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Budget Speech Opinion 2025
Dr Ambrosé du Plessis and Terrance Molobela, Lecturers in the Department of Public Administration and Management, University of the Free State.

Opinion article by Dr Ambrosé du Plessis and Terrance Molobela, lecturers from the Department of Public Administration and Management, University of the Free State.


The mechanistic administrative cog stemming from the sixth administration, through which policy development and implementation took place, has created a false sense of reality regarding the African National Congress (ANC)’s authoritative position in South Africa’s political landscape. The notion that the ANC remains the central political force in the country is increasingly proving to be a fallacy, especially in the face of the changing dynamics within the so-called Government of National Unity (GNU). Even though President Cyril Ramaphosa dutifully signed off on key legislative acts such as the National Health Insurance (NHI), the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA), and the Expropriation acts, the ANC, and indeed the broader GNU, have grossly underestimated the complexities of coalition politics.

One of the clearest illustrations of this miscalculation was the latest budget ‘negotiations’, which exposed the growing fractures within the governing coalition. With the budget tabled just two hours before presentation, it became evident that the coalition parties – especially the ANC – are facing a harsh political reality. In a move that has shocked GNU parties, the decision to raise value-added tax (VAT) by 2% has turned into a bone of contention. This cutthroat measure, aimed at generating an additional R58 billion, has sparked fierce opposition from within the very government it seeks to support. The bitter VAT debate has led to a near standstill in the budget process, with some GNU parties staunchly opposing it, while others view it as a necessary evil.


New can of worms

The proposal to raise VAT is indicative of a deeper issue. It is, quite frankly, a regressive measure in an economy already battling a cost-of-living crisis. Raising VAT disproportionately impacts the lower and middle classes, who spend a higher percentage of their income on consumption. This move is naïve at best. VAT might raise substantial sums, but it does little to stimulate the economy or promote productivity, both of which are sorely needed to grow South Africa’s GDP and reverse the country’s economic downturn. At this moment in time, the country cannot afford to further burden a shrinking tax base.

In addition, the VAT conundrum has opened a new can of worms. The Democratic Alliance’s (DA) publicly proposed budget goes beyond the initial 2% VAT increase, challenging the secrecy with which the failed budget was concluded. More importantly, it questions the political and financial ideological foundation on which the initial budget was compiled by the ANC, led by Minister of Finance Enoch Godongwana. There can be no doubt that the DA’s shadow budget, particularly its cost-containment measures, has thrown a spanner in the works of a deep administrative state. At this juncture, the lingering question is – can the true Minister of Finance please step forward? With various proposed budgets from the GNU parties, one can only wonder if the GNU is now officially facing a Pinocchio dilemma. This identity crisis emerged when the ANC indicated that it would now turn to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – who also opposes the 2% VAT increase – to approve the budget, although the EFF recently rejected the call for negotiations with the ANC and considered it a general discussion. From this stance, it is clear that the coalition game will be played both within and outside the borders of the GNU.

One cannot help but ponder how divergent political ideologies and principles are affecting government expenditure and revenue collection. Gone are the days when the ANC held a dominant, almost unquestionable position in government, able to dictate the terms of the national budget. Today, the ANC's reduced majority has forced it into an awkward position of compromise and negotiation, with the Minister of Finance increasingly serving as a ceremonial figure rather than an authoritative decision-maker. In years past, the State of the Nation Address (SONA) and the subsequent budget speech were seamless events under ANC leadership. But now the budget process has become an all-consuming political battleground, with ideological differences and party interests shaping every decision.

GNU a ‘death sentence’

The ANC's once-solidified grasp on the country's governance is now being tested in ways the party never anticipated. The ruling coalition is no longer a harmonious entity, but a group of political adversaries forced into uneasy alliances for the sake of governance. The impact of this fractured cooperation is glaringly evident in the stalling of critical national decisions such as the budget. What was once a party-centred process where consensus was driven by a unified political party, has now become a multi-party endeavour marked by negotiation, delay, and endless political wrangling.

Reflecting on the experience of the 1996 Government of National Unity led by Nelson Mandela, one sees a stark contrast. Despite hostilities within the tripartite alliance, that government was still able to implement policies and drive the country forward. However, the current GNU coalition partners have yet to demonstrate a similar level of cooperation and trust. In fact, the words of former Deputy President FW de Klerk seem eerily prophetic today. In his 1996 resignation statement, De Klerk described the GNU as a ‘death sentence’ for a meaningful government consensus. He feared that continued participation in the coalition would weaken the National Party’s influence and undermine democratic governance.

In many ways, these words echo the current state of the GNU. The budget process has become a metaphor for a government on the brink of collapse. Consultation among the political parties within the GNU has become a source of paralysis rather than progress. The government’s inability to align itself on critical issues such as the national budget, which totals more than R2 trillion, raises serious questions about its ability to move forward.

The so-called marriage of inconvenience between the coalition partners appears increasingly centred on securing positions rather than creating policies to address the pressing needs of South Africa’s citizens. The budget, a document that should have been a focal point of discussion since the formation of the coalition, has been delayed until the 11th hour. This delay in addressing the country’s fiscal needs points to a broader failure within the GNU. The South African economy, already battered by years of stagnation and underperformance, cannot afford further dithering.

The contemporary GNU, much like the former one in 1996, may have reached its breaking point. The promise of multi-party democracy and consensus-based governance is being undermined by the very factions that have come together in the name of unity. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the continued negotiations around the budget have become a form of political ‘death row’ for the current administration, with no clear path forward. As South Africa teeters on the edge of a political and economic crisis, the time for a new direction, grounded in pragmatism and focused on national interests, has never been more urgent. As South Africa stands at a critical juncture, with the deadline of 12 March 2025 rapidly approaching, the political landscape is poised for a moment of truth. Reports have indicated that the cabinet has reached an agreement on the finality of the budget, but conflicting statements from political leaders, particularly from the DA, suggest that this agreement is not yet a certainty. DA leader John Steenhuisen has publicly declared that no final agreement has been reached and that the parties are still working towards a resolution. For the country, the stakes could not be higher.

This raises significant questions about the future of coalition governance and the state of South Africa's fragile political economy. Several plausible scenarios could unfold, each with distinct consequences for the political stability and economic viability of the nation.

Scenario 1: A unified agreement – A lifeline for the political economy

In the first scenario, we imagine that the cabinet's agreement is genuine, aimed at averting risks to public confidence and the broader market. If the market-driven partners within the GNU recognise the overwhelming importance of a stable budget, they may choose to align their interests. With political stability hanging in the balance, the realisation may set in that South Africa is simply ‘too big to fail.’ This would, in theory, prevent a collapse into chaos, as the GNU partners, acknowledging the nation's susceptibility to political upheaval, would avoid creating conditions for widespread instability.

While this scenario seems like the ideal outcome, history suggests that political cooperation within the GNU has often been fraught with difficulty. The question is whether these partners can truly put national interests before political rivalries.

Scenario 2: The ANC’s secret deal – A recipe for distrust?

Alternatively, there is the possibility that the African National Congress (ANC) has reached a clandestine agreement with the EFF behind the backs of their coalition partners. This scenario would fracture the GNU, erode trust, and create a toxic environment of distrust in coalition governance. If the ANC manages to secure its hold on power, it risks alienating the markets, which would likely lead to a downward economic spiral. The longer this instability persists, the more vulnerable the country will become to a potentially catastrophic collapse in investor confidence.

Scenario 3: DA’s contradiction – The death of coalition unity

In a third possible scenario, the DA contradicts the agreement reached by the cabinet, exposing the extent of disunity within the GNU. This situation would further highlight the lack of trust among coalition partners, and the DA might find itself either paralysed within the coalition, or removed entirely, or even decide to withdraw from the GNU. This shift would trigger an intense debate about South Africa’s continued political economic stability.

South Africa’s economy, already vulnerable to shocks, would find itself in even deeper turmoil if this scenario were to play out. The markets would respond negatively, and the ripple effect would undoubtedly extend to the lives of everyday South Africans.

The real impact on South Africans

Regardless of which scenario unfolds, one thing is certain: the consequences for South Africa’s citizens will be profound. The allocation of funds to government institutions, provinces, and municipalities is likely to be severely affected by any political instability. Without a clear and stable budget, public services will suffer, leading to disruption in the functioning of provincial governments and municipalities. This, in turn, would delay public spending, putting vital services at risk and exacerbating the inequalities, poverty, and unemployment that already plague the country.

News Archive

Weideman focuses on misconceptions with regard to survival of Afrikaans
2006-05-19

From the left are Prof Magda Fourie (Vice-Rector: Academic Planning), Prof Gerhardt de Klerk (Dean: Faculty of the Humanities), George Weideman and Prof Bernard  Odendaal (acting head of the UFS  Department of Afrikaans and Dutch, German and French). 
Photo (Stephen Collett):

Weideman focuses on misconceptions with regard to survival of Afrikaans

On the survival of a language a persistent and widespread misconception exists that a “language will survive as long as people speak the language”. This argument ignores the higher functions of a language and leaves no room for the personal and historic meaning of a language, said the writer George Weideman.

He delivered the D.F. Malherbe Memorial Lecture organised by the Department Afrikaans at the University of the Free State (UFS). Dr. Weideman is a retired lecturer and now full-time writer. In his lecture on the writer’s role and responsibility with regard to language, he also focused on the language debate at the University of Stellenbosch (US).

He said the “as-long-as-it-is spoken” misconception ignores the characteristics and growth of literature and other cultural phenomena. Constitutional protection is also not a guarantee. It will not stop a language of being reduced to a colloquial language in which the non-standard form will be elevated to the norm. A language only grows when it standard form is enriched by non-standard forms; not when its standard form withers. The growth or deterioration of a language is seen in the growth or decline in its use in higher functions. The less functions a language has, the smaller its chance to survive.

He said Afrikaans speaking people are credulous and have misplaced trust. It shows in their uncritical attitude with regard to the shifts in university policies, university management and teaching practices. Afrikaners have this credulity perhaps because they were spoilt by white supremacy, or because the political liberation process did not free them from a naïve and slavish trust in government.

If we accept that a university is a kind of barometer for the position of a language, then the institutionalised second placing of Afrikaans at most tertiary institutions is not a good sign for the language, he said.

An additional problem is the multiplying effect with, for instance, education students. If there is no need for Afrikaans in schools, there will also be no  need for Afrikaans at universities, and visa versa.

The tolerance factor of Afrikaans speaking people is for some reasons remarkably high with regard to other languages – and more specifically English. With many Afrikaans speaking people in the post-apartheid era it can be ascribed to their guilt about Afrikaans. With some coloured and mostly black Afrikaans speaking people it can be ascribed to the continued rejection of Afrikaans because of its negative connotation with apartheid – even when Afrikaans is the home language of a large segment of the previously oppressed population.

He said no one disputes the fact that universities play a changing role in a transformed society. The principle of “friendliness” towards other languages does not apply the other way round. It is general knowledge that Afrikaans is, besides isiZulu and isiXhosa, the language most spoken by South Africans.

It is typical of an imperialistic approach that the campaigners for a language will be accused of emotional involvement, of sentimentality, of longing for bygone days, of an unwillingness to focus on the future, he said.

He said whoever ignores the emotional aspect of a language, knows nothing about a language. To ignore the emotional connection with a language, leads to another misconception: That the world will be a better place without conflict if the so-called “small languages” disappear because “nationalism” and “language nationalism” often move closely together. This is one of the main reasons why Afrikaans speaking people are still very passive with regard to the Anglicising process: They are not “immune” to the broad influence that promotes English.

It is left to those who use Afrikaans to fight for the language. This must not take place in isolation. Writers and publishers must find more ways to promote Afrikaans.

Some universities took the road to Anglicision: the US and University of Pretoria need to be referred to, while there is still a future for Afrikaans at the Northwest University and the UFS with its parallel-medium policies. Continued debate is necessary.

It is unpreventable that the protest over what is happening to Afrikaans and the broad Afrikaans speaking community must take on a stronger form, he said.

 

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