On the morning of 11 September 2022, the tailings dam at Jagersfontein collapsed, releasing between five and six million cubic metres of mining slurry into the surrounding area. Two people were killed, one person was never found, about 200 homes were damaged, and roughly 1 600 hectares of agricultural land were contaminated. Residents received no official warning. Many only realised what was happening when the wave of waste was already moving towards their homes.
According to
Prof Lochner Marais, principal investigator on the project, the central message is that "disasters should not become isolated events from which institutions learn little".
Prof Deanna Kemp of the University of Queensland adds that "documenting every disaster supports learning and risk reduction".
Prof Vasu Reddy, Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research, Innovation & Postgraduate Studies), echoes these views: “The lessons from Jagersfontein remind us that governance failures can be as consequential as technical failures. Effective early warning systems are not defined by technology alone, but by whether they reach and protect communities.”
The University of the Free State’s collaboration with the University of Queensland demonstrates the value of international research partnerships in addressing complex societal challenges. Universities have a vital responsibility to generate evidence that informs policy, preparedness, and public accountability,” says Prof Reddy.
Three years of research, six urgent lessons
The brief,
Let's learn from disasters: Six lessons from the Jagersfontein tailings dam disaster, draws on a four-year collaborative research project between the University of the Free State and the University of Queensland, supported by the
Australian Research Council. Grounded in extensive interviews with survivors and institutional stakeholders, it examines the disaster through the experiences of those who lived through it as well as the systems that failed them.
According to Prof Lochner Marais, principal investigator and researcher in the Centre for Development Support, the central message is straightforward: "Disasters should not become isolated events from which institutions learn little.”
His colleague, Prof Deanna Kemp from the University of Queensland, makes a similar case. "Documenting every disaster supports learning and risk reduction," she says.
The researchers argue that the conditions leading to the catastrophe were decades in the making. The Jagersfontein mine closed in 1971 but reopened in 2010 to reprocess historical mine waste. Over time, ownership transfers, technological changes, evolving operational practices, and fragmented oversight created a governance environment in which risk steadily accumulated.
Satellite imagery identified progressive wall movement and deformation around the tailings facility as early as 2019. That information was available to the mining company and the Department of Water and Sanitation. It was never communicated to the community.
Governance, not geology, is the deeper problem
The official investigation report referred to the term ‘failure’ more than 400 times. The word ‘disaster’ appeared only four times. To the researchers, that distinction matters. It reveals how disasters are often framed as engineering events rather than broader social and governance failures.
The first lesson of the policy brief is that tailings storage facility disasters emerge from long-term governance problems, not technical malfunctions alone. While engineering weaknesses played a significant role in the Jagersfontein collapse, it unfolded in a context marked by regulatory gaps, ownership changes, inadequate oversight, and limited accountability. Technical explanations, the researchers argue, tell only part of the story.
The second lesson follows naturally. Detecting danger is not the same as reducing risk.
Warning signs existed. Regulatory reports identified concerns. Miners raised questions. Community members noticed changes. Yet the institutions responsible for acting on that information failed to connect monitoring systems with communication systems and emergency planning.
The brief argues that an effective early warning system must combine risk knowledge, monitoring, communication, and response capacity. At Jagersfontein, these functions remained fragmented. Information remained within technical and regulatory processes rather than reaching the people whose lives depended on it.
"An early warning system that never reaches a community is not an early warning system," the report effectively suggests. The lesson is clear: data only becomes useful when it prompts action.
Communities as partners, not afterthoughts
A third lesson highlights the importance of community participation. Residents and mine workers noticed warning signs and voiced concerns before the disaster, but these concerns did not translate into preventative action. The researchers argue that communities should play an active role in disaster risk reduction through accessible risk information, reporting mechanisms, evacuation planning, and emergency drills.
The fourth lesson draws on what researchers call ‘disaster scenes’, detailed reconstructions of events based on survivor testimony. These accounts reveal how people interpreted risks, navigated escape routes, and relied on neighbours when formal emergency systems failed. At Jagersfontein, residents effectively became their own first responders. The brief argues that future emergency planning should incorporate this lived experience instead of relying solely on technical assessments and institutional procedures.
Recovery that is not recovery
Perhaps the most sobering lesson concerns recovery. Four years after the collapse, many households continue to live with unresolved losses. While some reconstruction has occurred, residents report unfinished repairs, lost assets, economic hardship, and reduced spending on essential needs such as food and healthcare. The researchers argue that recovery should be measured not by the number of houses rebuilt but by whether people's livelihoods, security, dignity, and social well-being have truly been restored.
The final lesson is that disasters must be documented and continuously reflected upon. Official investigations often focus on technical causes and legal compliance, yet they can miss the experiences of affected communities and the institutional weaknesses that allow risks to escalate. The policy brief argues that documenting survivor experiences, recovery outcomes, and governance failures is essential to preventing future disasters.
A national warning
The significance of the policy brief stretches far beyond a single Free State town.
South Africa is home to hundreds of active and inactive tailings storage facilities. Many are linked to decades of mining activity, changing ownership structures, and varying levels of oversight. The researchers argue that the lessons from Jagersfontein should inform disaster risk reduction, mine governance, environmental regulation, and recovery planning across the country.
Among their recommendations are stronger lifecycle regulation of tailings facilities, better integration of monitoring data into public early warning systems, greater transparency in risk information, meaningful community participation in disaster planning, and independent oversight of compensation and recovery programmes.
Four years after one of South Africa's most significant mining disasters, the mud may have settled, but the questions remain. The researchers' warning is clear: unless institutions learn from Jagersfontein, the next disaster may already be in the making.
“Recovery should be measured not only by infrastructure restored, but by livelihoods rebuilt, dignity protected, and trust renewed. Research-led policy briefs such as this help translate academic insight into practical solutions for communities and decision-makers. Jagersfontein is a powerful reminder that sustainable development requires transparency, accountability, and proactive governance. The most important lesson from Jagersfontein is simple: institutions must learn, adapt, and act,” remarked Prof Reddy.
Read the full policy brief here