prophetic today. In his 1996 resignation statement, De Klerk described the GNU as a ‘death sentence’ for a meaningful government consensus. He feared that continued participation in the coalition would weaken the National Party’s influence and undermine democratic governance.

In many ways, these words echo the current state of the GNU. The budget process has become a metaphor for a government on the brink of collapse. Consultation among the political parties within the GNU has become a source of paralysis rather than progress. The government’s inability to align itself on critical issues such as the national budget, which totals more than R2 trillion, raises serious questions about its ability to move forward.

The so-called marriage of inconvenience between the coalition partners appears increasingly centred on securing positions rather than creating policies to address the pressing needs of South Africa’s citizens. The budget, a document that should have been a focal point of discussion since the formation of the coalition, has been delayed until the 11th hour. This delay in addressing the country’s fiscal needs points to a broader failure within the GNU. The South African economy, already battered by years of stagnation and underperformance, cannot afford further dithering.

The contemporary GNU, much like the former one in 1996, may have reached its breaking point. The promise of multi-party democracy and consensus-based governance is being undermined by the very factions that have come together in the name of unity. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the continued negotiations around the budget have become a form of political ‘death row’ for the current administration, with no clear path forward. As South Africa teeters on the edge of a political and economic crisis, the time for a new direction, grounded in pragmatism and focused on national interests, has never been more urgent. As South Africa stands at a critical juncture, with the deadline of 12 March 2025 rapidly approaching, the political landscape is poised for a moment of truth. Reports have indicated that the cabinet has reached an agreement on the finality of the budget, but conflicting statements from political leaders, particularly from the DA, suggest that this agreement is not yet a certainty. DA leader John Steenhuisen has publicly declared that no final agreement has been reached and that the parties are still working towards a resolution. For the country, the stakes could not be higher.

This raises significant questions about the future of coalition governance and the state of South Africa's fragile political economy. Several plausible scenarios could unfold, each with distinct consequences for the political stability and economic viability of the nation.

Scenario 1: A unified agreement – A lifeline for the political economy

In the first scenario, we imagine that the cabinet's agreement is genuine, aimed at averting risks to public confidence and the broader market. If the market-driven partners within the GNU recognise the overwhelming importance of a stable budget, they may choose to align their interests. With political stability hanging in the balance, the realisation may set in that South Africa is simply ‘too big to fail.’ This would, in theory, prevent a collapse into chaos, as the GNU partners, acknowledging the nation's susceptibility to political upheaval, would avoid creating conditions for widespread instability.

While this scenario seems like the ideal outcome, history suggests that political cooperation within the GNU has often been fraught with difficulty. The question is whether these partners can truly put national interests before political rivalries.

Scenario 2: The ANC’s secret deal – A recipe for distrust?

Alternatively, there is the possibility that the African National Congress (ANC) has reached a clandestine agreement with the EFF behind the backs of their coalition partners. This scenario would fracture the GNU, erode trust, and create a toxic environment of distrust in coalition governance. If the ANC manages to secure its hold on power, it risks alienating the markets, which would likely lead to a downward economic spiral. The longer this instability persists, the more vulnerable the country will become to a potentially catastrophic collapse in investor confidence.

Scenario 3: DA’s contradiction – The death of coalition unity

In a third possible scenario, the DA contradicts the agreement reached by the cabinet, exposing the extent of disunity within the GNU. This situation would further highlight the lack of trust among coalition partners, and the DA might find itself either paralysed within the coalition, or removed entirely, or even decide to withdraw from the GNU. This shift would trigger an intense debate about South Africa’s continued political economic stability.

South Africa’s economy, already vulnerable to shocks, would find itself in even deeper turmoil if this scenario were to play out. The markets would respond negatively, and the ripple effect would undoubtedly extend to the lives of everyday South Africans.

The real impact on South Africans

Regardless of which scenario unfolds, one thing is certain: the consequences for South Africa’s citizens will be profound. The allocation of funds to government institutions, provinces, and municipalities is likely to be severely affected by any political instability. Without a clear and stable budget, public services will suffer, leading to disruption in the functioning of provincial governments and municipalities. This, in turn, would delay public spending, putting vital services at risk and exacerbating the inequalities, poverty, and unemployment that already plague the country.

News Archive

The state of HIV/AIDS at the UFS
2010-05-11

“The University of the Free State (UFS) remains concerned about the threat of HIV/AIDS and will not become complacent in its efforts to combat HIV/AIDS by preventing new infections”, states Ms Estelle Heideman, Manager of the Kovsies HIV/AIDS Centre at the UFS.

She was responding to the results of a study that was done at Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in 2008. The survey was initiated by Higher Education AIDS (HEAIDS) to establish the knowledge, attitudes, behaviours and practices (KABP) related to HIV and AIDS and to measure the HIV prevalence levels among staff and students. The primary aim of this research was to develop estimates for the sector.

The study populations consisted of students and employees from 21 HEIs in South Africa where contact teaching occurs. For the purpose of the cross-sectional study an ‘anonymous HIV survey with informed consent’ was used. The study comprised an HIV prevalence study, KABP survey, a qualitative study, and a risk assessment.

Each HEI was stratified by campus and faculty, whereupon clusters of students and staff were randomly selected. Self-administered questionnaires were used to obtain demographic, socio-economic and behavioural data. The HIV status of participants was determined by laboratory testing of dry blood spots obtained by finger pricks. The qualitative study consisted of focus group discussions and key informant interviews at each HEI.

Ethical approval was provided by the UFS Ethics Committee. Participation in all research was voluntary and written informed consent was obtained from all participants. Fieldwork for the study was conducted between September 2008 and February 2009.

A total of 1 004 people participated at the UFS, including the Main and the Qwaqwa campuses, comprising 659 students, 85 academic staff and 256 administration/service staff. The overall response rate was 75,6%.

The main findings of the study were:

HIV prevalence among students was 3,5%, 0% among academics, 1,3% among administrative staff, and 12,4% among service staff. “This might not be a true reflection of the actual prevalence of HIV at the UFS, as the sample was relatively small,” said Heideman. However, she went on to say that if we really want to show our commitment towards fighting this disease at our institution a number of problem areas should be addressed:

  • Around half of all students under the age of 20 have had sex before and this increased to almost three-quarters of students older than 20.

     
  • The majority of staff and a third of students had ever been tested for HIV.

     
  • More than 50% of students drink more than once per week and 44% of students reported being drunk in the past month. Qualitative data suggests that binge drinking over weekends and at campus ‘bashes’ is an area of concern.

Recommendations of the study:

  • Emphasis should be on increased knowledge of sexual risk behaviours, in particular those involving a high turnover of sexual partners and multiple sexual partnerships. Among students, emphasis should further be placed on staying HIV negative throughout university study.

     
  • The distribution of condoms on all campuses should be expanded, systematised and monitored. If resistance is encountered, attempts should be made to engage and educate dissenting institutional members about the importance of condom use in HIV prevention.

     
  • The relationship between alcohol misuse and pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), HIV and AIDS needs to be made known, and there should be a drive to curb high levels of student drinking, promote non-alcohol oriented forms of recreation, and improve regulation of alcohol consumption at university-sponsored “bashes”.

     
  • There is need to reach out to students and staff who have undergone HIV testing and who know their HIV status, but do not access or benefit from support services. Because many HIV-positive students and staff are not receiving any kind of support, resources should be directed towards the development of HIV care services, including support groups.

Says Heideman, “If we really want to prove that we are serious about an HIV/AIDS-free campus, these results are a good starting point. It definitely provides us with a strong basis from which to work.” Since the study was done in 2008 the UFS has committed itself to a more comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS. The current proposed ‘HIV/AIDS Institutional response and strategic plan’, builds and expands on work that has been done before, the lessons learned from previous interventions, and a thorough study of good practices at other universities.

Media Release
Issued by: Mangaliso Radebe
Assistant Director: Media Liaison
Tel: 051 401 2828
Cell: 078 460 3320
E-mail: radebemt@ufs.ac.za  
10 May 2010

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