08 July 2026 | Story Dr Ambrosé Ray du Plessis | Photo Supplied
Dr Ambrose du Plessis
Dr Ambrosé Ray Du Plessis, Senior Lecturer, Department Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State.

Opinion article by Dr Ambrosé Ray du Plessis, Senior Lecturer, Department Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State 

 


 

The local government elections are set to take place on 4 November 2026. Thise elections are expected to produce a significant number of hung councils. In other words, few political parties are likely to achieve 50 plus 1 percent to govern outright. In this context poor voter turnout may once again become the deciding factor.

Voter turnout has fluctuated over time. In the 2011 local elections, turnout stood at 51.8%. In 2016 it rose to 58%, before dropping sharply to 45% in 2021. This downward trend is also reflected in the 2024 national and provincial elections, where turnout reached a historic low of 58.64%, and is expected to continue into 2026.

The 2026 local elections will be a major test of South Africa’s 32-year democracy. Increasingly, voters are questioning not just political parties, but democracy itself. Liberal democracy is unfolding differently from what thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama once predicted. 

Liberal democracy is no longer widely accepted as the inevitable end point of political development. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2024) reports continued democratic decline globally: only 25 countries are classified as full democracies, 46 as flawed democracies, 36 as hybrid regimes, and 60 as authoritarian regimes. What is emerging is a mix of political ideologies in which democratic institutions coexist with increasingly authoritarian practices. States may retain elections and formal institutions while steadily weakening democratic substance.

South Africa reflects this trend. The Afrobarometer 2025 survey shows that 70% of citizens are dissatisfied with the way democracy functions. This signals a deep legitimacy crisis. It also creates ungoverned or contested spaces where citizens become open to alternative “new ideas” of governance outside formal democratic channels.

As the campaigning season begins, political parties appear focused on elections but are poorly prepared for coalition governance. This reflects the decline or failure of pre-election coordination efforts. The reluctance to negotiate coalition arrangements before elections creates serious risks for policy stability and service delivery in local government.

Instead, parties tend to wait for the 14-day post-election period to form governments. This approach risks further weakening already fragile public trust. Trust in national government has fallen from 64% in 2004 to 19% in 2025, parliament from 65% to 20%, and local government from 55% to 18% over the same period (HSRC, 2026).

These trends point to a deeper problem: reactive politics is eroding democratic legitimacy. Democracy depends not only on institutions, but on public confidence in those institutions. When trust collapses, governance becomes unstable and unpredictable.

 

Conclusion: A warning, not a prediction

The 2026 local government elections should be treated as a warning sign, not a routine democratic event. Analysis of the 2024 national and provincial elections voting district results shows that many municipalities – particularly metropolitan areas – are entering an era of fragmented electoral competition in which outright majorities are becoming less certain. While national results cannot directly predict local outcomes, voting patterns already provide clear signals of where coalition governments are becoming structurally more likely.

In KwaZulu-Natal, where the MK Party secured 45.35% of the provincial vote in 2024, the electoral landscape has already been fundamentally reshaped. These patterns point towards coalition governments becoming increasingly common.

Yet political parties continue to treat coalition formation as an afterthought rather than a core component of electoral strategy. Much of the current approach assumes that governance negotiations only begin once results are declared, despite clear evidence that voter behaviour already signals fragmented mandates. What is currently required – but largely missing – is the development of parallel structures within political parties: dedicated campaigning teams focused on electoral mobilisation, and dedicated negotiation teams tasked with post-election coalition design and governance planning.

Without this institutional separation, parties will remain tactically focused on winning votes while strategically unprepared for governing outcomes. The danger is unprepared coalition government. Without early planning and realistic engagement with voter behaviour, South Africa risks unstable councils, weakened service delivery, and further erosion of public trust in local democracy.


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