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Dr Solomon Chibaya
Dr Solomon Chibaya is a lecturer in the Department of Education Management, Policy, and Comparative Education at the University of the Free State (UFS).

Opinion article by Dr Solomon Chibaya, Faculty of Education, University of the Free State.


One of the most humbling intellectual reckonings occurs when reality defies even the most well-reasoned predictions, compelling one to acknowledge misjudgement. Some may call it swallowing the humble pie, but in the realm of law and governance, it serves as a reminder of the unpredictable nature of socio-political dynamics. When the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Bill was signed into law, I anticipated a legal battleground - a flood of court challenges from those vehemently opposed to its provisions. I was wrong. I also foresaw fractures within the Government of National Unity (GNU), expecting tensions to manifest in visible discord. Wrong again. The fierce contestation promised by opponents of the Bill and the Act has, thus far, amounted to little more than rhetorical smoke without the anticipated fire. The impassioned declarations of legal warfare that once filled public discourse have not translated into the courtroom the battles as I had envisaged. This turn of events is not only fascinating but also challenges broader assumptions about resistance and contestation in contemporary policymaking.

Why have legal challenges not materialised?

To understand the absence of legal challenges against the BELA Act, one must retrace its origins - its conception, development, and the rigorous debates that shaped it. The BELA Bill was first drafted in 2013, following the African National Congress’s (ANC) 2012 elective conference, which mandated amendments to the South African Schools Act (SASA), 84 of 1996. At its core, the Bill was anchored in the transformative principles of the Constitution of South Africa, serving as a legislative instrument to advance equity, inclusivity, and equality in the education system. Given its constitutional foundation, one must ask: who could successfully litigate against a law built on such unassailable pillars of justice and democratic values? The very essence of the Act is woven into the broader framework of South Africa’s post-apartheid transformation, making any legal opposition not just a challenge to policy but a confrontation with the constitutional ideals that underpin the nation’s democracy.

Constitutional imperative for inclusivity

Any legal challenge against the BELA Act, particularly concerning language and admission policies, would ultimately be rendered unconstitutional. The Act is not merely a legislative adjustment; it is a transformative mechanism that promotes linguistic diversity, broadens access to education, and fosters inclusivity in school admissions and employment. These reforms align with the constitutional vision of democratic participation and equitable opportunity, ensuring that mother-tongue instruction evolves alongside a more integrated and representative education system. Who, then, could successfully contest a model that upholds these fundamental democratic values?

At the heart of the Act’s implementation lies a collaborative governance framework, where School Governing Bodies (SGBs) comprising parents, educators, and non-educator staff, work in tandem with the Department of Basic Education at both provincial and national levels to shape policies that best serve their schools. Rather than diminishing the role of SGBs, the Act strengthens their mandate within a broader, constitutionally guided educational ecosystem. Any resistance to this cooperative approach would not only be a defiance of participatory governance but also an attempt to obstruct the very principles upon which South Africa’s democratic and inclusive education system is built.

A masterstroke in legal foresight

A closer examination of the BELA Act reveals a legislative framework meticulously designed to pre-empt legal battles by embedding arbitration and mediation as the primary mechanisms for resolving disputes. In the event of conflicts between SGBs or their representatives, such as FEDSAS, and the Department of Basic Education, the Act prescribes alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, effectively curtailing costly and protracted litigation. Beyond its procedural elegance, the Act reflects a jurisprudential evolution, drawing heavily from precedents set by past court rulings and sealing the loopholes that once rendered the South African Schools Act (SASA) vulnerable to legal contestation. By doing so, the BELA Act assumes the character of case law, informed by judicial scrutiny and legislative refinement.

With such a robust legal foundation, the anticipated flood of litigation against the Act has failed to materialise. Could I have miscalculated again? Highly improbable. In a climate of economic volatility and geopolitical realignment, financial prudence is non-negotiable, and litigation remains an expensive and time-consuming endeavour. Even the most relentless legal advocates must recognise the futility of challenging a law so deeply embedded in the constitutional ethos of the Republic of South Africa (1996). The once-fiery calls for litigation have seemingly dissipated into a quiet acknowledgement of legal inevitability. 

News Archive

Academic delivers inaugural lecture on South African foreign policy
2007-08-06

 

In her inaugural lecture Prof. Heidi Hudson from the Department of Political Sciences, focused on the impact that Pan-Africanist sentiments have had on South Africa’s foreign policy. She also put the resulting contradictions and ambiguities into context. At her inaugural lecture were, from the left: Proff. Frederick Fourie (Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the UFS), Heidi Hudson, Engela Pretorius (Vice-Dean: Faculty of The Humanities) and Daan Wessels (Research Associate in the Department of Political Science).
Photo: Stephen Collett

Academic delivers inaugural lecture on South African foreign policy

“We are committed to full participation as an equal partner … opposed to any efforts which might seek to project South Africa as some kind of superpower on our continent. … the people of Africa share a common destiny and must therefore … address their challenges … as a united force...” (Mbeki 1998:198-199).

Prof. Heidi Hudson from the Department of Political Science referred to this statement made by president Mbeki (made at the opening of the OAU Conference of Ministers of Information in 1995) when she delivered her inaugural lecture on the topic: South African foreign policy: The politics of Pan-Africanism and pragmatism.

One of the questions she asked is: “Can the South African state deliver democracy and welfare at home while simultaneously creating a stable, rules-based African community?”

She answers: “South Africa needs to reflect more critically and honestly on the dualism inherent in its ideological assumptions regarding relations with Africa. South Africa will always be expected by some to play a leadership role in Africa. At the moment, South Africa’s desire to be liked is hampering its role as leader of the continent.”

In her lecture she highlighted the ideological underpinnings and manifestations of South Africa’s foreign policy. Throughout she alluded to the risks associated with single-mindedly following an ideologically driven foreign policy. She emphasised that domestic or national interests are the victims in this process.

Prof. Hudson offers three broad options for South Africa to consider:

  • The Predator – the selfish bully promoting South African economic interest.
  • Mr Nice Guy – the non-hegemonic partner of the African boys club, multilaterally pursuing a pivotal but not dominant role.
  • The Hegemon - South Africa driving regional integration according to its values and favouring some African countries over others, and with checks and balances by civil society.

She chooses option three of hegemony. “Politically correct research views hegemony as bad and partnership as good. This is a romanticised notion – the two are not mutually exclusive,” she said.

However, she states that there have to be prerequisites to control the exercise of power. “The promotion of a counter-hegemon, such as Nigeria, is necessary. Nigeria has been more effective in some respects than South Africa in establishing its leadership, particularly in West Africa. Also needed is that government should be checked by civil society to avoid it sinking into authoritarianism. The case of business and labour coming to an agreement over the HIV/Aids issue is a positive example which illustrates that government cannot ignore civil society. But much more needs to be done in this regard. South Africa must also be very careful in how it uses its aid and should focus potential aid and development projects more explicitly in terms of promoting political stability,” she said.

Prof. Hudson said: “It is also questionable whether Mbeki’s Afro-centrism has in fact promoted the interests of ordinary citizens across Africa. Instead, elite interests in some countries have benefited. But ultimately, the single most important cost is the damage done to the moral code and ethical principles on which the South African Constitution and democracy is founded.

“In the end we all lose out. More pragmatism and less ideology in our relations within Africa may just be what are needed,” she said.

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